# THE GREEK WORLD 479-323 BC

SIMON HORNBLOWER



FOURTH EDITION

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**Simon Hornblower** is a Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He was previously Professor of Classics and Grote Professor of Ancient History at University College London. He is a Fellow of the British Academy. His many publications in Greek history and classical civilization include a Commentary on Thucydides in three volumes (1991–2008). He is now working on commentaries on Herodotus books 5 and 6, and on Lykophron's *Alexandra*.

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Fourth Edition

*Simon Hornblower*

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## Acknowledgements

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# PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE FIRST EDITION

This book is dedicated to Hector Catling, Director of the British School at Athens (BSA). By inviting me to lecture in 1979 and 1981 to courses held at the BSA on the Greek city-state, jointly organized by the BSA and the Department of Education and Science, and attended by sixth-form teachers, he made me think about many of the topics discussed in the present book. He also, both at Athens and on the sites we visited (in Attica and the neighbouring city-states), taught me much not just about Mycenaean Greece – his own speciality – but about Greece of all periods.

I am grateful to the general editor of this series, Fergus Millar, for his original invitation to write this book, and for encouragement and comments since. The book has been much improved by his general and particular criticisms, made at the penultimate stage. My wife Jane has also read and commented very usefully. John Roberts of Eton College read a draft of Chapters 1–3, for which I am also grateful, as also to Susan Sherwin-White and Robin Seager for comments on particular chapters and to Robert Parker for reading the proofs.

I have frequently, too frequently it may be felt, referred to other things I have written, especially to my book *Mausolus*, Oxford, 1982, my additions to the *Athenian Empire* LACTOR edn 3 (1984), and my forthcoming chapters (iii and xi[a]) on Persia and on Asia Minor in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, edn 2, vol. vi. I have also drawn on a forthcoming (1985) book of mine on *Thucydides* (London) [actually Hornblower 1987]. The reason is simply to save space by not repeating references or arguments given more fully in those places.

Simon Hornblower
*Oriel College Oxford*
*21 February 1983*

# PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

This is a completely rewritten version of a book which is now nearly twenty years old, and which inaugurated the series in which it appeared, a series which otherwise really got going only in and after 1993. Since 1983 there have been two reprintings (as I myself modestly and correctly called them, see *The Greek World* 1991: x) of my book, in 1985 and 1991. For those reprintings, including that of 1991 although the dust-jacket more ambitiously called it a 'Revised Edition', I was not able to make more than minimal changes: that is, to correct outright errors of typography or fact, to make small additions to the notes where space permitted, and to up-date the bibliographies at the end. Nevertheless, I have called the present book a 'third edition' because the 1991 version is referred to as a 'second edition' by, for instance, the authors of the volumes in the present series which cover the periods before and after my book (Osborne 1996a: xx; Shipley 2000: 504). But in fact this is the first properly new edition since the original publication.

1983 was before the days of word-processors, so five years ago I started writing the book all over again but using disks. The work of rewriting has taken five years, on and off, a period lengthened by a move of job from Oxford to London. The main changes are:

1 The inclusion of an entirely new chapter, on Argos (Chapter 7), with consequential renumbering of the subject-matter of the old Chapters 7–18 as 8–19.
2 The replacement of the old chapter on the Peloponnesian War by an almost entirely new one. This reflects my own work since 1983 on this topic, particularly in its Thucydidean aspect which is after all and inevitably the dominant one (see Hornblower 1991, 1992a and 1996).
3 The revision – sometimes light but often involving wholesale deletion, addition and rewriting – of all the other chapters. Since 1991, there have appeared the two volumes of the new *Cambridge Ancient History* which deal with the subject-matter of this book: vol. 5 (1992), which covers the fifth century BC with an explicitly Athenian focus, and vol. 6 (1994) which ostensibly covers only the fourth century but which actually includes a set of regional chapters reaching back to the fifth

as well. This has enabled me to lighten some of the bibliographical references, so as to compensate for the increase in other such references due to the ever-increasing flow of publications needing to be taken account of. Similarly I have often referred to the third (1996) edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, where authoritative articles with good bibliographies can be found, and which reduces the need for reference to more inaccessible works.

It ought not to need saying, but I have not aimed to cite everything relevant that has been written after 1991 or indeed 1983, but only those works which either strike me as specially helpful from the student point of view or have caused me to change my mind.

4 The adoption of a 'Harvard' system of reference, as opposed to the mad system insisted on by Methuen, the predecessor of Routledge, in the early 1980s. This carries with it the need for a full, alphabetized bibliography (pp. 348–70). But note that I have cited chapters in the new *CAH*, and entries in the new *OCD* (see (3) above), in full, with volume and chapter number, or with author and name of entry, rather than as elsewhere giving author, date and page numbers.
5 The substitution of 'arabic' for 'Roman' numerals wherever possible, especially in the giving of ancient references. Teaching and marking experience suggests that student ability to handle Roman numerals is sharply in decline, and it is useless to pretend otherwise.
6 The inclusion of illustrations. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. If any proper acknowledgement has not been made, we would invite copyright holders to inform us of the oversight.
7 The inclusion of subheadings within chapters. This is not only desirable in itself (see below on clarity) but brings the book into line with its successors in the series.
8 The addition of more direct quotations from the ancient sources, especially in Chapter 18 (Philip).
9 One other change is worth commenting on. Since the 1980s I have been converted to the view that we should write of (for instance) 'the Spartans' rather than 'Sparta' when we mean not the place but the decision-making elite human beings there. This can lead and probably has led to clumsier English sentences. But it has advantages which I hope will be agreed to outweigh this defect. The clumsier locution not only eliminates the need or excuse for inappropriate use of feminine words such as 'she' and 'her', it also reminds us to avoid over-simple and monolithic assumptions about decision-making. (I give a bad modern example below, p. 334 n.27.) I have retained 'Persia' sometimes because it was ruled by an autocrat. It would be nice to be able to add that my new preference can be justified by the practice of the ancient Greeks themselves, who spoke – or so I was taught long ago when learning to write Greek prose – of decisions being made by 'the Athenians' not by 'Athens'. But this is one of those

> 'rules' one has to unlearn, because Thucydides himself is quite capable of saying for instance that 'Stagiros' (not 'the Stagirans') revolted from the Athenians (4. 88. 2).

Next, I have a confession of inconsistency. This is not the usual apology for the mixed spelling of Greek names and places. This book is the usual botched compromise, with 'Thucydides' but 'Kleon', and so on, and there is nothing new to be said about that. The inconsistency is one less often addressed in book prefaces (though see Davies 1993: 275 for a policy statement similar to mine): it concerns the language of the modern books and articles which I cite. Textbooks, not just those in English, tend to refer to modern works written in the language of the author, or rather of his or her expected student readers. Nowadays in my experience students in the UK (and I think also the USA) cannot normally cope with any modern language other than English: appalling but true. Accordingly my book, which is primarily intended for such student readers, cites works in English for the most part, although this insularity may seem particularly churlish given that the 1983 edition has been translated into Spanish and Italian. But (and this is the inconsistency) I do cite works in other languages where the work in question is absolutely outstanding. Examples from the past ten years are a German book on the Second Athenian Confederacy (Dreher 1995) and a French one on Asia Minor in the classical period (Debord 1999).

Finally, what have I tried to do in this book? In its 2002 incarnation it is being reissued, more or less simultaneously, by the Folio Society as part of a four-volume History of Greece, together with two books on the archaic period by A. R. Burn (*Lyric Age*; *Persia and the Greeks*) and F. W. Walbank's *Hellenistic World*. (All these will appear under titles different from their original ones.) I have myself written prefaces to the four books individually, and also a general introduction to the whole set. In the Folio Society preface to my own book I explain – partly by reference to the influence of one of my graduate teachers P. M. Fraser – that one of my main aims in 1983 was, as it still is, to bring out regional diversity (this was true not only of the first half of the book but more generally I hope), and to get away from the dominance of Athens (and Sparta) in the modern secondary literature. I agree with and applaud some of the polemical remarks of Roger Brock and Steve Hodkinson in their introduction to a very welcome collection of essays on what they call 'alternatives to Athens'. But I would like to think that my own 1983 textbook did not suffer from the Athenocentricity which they detect in 'basic courses and textbooks on Greek political history' (Brock and Hodkinson 2000: 5), and I hope that with an additional regional chapter – that on Argos, see innovation (1) above – its successor of 2002 will look even less parochially Athenian. But in a narrative history of, say, the era of Demosthenes the orator and Philip II of Macedon, it is very hard to escape an Athenian viewpoint, though one can try to discount for it. On the other hand, it is precisely in the course of the Philip chapter (Chapter 18) that I reveal, if it is not already clear,

that there is a 'Thessalian' – that is, a regional and non-Athenian – theme which has run through much of the book right up to that point. If one wants to get away from the centre to the edges and the regions, such as Thessaly, one cannot do better than start with the poetry of Pindar. I have made even more use of it in the present edition than before, and I am at present writing a monograph for Oxford University Press to be called *Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinikian Poetry.* I have drawn on some of its conclusions in the present edition of this textbook.

My other main aim in 1983 was to give a clear strong narrative line, especially in the bewildering fourth century. I have tried in the present edition to make that line even clearer and stronger. (Hence for instance innovation no. (7) above, subheadings within chapters.) The temptation, twenty years later and in more cautious middle age, has always been to introduce tiresome qualifications and hedging formulae into assertions which now seem too airy and simple. I have tried to resist this temptation in the interests of clarity (and I hope also of liveliness), while correcting those simplifications which were downright misleading.

Now that the book is on disk it will be much easier to reissue it with corrections and up-datings from time to time, and I hope that readers who find further error or unclarity will let me know.

It remains to make a very few personal acknowledgements. In 1996 Robin Osborne re-read the whole 1991 book at my request and kindly supplied me with detailed suggestions for improvement. I am grateful to Richard Stoneman, my Routledge editor, for the perseverance, not to say relentlessness, of his efforts to get me to finish the book despite my endless broken promises about deadlines, so different from the promptness of 1981–3. And Fergus Millar, the general academic editor of the series, has been as encouraging and helpful as he was two decades ago; he read and commented on a sample of the revision, but this time I have not inflicted the entire manuscript on him. The index was compiled by Douglas Matthews, and I am grateful to him for this and other last-minute help.

Simon Hornblower
*Departments of Greek and Latin and of History,*
*University College London*
13 August 2001

In the 2003 reprinting of the third edition, I have corrected errors, many pointed out by three friends whom I should like to thank: Peter Fraser, Alan Griffiths, Christian Habicht.

# PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

This fourth edition is the last I intend to do. There will have been a new edition at roughly the start of every decade since the series was inaugurated just thirty years ago, in 1980 (that is: 1983, 1991, 2002, 2011). In the third edition (2002), the main innovations were an entirely new chapter on Argos, and a long replacement chapter on the Peloponnesian War. This time, the main addition is a sub-chapter on Islands at the end of Chapter 3 (pp. 37–42). The absence of any separate treatment of islands was not commented on by any reviewer, but for a long time it has seemed to me a serious deficiency in a book which claims (see below) to do justice to regional variety. I half-considered doing something about this for the 2002 edition, but could not then see how to integrate an island section. I hope I have now solved the problem in a way that makes sense. A further main stimulus to my 'insular' thinking has been the appearance of Christy Constantakopoulou's fine monograph about islands, particularly inside the Athenian empire (Constantakopoulou 2007). It is partly with her book in mind that I have located my island pages where I have. In addition, the study of the Greek islands in the whole of the Classical period – not only the Cyclades but Euboia, Aigina, Thasos, Rhodes, Krete, Cyprus, 'Ionian islands' such as Kerkyra/Corfu, and Sicily – has been greatly facilitated and enriched by the publication in 2004 of the Copenhagen *Inventory*, for which see further below. Perhaps, after all, it was not such a bad mistake to have waited till now before attempting to say something about this topic. Finally, Figure 4.6 (Orestes' Purification) is new.

For this edition I have revised and updated the text and notes throughout, but two books which have appeared since 2002 deserve special mention here. P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne's replacement in 2003 of Tod's fourth-century collection of inscriptions (abbrev. R/O; revised paperback 2007) has made all our lives much easier. I take this opportunity of saluting their achievement, and of wishing them well as they work backwards through the classical and then the archaic periods (this, I gather, is the plan) on the long road towards Nestor's Cup, ML no. 1. One main respect in which they have improved on Tod is by the provision of translations; another is by the inclusion of photographs of nine of the inscriptions. Their excellent translations arguably make it unnecessary for me to refer any longer to P. Harding's translated

fourth-century sourcebook, but I have nevertheless decided to retain Harding numbers alongside R/O ones, for the convenience of those students and readers who may be working only with translated sourcebooks. Some interesting inscriptions in Tod were dropped from R/O, and I naturally refer to both Tod and (where possible) Harding for these.

The other recent book I wish to single out is the great multi-author *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, edited by M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen (2004; abbrev. *IACP*), the result of many years of work by the Copenhagen Polis Centre, under Hansen's direction. This is the most important work on archaic and classical Greek history to have appeared in my lifetime (shame on the *Times Literary Supplement* (*TLS*) for not reviewing it! The only review to have done it justice is Parker 2006). No textbook history of ancient Greece in those periods can or should ever look the same again. I am sure that in revising this book I have used the *Inventory* much more often than I have referred to it in the notes below, but that is the fate of all good works of reference. The effect of the publication of this magnificent and authoritative collection of data about every aspect of the civic, political and religious life of over a thousand poleis, spread over the whole Mediterranean world and beyond, ought to be to allow and encourage a certain shifting of academic emphasis away from the traditional objects of inquiry, Athens and Sparta. (I use 'religious' advisedly, because, despite the polemical remarks about *polis* religion in the Introduction, pp. 130–4, the *Inventory* itself thankfully gives plenty of valuable evidence for cults; cf. Kindt 2009: 23 and nn. 60–61, who, however, somewhat understates the *Inventory*'s religious content.) In a much smaller way, the various editions of the present textbook have always shared that objective, namely the giving of proper attention to regional diversity – and not just in the fourth century either, but from the outset in 479 BC: see above p. xiv, from the Preface to edition 3. That is why I have undertaken yet another revision of this book, because I believe and hope that it still has a niche, if only because it is not Athens-dominated. *Greek world* means Greek world.

The third edition of 2002 was reprinted in the following year with corrections of mistakes of various kinds, which were pointed out by three friends in particular: see above p. xv for an expression of thanks. I now repeat those thanks, and would add (for corrections pointed out since 2003) two more names of the same sort: Timothy Doran and David Whitehead.

Simon Hornblower
2011

# ABBREVIATIONS AND BRIEF GLOSSARY OF TERMS

## Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AA | Arrian, *Anabasis.* |
| Aen. Tact. | Aeneas Tacticus |
| Aischin. | Aischines |
| *Anab.* | *Anabasis* |
| Andok. | Andokides |
| *Ann.* | *Annals* |
| Aristid. | Aristides |
| *AR* | *Archaeological reports*, booklet issued annually with *JHS.* |
| Ar. | Aristotle |
| Aristoph. | Aristophanes |
| Arr. | Arrian |
| Ath. | Athenaios |
| *Ath. Pol.* | *Athenaion Politeia* (Athenian Constitution attributed to Aristotle) |
| Bagnall/Derow | R. S. Bagnall and P. S. Derow (eds) *Greek historical documents: the hellenistic period*, Chico, 1981. |
| *Barr.* | R. Talbert (ed.) *Barrington atlas of the Greek and Roman world*, Princeton NJ, 2000 |
| *CAH* | *Cambridge ancient history*, new edn. The volumes most cited in the present book are D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, J. K. Davies and M. Ostwald (eds), vol. 5, *The fifth century* BC (Cambridge, 1992) and D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. Ostwald (eds), vol. 6, *The fourth century* BC (Cambridge, 1994). Note also J. Boardman (ed.), *Plates volume to vols 5 and 6* (Cambridge, 1994). |
| Call. | Callimachus |
| *CT* I, II, III | S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols, 1991, 1996, 2008. |
| CW | M. Crawford and D. Whitehead, *Archaic and Classical Greece, A selection of sources in translation*, Cambridge 1983. |
| *Cyr.* | *Cyropaedia* |

| | |
|---|---|
| Dem. | Demosthenes |
| Diod. | Diodorus |
| Dion. Hal. | Dionysius of Halikarnasssos |
| DK | H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 6, 3 vols., Berlin 1952. |
| *FGrHist* | F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 15 vols, Leiden 1923–1958. A collection of the fragments (i.e. quotations by other ancient writers) of the Greek historians whose works do not survive complete. *FGrHist* 328 F119 means fragment no. 119 of Philochoros who is no. 328 in Jacoby's numbering |
| Fornara | C. W. Fornara, *Translated documents, archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War* 2, Cambridge, 1983 |
| Harding | P. Harding, *Translated Documents, from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsos*, Cambridge, 1985 |
| *HCT* | See References under Gomme. |
| Hdt. | Herodotus |
| *Hell.* | *Hellenica* |
| *Hell. Oxy.* | *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* |
| Hicks and Hill | E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *Greek historical inscriptions*, Oxford, 1901. |
| $Hill^2$ | G. F. Hill, revised R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes, *Sources for Greek history 478–431* BC, Oxford, 1951 |
| Hyp. | Hyperides |
| *I. Labraunda* | J. Crampa (ed.) *Labraunda, Swedish excavations and researches 3(1) and 3(2): The Greek Inscriptions*, Lund, 1969 and Stockholm, 1972 |
| *IACP* | M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen (eds.) *An inventory of archaic and classical Greek* poleis (Oxford, 2004) |
| *IG* | *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin, 1873– |
| *Ind.* | *Indike* |
| Isok. | Isokrates |
| *Lak. Pol.* | *Lakedaimonion Politeia* |
| *LGPN* | *A lexicon of Greek personal names*, 6 vols published to date, Oxford, 1987–2010. For details see Bibliography under Fraser and Matthews; Osborne and Byrne. |
| $LSAG^2$ | L. H. Jeffery, revised A. W. Johnston, *Local scripts of archaic Greece*, Oxford, 1990. |
| *LSS* | F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*, suppl., Paris, 1962 |
| Michel | C. Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques*, Brussels, 1900–27 |
| ML | R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century* BC, revised edn, Oxford, 1988 |
| *Mor.* | *Moralia* |

| | |
|---|---|
| Nep. | Nepos |
| *OCD*$^3$ | S. Hornblower and A. J. S. Spawforth (eds) *The Oxford classical dictionary* edn 3, Oxford, 1996. |
| *Oec.* | *Oeconomicus* |
| *OGIS* | W. Dittenberger, *Orientis graecae inscriptiones selectae*, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1903–5. |
| *P. Oxy.* | Oxyrhynchus Papyri |
| Paus. | Pausanias |
| Plut. | Plutarch |
| *Pol.* | *Politics* |
| Pol. | Polybius |
| Polyain. | Polyainos |
| QC | Quintus Curtius |
| R/O | P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, *Greek historical inscriptions 404–323 BC* (Oxford, 2003, revised paperback edition 2007). |
| *SEG* | *Supplementum epigraphicum graecum* 1923– |
| *SGDI* | H. Collitz and F. Bechtel, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-inschriften*, 4 vols, Göttingen, 1884–1915. |
| Suid. | Suidas (or Suda), a Byzantine Lexicon. |
| *Syll*$^3$ | W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 vols, edn 3, Leipzig, 1915–1924. |
| Tac. | Tacitus |
| Th. | Thucydides. |
| Tod | M. N. Tod, *Greek historical inscriptions vol. 2: 403* BC to 323 BC, Oxford, 1948; mostly superseded by R/O. Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1946) was superseded by ML but is very occasionally cited in the present book for inscriptions 'dropped' by ML. |
| WV | J. Wickersham and E. Verbrugghe, *Greek historical documents: the fourth century* BC, 1973. |
| Xen. | Xenophon |

## Glossary

The following Greek or Greek-derived words are used in the text:

| | |
|---|---|
| *arche* | rule or empire. |
| *chora* | territory, often as opposed to the *polis* which exploited it. |
| *cleruchy* | a formal settlement of Greeks abroad; in the period covered by this book it usually refers to Athenians. |
| *ekklesia* | political assembly. |
| *harmost* | Spartan governor. |
| *helot* | member of the servile population of Sparta. |
| *hoplite* | heavily-armed infantryman; under the name *zeugites*, the second lowest property class at Athens. |
| *medize* | side or sympathize with the Persians. |

| | |
|---|---|
| *metic* | resident foreigner, especially at Athens. |
| *ostrakon* | potsherd used for the Athenian process of 10-year exile described below, Chapter 12, p. 12. |
| *pentekontaetia* | the 'fifty years' *c.* 480–30 BC. |
| *peraia* | the land opposite and controlled/exploited by an island. |
| *phoros* | tribute. |
| *polis* | city-state. |
| *proxeny* | the system by which 'local citizens served as *proxenoi* to look after the interests of other states in their community' (*OCD*3, under '*proxenos*/proxeny'). |
| *talent* | 6000 drachmai. Both in the early Peloponnesian War (Th. 3. 17. 4), and in the time of Alexander (Tod 183 = Harding 102), a drachma was the daily pay of a soldier; this gives a very rough idea of the value of a talent. |
| *thetes* | the lowest property class of citizens at Athens; the fleet was manned predominantly by *thetes*. |

# 1

# INTRODUCTION

### The extent of the Greek world in 479[1]

This book begins immediately after the Greek defeat of the great Persian invasion led by King Xerxes (480/79 BC AD). By the end of the period covered by the book, that is by 323, 'the Greek world' will include everything between Italy and India. The westward expansion of hellenism,[2] that is the Greek way of life, had long ago been achieved, in the eighth- and seventh-centuries BC colonizing phase of Greek history, when Greeks settled in Italy and Sicily.[3] The eastward expansion had also *begun* several centuries before 479. Thucydides, the great fifth-century Athenian historian, speaks (1.12) of the Greeks in this early phase as occupying Italy and Sicily on the one hand, and Ionia (western Turkey) on the other, and treats them as comparable operations. That was not quite accurate in that western colonization after 750 was much more highly organized than the earliest settlement of Greeks in the east.

But there was another, and for our purposes more important, difference between the fortunes of the Greeks in the west and of those in the east: Greek settlement in the east was interrupted for two centuries by Achaemenid Persia (*c.* 546 – late 330s). Carthage, the strongest non-Greek power in the west, mostly left the Greeks in Italy and Sicily alone; but when the Persian empire moved up to the western Mediterranean coast in the sixth century, a movement of conquest which established firm imperial institutions (Chapter 7), the presence of this solid power halted for two centuries the natural tendency of the Greeks, 'brought up in the company of poverty' (Hdt. 7. 102), to emigrate eastwards in numbers.

There is an essential qualification to this: Greek individuals, as we shall see in Chapter 6, are attested in Persia and Persian-controlled areas. On many pages of this book, including the last page of all, we shall see that the fourth-century Persian satraps (governors) in the Mediterranean region attracted or imported identifiable Greeks with various aptitudes, from the islands and mainland; and throughout the history of the Achaemenid empire, residence or visits by anonymous Greeks can often be reasonably assumed from the material evidence (though art historians are nowadays rightly cautious about seeing ethnic Greeks behind every instance of 'Greek'-looking workmanship[4]). So Greeks penetrated the Persian empire.




*Map 1* Greece, the Aegean and Western Asia Minor


Black Sea
Heraclea Pontica
R. Hebrus
R. Ergines
Selymbria
Chalcedon
Perinthus
Byzantium
Astakos
Ainus
Cardia
Pactye
Cius
Aegospotami
Samothrace
Lampsakos
Cyzicus
Imbros
Sestos
Abydos
Elaios
TROAD
R. Granicus
PHRYGIA
Illium
Tenedos
GREATER PHRYGIA
Adramyttium
Methymna
MYSIA
R. Caicus
Mytilene
Atarneus
Lesbos
Arginusae
LYDIA
R. Hermus
Magnesia
Sardis
Erythrai
Smyrna
Chios
Klazomenai
Chios
Kolophon
Notium
IONIA
Ephesus
R. Maiander
Samos
Magnesia
Samos
Priene
Ikaria
CARIA
PISIDIA
Miletus
Mykonos
Labraunda
Didyma
Iasos
Halikarnassos
Naxos
Cos
Amorgos
Knidos
LYCIA
Ios
Phaselis
Ialysos
Rhodes
Astypalea
Camirus
Xanthus
Rhodes
Thera
Lindos
Karpathos
0
50 km
Lyttos

It is nevertheless true that the scale of this social penetration was determined not by the penetrators themselves but by their Persian masters and patrons. So it was only when Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire *c.* 330 BC that the full-scale colonization of the east could be resumed, with the city-foundations of Alexander himself and of the hellenistic age generally. The two hundred years between Cyrus and Alexander can therefore be seen as an interruption in a single process by which hellenism was diffused through the formal settlement of whole new Greek communities. One main message of this book is that Alexander continues or resumes processes which had already been started or interrupted earlier, and to get that message across it will be necessary to investigate many parts of the Greek world other than the central city-states of the Greek mainland. That is because it is often those 'peripheral' places which anticipate future developments most clearly.

## The plan of this book

Even by the end of the first half of this book, the end of the fifth century, 'the Greek world' already has an impressive regional spread, and covers very different types of terrain, although Alexander's conquests are still three-quarters of a century away. In this first, fifth-century, half of the book the political and cultural narrative will be punctuated by regional chapters whose purpose is to introduce the main cities and areas of the classical Greek world: Italy and Sicily; Kyrene, Africa and Egypt; Persia and Asia Minor; Argos; Macedon, Thessaly and Boiotia; Corinth; Sparta; and finally Athens. Then, in the second, fourth-century, half of the book, a unified narrative is offered, which takes the earlier regional discussions for granted. It is one main aim of this arrangement to bring out the way in which the attractions exerted by certain regions determined the policies of other Greek states over long periods. For instance, there is the Thessalian theme. From the time of King Kleomenes I of Sparta *c.* 500 BC to that of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon, other states tried to get control of Thessaly in central Greece. The reasons for this are given, all at once, in the 'Thessaly' chapter (Chapter 8); but the stages of the struggle for Thessaly are distributed over the whole book. Another example might be Sicilian interference, or the fear of it, in the affairs of Greece proper. The permanent importance of such themes helps to connect the fifth century to the fourth, and it is another main aim of the book to bring out the closeness of that connection between the two centuries: even in terms of the history of Athens, which lost the 'Peloponnesian War' of 431–404 to Sparta, the end of that war represents only a light break in continuity. For instance, Athenian imperialism revived very soon indeed after 404.

## The sources

A modern history of early Rome opens with an explanation for the length of its introductory section about the ancient sources. One of the author's main

reasons was that all the surviving literary accounts were written centuries after the events they describe.[5] For classical Greek history, things are not as bad as that until we reach the reign of Alexander the Great, when, quite suddenly, there is a jump of three hundred years before we get to a surviving account. For this reason I shall deal with the specially tricky problems posed by the Alexander historians separately, in the long n. 1 to Chapter 19.

For the period 479–362, there are three surviving full-length histories by contemporaries or near-contemporaries of the events they describe. First, Herodotus, who described the wars between Greece and Persia of 499–479, and the prehistory of Persia and Greece before the clash. He is so rich a source that he often needs to be used even by the modern historian whose *starting* date is 479. Second, Thucydides, whose immensely detailed but at the same time highly selective history of the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 is prefaced by an account of Athenian expansion in the years 479–439; this is the most valuable literary account of that vital but poorly documented topic that we have. Third, Xenophon, who wrote a *Hellenica* ('Greek Affairs') covering the period from 411 to 362. This is a vivid and personal work of reminiscence, by an Athenian who spent much of his adult life in the Peloponnese and tilted his narrative towards Peloponnesian events. In addition there is Xenophon's *Anabasis* which describes his participation with the 'Ten Thousand' (an army of Greek mercenary soldiers) in an expedition in 400 against the new Persian king in support of a rival claimant, the king's younger brother.[6]

In addition we have Books 11–16 of the 'Library' (a universal history) of Diodorus of Sicily, a writer of the Roman period whose value for the classical Greek historian is that he drew for the years 479 – *c.* 340 on an earlier universal history, by the fourth-century BC writer Ephorus. This (together with inscriptions, see p. 7f., cf. 236) can be used to correct Xenophon and fill in some of his many gaps, because in the fourth century Ephorus represents a tradition independent of Xenophon.[7] For the fifth century, by contrast, Ephorus/Diodorus is usually less valuable because it does often represent a source already available to us in its original form, namely Thucydides, but with some rearrangement; for instance there is a tendency to treat the achievements of individuals one by one. (This is why Diodorus went to Ephorus rather than to Thucydides direct: Diodorus liked to moralize, and could accommodate his moralizing more easily to history treated as a series of connected biographies, in the 'Ephoran' manner.) There is a Loeb translation of Diodorus.

Other historians do not survive either complete or in 'digested' form like Ephorus, but only in isolated quotations by later writers. Such 'fragmentary' historians, as they are called, include the fourth-century Ktesias (who wrote about Persia) and Theopompos (who wrote about Philip, and much else). Plutarch, a biographer writing in the Roman period, drew on such writers abundantly, as well as on the surviving historians; and is thus immensely valuable to us. (All Plutarch's relevant Greek *Lives*, except the important *Artaxerxes* which is in a Loeb translation, are translated in the Penguin volumes *The Rise and Fall of Athens* and *The Age of Alexander*.)

The *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (*Hell. Oxy.*) deserves mention separately from both 'surviving' and 'fragmentary' historians. This is an extended but incomplete section of a fourth-century historian, found on papyrus at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt. The main section covers events of the 390s, and is high-grade material. It has an additional interest and importance in that it can be shown that Diodorus' version of events around the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries closely follows the reliable *Hell. Oxy.* where the two can be compared. This means that Ephorus, whom Diodorus used, himself used *Hell. Oxy.*, and this discovery has had the effect of forcing a revision of scholarly judgements of Diodorus' general worth, as against Xenophon's, as a source for those years. The revision has invariably been in Diodorus' favour. So for Greek history,[8] Books 13–14 of Diodorus have merits greater than the two books which come after them, and far greater than the books which come before. There is a good recent translation, with Greek text and commentary, of *Hell. Oxy.*[9]

In this book, much use (especially in the chapters on Kyrene and Sicily) will be made of the victory (epinikian) odes of Pindar and Bacchylides. These poems celebrated athletic victories by rich elite individuals at the great games held at Olympia and Delphi, and at two Peloponnesian sanctuaries, Isthmia and Nemea, as well as at some minor games. This poetry does not tell us much about identifiable historical events that we do not already know from elsewhere, but it is a rich source of evidence for attitudes and for social and religious history in a broad sense. But epinikian odes by no means made up the whole of the output of Pindar or Bacchylides. Some of the fragmentary poems – such as the paians of Pindar, found on papyrus as recently as 13 January 1906 – are also important sources for the historian.[10]

Attic (i.e. Athenian) tragedy is also an important type of historical evidence; recent work tends to insist that it be seen firmly, not to say exclusively, in its social and political (i.e. democratic) context, though there have been protests.[11] The comedies of Aristophanes relate in more obvious ways to contemporary politics than does tragedy, but Aristophanes' own political views and message(s), if any, are controversial.[12]

The writings of Athenian orators survive only from the late fifth century onwards, when they become an important source for both the political and the social historian. Andokides'[13] first and third speeches illuminate key events in Athenian history of 415–404, and in Greek history of 392, respectively. The fourth-century orators include Lysias[14] and Isaios,[15] who in English terms are a politically involved 'common-law' barrister and a 'chancery' barrister, that is, one covers all variety of topics, the other specializes in estates and wills. Lysias was a *metic*, i.e. not a national of Athens but resident there. He was actually from Syracuse in Sicily. Finally (to omit some minor figures) there is Isokrates, a professor and pamphleteer rather than an orator, whose more ephemeral writings will be used in this book, but whose chief importance and influence in history lies beyond the chronological scope of this volume and may be mentioned here: it is that he formulated an ideal of rhetorical education as a

training for life, an ideal which dominated Greco–Roman educational practice. This worldly programme was opposed to the 'pure research' programme of Plato. The argument is of enduring importance: in a comparable nineteenth-century debate, the 'Isokratean' position was held by the worldly Benjamin Jowett, the 'Platonic' by the pure scholar, Mark Pattison. Demosthenes (384–322), the greatest of the Athenian orators, and his contemporaries Aischines and Hyperides (of whom two new speeches have recently come to light) are prime evidence for Athenian society, and for Athenian reactions to the securing of power over Greece by Philip II of Macedon.[16]

Finally, there are two works of, or attributed, to Aristotle, the *Athenian Constitution*[17] and the *Politics.* The first, abbreviated *Ath. Pol.,* is perhaps not an authentic work of Aristotle. It has an account of the historical evolution of Athenian democracy as well as a descriptive analysis; the *Politics* is a much longer treatise on political thought, the first of its kind. Its scope is not confined to Athens, and though a work of theory it has a wealth of illustrations from actual Greek history and practice. There are Penguin translations of both works. The *Old Oligarch*, falsely attributed to Xenophon, is an ostensibly right-wing pamphlet about Athens and its democracy, usually thought to date from the 420s.[18]

The non-literary evidence is that of coins, archaeology and above all inscriptions (see pp. xvii–xviii for abbreviations and translated collections). Most of the important inscriptions are decrees and other documentary records carved (nearly always) on stone, many but not by any means all[19] coming from Athens which as a democracy believed in making its records permanently visible 'for anyone to see' (Andokides 1. 83). Just why the democratic Athenians put up as many inscriptions as they did has been much discussed in recent years. The old, simple, view, confidently followed in the first edition of this book, was that the proliferation of inscriptions had to do with accountability: the Athenians made their magistrates strictly and publicly accountable for their actions, especially in the financial sphere, hence the practical need for inscribed permanent records. Clearly, there is something in this, but motives other than the practical have been recently and rightly stressed, above all the symbolic. Imperial inscriptions were perhaps intended to intimidate as much as to inform, and the publication of lists of confiscated property was meant above all as a warning.[20] Nevertheless it is a fact that financial records on stone are very numerous; this is specially useful to us because ancient literary writers, perhaps for stylistic reasons, tend to under-report such matters. (See also p. 116 for the absence of inscriptions from Corinth.) It is above all the constant flow of finds of new inscriptions ('epigraphic' finds) which means that ancient history would not be a static subject, even if the perspectives of modern students of ancient history were not constantly changing – as they are. The great modern French epigraphist Louis Robert (1904–85) once called inscriptions the ancient historian's 'fountain of youth'.[21]

# 2

# THE BEGINNING OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE[1]

## The Athenians take the lead

'Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their city immediately after the retreat of the Persians.' That is Thucydides' summing-up of an episode which marked the tangible start of Athenian independence from Sparta (1. 89ff.). The tension between these two great powers (the subjects of detailed discussion below, Chapters 11 and 12) was a permanent feature of classical Greek history, easing only with the 360s and the rise of the Thebans to a prominence felt to be dangerous by both of the old two rivals.

The rebuilding of the walls of Athens, devastated by the Persian sack, is said by Thucydides to have been unwelcome to Sparta: an assertive act. In protest, the Spartans sent a deputation to Athens to complain; but its members were detained while the Athenian Themistokles, the man who had done much to bring about the defeat of the Persians in the recent invasion, went to the Peloponnese. There the great man lulled Spartan suspicions while the walls were hastily built – 'from whatever materials came to hand' – Thucydides says, and a patch of wall which can be seen near the Dipylon Gate confirms him. When the rebuilding work was complete, Themistokles tore off the mask and told the Spartan authorities that they must henceforth treat with Athens 'as with a state which knew how to consult its own interests and the general good' – perhaps the first hint of imperial pretensions, if this whole good story can be believed. The Spartans concealed their anger, not least (Thucydides claims) because 'the enthusiasm which the Athenians had shown in the Persian Wars had created friendly feelings between the two cities'.

But that is precisely the difficulty: how friendly *were* feelings between Athens and Sparta after the Persian repulse? There are two problems. The first is historiographical, the interesting but unanswerable question, how do ancient or any historians have access to states of mind, except by illicitly inferring motives from actions? The second is historical: is the statement likely to be true? The historical problem matters because it must affect our judgement of the circumstances in which the Athenians began their league; and therefore of the history of the next fifty years and more. The difficulty is this: Thucydides constantly writes as if the Spartans acquiesced in the

formation of the Delian League (the modern name given to the organization of Greek states under Athenian leadership, whose common treasury was on the island of Delos in the centre of the Aegean Sea). He does this not merely when putting defensive speeches into the mouths of Athenian speakers, which would not be surprising, but in his own considered narrative (1. 95, end). There is, however, other evidence which suggests that the Spartans' 'acceptance' was forced on them.

First, there is Thucydides himself, whose account, though it generally implies that the Spartans yielded the hegemony gracefully, contains puzzles. Straight after the Athenian wall building Thucydides describes a joint Athenian, Peloponnesian and allied expedition, which captured Cyprus and Byzantium. This was led by Pausanias (regent for the underage King Pleistarchos). His behaviour, however, 'resembled a tyranny rather than a military command' (1. 95. 3), and the *echthos* (hostility) so caused drove the allies into the arms of Athens. Pausanias was summoned home in disgrace to stand trial.

It all seems too easy, and too black and white. In Thucydides' version, the warmth felt by the Athenians and Spartans for each other gives way to *echthos*, all as a result of the pride of one young and still not very experienced[2] Spartan, whose conduct was anyway disapproved of by his home government. The suspicion arises that the Spartans had other reasons for relinquishing their supreme position, and that they did so against their will – or against the will of some of them (otherwise why did they send the Cyprus–Byzantium fleet out at all?). This suspicion deepens when we consult sources other than Thucydides.

Herodotus, in one of his rare glances forwards to events after the Persian Wars, remarks casually that the insufferable behaviour of Pausanias was the *pretext* which enabled the Athenians to 'snatch the hegemony' from the Spartans (8. 3. 2). There is no suggestion here that Sparta gave way to Athens unwillingly. Herodotus also records (6. 72) an expedition led by the Spartan king Leotychidas to Thessaly in 476 (see p. 103). This shows that expansionist ambitions were still alive then.

Then there is the *Athenian Constitution* attributed to Aristotle. This says (23. 2) that the Athenians took the hegemony, 'the Spartans being unwilling', *akont?n Lakedaimonion*. This is an explicit statement (see Lysias 28. 63 for an exactly parallel use of *akonton*) that Athenian hegemony was contrary to Spartan wishes.[3]

Another fourth-century item may be relevant: Arrian, using sources close to Alexander the Great's own time, records a rebuff delivered to Alexander by the Spartans in 336. He makes them say (*Anab.* 1. 1. 2) that it was the Spartan tradition to lead, not to follow the lead of others.

The truth, however, may be that Thucydides was neither completely wrong nor completely right: that is, opinion at Sparta was split. This leads to the most intriguing piece of non-Thucydidean evidence, namely Diodorus. He gives, under the year 475, details of a debate held at Sparta, on the question whether

to dispute the hegemony with Athens (11. 50). The real date could be earlier than Diodorus says,[4] in which case this story might really be about Spartan morale in the year or so after the beginning of the Delian League (winter 478/7). The younger Spartans, on this account, wanted the money which a Spartan naval empire would bring (a nice comment on the supposed absence of coined money in Sparta); but the elders and people were dissuaded by an elder called Hetoimaridas, who warned that it was not in Sparta's interests to bid for control of the sea. This does not look like invention: Hetoimaridas is otherwise unknown and he possesses a unique personal name, so that the detail of his name at least is circumstantial; and although the opposition of young and old Spartans was to recur in 432 before the Great Peloponnesian War, that does not exclude similar opposition in the 470s, since patterns can recur in Spartan history (and in human psychology).

Finally, we come to Thucydides, and a phrase describing a *second* voyage out by Pausanias, after his trial (p. 9). Thucydides says that Pausanias went out 'ostensibly to conduct the Greek War, but really to open negotiations with the (Persian) king' (1. 128). What does 'Greek War' mean here? The phrase 'Persian War' means 'the war against Persia'; so might not 'the Greek War' be a war fought *against* Greeks? That is, we might have here a reference to open hostilities between Athens and Sparta. The argument is ingenious,[5] but does not work. The main difficulty with it can be seen only by looking at the context, which may be obscured by concentration on the two words 'Greek War'. There is surely a contrast between Pausanias' *avowed* aim (to fight the Persian king) and his *real* aim (to do a deal with him).

But the 'Hetoimaridas debate', supported as it is by other evidence, shows that some Spartans were prepared to go to war with the Athenians, rather than see them take over the leadership of Greece. What, then, did Hetoimaridas mean when he said that a 'struggle for the sea' was not in Sparta's interests?

The answer lies partly in the steps the Spartans would need to take to assemble a permanent navy: they could no doubt get timber by buying or bullying; they had a harbour at Gytheion where traces of docks have been found,[6] but they could not provide the hundreds or thousands of rowers required except by finding some equivalent of Athens' 'naval mob' of poor citizens who served as rowers, and *that* meant using the serf population, the 'helots' – always a politically sensitive proposal (see below p. 121f. for the helots, the subjugated peoples of Lakonia and next-door Messenia). But perhaps the older, warier, Spartans were thinking less of the future than of the present and the past. Here there was plenty to alarm them: the suggestion of a speaker in Plato's *Laws* (698) of a Messenian War (that is, helot trouble) at the time of the battle of Marathon (490) is not supported by much other evidence.[7] But the Spartans certainly had other problems, notably with their northern neighbours the Arkadians. The Arkadians and helots between them go far towards explaining Thucydides' vague reference to 'local wars' which he says prevented the Spartans from doing more to prevent the growth of Athenian power in the Pentekontaetia (1. 118. 2); there was also Argos,

see below Chapter 7, but the Argives were not immediately threatening in the early 470s. Worries about Arkadia must by contrast be taken seriously as a factor in Sparta's refusal to lead the Greeks after 479. In the mid-sixth century the Spartans had subjugated their northern neighbours, the people of Tegea in Arkadia. But the Tegeans were restless even before 480, as a macabre incident shows. The state diviner at Sparta was Hegesistratos of Elis, who got into trouble at Sparta in the late 480s, escaped from confinement in the stocks by slicing his foot off at the ankle, and somehow hobbled over the border to Tegea, which, Herodotus says, 'was on bad terms with Sparta at the time' (9. 37). It is true that the Tegeans do appear alongside the Spartans on the Greek thank-offering for the victories of 479/8 (ML 27 = Fornara 59). But anti-Spartan feelings, or anti-Spartan elements, are again detectable at Tegea a little later in the 470s, when Leotychidas fled there after the collapse of his Thessalian expedition (above and p. 103). But the Arkadians evidently found it hard to unite; a brief but important passage in Herodotus (9. 35) enumerates the five contests in which Sparta was victorious between 479 and 458. Arkadians feature in the list, but not as a united people, indeed they were never federally united in the fifth century.[8]

Two individuals loom, from the fog that is Peloponnesian history in this period, as specially responsible for compounding Spartan difficulties. One is Pausanias the Regent, whose second and final disgrace was due to the suspicion that he was tampering with the loyalty of the helots (p. 120): 'and it was true', Thucydides adds. The reason is presumably that Pausanias, enterprising rather than (as in the official version) treacherous, planned to supplement Sparta's supplies of manpower by drafting helots into the army. That showed foresight: there had been 5000 citizen hoplites at the battle of Plataia in 479, a decent total, but even if the precise proportion of helots given by Herodotus, namely 7: 1 (9. 28), is exaggerated,[9] the imbalance was probably already enough to cause unease.

The other individual is Themistokles of Athens, who had gone to the Peloponnese after his ostracism (a kind of 'banishment by plebiscite' for ten years, without forfeiture of property or taint of criminality). He stayed at Argos, and visited other places in the Peloponnese. (Themistokles was the hero of the Persian Wars, but seems to have realized sooner than most Athenians that the enemy had changed and was now not Persia but Sparta: see p. 8 on the 'walls' episode.) Did Themistokles stir up trouble for Sparta in the Peloponnese? The suggestion has its attractions but cannot be proved.[10] (See further Chapter 7, Argos.)

Themistokles apart, it is an interesting question why Spartan leadership in the Peloponnese went sour at just this period. Motives in the dissident cities were no doubt mixed. First, Spartan leadership may not, in 490, have seemed the inevitability it had been in 550, since Athens had now emerged as a great power on a level with Sparta. Second, the old Peloponnesian troublemaker Argos was in very low water in the first thirty years of the fifth century. The decline of the Argives may have made the smaller Peloponnesian states

ask themselves what, or who, the Spartans were supposed to be protecting them from. Finally, the Spartan king Kleomenes had been engaged in the 490s in some kind of deal with the Arkadians (Hdt. 6. 74) which perhaps encouraged Arkadian thoughts of a looser rein. When this came to nothing and Kleomenes fell, opinion against Sparta may have hardened.

## Terms of enrolment

So when, in late 478, the allies asked the Athenians to be their leaders, Spartan chagrin was probably mixed with relief. Thucydides, in an important sentence (1. 95. 1) gives a double motive for the (mainly) Ionian approach to the Athenians, a negative motive and a positive one. The positive motive is 'in virtue of kinship', *kata to xyngenes*: the Ionians recognized Athens as their colonial mother-city or metropolis; this was a relationship which the Athenians were to exploit and exaggerate in the coming decades.[11] The idea of racial kinship (for which see p. 83) is not exactly muted in Thucydides; after all he introduces it very early in his work (see 1. 6. 3 for the phrase, and already 1. 2. 6 for the idea that Athens colonized Ionia. At 1. 12. 4 Athenian colonization of Ionia, which was actually more like a disorganized Dark Age migration, is given the status of an organized process comparable to the settlement of Italy and Sicily in the historical period.) Even so, he does not bring out its full importance: just three little words (at 1. 95. 1), and a purely financial mention of the great, and largely though not exclusively Ionian, sanctuary of Apollo at Delos (1. 96. 2) where the island is merely described as the location of 'the treasury'. The negative motive is fear of the violence of Pausanias. What kind of violence? Perhaps the *bia-* words used by Thucydides include the idea of literal physical violence. Spartans were prone to this sort of thing; telling instances from later books of Thucydides are the behaviour of Poludamidas at Mende (4. 130. 4) and that of Astyochus (8. 84. 2). As the Astyochus passage shows, free Greeks did not like being roughed up as if they were helots.[12]

The Athenians now assumed the command, and fixed which of their allies were to provide money, and which ships, for the war against Persia. 'A pretext', Thucydides says (1. 96. 1) 'was to exact reparation for what they had suffered, by ravaging the Persian king's land'. Pretexts imply that the motive given is not the whole story. Here scholars have assumed that Thucydides must be saying *either* that the Athenians' real but concealed motive was to impose their will on their allies, *or* that their real but concealed enmity was with Sparta not Persia.[13] If one has to choose between these two, the first explanation must be preferable: the following chapters go on to list the step-by-step extension of the empire. If so, the implication of 'pretext' is that the Athenians consciously and cynically planned their empire from the first, and that is disturbing: first, because it implies they could predict the future, and second because other sources imply idealism. Thus Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* (23. 5) describes the dropping of iron weights into the sea – a

sign of solidity, solemnity and permanence; and Herodotus, speaking of the defection of Ionia from Persia after Mykale (9. 105) treats it as a second Ionian revolt, and that, on the analogy of the 499 revolt of the Ionians from Persia, meant liberation. (Again, 'liberation from the Mede', i.e. from the Persians, is given as an original aim of the league by Thucydides' speakers, e.g. at 3. 10. 4.) But they have a case to plead and cannot be trusted. So there is misleading Thucydidean hindsight in the word 'pretext'. This conclusion can be avoided in only one way: 'pretext' could be taken to imply, not that Sparta, or the allies of Athens, were the 'real enemy', but that 'leadership' (Thucydides has just used the word) was something that appeared to the Athenians 'desirable absolutely', with no implication that they designed the empire from the start. They had a pretext for leadership ('a', not 'the pretext': the indefinite article lessens the degree of hypocrisy), namely the war against Persia.

No elaborate conditions were imposed on league members. Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* says that the Athenian Aristides caused the Ionians to swear 'to have the same friends and enemies' as Athens, a formula which no other source gives, but which is respectably fifth century, being found at Athens in the 420s (Tod 68: alliance with Bottiaians in northern Greece), and at Sparta in the same period, in a treaty with the Aitolians (*SEG* 26. 461). On the other hand, the formula implies a bilateral alliance, and this (see below) is less likely than a multilateral organization. So perhaps this detail cannot be pressed after all. The allies also pledged not to refuse to serve in league campaigns (this could be and perhaps was used as a device for preventing exit from the league), and not to make 'private wars' on other league members (Th. 6. 76. 3). Most important was the undertaking to provide ships. Some allies provided money instead, to a total of 460 talents, Thucydides says (but this total is incredibly large).[14] Aristides assessed the amounts.

There was a single league assembly in which Athens had only one vote – though small states could be relied on to follow the leader. A single assembly is clearly implied by a phrase in an allied speech in 428: 'the Athenians *led us on an equal footing* at first' (Th. 3. 10. 4). The same speech calls the allies 'equal in votes', *isopsephoi*, and though this word *can* mean 'equal decision-making influence', that cannot be true here because the word *polupsephia*, 'multiplicity of votes', occurs a few lines earlier, so the suffix ought to mean the same thing in both words. The allies, then, were 'equal in *votes*' to each other and to Athens. It was different in the fourth century (p. 243) when the Athenians, eager to please, set up a two-chambered system.

The extent of league membership at the beginning is given by no ancient source. (After 454 one-sixtieth of the annual tribute from the allies was made over to the goddess Athena, and records survive of these small payments, inscribed on stone: the so-called Athenian Tribute Lists – an inaccurate name, because the actual 'tribute lists', that is the full lists of tribute paid by the allies, do not survive.)

The islands of the central Aegean joined straight away – Delos after all housed the league treasury, and the neighbouring Cycladic islands must surely

be counted in. So must the large offshore islands to the east, Samos, Chios and Lesbos; presumably they brought with them their possessions on the Anatolian mainland, their *peraiai* (p. xx, 39). Far to the south-east, Rhodes may have been an original member; Cypriot membership is less likely.[15]

Of the mainland parts of north Greece and Asia Minor, Thrace east of the River Strymon remained Persian-held for some time; but some cities of the Chalkidike peninsula were in the league in 478. This is likely because in 421 they were made to pay the 'tribute of the time of Aristides' (Th. 5. 18) – unless, implausibly, this formula is shorthand for 'payment at an early, i.e. low level',[16] with no implication about early membership.

In Asia Minor, Herodotus' comparison (p. 73) with the first Ionian Revolt of 499 surely means that most of coastal Ionia joined this second revolt; and since places in Karia to the south, and the Aiolid to the north of Ionia participated in the 499 revolt, they joined Athens in 478. But here as elsewhere places further inland stayed out, as did the Greeks in the west (Italy and Sicily; but cp. *IG* I$^3$ 291: western 'tribute' *c.* 415).

There was much goodwill towards the Athenians when they assumed the leadership. They (unlike the preoccupied Spartans) offered hopes of liberation from Persia for the *polis* dwellers of western Asia, and protection for the islanders (the Turkish coast is clearly and menacingly visible from the big eastern islands, which then as now were afraid they would be suddenly overwhelmed from the hostile mainland). A hundred years later, however, when the Athenians started a Second Naval Confederacy, there was no stampede to join. The experience of the Delian League had made Athens' former subjects canny.

Something, clearly, went wrong. It is easy to criticize attempts to search literal-mindedly for the point at which the 'league' became an 'empire', and it is true that there is something odd about speaking of the 'harsh' imperialism of a later (420s) politician (Kleon), as if imperialism is ever soft. Nor is it easy to arrange the epigraphic evidence in such a way as to establish a deterioration in Athenian imperial attitudes: in recent years the dating of fifth-century Athenian decrees has been thrown into turmoil by the claim that one key text in particular, the Athenian alliance with the Egestaians in western Sicily (ML 37 = Fornara 81) should be dated to 418/7 rather than 458/7, the archonship of Antiphon rather than that of Habron. Everything hangs on a single badly preserved Greek letter, that immediately preceding the final syllable *–on*: is it a *phi* or a *rho*? The confident consensus now is that the letter is a *phi*, and that the archon's name was Antiphon. The present writer does not share the general confidence (Raubitschek in the 1940s thought he could see a *rho*; Matthaiou sixty years later says he can see a *phi*. But how to choose between two competent epigraphists? The condition of the stone is not likely to have improved in the interim). Nevertheless the present volume proceeds as if the consensus were right. Now if the 'Egestaian' inscription dates from 418, this removes one dating criterion previously thought to be solid, a change in about 446 from a

*sigma* with three bars, thus: ϟ (such as is found in the Egestaian inscription), to one with four bars, thus: Σ. We are therefore free to down-date some other Athenian inscriptions which use the three-barred sigma but have no other indication of earliness (a full-preserved archon-name would settle the matter), and the result has been a clustering of texts in the 420s. This makes it harder to trace qualitative change by means of inscriptions, unless we are to go back to the old 'harshness-of-Kleon' approach.

But there was a change: the best evidence is a chapter of Thucydides (1. 99), which clearly looks forward over many decades from its immediate narrative context of 478. The passage is important because for once Thucydides offers comment in his own person, rather than through the mouth of a speaker. He seeks to explain the revolts of the cities allied to Athens, and speaks of the growing unpopularity of the Athenians as a result of their oppressive and exacting methods.[17]

Part of the trouble, though, is admittedly a gap in the evidence. There are hardly any relevant Athenian inscriptions which can be confidently dated before *c.* 460, but several dozen decrees after that. This cannot easily be explained, any more than can the absence of surviving forensic (i.e. law court) oratory before the Peloponnesian War. A better approach is to abandon the attempt to associate changes in the machinery of control with particular individuals or decades, and to look at its structure rather than its development.

## Mechanisms of control

The administrative and political checks on the allies were numerous and hard to escape from: they consisted of several hundreds of Athenian officials, governors, 'supervisors' (*episkopoi*) – and garrisons. Sometimes garrisons were sent at the request of the democratic party in the 'host' city, as by Kerkyra in *c.* 410 (Diod. 13. 48. 5), and this can be seen as part of Athens' policy of supporting democracies (for which, see explicitly Ar. *Pol.* 1307b22).

But what exactly did 'supporting democracies' mean, especially in places with very small populations? It would have been futile to insist that such places adopt Athens' own fierce democratic rules about, say, the interval that must elapse before serving again in the local city council (*boule*), or about the size of that council. And in fact one of the earliest and best pieces of evidence for a political settlement imposed by Athens (the Erythrai decree of 454/3, ML 40 = Fornara 71) shows that the Athenians were realistic, not ideologically dogmatic: there is to be a council of 120 (contrast the 500 at Athens) and you could not serve again for four years (contrast the much severer restriction at Athens, twice in your entire lifetime). Erythrai in western Asia Minor was a small place, and the number and even the identity of the politically active Erythraians was going to be much the same whether they called themselves a 'democracy' or an 'oligarchy'. (Not that any oligarchs anywhere would have *called* themselves that; they would have demurely called themselves an 'aristocracy' in the ancient Greek sense, i.e. 'rule of the best',

Th. 3.82.8.) What mattered from the Athenian point of view was to install or support pro-Athenian personnel.[18] In any case the Athenians did tolerate some outright oligarchies, if we can believe the *Old Oligarch* (3. 11), which claims that they did so in Miletus and Boiotia; and there are other possible places, such as Samos.[19] From the 'Tribute Lists' we can add that the league membership included Karian dynasts with very un-Greek names like Pigres and Sambaktys.

Judicially, Athenian control was tight. Foreign defendants were obliged to come to Athens to be sued there (ML 31 = Fornara 68); the disadvantages of this to them were not just expense of travel, and politically motivated hostility, but uncertainty about the actual law. The 'undirected', i.e. judgeless, juries of classical Athens hindered the development of exact law. One consequence of the concentration of certain types of lawsuits in Athens (those involving particular penalties) was that subject states lost the power to inflict the death penalty (Antiphon 5. 47; ML 52 = Fornara 103, decree concerning the people of Chalkis on Euboia).

Economic coercion also made use of the law: in the fourth century, and quite possibly in the fifth as well, there were rules prohibiting Athenian citizens from carrying corn elsewhere than to Athens, and from lending money on ships bound elsewhere than to Athens (Dem. 34. 37, 35. 51). There were also more direct tactics: a securely dated Athenian inscription of 428 mentions 'Wardens of the Hellespont' (ML 65 = Fornara 128), who controlled the passage of corn from the Black Sea, presumably by exacting customs dues on it.[20] Nor was this just a war measure: a 10 per cent levy (at the Hellespont, perhaps) is mentioned in a decree of about 434/3 (ML 58 = Fornara 119). Above all there was the tribute, up to thirty talents from the highest payers (Aigina, Thasos), and carefully adjusted to capacity to pay. Antiphon's speech *On the Tribute of Samothrace*, of which only a fragment survives, shows the kind of arguments a subject-city would use: 'ours is unproductive rough land, much of it uncultivated . . .' and so on.[21] It is hard to be sure how much of a burden it was felt by the allies to be, or quite how large and important an element in Athenian public finances it was. On the first point, it is curious that tribute does not feature as a grievance in speeches by anti-Athenian speakers in Thucydides. Such speakers mention tribute all right, but usually to make a point about Athenian financial strength (see e.g. 3.13.6 and 4.87.3). This leads to the second point: just how important was it to Athens? It would be absurd to *deny* its great importance; nevertheless there is a risk of exaggerating that importance simply because we have the inscribed evidence for the tribute, whereas we can only conjecture the amounts which came in from other sources. But those other sources, which include, for example, income from the silver mines, should never be forgotten[22] (note that Pericles at 2. 13. 3 carefully speaks of money coming in from the tribute 'in addition to the other revenue').

Territorial encroachment was the most resented abuse of all, as is proved by the specific renunciations in the 'charter' of the Second Athenian Confederacy

of 377 (Tod 123 = Harding 35). For the lower classes at Athens the empire meant *cleruchies* (grants of land on territory still possessed by allies) or colonies (similar grants on evacuated sites).[23] For the upper classes it meant that they did not have to pay for the fleet, an enormous benefit. Aristotle in the *Politics* (1304b) shows that in states where the rich had to foot the bill for the navy without being cushioned by tribute, social revolution could result. His example is fourth-century Rhodes. More positively, the empire meant the possibility of estates overseas,[24] like those in Thasos, Abydos and Euboia, attested in inscriptions (Osborne 2000b: nos. 239–243), one of which was worth the staggering sum of over eighty talents (half a million drachmai, see Glossary at p. xxi). Some of these properties could, it is true, have been properly acquired by marriages to foreign heiresses, but most were, from the allied point of view, completely illegal because of the general rule that ownership of land within the territory of a given *polis* was confined to citizens of that *polis.* All this meant that rich and poor Athenians were in agreement about the desirability of having, running and policing the empire; a solidarity not broken until the financial crisis after the Sicilian expedition (below p. 154).[25]

Against this treatment there was no redress for the allies, apart from knowing influential contacts at Athens: Athens lacked what Rome later provided, a system of extortion law and courts. The positive advantages to the allies of subservience to Athens included security from Persia (a protection which was at most times no more than propaganda, and anyway covered only cities which were vulnerably placed) and from piracy. There may even have been allies who, when they visited the buildings, like the Parthenon, on the Athenian Acropolis and its south slope, thought that their tribute had been splendidly, and not altogether selfishly, spent. In any case, their views are irrecoverable.

# 3

# EMPIRE

## Early years

The new Athenian alliance had little to fear from the Persians in the years immediately after its formation. The initiative passed to the Athenians. Their first naval success was to expel Pausanias from Byzantium (he had avoided conviction after his recall to Sparta, and had returned to Byzantium). The Athenian campaigns which follow – the capture of Eion in northern Greece, on the River Strymon, and of the island of Skyros, north-east of Euboia, both in 476/5 – were the work of Kimon, son of Miltiades the victor of Marathon. Miltiades' last operation (in 489) against the island of Paros, in the Cyclades, can be seen as an attempt to move on to the offensive against Persia after the defensive stand at Marathon. Paros had been a failure; but Miltiades' son Kimon pursued a similar line in the 470s and 460s, showing that he saw himself as the heir to his father's policies as well as to his debts (for which see Plut. *Kim.* 4). But the similarity goes further: Miltiades had been a great figure in the early colonial days of Athens; his pocket principality in the Chersonese was in the van of Pisistratid expansion (for good relations between the tyrants and Miltiades in the 520s see the archon-list ML 6 = Fornara 23, belying Herodotus: Miltiades had held high office under the tyrants). In a sense, such sixth-century conquests are the beginning of Athenian imperialism. So Kimon's campaigns, which culminated in a victory over the Persians at the River Eurymedon in Pamphylia, show continuity not just with Miltiades the enemy of Persia but with Miltiades the founder of an overseas Athenian empire. This was very deliberate imitation, as is proved by the peculiarities of some epigrams which celebrate the family's achievements: a surviving pair commemorates the victories over Persia in the strange order Salamis-Marathon,[1] although Marathon was the earlier battle by ten years. It was perhaps Kimon himself who sought in this way to remind Athenians, in verse, of his father's great battle, just as painters were to remind them of it by their *Marathon* in the Painted Stoa at Athens, built in the middle of the fifth century.[2] Marathon was also monumentally remembered at the great sanctuary of Delphi, where the inscribed 'Marathon base' (ML 19 = Fornara 50) was built against the Athenian Treasury (a building to house dedications), and where

Miltiades in particular was commemorated by a statue in the 'monument of the eponymous heroes' (Paus. 10. 10. 1). This statue stood alongside statues of Athena, Apollo and the local heroes after whom the Athenian tribes or citizen units were named. So daring a juxtaposition was not quite deification or even the lesser religious honour of heroization, but it came close – closer, one feels, than Kimon (if he was behind the commission, as the French experts on the sanctuary believe) would have felt able to go in Athens itself.[3] Kimon was not the only statesman who sought to recall Marathon specifically: it has been ingeniously suggested that the 192 horsemen of the Parthenon frieze, begun after Kimon's death and completed as late as the 430s, may depict the Marathon dead, who numbered just 192, and who were given heroic honours (see Fig. 3.1). That would justify the otherwise difficult-to-explain horsemen on the frieze (Marathon was not a cavalry battle), because cavalry competitions were a feature of funerals for heroes.[4]

Kimon's attack on Skyros was an example of an action carried out in accordance with the instructions of an oracle, a form of divination involving the consultation of a god or hero at a fixed oracular site; the responses were transmitted by a priest or priestess. Delphi was the most prestigious oracular site in the entire Greek world, and it was Delphi which had given the Athenians instructions to bring back the bones of the mythical Athenian hero Theseus, buried on Skyros (Plut. *Kim.* 8 and *Thes.* 36). Not that Thucydides mentions the oracular aspect; his narrative of the years 479–440 is too brief for such details, and in any case the religious motive is the kind of thing his narrative highlights only rarely.[5]

Delphi was a magnificent sanctuary (Fig. 3.2) as well as the seat of an oracle, and it is possible that after Skyros, Kimon put up a thank offering



*Figure 3.1* A pair of horsemen from the frieze of the Parthenon

there.[6] Athenian interest in Delphi meant interest in central Greece, and control of land as well as sea. Themistokles, as well as Kimon, perceived the political value of a friendly or at least neutral Delphi: in about 478, when the Spartans tried to expel the medizing majority from the Delphic Amphiktiony (the multistate organization which decided the sanctuary's affairs), it was Themistokles who opposed them, arguing that to get rid of the medizers would make the amphiktiony unrepresentative of Greece: more bluntly, it would make a present of Delphi to Sparta (Plut. *Themistokles* 20).[7]

On that occasion Themistokles carried his view; but (Plutarch says) the Spartans took against him from that moment, preferring to advance Kimon instead. This is simplified and implausible (how could the Spartans exercise influence over Athenian politics?) but the grain of truth is that Themistokles was indeed out of favour at Athens by the end of the 470s, when he was ostracized (see Diod. 11. 54 and Fornara 65 generally for the final phase of Themistokles' career). Perhaps we should not look for too deep a political explanation: ostracism was for the man whose leadership had been rejected – which might happen for reasons of style rather than content – and whose disapproving presence was an obstruction and a reproach. In any case the messages on surviving *ostraka* are a warning against excessively political interpretations of the institution, which can be seen as a religious mechanism, a way of driving out the polluting scapegoat.

One has 'let Kimon take his sister Elpinike and get out', i.e. we have here an accusation of incest; others describe Pericles' father Xanthippus as an accursed leader and Themistokles himself as 'under a curse'.[8]



*Figure 3.2* Delphi: general view

Shortly before Themistokles fell, Aeschylus (in 472) produced a play, the *Persians*, which reminded the audience of how Themistokles had deceived King Xerxes at the time of the battle of Salamis. From a poet whose plays elsewhere show sympathy with Themistoklean policies (below, n. 10), this must be a topical not a nostalgic allusion, a contribution to a debate about whether Themistokles should stay or go. The production of the play was financed (see *Syll.*[3] 1078[9]) by the young politician Pericles, who cannot have been indifferent to its pro-Themistoklean content. That Pericles' maternal relatives, the noble family of the Alkmaionidai, were enemies of Themistokles (as they certainly were) is no objection to this view: Pericles' father had already distanced himself from the Alkmaionids by the time of his ostracism in 484 (*Ath. Pol.* 22, where his politics are distinguished from those of his Alkmaionid kinsman Megakles).

Themistokles' friends were, however, either too young (like Pericles) or too powerless (like Aeschylus, who, as a poet, had to put his points obliquely), and he was ostracized. He went first to the Peloponnese (above, p. 11) and then found a permanent home in the Persian king's Asia. He was condemned to death in his absence (469), and arrived in Persia as late as 465, eluding *en route* an Athenian fleet which was besieging Naxos.

It will not do to paint Themistokles as Kimon's opponent on the issue of foreign policy principles – that is, as a medizing Sparta-hater – and thereby seek to explain his ostracism in 471: it is now certain that very many *ostraka* were cast against him in the early 480s when his patriotism was not in question. And the logic of Themistoklean imperialism was perfectly compatible with the expansion of Athenian power in the Aegean for which Kimon was responsible, and which ultimately roused Kimon's friends the Spartans to make war on Athens, in 431.

That expansion had continued, after Eion and Skyros, with the coercion of Karystos on Euboia, and the suppression of the revolt of Naxos, the largest island of the Cyclades, which attempted to revolt in the early 460s. Individual Athenians felt no compunction at this tightening of the screws: some Athenian parents of about this time called their sons Karystonikos, shamelessly exulting in the 'Victory over Karystos', and the name Naxiades, which occurs in the same casualty list, can be similarly explained (ML 48 lines 27 and 49).

The Athenians did not, however, lose sight of the Persian War which, in accordance with the propaganda of 478, was still going on throughout the 470s. Soon after Naxos, the Athenians undertook a big, aggressive campaign in the south-eastern Aegean, under Kimon's leadership; this was perhaps in response to allied discontent at the way the league was turning into a machine for policing its own members. The Persian fleet put out from Cyprus and was defeated in Pamphylia (southern Asia Minor) at the battle of the River Eurymedon. This brought in new allies, particularly from inland Karia, and new revenue. Returning from this success, Kimon was obliged to deal with a big allied revolt, that of Thasos, an island in

the north Aegean which controlled rich minerals on its mainland holdings opposite (its *peraia*). It may indeed have been the news from Thasos which turned Kimon back from seeking further conquests after the Eurymedon victory. Ancient states did not much practise 'economic policies' in our sense, but they liked to control their own sources of corn, and of silver for the purpose of coining. So, because of the silver mines which it controlled, Thasos was – considerations of league discipline apart – too important to be allowed to secede (465).

At last the Spartans began to stir. When the Thasians, under siege by Kimon, appealed to them for help, they offered 'secretly' (but the offer was evidently everybody's secret at Athens) to invade Attica and thereby relieve Thasos indirectly. (Th. 1 101; Th. 1. 97–117 is the main source for the long period 479–440.) This was a clumsy piece of diplomacy: the offer was not implemented, though Thucydides is convinced that it was sincere, and we have no way of checking the grounds for his conviction. The Spartans' offer cannot have pleased their friend Kimon, any more than it pleased politicians of a more obviously radical complexion. But the same year, 465, saw the biter bit: instead of forcing the Athenians to abandon an overseas operation to deal with a problem nearer home, that is, a Spartan army menacing the Attic border, the Spartans were themselves forced to go back on the Thasos offer, because they had to deal with a revolt of the helots at Ithome in Messenia. This coincided with an earthquake – for a superstitious Spartan, a sign of divine disapproval, which might well make the helots, who were surely experts in the psychology of their oppressors, hope that Spartan nerve might give way.

Unable to cope alone, the Spartans called on the Athenians for help. The inconsistency is striking: unwilling to see the Athenians put down Thasos, a rebel subject, the Spartans nevertheless call on the Athenians to join them in putting down their own rebel subjects. Kimon's prestige was still great enough to get help voted, though he had first to beat back a prosecution for bribery over Thasos by Pericles. What happens next is a cardinal moment in fifth-century Greek history.

## The 'Ephialtic' reforms at Athens

The Athenians, 4000 hoplites (Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* line 1143) and their commander Kimon were sent home by the Spartans, who feared what Thucydides, echoed by Plutarch, calls their *neateropoiia,* their subversive tendencies. This rebuff led to a shift in Athenian domestic politics – the ostracism of Kimon – and to a switch to an audaciously anti-Spartan stance in foreign affairs – alliances with Argos and Thessaly and the acceptance of the adhesion of Megara. During Kimon's absence, the democratization of the Athenian constitution was taken a stage further. The Areopagus, the upper council in the Athenian state, composed of former archons (the nine officers of state), was deprived of its political and legal functions, other than those which

concerned a few types of homicide case. These powers, which the reformer Ephialtes and Pericles tendentiously represented as 'usurped privileges',[10] were given to the Council of 500 and to the people, i.e. Assembly and the law courts. Just what was redistributed in this way is obscure, but the Areopagus almost certainly lost its very important prospective control of magistrates through the *dokimasia* (testing of qualifications for office),[11] and perhaps also the right to hear charges of offences against the state (*eisangeliai*), unless this had already been removed from it. Also, the nine archons lost their first-instance jurisdiction to the popular law courts. Finally, the punitive powers of the 'Kleisthenic' Council of 500 were defined for the first time. (*Ath. Pol.* 25f.).

In Plutarch (*Kim.* 15), Kimon tried to reverse these changes on his return from Ithome. This has created a temptation to explain the passing of the radical reforms by pointing to the absence of the 'conservative' Kimon and his 4000 'conservative hoplites'. But this is wrong, for several reasons. First, the Athenians who were dismissed from Ithome for 'subversive tendencies' were not the Athenians who were at that moment overturning the Areopagus but precisely Kimon and 'his' hoplites (but we have no right to assume that he chose them personally; 4000 is a lot of people to know by name). So they were not conservatives at all. Second, a related point, the class of hoplites (technically, the 'zeugite' class) and the class of thetes (the lowest of the four census ratings introduced by Solon in 594) were not opposed groups:[12] on the contrary, both classes stood to gain from the demotion of the Areopagus. (It is relevant that the archonship was not open to the zeugites until 457; to the thetes informally some time after that date, and, formally, never. Both, then, were politically underprivileged groups in 462.) Third, we should ask, *who* ostracized Kimon? He was ostracized after his return by an 'electorate' which certainly included the 4000 hoplites he had brought back from Ithome, who went on to fight the Spartans hard over the next decade and a half of warfare (the so-called First Peloponnesian War, see below). Kimon, therefore, was dumped by (among others) his own troops of a few months before – he was, after all, the man who had got them into the Ithome mess. Kimon (we should remember Thasos after all) may not have been very well pleased with the way his Spartan friends had treated him, but that did not save him. Fourth, and finally, the rejection of the Athenians by the Spartans makes more sense if the Ephialtic reforms are seen as part of a process rather than as an event; that is, if the qualities which the Spartans feared were gradually manifesting themselves over the whole thirty-year period, 487–457.

The process had begun many years earlier with a reform in 487, the introduction of the lot (sortition) instead of election for the archonship. This was presumably done because the lot was considered more democratic, though it was used for some purposes at less-than-wholeheartedly-democratic Rome,[13] and though the 487 change at Athens need not necessarily have resulted in a lowering of the prestige of the archonship.[14] (Or rather, a *further* lowering: what really reduced the power of the archons was the introduction

in 501/0 of the *strategoi* or generals, a panel of ten which served as the main military and naval command.) Again, the new limitation on the first-instance jurisdiction of the archons is not likely to have replaced the old system at a stroke; a decree for Phaselis in southern Asia Minor (ML 31 = Fornara 68) which implies that the relevant archon still has substantive powers, could thus date from a little *after* 462 – but not much. And there are a number of other changes which are not directly associated with Ephialtes in the literary sources, and which are hard to nail down chronologically, but which surely form part of the great process of democratization. For instance, no source tells us explicitly when members of the Council of 500 (the *boule*) began to be paid, or when they began to be appointed by lot from a larger list, rather than being elected. They were surely not paid in the late sixth century when Kleisthenes introduced the new Council of Five Hundred (jury pay, not introduced before the 460s, is the headline-hitting item, so other types of political pay must post-date jury pay). But by the year 411 councillors were certainly paid: a passage of Thucydides (8. 69. 4) which actually reports how the democratic council was paid off and discharged in the oligarchic coup of that year, is the first evidence for council pay. The same passage of Thucydides shows that by that time the council was appointed by lot (or rather 'from the bean' as the Greek expression was), but is not quite the first bit of evidence: the Athenian regulations for Erythrai (ML 40 = Fornara 71) attest the imposition of a 'bean'-council there in 453, and it is fair to assume that the Athenians would not have exported an institution more democratic than was to be found at Athens itself. On the other hand, the council in 508 was not appointed by lot, because the headline-hitting item in this area is sortition for the archonship (above), and that was not introduced until 487, so it is safe to assume that it was the first. So the chronological band is 508–411 for pay and 508–453 for the beans. Surely we can regard both these changes as 'Ephialtic' too. Finally, and more speculatively, we may wonder whether the remarkable democratic innovation, whereby the state took responsibility for the burial of war dead, does not also belong in this general milieu.[15] This was an extension of Solon's principle of substituting the *polis* for the *oikos* or family/household.

To return to Plutarch's account of the immediate politics of the 460s, we must still explain why Kimon's opponents waited, as they evidently did, until the cat was away. The answer is not difficult, if we remember that each meeting of the Assembly was different in composition from all others; personal oratory and ascendancy, not party organization, decided the issues, and that is why the absence of Kimon mattered so much: he would have given his usual speech on the 'special relationship' with Sparta, urging that nothing be done to the Athenian constitution which would cause oligarchic Sparta to take mortal offence. Again, this makes sense only if it is allowed that Kimon had, for several years already, had his rivals: Pericles had prosecuted him for bribery, although the charge was withdrawn. That looks like a young man's demagoguery (cp. Julius Caesar's prosecution of Dolabella, or the way Cicero avoided taking prosecution briefs after his youthful attack on Verres). Pericles'

next logical step was to get a power base. So, to outdo Kimon, who threw his orchards open to the Athenian public, Pericles introduced pay for juries. The final step was the Ephialtic reforms, or rather their main phase. So Kimon's rivals, Pericles and Ephialtes, were not political newcomers in 462. Here, as elsewhere in Greek history, the temptation to have one politician off the stage before his 'successor' arrives, as in a well-constructed old-fashioned play, is delusive. Pericles overlapped with Ephialtes, and both of them overlapped with Kimon; and for a while it may have seemed feasible to operate Kimonian politics alongside those of his more radical competitors.

### The 'First Peloponnesian War'

By making an alliance with the Megarians, the Athenians were clearly seeking to secure themselves from a lightning invasion from the west – the threat which had been made at the time of Thasos. The Megarian alliance did not, however, automatically produce a state of war between Athens and Sparta;[16] on the contrary, the *polis* which really suffered from the Megarian change of loyalties was Corinth: Thucydides dates from this moment the emphatic hatred, the *sphodron misos*, which the Corinthians felt for the Athenians. This was a new factor in Athenian politics; previously relations had been friendly on the whole, partly for the standard reason that Greeks tended to be friends with their neighbours' enemies. Thus the Megarian–Corinthian quarrel, which drove the Megarians to detach themselves from the Peloponnesian League in 461 and join the Athenians, was originally over boundary land. *That* was a quarrel which went back to at least 720 BC, when the athlete Orsippos of Megara, more famous as the first man to run nude in the Olympic Games, 'freed' some borderland from the Corinthians (Hicks and Hill, no.l).

Corinthian friendliness towards Athens lasted throughout the archaic period and into the classical, i.e. as long as Megara was an independent power, capable of causing trouble for both Corinth to the west and Athens to the east: Megara's tyrant Theagenes helped a young man called Kylon in an attempt to become tyrant of Athens in the seventh century (Th. 1. 126) and, in the early sixth, Megara fought Athens hard for possession of Salamis. Fellow feeling between Athenians and Corinthians, occasioned by Megara, is traceable as far back as the time of the Cypselid tyrant of Corinth, Periander: called on to arbitrate between Athens and Lesbos over the possession of Sigeion on the Hellespont, he awarded it to Athens (Hdt. 5. 95, cp. 6. 108 for another Corinthian arbitration, in effect favourable to Athens, this time concerning Plataia). The Sigeion award cannot have pleased the Megarians or their daughter-cities in the region, like Byzantium. Then it was a Corinthian who, in the late sixth century, made a speech (Hdt. 5. 92) which saved Athens from invasion by Spartans who wanted to reinstate the Pisistratid tyrant Hippias. Finally, the Corinthians lent the Athenians twenty ships for their war against Aigina (Hdt. 6. 89; Th. 1 41. 2). Here we have a maritime application of the same principle which, by

land, determined Corinthian attitudes to Athens and Megara; the Corinthian policy was to strengthen whichever of Athens or Aigina looked the weaker, so as to prevent the stronger from controlling the Saronic Gulf. Stories in Herodotus of Corinthian–Athenian rivalry in the Persian Wars go back, not to 480, but to the 450s or later, when Herodotus was gathering his material and when the First Peloponnesian war had poisoned attitudes. The truth was that the Corinthians fought bravely in the Persian Wars (see ML 24 = Fornara 21 (battle of Salamis) and the 'New Simonides' (the battle of Plataia)).[17] In the early decades of the fifth century, the Corinthians tended to favour Athens against Megara by land and against Aigina by sea. That all changed when the Athenians threatened to absorb Megara and Aigina – which was the position at the end of the 460s: the Athenians subjected Aigina in 458/7. Incidentally the pattern was to be repeated thirty years later: when under the Thirty Years' Peace (446) the Megarians returned to the Peloponnesian League, and the Aiginetans regained some kind of autonomy, Corinthian hostility towards Athens abated, only to revive in the mid-430s when the Athenians once again began to pressurize the Megarians, by the 'Megarian Decrees', and to infringe the autonomy of Aigina (Th. 1. 67 and below, Chapter 9).

It was, then, the Corinthians not the Spartans who were mostly nearly affected by the rapprochement between the Athenians and Megarians in *c.* 460 and, consistently with this, it was the Corinthians rather than the Spartans who fought Athens hardest in the war which now broke out, the so-called First Peloponnesian War.

What was this war really about? Thucydides does not subject it to deep causal analysis, in contrast to his treatment of the main Peloponnesian War which broke out three decades later. It has been cogently argued[18] that the first war had its origins in Corinthian expansionism, not just in the direction of the Megarid (see above) but towards the south, in the direction of Argos. The rivalry between Corinth and Argos took an interesting form: it seems that in the middle decades of the fifth century, these two were engaged in a struggle for control of or influence at one of the four great panhellenic sanctuaries, Nemea (the others were Delphi, Olympia and Isthmia). Such control or influence had been from archaic times a more or less peaceful alternative to warfare;[19] there was, as the tyrants of the seventh and sixth centuries discovered, great prestige to be derived from the kind of activities which went on in these places – that is, from financing lavish new building works where athletes, spectators and pilgrims could see them, and from exercising organizational ascendancy at the great festivals and ritual athletic contests held every two years (Nemea, Isthmia) or every four years (Olympia, Delphi, where the games were called the Pythian). Athletic success at the four great sets of games still conferred more than purely political prestige, as we see from the account in Thucydides (5. 49–50) of the Olympic Games of 420 BC: the Spartans had, because of failure to pay a fine, been temporarily excluded from the games by Elis, which controlled the sanctuary and its affairs. Everyone feared that the Spartans would assert themselves by armed force. As it turned out, it all passed off peacefully,

after Lichas the Spartan had entered for and won the chariot race in a Boiotian livery so as to evade the exclusion (below, p. 167). Again, note Thucydides' very revealing comparison of the delirious reception of Brasidas at Skione (423 BC) to the welcome given to an *athlete* (4. 121. 1: p. 162).[20] The days were past when 'panhellenic' status could be secured for a sanctuary other than the canonical four mentioned above; but by their deliberate cultic attention to Delos in 426/5 BC, and their revival in more splendid style of the old Delian festival, the Athenians were doing the next best thing to conferring Big Four status on a sanctuary at the centre of their sphere of imperial influence (for this episode see below p. 164). Now the *polis* which looked after Nemea and the Nemean festival (that is, the counterpart of Elis in its relation to Olympia) was the small and otherwise insignificant state of Kleonai, and this supervisory relationship adds an important religious dimension to the struggle between the Argives and Corinthians for possession of Kleonai during the First Peloponnesian War. It is a dimension entirely ignored by Thucydides, who takes such religious aspects of Greek life for granted. He prefers on the whole (despite occasional revealing coverage like that at 5. 49–50, see above) to concentrate on competition of a military and diplomatic type, and thus underestimates and under-reports the degree to which such religious considerations did in fact affect the war and diplomacy which was his own ostensible theme (Nemea: Fig. 3.3).

So it was a religious struggle, between Argives and Corinthians; but perhaps also a religious struggle between Athenians and Spartans, for influence at another of the Big Four, namely Delphi. As we have seen in connection with



*Figure 3.3* Nemea: the temple of Zeus

Themistokles and the medizers, Delphi's affairs were not administered by any single *polis* but by the amphiktiony, an organization made up of different ethnic units, with Thessaly preponderating, for historical reasons (this last feature may suggest that there was an amphiktionic aspect to the Athenians' alliance with the Thessalians, Th. 1. 102. 4, as well as with Argives and Megarians, at the beginning of the war). The amphiktiony could impose fines for offences like cultivation of sacred territory, with fines or even 'sacred wars' as the sanction; such offences were matters of definition, and gave scope for manipulation (or if that is a too cynical and modern a way of putting it, for self-assertion) by powerful member states. The international aspect to all this meant that influence at Delphi was even more desirable than influence at Nemea. But for the Spartans, who 'valued the things of the god more than the things of men' (Hdt. 5. 62. 2), it must have been annoying that there was an obstacle to amphiktionic influence: Sparta's voting status was tenuous and indirect, being exercised only *via* the 'Dorians of the Metropolis', a small people in central Greece.[21] This connection between Sparta as daughter-city and Doris as Metropolis or mother-city explains why the Spartans exerted themselves on behalf of their metropolis or 'mother-city' Doris in 458/7, as we shall see they did. This time Thucydides does make the religious or sentimental connection explicitly clear (1. 107. 2. These Metropolitan Dorians continued, even in hellenistic times, to enjoy prestige out of proportion to their numbers or political importance: *SEG* 38. 1476, from the late third century BC, records an appeal for financial help from Kytinion, one of the small *poleis* of the metropolitan Dorians, to Xanthos in Lycia; the people of Kytinion appeal to shared Dorian kinship, just as they appealed to the Spartans two and a half centuries earlier.)[22] But it was not satisfactory, from Sparta's point of view, for their Delphic influence to be so dependent on religious ventriloquism of this sort, that is, for their voice to be heard only through the mouth of tiny Doris; and it was arguably in order to secure more direct control of an amphiktionic vote that the Spartans founded a new city at Herakleia in Trachis (426 BC: Th. 3. 92, cf. p. 163). Certainly, Herakleia has its own amphiktionic vote in the 340s when Delphic inscriptions begin to be informative on this sort of thing, and it is likely that the arrangement goes back to 426 and that the Spartans' motive for the foundation was, in part, to pocket a new, Dorian, amphiktionic voting unit. (Twelve chapters later Thucydides records the Athenian reorganization of the *Ionian* festival at Delos, already mentioned above; surely a religious response to a piece of religious warfare.). We shall see (p. 33) that the Athenians, in the First Peloponnesian War, also tried to win the favour of Delphi (both oracle and amphiktiony, compare above on the Athenian–Thessalian alliance) and that the Athenians and Spartans clashed directly at the end of the 450s at Delphi in the so-called Second Sacred War (the first had been fought in the early sixth century): Th. 1. 112.[23] Here then is a parallel level of conflict to Argive–Corinthian competition for control of Nemea, namely, Athenian–Spartan competition for influence at and the favour of Delphi. If this aspect is kept in mind, we shall be less

impressed than most modern scholars have been by Spartan 'passivity' in the First Peloponnesian War: on the contrary, the Spartans act decisively and in force whenever their Delphic standing is threatened (the move in defence of Doris; the Second Sacred War).

But the first engagement of the war, that at Halieis, a port in the Argolic Gulf, was certainly fought between Athenians and (not Spartans but) Corinthians, plus Epidaurians and (on the evidence of *SEG* 31. 369) Sikyonians. Moroever a sea battle which followed, off Kekryphaleia, a small island between Aigina and Epidaurus, and some fighting on Aigina itself and in the Megarid, were conducted by 'the Peloponnesians', who are 'presumably the same combination' as at Halieis.[24] The Spartans do not yet seem to be involved: in the operations in the Megarid the Corinthians, and only the Corinthians, are mentioned by name on the Peloponnesian side. The emphasis on Corinth and the Corinthians is very pronounced, and may be a function of Thucydides' heavy use of Corinthian oral informants.[25] The Spartans had not yet come to blows with the Athenians, but that would change, and it would be wrong to assume they were indifferent to what was happening.

In all these engagements the Athenians were conspicuously successful, the more remarkably so because they were involved, from perhaps 459, in a distant adventure requiring much manpower, an Egyptian revolt from Persia. The violence and confusion which Diodorus (11.71) says marked the end of Xerxes (465)[26] and the accession of Artaxerxes I, who acquired the throne by murdering his elder brother, led Egypt in the south of the empire and Baktria in the east to revolt in the hope of freedom. Of the Baktrian revolt nothing is known except that the satrapy was recovered by aid of a providential wind, presumably a sandstorm blowing from the steppes. In Egypt the rebel leader was Inaros, a Libyan chieftain, who applied (*c.* 460) to the Athenians for help. He was doing quite well even without it: he had already defeated and killed the satrap Achaimenes, Xerxes' brother (Hdt. 3. 12; 7. 7). When the message arrived, Thucydides says, the Athenians 'were just then engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies'. But they let themselves be diverted to the Nile Delta and there holed up the Persians in the 'White Castle'. The mention of Cyprus is interesting because it shows that Egypt was not mere opportunism: the decision to attack Persia in strength on Cyprus had already been made. A casualty list (ML 33 = Fornara 78) confirms this: it starts with Cyprus and Egypt, in that order. (The list contains the casualties from just one of the ten Athenian tribes, and includes no less than two generals as well as an impressively large number of other names – 177 in all.) The Cyprus expedition shows that, even after ostracizing Kimon, the Athenians were happy to follow up his Eurymedon victory. In other words, the 'Themistoklean' policy of aggression towards Sparta did not exclude 'Kimonian' war on Persia.

What the Athenians wanted from Egypt is not stated by the sources, which are very bad; but Egypt was a supplier of corn to other states, from biblical times to the Roman empire. This landed wealth of Egypt was, later in the fifth

century, exploited by rentier Iranian landowners who screwed all they could out of the local peasants: their demands are preserved in Aramaic on leather documents bought in Egypt in 1943–4 and now in the Bodleian Library in Oxford.[27] That quoted below, p. 69, refers to the rent paid on Egyptian domain land to a Persian absentee overlord. To cut the Persian nobility off from such sources of revenue would be a good way of avenging the Persian attempt to satrapize Greece in 480, and to farm Attica and Euboia as royal estates. But the negative motive is not the whole of it; the Athenians were anxious about their own supplies of grain in the mid-fifth century, and benefited in 445/4 from a massive gift of corn – 30,000 medimnoi, or a million and a half daily rations – from an Egyptian prince 'Psammetichos' (Philochorus F 119 = Fornara 86). It has been supposed that the Athenians' ambitious foreign policy of this period was forced on them by the need to seek alternative supplies of corn, because their usual overseas sources, Thrace and the Black Sea region, had arguably both become precarious.[28] Thrace was always in fifth-century Athenian thoughts,[29] and the connection found curious mythological expression in a story that the Thracians and Athenians were related by ties of kinship, through the Athenian Procne's marriage to the Thracian Tereus (Xen. *Anab.* 7. 2. 31 and 7. 3. 39. The story was known to but rejected by Thucydides, 2. 29. 1–3). But Thucydides' stress on Athenian anxiety to clinch an alliance with the Thracian ruler Sitalkes in 431 (2. 29. 1) surely implies that relations had been sticky before that, although there is much uncertainty about the chronology of the reigns of Sitalkes and of his father Teres.[30] As for the Black Sea (the Bosporan kingdom), the sequence of events and the chronology are again obscure, but the Archaianaktid dynasty which had ruled since about 480 was succeeded in about 440 – about the time when Byzantium at the entrance to the Black Sea joined Samos in its revolt from Athens – by the Spartokid dynasty. There is reason (mention of 'exiles' at Theodosia in the Crimea) for thinking that the changeover was preceded by a period of political disturbance.[31]

But there are two distinct difficulties about the 'alternative supplies of corn' thesis. First, the political facts which it presupposes are disputed, and second, its assumptions are said to be untrue to the realities of ancient economic history. First, the political facts: one of the alternative suppliers was thought to be Sicily, and one attraction of the thesis was that it provided a specific motive for the Athenians very brash, early (458) and ambitious-looking alliance with the people of Egesta (the Latin form of the name is Segesta), a non-Greek town far in the interior of Sicily (ML 37 = Fornara 81). But the dating of this inscription was never certain or agreed, and we have already seen that scholarly opinion now inclines to a much later date for the inscription, namely 418.[32] But there is other early evidence for Athenian contacts with this part of the world (Hdt. 8. 62. 2 has Themistokles in 480 claim that Siris in south Italy was an old Athenian possession, whatever exactly lies behind this) and it is certainly not the last, see below pp. 59, 169f.

Second, it has been recently and acutely argued by Peter Garnsey that the classical Athenians were less dependent on foreign grain than has often been assumed.[33] No document earlier than the first decade of the war refers to the Wardens of the Hellespont, and this (it is said) suggests that the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was a crucial turning point.[34] Against this, one might wish to quote the influential ancient historian Moses Finley, speaking of these same Wardens: 'the temptation to label them a "wartime measure" must be resisted. Not only does it introduce the argument from silence, about which I have already said enough, but it ignores the fact that very few years since 478 were not "wartime years"'.[35]

But is there specific evidence for the mid-fifth-century period? Yes, there is: an admittedly very fragmentary Athenian inscription of perhaps before 445 (*IG* $1^3$30 = Hill$^2$ B47) seems to thank someone for help 'in the corn shortage'. In any case we must distinguish between real and perceived needs: Thucydides makes Nikias in 415 speak in a worried way about Athenian dependence on imported grain (6. 20. 4) and such fears may have been widely shared at even earlier dates, even if we, with the benefit of tables and statistics prepared by modern economic historians, may wish to conclude that such fears were to some extent irrational. But Garnsey has made out a strong case against the older view, and the line taken throughout the present edition of this book on this important issue has been modified accordingly. It is true that as late as 1991, the distinguished American scholar W. K. Pritchett remarked that 'a great deal of acuteness and learning has been in large part wasted in not recognizing Athens' permanent dependence on imported grain',[36] but I suspect that we should not here press 'permanent' too hard because the remark occurs in a section on the Athenian economy of the fourth century. A final point we should keep in mind is that grain was not the only commodity. Another major motive for fifth-century Athenian interest in the west is plausibly thought[37] to have been desire for the abundant shipbuilding timber of south Italy (see Th. 6. 90. 3 and p. 59 below).

To return to the First Peloponnesian War, the Athenians and Inaros were brilliantly successful at first, as revolts from Persia often were, initially – before the Great King had had time to mobilize a feudal force from nothing. At first he tried bribery, sending his agent Megabazos to Sparta to get them to create a diversion in Greece by invading Attica. Though nothing came of this, it is of interest because it anticipates the 'Cold War' methods by which the Persian rulers sought to infiltrate Greece in the second half of the century. When the full Persian army did arrive, perhaps no earlier than 456, Lower Egypt was still in the control of the rebels, though Upper Egypt, with its garrison of Jewish colonists at Elephantine, held out. The numerical imbalance was not too great, even with the large Greek contingent: the Persians swept up Greeks and Egyptians into a small island in the Nile Delta called Prosopitis. The entire Athenian fleet of 200 ships, plus a relieving squadron of fifty, was annihilated (454); we do not know the proportion of Athenian to allied casualties but surely both groups suffered severely. This poorly documented affair does not

come within the scope of Thucydides' detailed narrative, but his summing up, 'few out of many returned home', specifically anticipates the use of that precise phrase about the disaster in Sicily (7. 87. 6, and note 3. 112. 8). Such a shattering of great imperial hopes was the material from which 'tragic' history could be written (though Athenian recovery after both Egypt and Sicily was quick); but Thucydides, who never explores the same theme twice, reserves the full treatment for Books 6–7 (Sicily and Italy).

The few survivors got home via the friendly Greek state of Kyrene to the west. Though there is no reason to think that the kings of Kyrene had actually helped Inaros at the beginning of the revolt, the fall of the Persian-backed Kyrenaian monarchy at about this period can be attributed to the infectious restlessness of Egypt next door,[38] cp. below, p. 65.

Meanwhile the war in Greece was more evenly matched and fought. As long as Corinth led the Peloponnesians, the Athenians had the best of it, though they were sufficiently alarmed to build the Long Walls, which secured communications between Athens and its harbour city of Piraeus: in future, Spartan invasions would not cut Athens off from the sea (Th. 1. 107). But in 458/7, a large Spartan army crossed into central Greece, initially against Phokis in support of Doris, Sparta's mother-city: for the significance of this motive, which should not be trivialized as specious or 'merely' religious and sentimental, see above, p. 28. The Spartan force, 1500 of 'their own' hoplites, was strikingly big, even if 'their own' included an element of, say, half drawn from the 'perioikic' communities, that is, places in Lakonia and Messenia whose inhabitants were under Spartan control but were not actually enslaved as were the helots of Messenia.[39] If the rebel helots at Ithome were still maintaining their siege (465–455 are the dates Thucydides implies) this use of manpower was reckless indeed; so perhaps the text is wrong and the Ithome dates are really 465–460. In any case, the Spartans were evidently up to something big; unable, after disciplining the Phokians, to return overland – the Athenians now possessed Megara, it must be remembered, also Pegai, a strategically useful port on the Corinthian Gulf – they decided to wait in Boiotia for a while. The Athenians came out and fought them at Tanagra (457); the Spartans won but then the Athenians retrieved this defeat under Myronides at Oinophyta two months later. What was happening, and why did the superpowers collide just here and just now? Part of the reason why the Spartans were exerting themselves just now is religious, as we have noted already (p. 28): the Spartans not only wanted to protect the 'mother' Doris (a relation of kinship conceived in terms of mythical ancestry) but were in competition with Athens for influence at Delphi and with the amphiktiony. Second, the Spartans may have had an anxious eye on Athens' new allies and their own traditional enemies the Argives, who certainly supplied 1000 troops on the Athenian side at the battle of Tanagra (Th. 1. 107. 5).[40] A third part of the story is given by Diodorus: the Spartans hoped to establish Thebes as a counterweight (*antipalon*, 11. 81. 3) to Athens (cp. Justin 3. 6. 10, Fornara 73). The Athenians, for their part, could not allow a strong centralized

Boiotia to the north of them. (The position can be compared to that in 404, when the Spartans hoped to make Attica, this time, a docile satellite, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30, *oikeia kai piste,* cf. p. 218; the Thebans and Corinthians wanted Athens to be destroyed sooner than see it become a Spartan puppet. Or we might compare the way Philip II refrained from exterminating the Phokians in 346 rather than make a present of Phokis to Thebes.[41] Such considerations constantly determine policy in Greek history.) If this means attributing to Athens an uncharacteristic desire for *land* empire, we should not hesitate to do so – Thucydides (1. 111), after all, records an Athenian expedition to *Thessaly* as well (here too we should recall the amphiktionic importance of Thessaly, noted above in connection with Athens' Thessalian alliance of a few years earlier). If any individual was responsible for the land empire policy it was surely Pericles, whom Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1407) quotes as saying that the Boiotians tended to 'cut each other down' – that is, they were weak because of internal division. This was surely an argument for getting involved in Boiotia, because it was too weak to resist effectively, rather than an argument for leaving Boiotia alone, because it was too weak to make trouble for Athens.[42] In any case, the battle of Oinophyta resulted in a decade of Athenian control in Boiotia, as Thucydides states with a six-word brevity which is out of proportion to the fact (1. 108. 3, closely echoed by Hippokrates at 4. 95. 3; contrast the entire chapter devoted to the fate of some Corinthians at 1. 106). Inscriptions seem to show that Orchomenos and Akraiphnion in Boiotia were made tributary, i.e. that the Boiotian cities were regarded in the full sense as part of the Athenian empire.[43]

With the free hand in Boiotia given them by Myronides' victory at Oinophyta, the Athenians, exceptionally, are said to have supported the oligarchs there (*Old Oligarch* = Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3. 11).[44] This is probably not quite the ideological paradox it sounds: it just means that they supported the politicians and parties in fragmented Boiotia who would tend to *keep* Boiotia fragmented, that is, the Thebes-haters, the local men who wanted to be big frogs in small and separate Boiotian ponds. That such people could be called oligarchs is not surprising, since their aim was to keep power in their own irresponsible fingers. The Athenians, then, were not doctrinaire in the methods they used to further their interests on the mainland. Religious propaganda could also be exploited, as hinted already at p. 28 above: an inscription (*IG* I[3] 9) shows that the Athenians, probably in the 450s, made an alliance with the Delphic Amphiktiony; in other words, they were in a slightly different way continuing Themistokles' 'amphiktionic' policy of the 470s (see p. 20 for his anti-Spartan action) by maximizing Athenian influence at Delphi. Delphi was to be by land what Delos already was by sea, a religious focus for Athenian imperialism. The oracle was separate from the amphiktiony and should not be confused with it, but an oracular response, perhaps to be dated after Oinophyta, hails Athens as an 'eagle in the clouds for all time' (Parke and Wormell 1956: 121); this did not stop the oracle going very far

indeed in its favour for Sparta in the run-up to the main Peloponnesian War (Th. 1. 118. 3, cp. 2. 54. 4).[45]

By sea the Athenians had forced the submission of Aigina, and the general Tolmides sailed in triumph round the Peloponnese (both 456). Then came the Egyptian catastrophe. But the rapid sequence of the events which follow proves that Athenian morale remained buoyant even though 250 of their ships were at the bottom of the Nile Delta. One lesson the Athenians had learnt was not to overreach themselves with warfare in two theatres. So a truce was made with the Spartans (451) which, as Thucydides describes it (1. 112), need not have been motivated by more than a common sense Athenian desire to deal with enemies one by one. A big expedition was sent to the eastern Mediterranean, the direct cause of which was the return from ostracism of Kimon, shortly before 451. Such an expedition takes time to mount, and there cannot have been much of a gap between the Egyptian failure and the decision (possibly 453/2) to return to Cyprus. Moreover, the Athenians showed no loss of grip when dealing with refractory league members in the east Aegean in 452. (See ML 40 and 43 = Fornara 71 and 66: Athenian intervention against medizers at Erythrai and Miletus.) But Kimon's death in Cyprus, after some glorious victories, ended that phase of aggressive Athenian activity, and it is likely the Athenian Kallias arranged a peace with Persia. The historicity of such a peace is controversial, because Thucydides does not mention it in his *Pentekontaetia*, though other passages in his *History* (e.g. 8. 56. 4 and 58. 2) probably presuppose it. But Diodorus (12. 4), derived from Ephorus, definitely knew of such a peace, and it has even been argued that there were *two* peaces, or rather that the peace of 449 was actually a renewal of an earlier agreement dating from the 460s.[46]

The end of the Persian War did not bring to an end the Athenian empire, though the existence of the confederacy was now harder to justify. There were also other reasons why resentment of Athens should have intensified in the late 450s: for instance, this was the period of the first imperial cleruchies (settlements of Athenians on territory abroad; the *institution* goes back to the sixth century,[47] before the beginning of the Athenian empire). Thus a cleruchy was imposed on Andros in 450, perhaps on Euboia too, since tribute from these islands drops after 450, one sign of a cleruchy: loss of land brought mitigation of tribute.[48] Only Athenian citizens could profit by allotments of land as 'cleruchs' (literally 'allotment-holders') and it may be more than chance that the qualifications for Athenian citizenship are more closely defined at about this time (451): citizen descent was now required on both sides (*Ath. Pol.* 26; Philochorus F 119 = Fornara 86). The intention of the law is not certain;[49] the idea that it was specifically directed against Kimon, whose mother was Thracian, fails because Kimon is now thought to have died as early as 451,[50] too early for the law to have touched him. Part of the idea may have been a selfish desire to limit citizenship to as few people as possible, now that it brought greater material advantages. Also, the law[51] policed the

divide between ruler and ruled and ensured that it could only exceptionally be crossed.

The disillusionment after the Peace of Kallias, inside an empire that had lost its ideological *raison d'être,* is noticeable even in our desperately thin historical record. The great rectangular block on which are inscribed the one-sixtieth fractions of the allied tribute which were 'paid' to the goddess Athena has room for one fewer annual list than the available years, and the most likely solution from a technical point of view is that no one-sixtieth was paid to Athena in 449. Some unusual explanation is called for. The idea that the Athenians actually remitted all tribute that year can be dismissed – there is no other good evidence for an easing up in the way the empire was run. Either the money was earmarked for some special project like the building of the temple to Athena Nike, goddess of victory, a way of saying 'we have won the war against Persia', or else Athena was refused her one-sixtieth part, for symbolic reasons, the other fifty-nine sixtieths being paid in the usual way. The payment to Athena was the *aparche*, the first fruits in a religious sense. By not giving this to Athena, the Athenians were tactfully declining to cream off the best for the national goddess, thereby showing that all tribute that was collected was needed for utilitarian purposes.

Though there were grumblings in the league, the Athenians were now formally at peace, for the first time since the Persian Wars, having settled their differences both with Sparta, provisionally, with the Great King of Persia; for their part the Spartans had come to terms with Argos (see Th. 5. 14. 4, under 422/1, for what Thucydides there offhandedly calls 'the' Thirty Years' Truce between Argos and Sparta, although he has never mentioned it before). The Athenians' only clash with Sparta was at Delphi (448). The Spartans had taken Delphi out of Phokian control; Athens intervened to give it back to the Phokians. In other words, the Athenians were still, for the moment, successfully holding to the idea of a central Greek, religiously based land empire. This is the so-called Second Sacred War; see p. 28f. above for the importance of this episode, which even more obviously than the Spartans' action in defence of Doris shows how much they cared about the sanctuary at Delphi.

The immediate cause of the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta was the Athenians' extreme vulnerability in 446. First, they lost Boiotia in a rising which ended in an Athenian defeat at Koroneia. The rebels were helped by exiles from Euboia, which may imply a concerted plan, because Euboia revolted next, encouraged by the Athenian reverse in Boiotia. Also, the Euboian cleruchy may actually and ironically have accelerated the revolt it was designed to prevent – because cleruchies had a garrison function; but if the cleruchy was installed as early as 450 it cannot have been an immediate grievance.[52] Finally, during Pericles' absence on a punitive expedition to Euboia, the Megarians revolted, and the Spartans invaded Attica, reaching Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. Pericles returned from Euboia, and then marched straight to the Megarid (as an inscription, supplementing Thucydides, reveals: ML 51

= Fornara 101). Mysteriously the Spartan king Pleistoanax now withdrew, thereby puzzling and enraging his compatriots, who fined him for alleged bribery (Th. 2.21 and Fornara 104): he went into semi-voluntary exile in Arkadia because – as his enemies no doubt anticipated – he could not pay the enormous fifteen-talents fine, which thus amounts to an indirect infliction of exile.[53] The Athenians could now return to Euboia, which they subdued (*katestrepsanto*, a strong word). 'Not long after, the Athenians made a peace with the Spartans and their allies for thirty years, giving up Nisaia, Pegai, Troizen and Achaia, their possessions in the Peloponnese' (Th. 1. 115. 1). The unrecorded item in this narrative must be that the terms of the final peace were agreed in principle by Pleistoanax and the Athenians when the former was still at Eleusis.

The terms of the Thirty Years' Peace[54] have not come down to us in detail, unlike for instance the truce of 423 or the Peace of Nikias of 421 (Th. 4.118; 5. 18). We know some of its detailed terms from scattered references (mostly Thucydidean); thus there was an important arbitration clause which ruled out armed attacks by one side if the other wished to go to arbitration (Th. 7. 18. 2), and 'unwritten *poleis*', i.e. ones not attached to a list of allies attached to the treaty, could join either side (Th. 1. 35. 2 and 40. 2). Complete certainty on detail is not possible. But we can say for sure that the peace meant, for Athens, not just the loss of Nisaia and the other Peloponnesian outposts mentioned above (Th. 1. 115. 1) but also more generally the end of the central Greek land empire, the end of the plan to control Delphi through the amphiktiony. Nevertheless the peace was an Athenian triumph because it effectively acknowledged Athens' empire by sea. (But not explicitly: the view that the peace treaty allowed each side to keep what it possessed at the time when the peace was signed, and thus recognized the Athenian empire, rests on a mistranslation of a remark in a speech of the Thucydidean Pericles, which merely stipulates that each side should retain disputed territory *pending arbitration,* Th. 1. 140. 2.)[55] The proof of the *effective* acknowledgement can be seen only by anticipating the events of the next ten years, during which the Athenians sent colonies to the west – to Thurii in Italy (Diod. 12. 10ff; for this venture, see p. 59 below); to the north – to Brea in Thrace in perhaps 446 (ML 49 = Fornara 100), and to Amphipolis in 437 (Aischin. 2.31 and Th. 4. 102). Pericles also led an expedition to the Black Sea which can now be confidently dated to the early 430s (Plut. *Per.* 20 with *IG* I[3] 1180), a splendid display of Athenian power; see below p. 111 and n. 10. Most important, the Athenians enjoyed a free hand in the east: Kolophon on the Asiatic mainland was coerced in about 446 (ML 47 = Fornara 99). And when the islanders of Samos revolted in 440, the Peloponnesian League let Athens get away with savage reprisals. The sequence of events is interesting; it was made possible only by the structure of the league, which always gave huge power to the Spartans, who first voted on an issue and only then decided whether to hold a League Congress at all.[56] The Spartans seem to have voted for war against Athens on this occasion in their own chamber, thereby getting Samos on

to the Peloponnesian League agenda (see the broken beginning of ML 56 = Fornara 115); the Corinthians voted for peace in the second, decisive, meeting, composed of the whole of the Peloponnesian League (Th. 1. 40). The Corinthians could afford to be indifferent to the vengeance Athens took against Samos; Megara was what mattered to Corinth, and the Megarians were now back in the Peloponnesian camp. As for the Spartans, perhaps their first and more aggressive-looking vote was merely a warning shot, and their *second* was for peace; they wished to articulate concern but not to get into a war.[57] But another possibility is that there was a *general* autonomy clause in the Thirty Years' Peace, and that this treaty is what the Aiginetans refer to in the late 430s when they complain that they are not 'autonomous according to the treaty' (Th. 1. 67. 2). If there was such a general autonomy clause in the Thirty Years' Peace, then the Spartans had good grounds for complaint against Athens over Samos.[58]

With Samos, our main source Thucydides ends his account of the *Pentekontaetia*, before the fifty years were up, and ignoring the early 430s. This is perhaps deliberate, an emphatic full close to the story of Athenian growth and the fear it inspired in the Spartans. Samos was the last big violation of autonomy which Athens was to get away with. That literary or aesthetic explanation may be part of the truth; but there is no dodging the fact: the first half of the 430s are, historically, what we may call the Great Gap. In a later chapter (Chapter 9) we shall see that crucial manifestations of Athenian expansionism can be dated, from non-Thucydidean evidence or from the evidence of books of Thucydides later than Book 1, precisely in the Great Gap. The problem is to know whether his decision to omit them in his 'pre-war' book was determined primarily by aesthetic considerations, or by the desire to play down Athenian aggression.

## The islands

The determination of the Athenian decision makers to suppress the breakaway movement of the Samians was surely caused in part by their feeling that islands, as such, somehow owed them special obligations of obedience. Even their imperial accountancy recognized this (there was a separate 'island' district in the Tribute Lists); and Thucydides twice explains Athenian attacks on the neutral Dorian island of Melos, in 426 and 416, by reference to the Melians' island status (3. 91. 2 and 5. 84. 2). On both occasions he says, in almost identical language, that the Melians refused to submit to Athenian domination *although they were islanders*. He finds it unnecessary to elaborate further, and we are meant to supply for ourselves the needed point about Athenian attitudes. No doubt there were special circumstances in the Melian case: Melian provocation apart (and Thucydides goes out of his way to keep this aspect out of sight, if it existed)[59], Melos was mineral-rich, and its location at the western edge of the Cyclades and the Aegean island system, and on the eastern sea route from Lakonia, gave it extra strategic value (see esp. Th.

8. 39. 3).[60] Where Ionian islands were concerned, Athenian expectations of deference were in part those of colonial 'mother' (*metropolis*) to 'daughters', as illustrated by the fourth-century inscription concerning Paros (R/O no. 29; cf. below p. 243f. for a translation of this remarkable text). But these expectations were not limited to islanders, and will in any case not stretch to Melos, whose spokesmen in Thucydides' famous Dialogue (5. 84–119) insist on their hopes of rescue by their founders, the Dorian Spartans.

Then as now, the eastern Mediterranean was an island culture: the Aegean archipelago was and is a culture of maritime 'connectivity', [61] and island peoples were proud of their individual identities; islands might also (Rhodes is the best example) exercise mini-imperialisms over smaller networks of islands nearby. This control might take the form of cultic dependence, such as that owed to tiny Kalaureia (mod. Poros, in the Saronic Gulf) by the members of its venerable amphiktiony, who at one time included the Aiginetans and even the Athenians (Strabo 8. 6. 14; the superintendent god was Poseidon, and the amphiktiony still existed in the Hellenistic period); and Cycladic Paros had an elevated temple of Apollo Delios which looked straight out towards Delos, in transparent homage to the god's island birthplace (cf., probably, Pindar frag. 140a lines 62ff.). [62]

Many of the Aegean islands are too small to sustain human habitation. In some such cases, goats might be grazed there. Even where such little protruding spots of land were concerned, feelings might run high: in some year after 336, the Argives, on the instructions of the League of Corinth (for which see below, Chapter 18), had to arbitrate between the islanders of Melos and those of its small next-door neighbour Kimolos (R/O no. 82). The subject of the dispute (which was won by the Kimolians) was three yet smaller islets, one of which was called Polyaiga, the 'place of many goats'. Similarly, a tiny island called Herakleia, south of Naxos (the largest of the Cyclades), was a place of goat pasturage. There were many such.

Greeks themselves thought hard and affectionately about islands. The best ancient account of the Greek islands is to be found mainly in Books 10 and (for the east Aegean islands) 14 of the geographer–historian Strabo, writing in the time of Augustus or a little later; but he drew on much earlier evidence. In addition, he provides scattered information about islands in many other parts of his seventeen-book surviving work.

In the days of the fifth-century empire, the long arm of the Athenian navy ensured political and military obedience from even the greatest of the islands; in particular, control of Euboia was absolutely vital, for reasons to do with the food supply (Th. 8. 96. 2); and so, to a lesser extent, were the cleruchies Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros.[63] Aigina, the independent island closest to Attica, was reduced in 458, as we have seen. But force can be undermined or circumvented by subtle means, such as significant ritual. Thus the fifth-century Rhodian islanders had – most unusually – a fireless sacrifice, on the evidence of Pindar's *Olympian* 7, a poem for the local boxer Diagoras (see lines 48f.), and it has been ingeniously suggested that this is a quiet rejection of the

opposite ritual of the Athenian Panathenaic festival, and thus by implication of noisy meddling Athenian values more generally.[64] Pindar's silence about the Athenian empire 'deafens by its silence, at least in the epinikians', some of which odes were written for Dorian or Aeolian islanders at times when they were inside the empire. The islands in question were Aigina, Rhodes, and Aiolian Tenedos.[65] Modern research on the poems of Pindar and Bacchylides (fragmentary poems such as paians, as well as victory odes) has traced nuances of politics in apparently unpolitical poetry sung at Delos and elsewhere, and this is a very promising approach to the study of the Athenian empire, especially in its island dimension. If, as I have argued elsewhere, Pindar wrote a dithyramb for the Ionian Chians (frags. 71–4, about Orion), that would not be too surprising: they were rather conservative and Dorian Ionians (cf. Th. 8. 24. 4–5, comparing them explicitly to the Spartans). [66]

A not dissimilar but opposite line of politico–religious explanation has been sought for the local hero-cult paid to a phenomenally successful athlete called Theagenes or Theogenes, from the rich and green island of Thasos in the north Aegean. In the 460s, as we saw earlier in the present chapter, the rebel Thasians were brought forcibly to heel by the Athenians because of their valuable mainland resources ('a quarrel over markets and mine', as Thucydides rather one-sidedly put it, 1. 100. 2), and perhaps – the theory goes – the Thasians were led in a pro-Athenian direction by Theagenes. The thesis is vulnerable and has been rejected. One might even want to reverse it and to wonder if the Thasians, by their treatment of Theagenes, were seeking to compensate for their humiliation at Athenian hands by raising the local boy Theagenes to hero status; remarkably, he was still enjoying this cult in the first century BC.[67]

The Thasian case is a reminder that the very concept of islands is too simple, because many islands had territorial possessions on the mainland opposite them, or at any rate were able to exploit parts of the mainland economically. The word for this phenomenon is *peraia*, and it plays a part in Greek political life too: exiles, who would often be oligarchs in the time of the Athenian-supported 'democracies', might take refuge on the mainland and make nuisances of themselves from there. Examples are the exiles who were installed at Anaia opposite Samos in the east Aegean (Th. 3. 19. 2 and 32. 2), and, on the other side of Greece, the exiled oligarchs from Kerkyra/ Corfu (Th. 3. 85. 2).

A *peraia* might also have cultural effects. The Rhodians, perhaps from as early as the end of the fifth century, had possessions on the Karian mainland; this developed by the Hellenistic period into an enormous area of 'subject' and 'incorporated' territory.[68] The hellenization of this tough landscape must have owed much to Rhodian influence and infiltration of an unindividuated sort, as well as to the more obviously personal and top-down policies of the Hekatomnid Karian dynasty (see below Chapter 6 for the fourth-century Mausolus and his family).

One lesson which Mausolus may have learnt from the Rhodians was that of synoikism, the forming of new and successful physical *poleis* by aggregation

of pre-existing *poleis* or of smaller non-*polis* communities (see further below Chapter 13 n. 80 and Chapter 19 n. 27). When he synoikized his coastal capital Halikarnassos in the 370s, he was surely impressed by the examples of the island synoikism of Rhodes in 408, which had resulted in a thriving new city, as did that of the island of Kos in the 360s, a few years after that of Halikarnassos. Defence was presumably one motive for these state-of-the-art urbanizing projects, but emulative quest for prestige was surely another.

The three old cities of Rhodes, already known to Homer, were Lindos, Ialysos and Kamiros, Why some islands had just a single *polis* (Samos, Chios), while others had three or more (Rhodes, Lesbos), is a mystery. It does not seem to be a function of size, or even of distance between the communities on the island. Mykonos was small, but was a *dipolis*, a 'two-city' island, as was Lemnos. On Keos, the closest of the Cyclades to Attica, there were four *poleis*, two of which (Iulis and Koressos) were astonishingly close to each other. The Athenians were clever at manipulating rivalries inside islands, and in the fourth century they deliberately broke up the federal set-up on Keos. [69]

We know that the two cities of Mykonos synoikized themselves in about 200 BC on the evidence of an inscription (*Syll.*[3] 1024 = Austin 2006: no. 148), a very interesting calendar of religious sacrifices (cf. R/O no. 62 from Kos, fourth century); the Mykonos text is interesting not least because of the continuity it displays with archaic and classical cults and rituals for the old Olympian gods, who are evidently far from dead, as is sometimes claimed. The reason for the Mykonos synoikism is not stated and is obscure to us; nor is it easy to spot the religious novelties resulting from the synoikism. The Rhodians, by contrast, made Helios, the sun god, the patron of their new synoikized city, and did so with a bang; Helios is already prominent many decades earlier in Pindar's 'Rhodian' ode (*Ol.* 7) mentioned above, but there is no doubt that the god's new status was the result of a definite decision. In addition, the citizens of the three pre-synoikism cities of the island had a 'federal' sanctuary on Mt Atabyrion, on the evidence of the same ode of Pindar (line 87); the same seems to have been true of another large and important island, Lesbos, where the Mesa sanctuary, already known to Alkaios (130b Voigt), was common to the several *poleis* of the island. Near the southern tip of Chios, a sanctuary of Apollo Phanaios (Strabo 14. 1. 35, cf. Th. 8. 24. 3), at which fruitful excavations are ongoing, would be an excellent candidate for another such federal sanctuary – but Chios is a one-*polis* island! [70]

One increasingly understood way in which the ancient Greeks exploited religion and mythology was by 'kinship diplomacy', the stressing of colonial and other ties; the Athenians used this in their relations with the islanders, and not only by the broad device of the 'Ionian' connection (Th. 1. 95. 1, already discussed above). It has even been claimed that 'the Greek mythological tradition was sufficiently flexible that, if one tried hard enough, any given *polis* could plausibly be connected to almost any other', but this cynical view goes too far: the whole system, however ingeniously elaborated, would have been valueless and discredited unless built on a substratum of believed

fact. A newly discovered third-century BC inscription attests to a remarkable assertion of a kinship tie between the Athenians and the inhabitants of Kydonia (modern Chania ) on the north coast of Dorian Krete, apparently *via* a Kydon, son of Apollo. How far back does this notion go? We have no way of being sure, but it has recently been claimed that fifth-century Krete was less remote from Athenian trading and other interests than is usually supposed; however, in 429 the Athenians were persuaded to *attack* Kydonia (Th. 2. 85. 5), so a fifth-century concoction of a mythical tie between these two places seems unlikely. Literary evidence for Krete in this period is not plentiful (epigraphic evidence by contrast includes above all the great legal 'code' from Gortyn, ML 41). One individual is known to us from Pindar to have left his home in Kretan Knossos for Sicilian Himera because of 'hostile *stasis*'; but the poem's claim (line 15) that he would not have won glory if he had stayed in Knossos should not be pressed too hard as evidence for classical Kretan conditions: other Kretans competed at Olympia in this period, and it has been well said of the poem that 'the logic … is encomiastic, in favour of [Ergoteles'] new city'. [71]

There might be an objection to my formulation, at the beginning of this section, about Athenian expectations of obedience from islanders, that the formulation was too wide: should we not say *Aegean* islanders? Not so, if we look back and recall (p. 34) that Kimon died during Athenian aggressions on Cyprus, the distant half-Greek island with which this book will close (p. 319f. below); and if we look forward to persistent Athenian designs on another large but remote island, Sicily, which will be one of the main subjects of the next chapter.[72]

I end this section by looking at a very small island, also in the west, but one which was not the object of great-power covetousness, as far as we know. But it illustrates the religious attention which some islands tended to attract (Delos is the paradigm case, see esp. Callimachus *Hymn* 4, but cf. also above for Kalaureia), and their magical ability to attract to themselves powerful myths.[73] The island which concerns us is the little Adriatic island of Palagruza, which spectacular recent finds from the fifth century allow us to identify as the 'island of Diomedes', already known from literary sources. In the *Iliad*, the Greek warrior Diomedes, son of Tydeus, was a sort of Achilles substitute, when that warrior was sulking in his tent; and Diomedes, like Odysseus and other Greek heroes, had a long and difficult afterlife when Troy fell. After an unhappy homecoming or *nostos* to Argos, he set off again. His travels took him west, and he enjoyed cult there. (Achilles' well-attested Black Sea cult corresponded to Diomedes' Adriatic one.) The Hellenistic poet Lykophron says of Diomedes' followers, who settled in Daunia in central Italy, that they 'dwell on an isle which bears their chieftain's name'. Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus had in the latter part of the fourth century talked about this cult in a most unexpected place, his scientific treatise *History of plants*: he says there are no plane trees in the Adriatic, 'except round Diomedes' temple'. In a chance archaeological find on Palagruza in 1995, inscribed pottery of

the fifth century, unmistakably carrying part of the name Diomedes, was found, showing that islands in the *central* Adriatic contained sanctuaries of Diomedes, not only islands off the Daunian coast, as the Greek geographer Strabo said in 10 AD; or perhaps Strabo was wrong on the detail.[74] (See the dust jacket to this book for the pottery fragment.) It is to the west, south Italy and Sicily, that we may now turn.

# 4

# SOUTH ITALY AND SICILY[1]

## 'Big Greece': south Italy and Sicily as a unit

This chapter deals with south Italy and Sicily, whose inhabitants are often nowadays called, by adoption of the perspective of Greece proper, the 'Western Greeks'.[2] Although for convenience I shall deal first with the one subregion then the other, it is important to realize that, by the classical period at any rate,[3] the ancient Greeks themselves regarded the two as forming, in many ways, a single cultural and political unit. They sometimes referred to that unit as 'Big Greece', 'Megale Hellas', Latin 'Magna Graecia' (Strabo 253). Thucydides does not himself use the expression 'Big Greece', which may be Pythagorean in origin[4] (for Pythagoras and his followers see below p. 60); but he correctly brackets Italy and Sicily together as areas of early Greek settlement (1. 12. 4). And we shall see (p. 170.) that his detailed account of the 'Sicilian expedition', i.e. the Athenian invasion of 415 BC makes clear, by its detailed references to south Italian allies on both sides, that more than just Sicily was involved. (See 6. 88. 7 for a plausible if self-interested statement of this point by some Syracusan envoys, who warn the Italians that the Athenians have designs on them too.) There would be much to be said for calling it the 'Athenian Expedition against the West', were it not that Thucydides himself uses the shorthand 'Expedition against Sicily' (2. 65. 11; 4. 81. 2; 6. 1. 1), partly, we may suspect, because he has peculiar ideas about Athenian proprietorial feelings about *islands* in particular (above, p. 37). Thus a statement that the Athenians attacked the people of Melos (in the Cyclades) because they were non-submitting *islanders* is twice and surely significantly juxtaposed to an account of an Athenian expedition against Sicily (3. 91. 2 with 86–90; 5. 84. 2 with 6. 1. 1). The more complex truth is that the history of cities like Rhegion or Lokri near the toe of Italy was always closely bound up with that of Sicily, while even the more distant Campanians and Etruscans involved themselves in the struggle of 415–413.

The hellenism of Magna Graecia was to be amazingly tenacious. As late as the 1960s AD, there were Greek-speaking enclaves in south Italy (Apulia and Calabria), whose origins are thought to go back, not to Byzantine settlement, but to the original occupation by Greeks of the archaic period.[5]




*Map 2* South Italy and Sicily

## The problem of the sources: Thucydides not enough

Diodorus' narrative of Sicily at this time is in some ways more helpful to us than that of Thucydides, who has little to say about the west in his very succinct narrative of 480–430, the Pentekontaetia, although Athenian activity and diplomacy there made it arguably very relevant to his theme of Athenian growth and the fear thereby generated at Sparta. Even in the narrative proper, Thucydides' accounts of Athenian involvement in Sicily and Italy are spare: fighting is episodically described at intervals from 3. 86–90 to the end of the book, and there is more western material at 4. 24–5, 58–65

and 5.4–5; but this would make better sense to us if he had given us more of the Pentekontaetia earlier. Perhaps he wanted to minimize direct handling of Sicily for the moment, so as to make more impact with it in Book 6.[6] Even there, he does not immediately disclose all he knows. In his introduction to the Athenian expedition of 415–413, he seems to want to explain his view that the Athenians were biting off more than they could chew, and so we get the so-called *Sikelika* (6. 2–5). A different historian might have given us at this point some account of Sicilian civilization and resources, some description of the fortifications of Syracuse, the temples (an index of prosperity) of Akragas, or the revenues derived from the subjugated interior; something, in fact, like Herodotus Book 2, about Egypt, which introduced the invasion by the Persian king Kambyses. Instead, we get from Thucydides a list of founders and foundation dates for the various Sicilian cities, and even this probably owes something to Antiochos of Syracuse, an older contemporary of Thucydides. But this unexpectedly 'antiquarian' introduction is really nothing of the sort, but makes good contemporary sense when we recall that the Athenian expedition is more than once spoken of as an attempted act of colonization (see most explicitly 6. 23. 2 in the mouth of Nikias). The colonial theme also reminds us how important to Greeks were the 'kinship' links established through colonization (above p. 13 and below, p. 78) and prepares us for the rich colonial material towards the end of the two-book narrative of the expedition (see 7. 57–8), when he lists the allies on each side before the final sea battle. So the *Sikelika* makes sense, if seen on Thucydides' own terms: it sets out the variety of the settlements of Sicily – Greek and non-Greek, Ionian and Dorian – and introduces the very important 'colonial' theme of the two books.[7]

But an introduction to Sicily alone was not enough; we have seen above that South and even Central Italy was relevant and this too needed to be introduced properly. But he does not do this, and what he does tell us is introduced obliquely and late. For example Thucydides does not mention the Athenian alliance between Athens and Metapontion until well into Book 7 (7. 33. 4), although when he does mention it he makes it clear that it was of longstanding: this narrative delay is perhaps consistent with the general tendency (see above and n. 6) to play down earlier contacts so as to make the beginning of Book 6 seem more startling, more of a new adventure. A more serious retardation and omission is the postponement of a mention of the Athenian alliances with *non-Greek* powers in Italy and Sicily, although it is clear that Athens had been 'playing the barbarian card' for some time before the war. In Sicily, there was Archonides the Sikel king, a useful friend to Athens (7. 1. 4 with Walbank 1978: no. 40, showing that this man was a *proxenos*, see above p. xxi, as well as an ally). This is both a literary retardation, because we might have hoped to be told about this at the beginning of Book 6 not Book 7, and an omission, because the connection was surely older than 415, i.e. its origins ought to have been given in some earlier book, perhaps in Book 1, the Pentekontaetia.

The same is true of the Athenian alliance with the Messapian king Artas or possibly Artos, 'Bread-man'.[8] Thucydides tells us about this alliance in the same context as the Athenian–Metapontine friendship (7. 33. 4, with M. Walbank 1978: no.70, showing that he too was a *proxenos* of the Athenians). This is a very interesting connection. The Messapians or Iapygians were a people in the hinterland of Sparta's colony Taras (Tarentum) and they and their neighbours the Peuketians placed the Tarentines under constant pressure throughout the fifth century, and indeed in the fourth century and the hellenistic period as well. Herodotus (7. 170. 3, cp. Diod. 11. 52 under 473 BC; see also Ath. 522d) describes a terrible slaughter by the Messapian Iapygians of a combined force from Taras and Rhegion (from Aristotle we learn that the heavy casualties among the notables led to a democratic takeover at Tarentum, *Pol.* 1303a 3ff.); and the chronic character of the struggle is made clear by fifth-century Tarentine dedications at Delphi for victories over the Messapians and Peuketians (*Syll.*$^3$ 21 and 40; Paus. 10. 13.6).[9] For the Athenians to align themselves with the Messapian Artas was an anti-Tarentine and thus an anti-Spartan act. The Spartans kept up their links with South Italy, long after the original foundation of Taras towards the end of the eighth century; thus the Spartan king Archidamos III helped Taras against the Lucanians in 338 BC (he was killed doing so); and so did the Spartan general Kleonymos in 303 (Diod. 16. 88; 20. 104–5). Much earlier, the Spartans, so the legend went, loaned their national heroes the Dioskouroi, that is Kastor and Polydeukes or Pollux (Fig. 4.1), to help the people of Lokri Epizephyrii, who then won the Battle of the Sagra River in the sixth century against their enemies the people of Kroton (Strabo, 261; Diod. 8. 32).



*Figure 4.1* The Spartan Dioskouroi, marble relief

These divine twins repeated their appearance or *epiphany* in 405 BC when the Spartans themselves defeated the Athenians at Aigospotamoi (Plut. *Lys.* 12; see below p. 189); a similar story, immortalized in one of Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome*, was told about the Roman defeat of the Latins at the battle of Lake Regillus in the 490s BC. The religious truth behind the Sagra story is surely that there was some interchange of cult between Sparta and South Italy, and an inscribed cup found near Sparta, published in 1989, seems to confirm this: it appears to be a dedication to 'Zeus Messapeus' (*SEG* 39. 376, showing that the colonial world sometimes re-exported its cults back to the motherland). At the political level, the Spartans, like the Athenians, had friends in South Italy and Sicily even before the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides (2. 7. 2) mentions those who *had chosen* the Spartan side in 431. He does not expand here or in Book 1, but Antiochos of Syracuse, quoted by Strabo (*FGrHist* 555 F11 = Strabo 264, cp. Diod. 12. 36. 4) provides a shaft of light. He says that when the Tarentines were at war with the people of Thurii and their general Kleandridas (for such fighting cp. ML 57 = Fornara 112), for possession of the territory of Siris, they came to an agreement and colonized it jointly, though it was judged to be a colony of the Tarentines; but later on it was called Herakleia, changing its site and its name (below p. 170). Spartan involvement in this Tarentine initiative of perhaps the 430s is likely, given that the Spartans founded another Herakleia, in Trachis to the south of Thessaly, in 426 (Th. 3. 92–3, cp. Hdt. 5.43 for another, late sixth-century, Spartan attempt to found a colony called Herakleia. This one, like Siris/ Herakleia, was in the west, actually in Sicily.). We can even identify one particular Spartan family active in this region, that of Kleandridas himself, the man whom Antiochos (above) mentions as the champion of the Thurians in their struggle with Taras, and perhaps also the man who brokered the compromise with Taras about the new colony. In 414 BC his son Gylippos, based at the time at Taras, renewed his father's Thurian citizenship (Th. 6. 104, a textually problematic passage), though he failed to win Thurii over to the Spartan/Syracusan side; and down in Roman times it seems that Kleandridas was receiving heroic cult at Thurii.

It will be seen that although Thucydides is a very good and very detailed source for what he does talk about, such as the great Western Expedition of 415–413, he chose to be silent about many fifth-century developments in the west, even when they bore directly on the events of 415–413. The modern historian has to use inscriptions, Herodotus, Antiochos, Diodorus, Strabo and so on; and the praise ('epinikian') poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides.[10]

## Sicily

In 479 BC Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, displayed himself unarmed before his people and made a speech in justification of his career (Diod. 11. 26. 6). The crowd hailed him, Diodorus says, as 'benefactor, saviour and king'. The interest of this triple acclamation is that it sounds emphatically and

oddly hellenistic (cp. *OGIS* 239, 301 etc., inscriptions of the Seleucid and Pergamene kingdoms). Now Diodorus' Sicilian narrative here is taken from the third-century BC historian Timaios of Tauromenion. (Diodorus also used the fourth-century Ephorus, and his extensive use of these two writers makes Diodorus the main source for west Greek political history in the classical period.) But Diodorus probably himself added the titles used of Gelon; in the same way he regularly gives his early Egyptian pharaohs the hellenistic royal virtues. Diodorus' information then was possibly false; but his insight was correct.

The tyrants of classical Sicily did indeed behave like the kings of hellenistic Greek history, intermarrying (with a vengeance: they practised polygamy), shifting populations around (Gelon's transfer of capital and population to Syracuse), and building on a heroic scale. They anticipated the hellenistic taste for 'theatricality' and theatrical gestures: at the beginning of the fourth century, Dionysios I of Syracuse brought his bride from Italian Lokri in a warship decorated with gold and silver (Diod. 14. 44. 7); compare the end of Plutarch's *Life* of Demetrios, which has a splendid account of the cortège in which the third-century king Antigonos Gonatas brought back by sea to Macedon the gold funeral casket of his father Demetrios the Besieger (Plut. *Demetr.* 53).[11] The Sicilian tyrants also look backwards to the archaic age of mainland Greece: Gelon's appeal to the Syracusan populace is demagogy of a kind that recalls the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos, as does Dionysios' demand for a bodyguard (Diod. 13. 95, with a specific reference to Peisistratos). So Plato, who wrote about both the Athenian family of Peisistratos and about the tyranny in fourth-century Sicily, spoke (*Rep.* 566b) of the 'tired old tune', the tyrannical demand for a bodyguard; for the relevance of this to Sicily see below p. 222. Aristotle too (*Pol.* 1305a 23–6) mentions Peisistratos and Dionysios I in the same breath. And elite intermarriage had characterized the age of the tyrants;[12] it is epitomized by the party given by Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sikyon, for his daughter Agariste's suitors (Hdt. 6. 126ff.) – but there are also marriage links between the Kypselids of Corinth and both the families of Miltiades of Athens and of the Egyptian king Psammetichos. The Sicilian tyrant Hieron married the daughter of Anaxilas of Rhegion; and Gelon married the daughter of Theron of Akragas. These parallel developments in east and west were not quite independent: Herodotus says (6. 131) that a man from Sybaris and another from Siris, both Italian towns, were among Agariste's suitors at Sikyon; and some of the poets patronized by the western Greeks had experience of mainland monarchy. For instance, Pindar and Simonides both wrote for Sicilian patrons: Pindar composed his tenth *Pythian* Ode, his earliest poem, for the Thessalian Thorax of Larissa, and Simonides had been patronized by Polykrates of Samos and Peisistratos of Athens in turn.[13] Plato wanted tragedians banned because they were 'singers of the praises of tyranny' (*Rep.* 568b).

The Sicilian tyrants did not, however, take the personality cult as far as the successors of Alexander. Their dedications are no less assertive; but like




*Figure 4.2* The temple of 'Concord', Akragas

Kypselos, whose name originally stood on the Corinthian 'treasury' (i.e. building to house dedications) at Delphi,[14] they identified themselves with the state, or put themselves on a level with it: they did not openly claim to rule it. So Gelon's thank-offering after the battle of Himera, in which he defeated the Carthaginians, just reads 'Gelon son of Deinomenes the Syracusan'; similarly the bronze helmet found at Olympia, dedicated by Hiero after his victory at Kyme – 'Hieron son of Deinomenes and the Syracusans' (ML 28–29 = Fornara 54, 64, and cf. *SEG* 23. 253 and 33. 328, for two more 'Hieron and the Syracusans' helmets). And none of the Sicilian tyrants before Agathokles (end of the fourth century), put his own name on his coinage – contrast the HIP – issue of Hippias of Athens,[15] admittedly a coinage struck in exile at Sigeion *c.* 500 BC, but one which shows that the idea of a coin with an individual's name on it was at least thinkable that early.

Gelon of Syracuse had left his younger brother Hieron in charge of Gela. On Gelon's death in 478 Hieron took over Syracuse, and another brother Polyzalos married Gelon's widow Damareta, who was a daughter of Theron of Akragas, cf. above. (It was Polyzalos who dedicated the famous 'Charioteer', a bronze statue celebrating a victory at the Pythian Games of 474 at Delphi; Fig. 4.3.)

Theron's son Thrasydaios, who ruled Himera as his father's 'proconsul', and the disgruntled Polyzalos formed a brief alliance against Hieron. The alliance



*Figure 4.3* The charioteer of Delphi (detail)

between Hieron and Theron looked like breaking up, but by 476 friendship was renewed, Polyzalos pardoned and Pindar was able to write victory odes (*Olympians* 1 and 2) for both Hiero and Theron in the Olympic Games of 476. This moment is perhaps the high point of the Sicilian tyrannies, judged by what Greeks regarded as glorious. Theron died in 472 and his son Thrasydaios did not keep the power long. The Syracusan tyranny lasted for a few more years; Hieron was even able to install his son Deinomenes as ruler of a new city of Aitna, built to house the population of Katane and Naxos, ousted sometime in the 470s (cp. Diod. 11. 49). Pindar wrote the third *Pythian* in 474 and referred in it to Hieron 'of Aitna', to flatter the tyrant's pride in the new foundation. By 467 Hieron was dead, and the rule at Aitna of his son Deinomenes, like that of Thrasydaios, was brief. At Syracuse itself Hieron's son Thrasyboulos succeeded but was ousted in 466. This was perhaps the occasion

of Pindar's twelfth *Olympian* ode, which begins with an invocation of Zeus the Liberator (*Eleutherios*; for a similar cult at Syracuse itself cf. Diod. 11. 72); the ode celebrates an athletic victory by Ergoteles of Himera, and Himera had for the last few years been under Syracusan subjection. The liberation of Syracuse thus entailed the liberation of Himera.[16] Pindar, it should be noted, did not always celebrate the successes of tyrants but sometimes their fall.[17]

External policy was spectacularly successful: in 480 Gelon defeated Carthage off Sicilian Himera, and in 474 Hieron defeated the Etruscans at Kyme (ML 28 and 29, see above).

The crude facts about the tyrannies are easily stated; it is harder to get at the truth about what the tyrannies were like. The archaic tyrants of old Greece and of classical Sicily, the hellenistic kings and the Roman emperors, attracted the same kinds of stories. Herodotus' Samian tyrant Polykrates was brought a present of an enormous fish by a fisherman and a good story was attached – but Suetonius' Tiberius and Juvenal's Domitian were also brought large fish to which good stories were attached, and when in AD 526 a large fish was served to Theodoric the Ostrogothic king, he 'suddenly explained that he beheld the angry countenance of Symmachus [a recent victim], his eyes glaring fury and revenge, and his mouth armed with long sharp teeth which threatened to devour him'.[18] Again, Tarquin in Livy Book 1 and Herodotus' Thrasybulus of Miletus both recommend 'pruning the tallest poppies', i.e. eliminating noble dissidents. This kind of thing, what has been called the 'roving anecdote', makes it easy to recognize the tyrannical or other type, and hard to get at the truth about an individual. Nor are such stories necessarily false: life may deliberately imitate literature (cp. p. 297 on Alexander and the Homeric heroes), and life may imitate life – Domitian reading Tiberius' notebooks to get ideas.

By looking back at the archaic phase of Greek history and forward to later autocrats, as we have done with the Sicilian tyrants, we can remind ourselves that the democratic interludes of Greek history were not merely short but untypical. In Syracuse, Macedon, Kyrene and satrapal Asia Minor, one-man rule was normal for much of the period 479–323 BC. In Syracuse, however, as in some other of the Greek states of the west, tyranny alternated with periods of democracy, or at least self-determination. The history of the Greek west cannot, however, be written like that of truly democratic Athens; for one thing, there are virtually no politically informative inscriptions. (And the western Greeks tended to make their dedications at the Greek sanctuaries of the mainland – especially the nearest of them, Olympia – rather than creating or patronizing a big cult centre of their own.) Fifth-century Italy and Sicily did produce historians, like Hippys of Rhegion, or Antiochos and Philistos of Syracuse, the 'Sicilian Herodotus and the Sicilian Thucydides'; even Dionysios I, tyrant of Syracuse from the later fifth century to 367, wrote history as well as the tragedies and comedies for which, as we shall see, he was more famous.[19] But of Hippys' work on Italy only a few quotations survive, and these are about foundation myths of places, or physical curiosities. Antiochos

was probably used by Thucydides for Sicilian antiquities at the beginning of his Book 6,[20] but not for fifth-century history, though he went down to 424. Philistus was rated high in antiquity, but forty-one of the seventy-seven surviving quotations are all from the same late geographical dictionary. The important surviving narrative, as we have noticed already (p. 44), was written by Diodorus, himself a Sicilian, writing in the Roman period. He came from Agyrium (the modern hilltop town of Agira) in the interior, not far from Enna. (Diodorus' universal history is weighted towards Sicily in the classical period, conspicuously so in Book 14 which covers 404–387; this is no doubt because he was Sicilian himself.) Philistos may have influenced the tradition which survives in Diodorus more than is now obvious; he was an adviser of Dionysius I and, later, of that tyrant's son Dionysius II. No later writer could afford to ignore so well-placed a source.[21]

Diodorus' account of Gelon is not hostile; but he treats the fall of the tyrannies at Syracuse (467) and Akragas (472) as welcome events, the beginning of 'democracy'; so too does Pindar, see above for the twelfth *Olympian*. Diodorus saves himself from inconsistency by criticism, in each case, of the harsh rule of a son and successor (Deinomenes at Syracuse and Thrasydaios at Akragas); but as with the fall of the tyrannies of old Greece there are deeper causes. Deinomenid policy at Syracuse had been successful in creating wealth and with it a prosperous agricultural class, which could not be excluded from office for ever. Things were similar in other of the big cities of Sicily. Diodorus, who by contrast with Thucydides (see the section on the problem of the sources, p. 44ff. above) gives a fine idea of the size and wealth of the Sicilian cities, is particularly full on Akragas, a city which put up more temples in the fifth century than any other Mediterranean city except Athens:[22] he says that the temples were built by Carthaginian prisoners of war (11. 25–6, which includes the detail that swans came to settle in the public lake of the city). In a later passage, dealing with the year 406 but surely true of earlier decades as well, Diodorus says the people of Akragas made vast fortunes from their olive plantations, from which they exported to Carthage (13. 81. 4–5; the whole long section 81–4 is precious even if overdone). There is an important point here: ancient accounts of Greek relations with Carthage often treat it as a barbarian power whose dealings with the Greeks were uniformly hostile. But this passage of Diodorus emphasizes that in times of peace there were benefits in having a rich neighbour like Carthage. Our sources do not for the most part interest themselves in times of peace – the impression from Diodorus' own narrative is that Dionysius did little but fight wars against Carthage; but Carthaginian aggressiveness, like Persian, was exaggerated by 'crusading' Greek historiography and poetry. The other (modern) extreme, that of denying that there was such a thing as Carthaginian imperialism, is equally unsatisfying: from Plato onwards, Greeks spoke of Carthaginian *eparcheia*, a compound of *arche* = rule or empire, in Sicily; and the Carthaginians imposed tribute, *phoros*, on Greek cities which fell into their power (e.g. Diod. 13. 59. 3: Selinus).[23] But for most of the fifth century

Carthage's relations with the Sicilian Greeks were co-operative and good; and the Carthaginians' fourth-century quiescence in the time of Dionysios II, who did not provoke them, is striking.

Democracy, then, in Syracuse, Akragas (see Figure 4.2) and elsewhere, meant the rule of a prosperous agricultural class, which did not necessarily regard Carthage as an enemy, or benevolent co-existence with Carthage as a sin. One might compare the position of feudal Anatolian families living under the Persian empire (see Chapter 6), though these people were actual subjects, not just neighbours, of a great non-Greek power. There are, however, some signs of a raising of political consciousness in Sicily in the mid-century. The tradition (pp. 151, 195) which associated Sicily with the development of rhetoric is a symptom of this. Compare the famous visit to radically democratic Athens of Gorgias of Leontini in 427 BC (Diod. 12. 53, cf. Timaios F 137); even the Athenians, fond as they were of dialectic, were impressed by Gorgias' verbal skills. Such skills surely presuppose active political assemblies: Plato makes Gorgias boast of the persuasive powers of rhetoric 'in an assembly or any other meeting'.[24] Again, allotment plates from Kamarina in Sicily appear to attest a 'rational creation' of phratries, perhaps after a democratic refoundation in 461 (*SEG* 41. 778–95).[25] This is, so far, an isolated and tantalizing find. Finally, in about the middle of the fifth century Syracuse introduced the radical-seeming device of *petalism* (which like Athenian ostracism was a way of getting rid of prominent enemies, except that olive 'petals', i.e. leaves, not potsherds, *ostraka*, were used). But this had no very radical consequences: it was dropped after a few years, Diodorus says (11. 87), because too many of the prominent citizens were thereby discouraged from engaging in political life. Syracuse was not a naval empire but relied like Akragas on the exploitation of an agricultural interior, worked by the subjugated indigenous population, the Sikels. (These had a special name, Kyllyrioi, Hdt. 7. 155. 2, and were perhaps analogous to Spartan helots.) The conditions for establishing and consolidating Athenian-style democracy were absent from fifth-century Syracuse. But there *were* present in the Sicilian cities all the ingredients of *stasis*, civil strife: a new sacred law from Sicilian Selinus, showing preoccupation with homicide, may have been formulated in the aftermath of a bloody bout of *stasis*.[26] Athenagoras, the Syracusan demagogue, is made by Thucydides (6. 38. 3) to say that Syracuse 'is only rarely in a state of internal peace'. This was because Syracuse was a multiracial society. It was not the only mixed city. Constant immigration to this relatively new country (cp. p. 59 on Thurii) and population transfers meant that the citizen body of many west Greek communities was more fluid than the states of old Greece: this is the 'mixed rabble' of which Thucydides speaks (6. 17. 2, in the mouth of Alcibiades, and referring to the Sicilian cities generally). But at Syracuse at any rate the old *Gamoroi*, the 'land-holders', kept up their Dorian loyalties, occasionally sending numerically small but often in the event significant contributions to the Spartans in their struggles at home in the fifth and fourth centuries (see, too, p. 223 for the way the favour was

returned). And outside in the *chora* or hinterland, and virtually ignored by Thucydides, were the Sikel peasants or serfs. The Athenian expedition against Syracuse was thus, as we shall see, not altogether hopeless in its aims, which possibly included the manipulation of the hatred of these groups for each other. (Thucydides rules out the possibility of Syracusan internal revolution, both in his own mouth and in that of Nikias: 7. 55. 2 and 6 .20. 2. But cf. below p. 176 for non-Thucydidean evidence of a slave uprising at Syracuse during the Athenian operations of 415–413.)[27]

We should imagine similar conditions at other places for which we have no such extended literary record as exists for Syracuse or Akragas. At Kamarina, Psaumis, a private citizen, used his money to help rebuild the city, refounded in *c.* 460 after its destruction by Gelon in 484. (West Greek cities oscillate between prosperity and obliteration, justifying all Pindar's insistence on the mobility of fortune: *Olympian* 12, for which see above p. 51, is his frankest hymn to Fortune, *Tyche*.)[28] The fifth *Olympian*[29] praises Psaumis who 'builds well-founded houses, grown with speed like the tall branches of a forest, bringing his city's people from the harsh bonds of their distress into the light of day'. These few lines, written probably in the 450s, illustrate how much of Sicily's wealth was in private ownership and how much was expected of its possessors. (For parallels one must wait until the hellenistic age, when again citizens step in to underwrite their impoverished cities, a phenomenon for which the word *euergetism* has been coined in modern times; cf. p. 137.) Psaumis and other victors in the Greek Panhellenic Games, especially the equestrian victors among them, needed money to make a big splash at places like Delphi and Olympia. Not all these western victors were actual rulers, though some (like Chromios for whom Pindar wrote *Nemeans* 1 and 9) were closely involved with the tyrants of Gela then Syracuse. The statue found at Carthaginian Motya (Mozia) in 1979 (Fig. 4.4) may once have commemorated such a 'Pindaric' victory in the games, and then have been carried off as war booty in a Carthaginian attack on a Greek city like Himera (for which see Th. 6. 62. 2 'the only Greek city in that part of the island', i.e. the north, and Pindar *Olympian* 12 for Ergoteles of Himera, though he was not an equestrian victor).[30]

Elsewhere there is not even the clue of a sentence in Pindar to show who was behind some great construction: Egesta (Segesta), for instance, a long way over in the interior of the west of the island (p. 30), had a fine though unfinished fifth-century temple, the expenses of whose construction can only have been met (given the position of the city) from agricultural wealth, that is, from the product of the labour of the native Sikels. Not that Egesta itself was a Greek community: the Egestaians were *Elymi*, that is indigenous people, of some kind not yet fully understood, although the scribblings from their vases are in Greek letters (for an example, whose interpretation is, however, controversial, see *SEG* 30. 1127 bis and 1891; 35. 1017).[31] Their architecture was certainly Greek – assertively so: it has been suggested that for such culturally marginal communities as Egesta, 'monumentalizing' was



*Figure 4.4* Statue, probably of a charioteer, from Motya in Sicily. Courtesy of Regione Siciliana – Assessorato dei Beni Culturali e della Identità Siciliana, Dipartimento dei Beni Culturali e della Identità Siciliana, Servizio Parco Archeologico ed Ambientale presso le Isole dello Stagone e delle aree archeologiche di Marsala e dei Comuni limitrofi - MARSALA

the result of a specially acute need to assert Greek credentials, as a way of impressing both Greek visitors (cp. Th. 6. 46) and neighbours even less Greek than themselves.[32] The resulting wealth made possible the issue of splendid coinages: the coinage of Egesta copies some famous Syracusan types such as the spring-nymph Arethusa (see Figure 4.5), but also depicts the local goddess Egesta.[33] There is some ambiguity about the mythological founder of Egesta; was it the half-Sicilian, half-Trojan Acestes (cp. Th. 6. 2. 3 for the Trojan




*Figure 4.5* A coin of Syracuse, fifth century BC

origins of the Elymi and of Egesta), or was it the great Trojan hero Aeneas himself as Virgil maintained?[34] Classical and hellenistic cities made extensive use of foundation myths and kinship ties as a way of defining themselves, and the ambiguity about Egesta's origins reflects an ambiguity about the place's identity. At any rate the Elymi could not quite pass themselves off as Greeks; but like Rome, Aeneas' more famous foundation, they devised for themselves a non-Greek, but nevertheless prestigious, 'outside' ancestry.

If Egesta was a cultural hybrid with Greek elements or pretensions, so too was Selinus, which though Greek was awkwardly exposed in an area of Phoenician ('Punic') dominance. Hence it, too, needed to assert its Greekness architecturally.[35] But that architecture was itself a bit of a mess from the purist point of view: it includes a 'splendidly outrageous' mixing of the 'Doric' and 'Ionic' architectural orders.[36] The same thing is found at fourth-century Labraunda in Karia, where culture is equally mixed.[37] The most interesting recent publication from fifth-century Selinus is a 'sacred law' inscribed on lead (a 'chthonic' metal, i.e. with underworld connotations) and since 1999 the prize exhibit in the little *museo civico* at nearby Castelvetrano, having been given back to Italy in 1992 by the J. Paul Getty Museum in California where it was studied. It lays down rules about religious purification and pollution. It has similarities to a famous fourth-century 'cathartic' or purificatory law from another Greek colonial city, Kyrene (*SEG* 9. 72; *LSS* 115; R/O no. 97). But though the Selinus inscription is in Greek and has these affinities to Kyrene,[38] there are signs of syncretism between Greek and Punic cult, particularly in the cult of Zeus Meilichios attested by the new inscription. The inscription is

difficult to interpret, but seems clearly to show a preoccupation with homicide: the purificatory provisions (the enjoining of silence until purification by the slaughter of a sucking pig) are strikingly similar both to Orestes' situation as Aeschylus makes him describe it in *Eumenides* of 458 BC (lines 448–50), and to a painted pot now in the Louvre in Paris (Fig. 4.6) and depicting Orestes' purification. We should like to know whether there had been recent bloodletting in this south-western corner of a notoriously *stasis*-prone island (below n. 50), or whether this sort of provision was routine and a normal feature of ancient Greek civic life. The mention of rituals to be performed at the Olympic festival might tend to favour the second view.[39]

Was there syncretism between the Greek cults and those of the indigenous peoples, as well as those of the 'Punic' Carthaginians (who were invaders, just like the Greeks)? The cults of Demeter and Persephone are particularly prominent in Sicily as in South Italy; and were associated with the Sikel centre of Enna. But we cannot be sure how much interaction there was with indigenous cults.[40]

In about the middle of the fifth century these Sikels found a leader, Duketios, one of whose techniques was to exploit the appeal of their indigenous cults. His career lasted from about 460 to 440. He captured Morgantina and founded a short-lived city called Palike near a sanctuary of two local geyser-gods called the Palikoi; this was a place of asylum for slaves. Duketios made




*Figure 4.6* Orestes' purification. Bell-krater from the Louvre

Palike the centre of some kind of Sikel federation. He had further successes (the capture of Inessa or Aetna) and even managed to defeat a combined army from Syracuse and Akragas (451). But next year he was defeated and escaped with his life only by taking refuge as a suppliant at the altars of Syracuse. With notable religious scruple, and to the subsequent annoyance of the Akragantines who were not consulted, the Syracusans respected his sacred status and sent him to the mother-city Corinth (note the continuing connection, cp. below p. 270 on Timoleon and Dionysius II). They even provided the financial means for his support there. But he returned and founded a joint Greek–Sikel colony at Kale-Akte, eventually dying of illness in 440. This curious story is of interest because it is rare in classical (as opposed to hellenistic or Roman) Greece for an oppressed group to find a leader with the capacity to defy organized city-state forces. The Duketios episode is a measure of the normally submerged human resources of the native Sikels, and of the appeal of their indigenous religion (the Palikoi and their sanctuary); Duketios also attests the effectiveness of the Greek tyrannical methods which he was surely imitating (Diod. 11. 76; 78; 88–92; 12. 8; 29).[41]

Sicilian wealth and power were coveted both by outside powers and by Syracuse, the greatest *polis* of Sicily down to Roman times. Of the outsiders, the Carthaginians established themselves permanently in the west of the island; the classical wars were fought about where to draw the line of boundary. The other outside power was Athens, whose interest in the west allegedly began with Themistokles, who called one of his daughters Italia. In perhaps 457 (the date is contested) Athens made an alliance with Egesta (ML 37 = Fornara 81; cf. p. 14). A later orator was reported to have castigated the Athenian Assembly for making alliances too readily (Th. 6. 13. 2: Nikias), and it is hard to see what good the Athenians hoped for from Egesta in 457. But down-dating the inscription to, say, 418 by no means eliminates the evidence for mid-century Athenian diplomacy with the west, because we have other inscriptions attesting alliances originally made in about 443, with Leontini on the east coast of Sicily, and Rhegion on the Italian side of the straits between Italy and Sicily (ML 63–4 = Fornara 124–5, inscriptions recarved in 433/2). By the 440s the other power with ambitions of hegemony in Sicily, Syracuse itself, had begun to coerce its neighbours in an organized way. Diodorus speaks (12. 30. 1, under 439, though the date is not exact) of Syracuse massing troops and resources with a view to conquering all Sicily: it was not only under the tyrants that Syracusan foreign policy was expansive. Whether Athenian involvement in Sicily and support of the Ionian, or rather non-Dorian, cities there was the cause of Syracusan expansion, or whether the Athenians were reacting in alarm to Syracusan aggressions against Athenian friends, is hard to say, so gappy is the narrative. (And such questions are always among the hardest to answer even where evidence is full.) But though Athens' diplomatic interest in the west goes back so early, it seems that Syracuse's aims of conquest long preceded and are independent of any serious commitment of men or money by Athens.

## South Italy

Of fifth-century Italy, no consecutive history can be written. Diodorus' sources were less interested in it than in Sicily, as was Diodorus himself: he gives the Roman consuls and even some episodes of Roman history like the Decemvirate, but does not help much with the Greek cities which are our present concern. Some later biographies survive of the Pythagoreans who settled in Italy, and these describe the oligarchic governments and even federations of cities which they established, but the details cannot be trusted: these are hellenistic treatises whose authors had ideas of their own about the theory of kingship; they have probably contaminated the biographical material beyond salvage.

In the extreme south, Italy's history follows, naturally, a Sicilian pattern: we saw that Anaxilas of Rhegion married into the Syracusan tyrannical house, and he practised the same sort of aggression against the neighbouring Greek states as his Sicilian contemporaries. An attempt to annex nearby Epizephyrian Lokri was put a stop to by Hieron in 478. Lokri too has a Sicilian rather than an Italian flavour in the fifth century: a Lokrian, Agesidamos, was the only Italian to receive victory odes from Pindar (*Olympians* 10 and 11); but Lokrian society and culture was unusual, compared to Sicily and everywhere else, in the prominent role played there by women.

One event in Greek Italy is fully described, by Diodorus: the foundation of Thurii, on the exceptionally fertile site of the former Sybaris in southern Italy (Diod. 12. 9–11). Sybaris had been destroyed by its neighbours the men of Kroton in 510 BC; the mid-fifth-century recovery was organized by Athens but it was a mixed foundation, and was a victim of its own mixed loyalties, and contained both pro- and anti-Athenian elements. (For an expulsion of the latter group see Th. 7. 33. 5.) Accordingly, we find Thurians helping now Athens, now Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War (Th. 7. 57.1; 8. 35.1; local tensions: ML 57). The Athenian motives for the Thurian project are disputed. At one time it was thought to have been panhellenic but this view has been decisively overthrown, at least if 'panhellenic' is understood in any sense which excludes imperialism on Athens' part.[42] Could it have been political expansionism, then? But were there economic motives as well? A corn shortage at Athens is firmly attested at about this time by a fragmentary inscription (*IG* I$^3$ 30), so that one might be tempted to see Thurii as an overseas enterprise of an archaic type – a response to a temporary food crisis.[43] The author of the most authoritative modern treatment of ancient famine and food supply is sceptical, but the possibility remains.[44] Grain was in any case not the only commodity Athens was interested in: as we have seen (p. 31), one of Athens' motives for western involvement was the abundant shipbuilding timber of southern Italy, and timbers from, precisely, Thurii, are mentioned in an Attic inventory of the late fifth century (*IG* I$^3$ 386 line 100).[45]

Elsewhere in Italy, colonization continued in the fifth century: Siris, as we saw, was refounded as Herakleia (above p. 47). The Italian states advertised their

prosperity in buildings like the fifth-century temples at Paestum (Posidonia), which are comparable in size to those at Akragas, but are on a higher artistic and technical level. The main independent cultural contribution of southern Italy in this period lay, however, in the sphere of philosophy: fifth-century followers of Pythagoras of Kroton, the mathematical and metaphysical theorist, formed themselves into ascetic cult-communities which, despite their wish and tendency to remain apart from the world, nevertheless became involved – sometimes as the victims of violence – in the politics of the Italian *poleis.* Among these Pythagoreans was Lysis of Taras, who was to be the teacher of the Theban leader Epaminondas; but attempts to link Theban politics with Pythagorean philosophy are not convincing.[46] Connected to Pythagoreanism, and now well-attested in South Italy, was the more proselytizing value-system of Orphism. This was a set of religious beliefs and practices with an eschatological slant, and was supposed to derive from the mythical singer–hero Orpheus. Exciting recent finds, especially an inscribed gold leaf from the South Italian city of Hipponion (Vibo Valentia) show that the cult of Dionysus was part of Orphism (*SEG* 26. 1139, mentioning 'initiates and bacchoi'; cp. *LSS* 120, from Cumae in the bay of Naples region); there are also gold leaves from Thurii, which show the influence of Pythagoreanism.[47] Pindar, in a poem written for Theron tyrant of Akragas, shows awareness of Orphic beliefs (*Ol.* 2, cf. 3. 41, also written for Theron), and it has been suspected, but cannot be proved, that he is here flattering the west Greek beliefs of his patron.[48]

A great Italian intellectual centre was Campanian Elea (Latin Velia), which gave its name to the Eleatic school whose most famous representatives (Zeno, who is not the same Zeno as the fourth-century founder of Stoicism; and Parmenides) addressed themselves to philosophical problems of being and identity. But some intriguing statues from Elea, dating from the first century AD and published in the 1960s, may suggest that Parmenides' activity and influence extended to medicine as well as philosophy. The evidence indicates a medico–religious society looking back to Parmenides and perhaps also to Pythagoras, presided over by '*pholarchs*' or 'leaders of the den', worshipping Apollo under the cult-name Apollo Oulios and led by a clan calling itself the 'Ouliadae'.[49] The difficulty is to know how far back this organization really went. One of the *pholarchs* is stated to have held office in the '446th year' after something or other, and this would suggest that the pedigree of the 'den' goes right back to classical Greece. At any rate the medical aspect of Parmenides comes as a surprise. Looking in the other chronological direction, the future Arab medical school of Salerno was round the corner, and it is tempting to speculate on the transmission of knowledge.

## Conclusion: a distinctive culture?

Italy and Sicily suffered from the same divisions and neighbourly jealousies as did old Greece, jealousies made more dangerous by racial friction and the

threat of uprisings by indigenous peoples (the proximity of non-Greeks is one main difference from old Greece). And yet the geography of Italy and Sicily did not, as it did in mainland Greece, impose these divisions.[50] There was, for instance, no shortage of good land for corn and cattle, as the ears-of-corn coinages of Metapontion and Siris in southern Italy, or the Thurii bull, remind us. But the colonial Greeks of the west, like colonials in all periods, inherited and exaggerated the classic attitudes of their race, in particular the governing feeling that as Pindar put it 'it is better to be admired than pitied' (*Pyth.* 1.85, but the thought was proverbial, cf. Hdt. 3.52). Pindar's poetry did not have to be adapted much for west Greek consumption.

'Theatricality' was not peculiar to Sicily, but it was, arguably, more prominent there, and at earlier dates, than it was in old Greece. Sicilian Greeks were proud to be different. Their writers expressed their differences by such means as assertive use of Doric dialect; examples are the comic poet Epicharmos – perhaps a precursor of, and influence on, the great playwrights of Athenian Old Comedy – and the mime-writer Sophron. It is not for nothing that the proud Greeks of Sicily called themselves by a special name, *Sikeliotai*. (It is first found in the Athenian Thucydides, but he is not likely to have invented it.) And yet it has been pointed out that these same *Sikeliotai* expressed their identity, not through some shared Sicilian sanctuary, but at Olympia and Delphi.[51]

# 5

# KYRENE AND EGYPT[1]

## Kyrene

In the year 474 BC, Polyzalos, brother of Pindar's patron Hiero, won the four-horse chariot race in the Pythian Games at Delphi. In the same year, Telesikrates of Kyrene in north Africa, another colonial Greek city, won the foot race in the same stadium.[2] Pindar celebrated that victory in his ninth *Pythian* Ode. These are more than coincidences: there was much that Greek Sicily and Greek Kyrene had in common, patronage of Pindar being only the most obvious and symbolic link. Both were places with non-Greek neighbours, and in both Kyrene and Sicily participation in Panhellenic Games was a way of asserting hellenism under pressure. Pindar wrote two more odes for victors from Kyrene, *Pythians 4* and *5* (462); both were for Arkesilas IV, hereditary 'Battiad' king of Kyrene; that is, descended from Battos, the original founder in *c.* 630. This first Battos was the recipient of hero-cult as 'oikist' or founder of the city in Pindar's time (*Pythian* 5. 93–5), and 'the man Battos the founder' still belongs to a special category of dead in the late fourth century, on the evidence of the purificatory law mentioned above, p. 56 (see R/O no 97, A line 22). Such glorification of founding individuals may remind us of Pindar's praise of the Sicilian tyrant Hiero as founder of Aitna in *Pythians* 1 and 3, though Pindar, true to a deeply felt inhibition imposed by classical Greek religion, stops just short of calling Hiero a living god or hero.[3] And here is another link between Sicily and Kyrene: at Kyrene, as at the Syracuse of Gelon, Hiero and Polyzalos, monarchy survived from the sixth century, when most of the cities of old Greece got rid of their tyrants, into the fifth. Again, like Syracuse (which co-existed with Carthage), Kyrene co-existed for decades not just with one great non-Greek power, but with two, Carthage (again!) and Persia. Prolonged warfare between Kyrene and Carthage is attested by the Roman historian Sallust (*Bellum Jugurthinum* 79, cp. 19; an unexpected source, but his information may go back to the good Greek authority of Posidonius); Sallust says that two Carthaginians with the suspiciously Greek (as opposed to Punic) sounding names the 'Philaeni' allowed themselves to be buried alive so as to fix the frontier between Carthage and Kyrene at a point considered favourable to Carthage. It is not easy to

know what to make of this, but an end to hostilities may indeed have been negotiated in the fourth century BC, and the 'altars of the Philaeni' were an ancient landmark, reidentified in modern times.[4] As for Persia, the conquest of Egypt and Cyrenaica as far west as Euesperides (near modern Benghazi, the ancient Berenike) by the Persian Kambyses did not entail the overthrow of the Battiads, nor did it interrupt the cultural traffic of Dorian Kyrene with the Peloponnese and even Ionian Attica. Lakonian pottery at archaic Kyrene is a reminder that Sparta was the mother-city of Thera, which was the mother-city of Kyrene (and see below p. 218 for Lysander's brother Libys).[5] Indeed the line of colonial descent is even longer because Euesperides in its turn was very probably a colony of Kyrene (see *FGrHist* 470 Theotimos F1) and has magistrates called 'ephors' (*SEG* 18. 772, a fourth-century grant of *proxeny* to two Syracusans), just like Kyrene (*SEG* 9. 1 line 33; 18. 739), Thera and Sparta itself. P. M. Fraser, who half a century ago published the proxeny inscription just cited, wrote that 'no other instance in which the transmission of constitutional forms can be discerned at so many removes is known to me'.[6]

The Spartans and their influence were, then, noticeable in Kyrene and Cyrenaica. But they had no monopoly of north African friendships and contacts: their enemies the Messenians are said to have found new homes in Cyrenaica as well as in Sicily in the late fifth century (Paus. 4. 26; Diod. 14. 34).[7] (The bracketing of the two regions is interesting in view of the parallels we have been suggesting.) Kyrene, like Syracuse was culturally cosmopolitan, so that for instance its art owes a clear debt to Athens, witness the bronze head from the mid-fifth century, in the style of Phidias (Chamoux 1953: plate xxiv, 3–4). But the most spectacular and intriguing evidence of Kyrene's continuing involvement with the Greek world to the north of it is the fourth-century *sula* ('reprisals') inscription, *SEG* 20. 716; this lists places, many of them Peloponnesian, to which Kyrene paid hefty reimbursements as 'reprisals' for some mysterious episode or purpose. It mentions shady-sounding individuals like 'Nikias the drug dealer'.[8]

The final area of resemblance between Kyrene and the great cities of the west was social structure. It was multiracial, so that the sixth-century reformer Demonax of Mantineia allowed one tribe for the indigenous 'dwellers round about', as well as one for the old Greek settlers and one for new arrivals (Hdt. 4. 161, cp. 159. 4).[9] These indigenous people left traces on the religion of Kyrene: Zeus Ammon (see below for his oracular sanctuary to the south-east, half way to Egypt) is a hybrid with a local element, and Egypt itself influenced Kyrene on points of ritual: thus the women of Kyrene abstained from veal (Hdt. 4. 186) in deference to the rules of Isis-worship. The 'heroines' mentioned by the hellenistic poet Callimachus, who came from Kyrene originally, are *local* Libyan cult-figures (Call. F 602 Pf.).[10] Indigenous names like Alazeir occur at Kyrene (Hdt. 4. 164 with the interesting inscribed genealogy *SGDI* 4859, and see *LGPN* 1 under 'Alatteir' for a coin from Barca-Ptolemais);[11] Bakal is another indigenous name, attested eight times at Kyrene, including one

mention in the late fourth-century decree of Ptolemy I from which we derive much of our knowledge about the early hellenistic city (*SEG* 9. 1, line 81; Austin 2006: no. 29 for translation which however omits the names at the end); a Bakal is also found at the metropolis Thera (for all these Bakals see again *LGPN* 1). So there was intermarriage with the local people, something also implied by Pindar (*Pythian* 9), who describes how Telesikrates' ancestors competed for the daughter of Antaios the Libyan giant (and cp. Callimachus *Hymn* 2. 85ff., a poem which may actually have been written for performance in Kyrene).[12] It is not, however, likely that these indigenous people acquired citizenship in any numbers. And the population, like that of Syracuse, had a backbone of old-established Dorian Greek farming families (Rhodians and Spartans as well as the original Therans). At Syracuse the indigenous element did not much influence the quality of Greek culture; it was slightly different at Kyrene, where as we have seen religion was not entirely Greek, and where the need to impress the Libyan locals may have had something to do with the long survival of the Battiad kingship.[13] The indigenous element consisted partly of nomads;[14] the *georgoi,* a word which normally means 'farmers', mentioned by Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 14. 115, may actually be indigenous serfs.[15] If so, they would correspond to the indigenous serf labourers of Persian Asia Minor or the Sikels of Sicily (see Chapters 4 and 6).

In Cyrenaica, then, the social and economic pattern was agricultural, and to a degree which was thought remarkable even in a world not familiar with alternatives to agricultural economies. Like Italian Thurii or Metapontion, Kyrene issued coinage which depicted the riches of its soil, in the form of the plant silphium.[16] This mysterious drug is now extinct, but is thought to have belonged to the *ferula* genus;[17] from the time of Solon to that of Julius Caesar it was to Kyrene what sherry is to Spain. Silphium was used as a vegetable in cooking, as fodder for cattle, and, most important, it was supposed to be a cure-all, for infection, indigestion and so on, rather like comfrey in the modern herbarium. It was a royal monopoly, and an earlier king Arkesilas is depicted on a Spartan vase of the mid-sixth century (Fig. 5.1) supervising his officials as they weighed it on a man-size balance (though one theory says that the substance here depicted is not silphium but wool).[18]

For Pindar, Kyrene was the place of many sheep (*Pyth.* 9. 6a), and the equestrian successes of Arkesilas were won on the famous bay horses of Kyrene. But the years 364–348 were the period of Kyrene's greatest Olympic glory: the city's five victories of the fourth century belong to that period.[19] (And for a virtuoso charioteer who showed off in front of Plato, see Lucian, *Encomium of Demosthenes* 23.) The landowners, like the 'land-holders' (*gamoroi*) of Syracuse, were a feudal nobility who were not always on easy terms with their kings. In the fourth *Pythian* (263ff., cf. p. 191) Pindar pleads with Arkesilas for one of these nobles who is out of favour, a 'pollarded oak tree' – cp. the tyrant's maxim about 'pruning the tallest poppies'; and in the late sixth century when the balance of strength was the other way, Arkesilas III had been forced out of the country to Samos. The lifestyle of a Kyrenaian

aristocrat was centred on his *pyrgos* (Hdt. 4. 164; Pol. 31. 18. 11 mentioning Tetrapyrgia; cp. also Strabo 836), a word found in Asia Minor[20] to describe a fortified estate, which in Asia Minor and no doubt in Kyrene was run in irresponsible baronial fashion. These aspects of Kyrene – a monarchic government supported or occasionally subverted by horsebreeding aristocrats – recall two other places whose hospitality Pindar samples early in his career, Thessaly and Macedon.

In the fifth century there were only two kings of Kyrene before the monarchy fell some time before *c.* 450, Battos 'The Fair' and Arkesilas IV;[21] in about the middle of the fifth century, Kyrene freed itself from the never very oppressive control of Persia, perhaps following the lead of the Egyptian revolt. Perhaps, too, there is a link between the internal revolution and the rejection of Persia.[22] (When Arkesilas IV had succeeded Battos IV is unknown, but Pindar addresses him as a young man in 462. In 460, two years after his success at the Pythia, Arkesilas achieved the crown of human ambition by winning the chariot race at Olympia, fulfilling Pindar's prayer at the end of the fifth *Pythian.* By the middle of the century Arkesilas was himself on the run, fleeing from Kyrene via Euesperides to the west, where he was assassinated.



*Figure 5.1* King Arkesilas of Kyrene overseeing the loading of wool. Spartan black-figure kylix

Pindar knew (none better) how to celebrate a victorious horse in the literal sense, but rarely backed a political winner: clients of his, or their families or states, came to misfortune in Athens, Sicily, Aigina and Kyrene. The monarchy in Kyrene had been a splendid anachronism; the 'democracy' which ousted it (Aristotle F6l1. 17, see n. 22 above) made no such splash in the outside world. That 'democracy' was probably an oligarchy of a narrow enough type. Thereafter till the end of the century Kyrene virtually disappears from the record except that a Kyrenaian individual helped Athenian survivors of the Sicilian disaster of 413 *(IG* I³ 125; Dem. 20.41–2; but see Th. 7. 50. 2 for state help by Kyrene to Sparta, mother-city of Kyrene's mother-island Thera, in 413). Political disorders are attested in 401 (Diod. 14. 34); it is tempting, though when evidence is so sparse it is not necessarily right, to associate these with the political convulsion and change attested in the *Politics* of Aristotle (1319b 1–32). Diodorus says that some of the 'powerful' (*dunatotatoi*) citizens were put to death and others banished, after which there was a reconciliation. Aristotle speaks of two things, a reaction by the 'notable' (*gnorimoi*) against extensive enfranchisements by the democrats (let us call this passage Aristotle (1)); he then, in a separate and slightly later passage a few lines later, refers to the *founding* of democracy at Kyrene (Aristotle (2)). One way of reconciling all this[23] is to put the establishment of democracy in 401 (Diodorus; Aristotle (2)), followed *immediately* by a reconciliation (Diodorus again), but *later*, in perhaps the 360s, by the uprising of the *gnorimoi* (Aristotle (1)). But there is no certainty: the situation (a few wisps of evidence) resembles the archaic period of Greek history, and we should not assume that all the data can or should be brought smoothly into connection with each other. The next constitutional evidence about Kyrene that has come down to us is the early Ptolemaic inscription (*SEG* 9. 1) which defines the citizen body, the Council (*boule*) and the Council of Elders (*gerousia*). There is a property qualification for citizenship, i.e. the set-up is 'timocratic' rather than fully democratic. But 'the general (*strategos*) is to be Ptolemy himself', so we are in a world later than that covered by the present book.

In the fourth century the coinage of Kyrene improved in quality and increased in volume; and the Treasury of Kyrene at Delphi was built in perhaps the years 334–321.[24] At Kyrene itself, building activity is more intense after the middle of the fourth century; the 'column of Pratomedes' (Fig. 5.2) dates from this time. Pratomedes was a civic benefactor comparable to the 'euergetists' of Magna Graecia like Psaumis of Kamarina (see above, Chapter 4, p. 54). The Kyrene of Alexander's time was a prosperous place: its citizens sent a gift of three hundred horses and five splendid four-horse chariots to Alexander the Great (Diod. 17. 49), and sold off Kyrene's corn to the Greek world in time of shortage (R/O no. 96= Harding 116).[25] This inscription names Athens, Corinth, Thebes and Alexander the Great's mother Olympias as recipients. Kyrenaian generosity on this occasion was still being recalled in the Emperor Hadrian's time, in the second century AD.[26]



*Figure 5.2* Hemicycle fountain and, behind it, the column of Pratomedes in the Sanctuary of Apollo at Kyrene

Arkesilas IV is called 'king of many cities' by Pindar. These cities certainly included Euesperides (above p. 63), Barke and Taucheira (Tocra), both to the west; and Antipyrgos (Tobruk) to the east: Barke issued coinage modelled on Kyrene's after 480.[27] (Archaeology has confirmed a substantial Greek presence at Tocra in the fifth century, though the Persian period is impoverished in comparison with what went before;[28] while at Euesperides there was a burst of urban expansion, accompanied by fortification, in the period 375–350 BC. 'The language and [see above p.63] institutions of Euesperides seem to have been predominantly Greek but there are indications from the excavations – further to be explored – of Libyan influence on diet, ceramics and other media.'[29]

## Egypt

One consequence of the Persian presence in Cyrenaica was to bring the Egyptian oasis of Siwah, with its oracle of Ammon, into closer touch with Kyrene: Zeus Ammon, as Pindar calls him *(Pyth.* 4. 16), features on the reverse of Kyrenaian coins issued after 480. There is plentiful fourth-century evidence for the spread of Egyptian, oriental and Thracian cults, and this has reasonably enough given rise to a view that the spread itself was a phenomenon of the Peloponnesian War and the fourth century.[30] But this is in part a trick of the evidence, at least as far as Athens goes, and Athens supplies us with most of that evidence:[31] the better view is that Ammon was well established in Greek religious thinking by much earlier dates. Thus Kroisos in the sixth

century (Hdt. 1. 146) and the Athenian Kimon in the mid-fifth (Plut. *Kim.* 18) had already consulted the Ammon oracle. (See further below, Chapter 19 p. 307 for Alexander the Great's visit.)

Egypt itself had been penetrated by Greek mercenaries as early as the seventh century, when Ionians and Karians were hired by the Saite pharaohs. Egyptian knowledge of Anatolia went back much further: the Greco–Karian city of Pedasa, just north of Halikarnassos, is mentioned in the gazetteer of Amenhotep (twelfth century BC). After Egypt was conquered by the Persian king Cambyses in 525 BC the Greeks and Karians lost their old employers; but it is certain from several pieces of evidence that they stayed on under the new management, as distinct ethnic groups, surviving until and beyond the Macedonian takeover in 331. In the first place, Herodotus (2. 61), discussing Egyptian customs, specifically mentions 'the Karians who *are* in Egypt': the historian wrote this in perhaps the third quarter of the fifth century. Second, recent excavations at Saqqara, the burial place of Egyptian Memphis, have produced Karian graffiti of the classical as well as the archaic period. Third, Greeks in the fourth century and later are described in written sources and inscriptions as coming from Naukratis, which was the old port of trade between the Greeks, with their silver to sell, and the xenophobic Egyptians with their more stagnant economy – but a surplus of wheat. (For money of 'Jawan', i.e. Ionia = Greece, in Egypt at the end of the fifth century, see Kraeling 1953: no. 12.) A recently discovered Aramaic papyrus gives the exit documents from the Nile Delta in 475 BC, in a period of Persian control; it lists a number of named Greeks involved in the shipping trade, and interestingly implies that the Persians imposed differential tariffs on the various nationalities, and that the Ionian Greeks were treated unfavourably: this was a time of continuing Greco–Persian tension, four years after the final battle of the Persian Wars and only a couple of years after the foundation of the Delian League with its ostensibly anti-Persian programme.[32]

Over the centuries these Greeks and Karians intermarried with the locals, so that in hellenistic times people called 'Karomemphites' and 'Hellenomemphites', obvious results of mixed marriages, are attested in Memphis.[33] These Greeks and Karians had garrisoning jobs in the Persian period, the enemy being presumably the native Egyptians. Another well-documented foreign garrison in Egypt (this time directed against trouble from the south as well as subversion from inside) was made up of contingents of Jews stationed in Upper Egypt at Aswan (Elephantine), at the Third Cataract of the Nile. The evidence for this group is a set of letters of papyri.[34] The most interesting of these seems to concern the Jewish passover; interpretation is difficult and controversial, but 'perhaps the Persian government gives its blessing to the continued performance of the cult' (A. Kuhrt). It dates from 419 BC:[35] it stipulates the days of unleavened bread, and speaks of abstinence from beer and work.

Egypt revolted from Persia three times in the fifth century, proving that these Greek and Jewish garrisons were needed. A revolt in 486 was put down

straight away. The third and most successful revolt began in 404 and gave Egypt independence until the 340s (there was a brief final revolt in the 330s). In between fell the revolt of Inaros, a Libyan prince, *c.* 462–52, whose final defeat entailed the defeat of an Athenian force of two hundred ships, sent to help Inaros during the First Peloponnesian War. The episode, known from both Herodotus (3. 12; 7. 7) and Thucydides (1. 104; 109–10), is the reality behind the fifth-century myth of the 'Persian Wars tradition' which glorified the events of 490–479 and the Eurymedon victory of the 460s: the frank truth was that Persia had inflicted a smashing defeat on Athens, and when Herodotus alluded lightly to the Egyptian disaster he was alluding, in effect, to the Athenian Vietnam. That is, 'Egypt', to many of Herodotus' listeners (not just Athenians but Samians, see ML 34) meant more than just weird customs and inverted religious practices, it meant dead family and friends.[36]

Persia's vigorous actions to recover Egypt are in proportion to what was at stake. From the fifth-century period of Persian control between *c.* 450 and 404 there survive leather documents[37] which show that much of the best land in Egypt was parcelled out among absentee Persian landlords. Here is an extract from a letter written by an indignant rentier to his bailiff (Driver 1957: no. x; Kuhrt 2007: 720):

> [In regard to] that domain which has been given to me by my lord in Egypt – they are not bringing me anything thence ... let a letter be sent ... to instruct one named Hatubasti, my officer, that without fail he collect the rent on those domains and bring it to me ...

When in the next century Alexander the Great, after winning the battle of Issos in Cilicia, turned south against Egypt rather than going immediately east towards the Iranian centre of the Persian empire, his decision, as we shall see, was strategically sensible; what is surprising is that the Persians surrendered so quickly, not trying to defend Egypt at all, although economically Egypt probably mattered more to the Persian upper class than any other satrapy (see below, p. 302).

In the late 330s, after Alexander had entered and taken over Egypt, his officer Peukestas, son of Makartatos, put up what is the earliest Greek documentary papyrus from Egypt. It was first published in 1974 and is cited on p. 305. It is the first drop of a deluge of such material, which makes social life in Egypt in the centuries after Alexander better known to us than any other part of the ancient world. But Greek knowledge of Egypt, and the Greek presence there, already had a 300-year history when Peukestas put up his notice. It is not surprising that in the mid-fourth century the shape of the Pyramids should have influenced the architecture of an otherwise Greek building like the Mausoleum at Halikarnassos (Fig. 5.3); or that the cult of the Egyptian Isis should have had worshippers at fourth-century Athens (R/O no. 91 = Harding 111, line 44, and below p. 214 for such foreign cults).




*Figure 5.3* Suggested reconstruction of one of the shorter sides of the Mausoleum of Halikarnassos

# 6

# THE PERSIAN EMPIRE,[1] ESPECIALLY ASIA MINOR[2]

## Introduction

The Jewish garrison at Elephantine (p.68) exemplifies the mixed racial and cultural character of the Persian empire: it was a Jewish garrison, stationed in Egypt, commanded by Iranians, owing allegiance to Persia, recording its business in Aramaic, on a site whose name is Greek ('the place of ivory'); finally, among the names identified in its papyri is a Chorasmian from north of the river Oxus.[3] Ease of travel was one of the benefits brought by an empire as large and stable as the Persian, which, after the conquests of Cyrus, Kambyses and Darius I in the second half of the sixth century, extended from Thrace to modern Afghanistan and from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf and the Third Cataract of the Nile. The eastern travels of Herodotus, who moved freely across the two thousand miles separating Babylon from Kyrene, were made possible by Persian indulgence and protection. Some Greeks admired Persian methods; even Plato, who thought that Persians suffered, as from a disease, from an excess of tyranny which made them congenitally weak, could call their empire a 'solidly based system' (*Laws* 685 where the reference is to Persia. Note also the intriguing possibility that the mighty empire Atlantis, depicted in Plato's *Timaeus*, stands for Persia).[4] Herodotus' *History* can be seen as a sermon on the text that Spartans and Persians, even in their great period of conflict, gradually came to value each other's qualities:[5] at first (Hdt. 1. 153) Cyrus the Great scoffs at the Greeks who come together in a marketplace (agora) to cheat each other; six books later, the exiled Spartan king Demaratos is shown (7. 104) lecturing to a clearly impressed Xerxes on the subject of Spartan deference to law.

The Persian empire, then, was not uniformly hated or despised by Greek writers. The 'Persian-Wars tradition' was a potent myth for centuries to come. According to the myth, Persia was trounced by the Greeks in 490–479 and then again at the battle of the Eurymedon. The truth was a bit different: as we saw (pp. 31, 69), Persian troops inflicted a very heavy defeat on the Athenians in Egypt,

and in the century from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Gaugamela, when Alexander finally destroyed Achaemenid power on the battlefield, the Persian kings and satraps exercised a continuous influence on Greek inter-city politics, often by expenditure of money. Some fourth-century Greek writers moved away from the old triumphalist approaches of the fifth century,[6] and interested themselves in the reality rather than the myth. That is, in Persian mechanisms of control, the way satraps controlled the Greeks with whom they came into contact, and the way Persian kings controlled their feudal subjects. Thus the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (Chapter 22 Chambers) has some good comments on the way Persian commanders deliberately withheld payments from (Greek) mercenaries; this would put them more in their power. The two most interesting items, in view of recent archaeological finds, are, first, a remark of a fourth-century historian, Herakleides of Kyme (*FGrHist* 689 F2), who says that the Persian king pays his soldiers in food, dividing the meat and bread equally, and that this corresponded to the money which Greek employers paid to their mercenaries. Herakleides goes on to speak of them as the king's 'fellow-diners'. And, second, there is a sentence in Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* (Chapter 4) about the revolt of the younger Cyrus (for which see p. 220): 'some say that he revolted because he was not given enough daily dinner rations'. The publication in 1969 of the Persepolis Fortification Tablets makes all this intelligible: the tablets record payments of large quantities of food – grain, sheep and so forth – to Persian grandees like 'Parnaka', the Pharnakes who was uncle of Darius I and is named by Herodotus (e.g. 8. 126). Thus (PF 654 = Kuhrt 2007: 782f., 503 BC): 'Twenty sheep, allocations by Harbezza, Parnaka received for rations. For a period of ten days, in month X, year 18 Mannunda communicated its message.' Now to eat twenty sheep in ten days a man needs a lot of help. The rations given to Parnaka were surely intended to support a large household, of a feudal type, in fact a household of what Herakleides called 'fellow-diners'. That satraps as well as the king had their entourage of fellow-diners is proved by Xenophon's *Anabasis* (1. 8. 25) which says that Cyrus the Younger had his 'table-sharers', and by Diodorus's description (17. 20) of the 'kinsmen' of the satrap Spithrobates, who fought with him at the battle of the Granikos in 334. (This item comes from Kleitarchos, who was interested in Persian institutions, cp. F5; not surprisingly since he probably grew up in Persian-held Ionia, which as with Herodotus, Ephorus and Herakleides must have helped determine his literary bent.)

Feudalism is a system of loyalty in return for benefits, usually land. In that general sense Achaemenid Persia was feudal. The satraps often revolted from the Great King, but when Alexander invaded, they fought to repel him. Greeks found these attitudes hard to understand; accustomed to connect one-man rule with harsh policing, they imagined that the Persian empire must have been held down by a system of institutionalized controls – garrisons and garrison commanders – and touring royal armies and officials, King's Eyes and King's Ears, and so on (Isok. 4. 145; Xen. *Oec.* 4. 9–12:[7] Hdt. 1. 114; Xen. *Cyr.*

8. 2. 11). These (it was thought) watched for signs of revolt among satraps. There is *some* evidence for all of this; but an inscription from Xanthos in Lycia, discovered in 1973, shows the satrap, Pixodaros, not the king, appointing a garrison commander (*SEG* 27. 942 = Hornblower 1982: M9).[8]

The benefits received by the satraps were too great for any of these checks to be necessary. What were those benefits? For the immediate entourage, the kinsmen or table-sharers of the king, splendid maintenance was one benefit. These were the feudal followers whom Herakleides had in mind. There is not much other evidence for any kind of standing army: the classical Greek historians (e.g. Hdt. 7. 83) speak of the Ten Thousand 'Immortals', but that word is now thought to be a confusion between two similar Old Persian words; one meant 'Immortals' and the other meant 'followers', the 'chief men around the chief', ideas which take one straight back to feudalism (cp. the 'king's kinsmen' in the Persian battle-array at Gaugamela, Arr. *Anab.* 3.11. 4).[9]

But for most of the king's vassals, who did not inhabit the Iranian heartland, the benefit took the form of gifts of land like medieval fiefs, in return for which the man 'enfeoffed' was expected to maintain a levy of troops. Such were the troops who fought Alexander at the Granikos. In the late fifth century 'bow land' and 'chariot land' were given away on condition that the owners for the time being paid for soldiers or cavalry. The system goes back to the sixth century, when the founder of the Persian empire, the great Cyrus, presented seven cities in northern Anatolia to Pytharchos of Kyzikos (*FGrHist* 472 F6, cp. Fornara 46 for the signature of a man called Pytharchos found at Persepolis; perhaps a descendant rather than Cyrus' friend). The astonishingly well-preserved sarcophagus found not far away in the Granikos valley in 1994, with a relief of the sacrifice of Hecuba's daughter Polyxena on one side (Fig. 6.2), perhaps comes from a Greco–Iranian milieu of the Pytharchos sort; the tomb seems, unusually, to have been intended for a *woman* (below p. 78 and n. 25). There is literary and epigraphical evidence for women holding power in Asia Minor, see below p. 78 for Mania in just this region, or Artemisia and Ada further south in Karia.

The Persian gift-giving commented on by Thucydides (2. 97) continued through the time of Themistokles (1. 138) down to the eve of Alexander's arrival. Arrian (*Anab.* 1. 17. 8) mentions 'Memnon's Land' in the neighbourhood of Troy; the possessor of this land was a Persian general (and see further p. 77 for Persians or Persian favourites settled in Anatolia). Such generosity was at the expense of the Greek cities on the coast, and may help to explain why they revolted from Persia again in 479 (Hdt. 9. 105, treating their adhesion to the new Delian League as a second 'Ionian Revolt'), as before in the Ionian Revolt of 499. But though such grants may have caused friction, and perhaps some economic hardship, there is no compelling reason to believe that fifth-century Ionia was notably impoverished; certainly the evidence of the Athenian Tribute Lists is unsafe support for such a view[10] (see Figure 6.1).

Did the Persians go beyond territorial expropriation at the expense of favourites? That is, did they impose political regimes ('tyrannies') which were uncongenial to their Greek subjects? Certainly, resentment of such 'tyrannies', especially in the aftermath of the democratic reforms of the Athenian Kleisthenes (*c.* 508), helps to explain why Ionia, with its kinship connections with Athens, rebelled against Persia just when it did, i.e. after nearly fifty years of subordination without attested protest. But it is not so




*Figure 6.1* One of the Persian 'Immortals': terracotta relief.
© bpk / Vorderasiastisches Museum



*Figure 6.2* The sacrifice of Polyxena by Neoptolemos at the tomb of Achilles. Relief, archaic marble sarcophagus from Gümüşçay, Troad

clear that Persian policy was to *impose* tyrannies: not enough attention (so runs a recent plausible argument) has been given to 'self-interested initiatives by individual upper-class Greeks, who approached the Persian king in the justified expectation of gaining power and rewards in return for services rendered to him'.[11]

Greek tyrants, however installed, were not the only people who restricted the freedom of the Greeks of Asia Minor. The institutionalized authority was the satrap, who extorted tribute, including personal military service. The main satrapal bases in western Anatolia were Sardis in Lydia (central western Asia Minor) and Daskyleion in 'Hellespontine Phrygia' (the north-west).

## Satraps

What was a satrap? He (or occasionally she)[12] was a Persian provincial governor. A satrap's powers had few limits provided he stayed loyal. Satraps led contingents from their satrapies in the great battles against Greeks or Macedonians of which we hear in Herodotus or the Alexander historians; they also levied troops for less grand operations. Thus we hear of those who muster in the plain of Kastollos' (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 2.7). Satraps usually had the military authority where the satrapal authority was divided, as it sometimes was (see p. 309: Sardis); and such divided commands could enable the king to keep an eye on the ambitious. In diplomacy with subject or foreign peoples, satraps were supposed to refer everything to the king of Persia, the 'Great King' (Diod. 15. 41. 5), but there is nothing to imply deference to the king in inscriptions like Mausolus' treaty with the Pamphylian city of Phaselis,[13] or his grant of political privileges to the Kretan city of Knossos.[14] In the sphere of finance, satraps were supposed to forward tribute (Th. 8. 5).

The presence of such a satrap, then, was the first affront to local freedom. How oppressive the satraps were in reality is a question which can be answered only by looking at the second area in which Persian power impinged, tribute and military service.

Personal service, and the obligation to lead one's own retainers, is essential to a military system like the Persian. Herodotus says that a rich Lydian called Pythios tried to get his son exempted from the draft by entertaining the king magnificently; but the king had the young man sliced in half and made the army march between the pieces (Hdt. 7. 27f.). The punishment oddly resembles the Roman way of purifying an army after some pollution: did the Achaemenids, who as Darius' Behistun inscription proclaims, ruled by the grace of Ahura Mazda, regard military conscription as a religious duty? Later, it was possible to pay for somebody else to carry a pike for you;[15] like the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League (Th. 1. 99. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 21), the Persians found such a system of commutation more convenient and perhaps, in dissident satrapies, more secure.

In finance, the crude picture in Herodotus' list of the Tributes (3. 89ff.) and depicted on the reliefs at Persepolis – huge quantities of bullion brought by subject peoples – must be modified by the fourth century. By then the satraps in Asia Minor (which is the best attested cluster of satrapies) allow the *poleis* to grant citizenship and tax exemption on their own initiative, provided the Great King gets his tribute.[16] Whether Asia Minor is untypically sophisticated, we cannot be sure; the picture there at least is that the Persian authorities did not suppress local autonomy (see further p. 78). And the tendency towards appointing indigenous locals rather than Iranians as satraps after 400 gave a chance to humbler men who could rise as their masters rose: a trilingual inscription published in 1974 shows the satrap appointing two Karians to office in Xanthos (R/O no. 78; Kuhrt 2007: 859–63).[17] Much of this evidence is from the satrapy of Karia, ruled by a local dynast Hekatomnos and after him by his children; and though the Hekatomnids certainly enjoy unusual latitude, there is no denying them their full status as satraps: the matter is put beyond doubt by the Aramaic text of the trilingual inscription from Xanthos mentioned above (see the full text in *Fouilles de Xanthos* 6 (1979), which refers to Pixodaros as 'satrap in Karia and Lycia'; translation at Kuhrt 2007: 861f.).

We know less about other local dynasties in Asia Minor, because there is not the same abundance of inscriptions. But Kilikia in south-eastern Asia Minor provides a good parallel to and perhaps precedent for Karia in the south-west. Here a local family, in which the name Syennesis occurs regularly without necessarily having been a dynastic title, seems to have ruled from the sixth century (see perhaps Hdt. 1. 74. 3) until at least the beginning of the fourth, and for most of that time under Achaemenid overlordship and with their base at Tarsus. There are even specific links with Karia: an early Kilikian king Syennesis married his daughter to a prominent Karian called Pixodaros son of Maussollos, very likely an ancestor of the fourth-century ruling Hekatomnid family (Hdt. 5. 118. 2, 499 BC). And in the late fifth century, another Syennesis was honoured at Karian Iasos, as a recently published inscription shows[18] But unlike the Hekatomnids, the Kilikian rulers are not



*Figure 6.3* Tribute bearers from the ceremonial staircase at Persepolis

attested as satraps – so far. But then, we have no Tarsus equivalent of the Xanthos trilingual inscription. That could change.

### Asia Minor under the Persians[19]

That one language of the Xanthos trilingual inscription is Aramaic, the Persian bureaucratic script, is a reminder that there were Persians in numbers settled in classical Anatolia. The new, indigenous administrators did not displace these Iranian settlers but imitated and co-operated with them. A strong Iranian social presence throughout the period 479–334 is indicated by chance literary references, such as Herodotus, who refers not only to Persian individuals at Sardis before the Ionian Revolt from Persia of the 490s, but also to Persians being given the land round Miletos *after* the revolt (5. 101; 6. 20). Or there is Xenophon, who describes (*Anabasis* 7. 8) the rich feudal estate of the Persian Asidates in north-west Asia Minor at the beginning of the fourth century. The 'territory' of Tithraustes, a Persian name, in Hellespontine Phrygia, is mentioned in a papyrus dealing with the events of the Social War of the 350s (*FGrHist* 105, cp. p. 272). But here it is epigraphy which has added most strikingly to our knowledge: as early as Herodotus' day there had been Persians with names like Megabates at Halikarnassos (ML 32), and more recently discovered inscriptions from fourth-century Labraunda, a sanctuary in Persian-held Karia, attest the Iranian proper names Phrathethnes and Ariarames (*I. Labraunda* 77 and 78). In the late fourth century Bagadates and Ariaramnes, two obvious Persians, are honoured at another Karian sanctuary, Amyzon; and as late as the second century BC we find a Lycian called Telepolemos son of Artapates (Greek name, Persian patronymic).[20] Another inscription, published in 1975, from Sardis in Lydia seems (the interpretation is controversial) at a minimum to record a dedication of a statue to 'Zeus

of Baradates' by Droaphernes the Persian hyparch, i.e. governor of Lydia. Whatever exactly lies behind the expression 'Zeus of Baradates', the names Droaphernes and Baradates are certainly Iranian and this text indicates some mixing or overlap between Greek and Persian religious activity (*SEG* 29. 1205 = Kuhrt 2007: 865ff.).[21] That may also be the implication of the phrase 'Gods of the Greeks and Persians' at hellenistic Tabai in Karia (*CRAI* 1978, p. 281).

Persian values also made themselves felt at local satrapal courts: a *Greek* verse inscription from *Lycian* Xanthos, put up by a dynastic ruler in the early fourth century, partly echoes *Persian* educational ideals ('riding, shooting and speaking the truth') (Hdt. 1. 136), when it speaks of 'what wise men know, archery, virtue [or 'courage', Greek *arete*], and hunting on horseback – this I know also' (*SEG* 28. 1245 = R/O no. 13, lines 14f).

The dynast in question is called Arbinas: he is certainly a Lycian but it is thought that the form of the name is Persian. Such Persian names survive in local nomenclature till Roman times: the priests of Artemis at Ephesus went on being called Megabyxoi for centuries after 330; or we might compare the place-name Maibozani, attested in an inscription from Roman Ephesus.[22] This same place Maibozani has yielded a dedication to 'Persian Artemis'.[23] Archaeology confirms the general picture. Thus at Elmali near Karaburin in north Lycia there has been found an early fifth-century tomb painting of a Persian dignitary, but executed in a partly Greek artistic manner.[24] But one of the most spectacular finds from western Asia Minor is a fine late archaic sarcophagus (Fig. 6.2) from near the mouth of the river Granikos, depicting the sacrifice of Polyxena, daughter of Priam and Hecuba. The tomb, whose iconography is markedly female in focus, was perhaps intended for a woman (a female ruler or even satrap?), but was then used, in unfinished form, for a male burial.[25] If the female hypothesis is right, this would recall the literary evidence for Mania the satrap in this region (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3) and, in the south of Asia Minor, female Karian satraps like Artemisia and Ada, the daughters of Hekatomnos.[26]

One specially rich satrapal capital is Daskyleion in northern Asia Minor, situated in 'fine fishing and hunting country' (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 1. 15f.), and excavated in the 1950s and again from 1988. Greco–Iranian *stelai* (funerary pillars) from Daskyleion are sometimes carved in Aramaic, indicating the Persian nationality of the customers for whom they were made; other Aramaic-inscribed objects have been found there, but also Greek pottery imports.[27]

But it must be emphasized that this extensive social penetration by Iranians does *not* seem to have destroyed local autonomy or opportunities for office-holding by locals: thus the Amyzon inscription mentioned above certainly honours Iranians, but one of the *archontes* (magistrates) has a Karian name (Panamyes) and so does Hyssollos the 'Treasurer of the Gods' and the 'mountain guard' Paes son of Panamyes.

## Conclusion

This was the Persian empire with which the Greeks dealt – large, catholic and not obviously tyrannical in its treatment of the local communities, at least in its later phases. The internal history of Persia and its kings is harder to reconstruct, because there is no indigenous Persian historiography. Xerxes, the invader of Greece in 480, died in 465 and the long reign of Artaxerxes I began, lasting until 425. It was he who ended the war with Athens, or perhaps turned the hot war into a cold one (because satraps continued to subvert Athenian-supported democracies in Anatolia): after the Persian recovery of Egypt in the 450s Athenian aggression against Persia was checked, except for a brief campaign in Cyprus at the end of the 450s. The resulting Peace of Kallias of 449 did not, however, affect the diplomatic position of the Spartans, and it is easy to be misled by the Athens-centred character of the written sources and forget that the Spartans and the Persians were technically at war right down to 412 BC.[28] This is not just a historical curiosity, although for much of the fifth-century Sparta and Persia had no attested dealings. The word 'attested' is important: there was certainly more to-ing and fro-ing between Persia and the Greek states than is recorded, especially on a change of ruler. For instance, the Argives, in perhaps the later 460s, needing protection against the Spartans after concluding an alliance with Athens, sent envoys to Persia for reassurance of friendship from the new king, and got it (Hdt. 7. 151; see further the beginning of Chapter 7 below). The Spartans wanted help in the Peloponnesian War, and sent more than one delegation (Th. 4. 50). The difficulty was that Persia insisted that the Spartans recognize that Asia Minor was Persian property, and this they were unable to do, for domestic reasons connected with the Peloponnesian League (pp. 127, 159).

Artaxerxes I was succeeded in 424 by Darius II after an anarchic interval. Under Darius the Lydian satrap Pissouthnes revolted, and the Athenians supported this revolt, which was continued by his bastard son Amorges (see p. 168). That support ended the Peace of Kallias, and Persian intervention in Greek affairs is now stepped up (413). Support of Amorges and its ultimate consequence, the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, is, however, a story we shall resume later.

# 7

# ARGOS[1]

## Introduction: the physical setting and the sources

Argos was the most important power in the eastern Peloponnese, and alongside Sparta was the most famous city of the entire Peloponnese, as Strabo says (376). The *polis* of Argos, with its two fortified hills the Larissa and Aspis, lay about 5 kilometres from the tongue of sea known as the Argolic Gulf. By a process nowadays thought to have been slow, gradual and not complete until the 460s,[2] the city extended its domination over the triangular Plain of Argos, which also includes the great second-millennium cities of Mycenae to the north and Tiryns to the south. The temple of Hera, the famous 'Argive Heraion' (see Figure 7.1), is on the edge of the plain to the south of Mycenae and north-west of Argos, marking the limits of Argive territory in good times for Argos, though occasionally, for instance at about the time of the Persian Wars, Mycenaean assertiveness took the form of control of the temple, and an ultra-sceptical view insists that the first unequivocal literary evidence connecting Argos and the Heraion is in Pindar's tenth *Nemean Ode* of perhaps 464 BC.[3] (For this poem see further below p. 82.) Nauplia and Temeneion provided classical Argos with its access to the sea.[4] The territory of Argos was called the 'Argolid', and ran to the south as far as the Thyreatis, though this region was disputed with, and eventually lost to, the Spartans. To the east of the Argive plain, mountains separated Argos from the usually independent cities Troizen, Hermione and Epidauros. North of the Argive plain, Argive influence took subtler forms than direct military control of the kind exerted within the plain itself: Argos, as we have seen (Chapter 3, p. 27), had a claim on the panhellenic sanctuary of Nemea *via* Argive control of the small *polis* of Kleonai which in turn controlled the Nemean Games.

Classical Argive history is poorly documented. Herodotus has a very few relevant forward-looking allusions to the Pentekontaetia: he tells us that the Argives fought the Spartans twice, once alongside the Tegeans of Arkadia and then at Tanagra in 458 (9. 35), and that they applied to Persia in the 460s to renew their friendship, a reference to what many Greeks would have regarded as the deplorable episode of Argive medism (see section on Argos and 'kinship diplomacy' below). Thucydides, who did sketch the period,



*Figure 7.1* The Heraion of Argos, general view

was not interested in the question of medism, but still regarded the Argives with some contempt. His account of an episode from 418 BC says it all: he describes how the Spartans and Argives nearly collided in armed conflict; both armies were disgruntled and angry with their leaders because of the missed opportunity, but whereas the Spartan troops waited until they got home and only later punished their king Agis in constitutional fashion (Th. 5. 63, cp. 60), the Argives actually began to stone their commander Thrasyllos there and then (5. 60). Thucydides makes no comment, but we are surely meant to take away an impression of Argive indiscipline. It is true that Thucydides is, as we shall see (p. 83, 166), well aware of the romantic pan-Peloponnesian ambitions of the Argives after 421 BC, and of the way these ambitions were expressed in terms of ancient mythical hegemony; but at the same time he makes implicitly clear his own opinion that the Argives' reach exceeded their realistic grasp. Whatever the reason, Thucydides has very little to say about Argos in the mid-fifth century apart from the facts that the Athenians allied with the Argives in the late 460s and that a thousand Argives fought at Tanagra in 458 (1. 102. 4 and 107. 5). He does not even tell us in the expected place in Book 1 that the Argives made a separate thirty-year peace with Sparta in 451 BC, though he does tell us under 421 that '*the* thirty-year treaty with Sparta was on the point of expiring' (5. 14. 4): the definite article implies that we know what he is talking about, which we do not. The Pentekontaetia narrative of Book 1 is, however, very selective and this particular item may not have seemed to Thucydides to be sufficiently relevant to his main theme, the growth of tension between Athens and Sparta. But

Thucydides had his likes and dislikes, and some such silences and narrative postponements (*analepses,* in the language of literary theory) may be evidence of impatience or intolerance. Whatever the explanation of the 451 omission, he is less well informed or less disposed to be communicative about Argos in this period than about, say, Corinth.[5]

Pindar has one ode for an Argive victor, Theaios, who won the wrestling event in the local games to Hera (*Nemean 10*). This moving poem begins with praise of Argos, 'home of Hera and fit for a goddess' (line 2), and ends with the account of the decision of Polydeukes to bring his twin brother Kastor back to life on alternate days, thus unselfishly rejecting Zeus' alternative offer that he himself should enjoy uninterrupted immortality. Now the Dioskouroi Kastor and Polydeukes were specially connected with Sparta ('stewards of spacious Sparta' as Pindar himself calls them, line 52), and it is a bold stroke to make them the central or rather closing myth of an Argive-centred poem; the ostensible link is the hospitality shown to the mythical twins by Theaios' ancestor Pamphaes (lines 49–50). There is no crude political message here, but whether Sparta was a rival or a friend at the time, Pindar seems clearly to be placing the two cities on the same exalted level.

This is not a lot of evidence. So we have to reconstruct what happened at Argos between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars from wisps of contemporary evidence blowing in different directions, and from the later writers Strabo (369–72) and Pausanias, in an important section (2. 16–25, from a book which also dealt with Corinth and its territory and neighbours). French and Greek excavations have produced interesting classical inscriptions from Argos on a greater scale than either Corinth or Sparta; and archaeological survey work in the southern Argolid (the region containing the *poleis* of Epidauros, Troizen, Halieis and Hermione) has illuminated settlement patterns and the way the resources of the countryside were exploited.[6] Some of the findings are a little unexpected and their causes are not yet fully understood, notably the evidence for increased public and private prosperity in the fourth century compared to the earlier periods.[7]

Classical Argos was nothing like as important as it had been in the prehistoric or archaic periods; but it was more important than the poor state of the sources suggests.

## Argos and 'kinship diplomacy'

We saw at the end of Chapter 6 that the Argives approached the Persians in the 460s to renew their friendship. Herodotus precedes his account of this event with a story of an appeal in the opposite direction at the time of the Persian Wars: the Persians asked the Argives to remain neutral. The grounds of the appeal are of great interest (7. 150, contrast 6. 54, where the Persians are made to say that the Argives were really of Egyptian descent): the Persians claimed to be related to the Argives through their supposed ancestor Perses, the child of the Argive hero Perseus and of Andromeda.

What are we make of this sort of reasoning? It is hard for us to take this particular example seriously, because it is so obviously based on a mere similarity of names starting in 'Pers- '. But the underlying appeal to kinship (*syngeneia*) is (cf. p. 12) important for the understanding of Greek international politics, because colonial relations between mother- and daughter-cities were thought of as a sort of family relationship in ancient Greek as in modern English parlance (*metropolis* or 'mother-city' means the main founding city). So if the Persians really spoke the language of *syngeneia* when dealing with the citizens of a proud and ancient Greek *polis*, they certainly knew the right way to go about things.[8] 'Kinship diplomacy', as it has been called, was an important kind of sentimental and religious oil for political wheels. By invoking shared mythical ancestors you said, in effect, that a foreigner was after all family and owed you good treatment. The obligations so created or acknowledged would certainly be reciprocal, and reciprocity is at the heart of Greek relations with each other at both the personal and the inter-state level. The topic has been much studied in recent years;[9] as often the stimulus to scholarly work was provided by a particular discovery, an inscription from the Letoon in Lycia recording an appeal for financial help from the small central Greek city of Kytenion (Kytinion) to Lycian Xanthos (*SEG.* 38. 1476). The appeal is couched in terms of a complicated mythical kinship: Apollo and Artemis, children of Leto, were born at Lycian Xanthos, and Asklepios, son of Apollo and a descendant of Dorus, was born in Doris, i.e. the homeland of the Dorians. The argument is quite a tour de force because the more straightforward connection was between Apollo and his son (by Creusa) Ion, the eponymous ancestor of the Ionians rather than their rivals and opposites the Dorians; evidently the financially desperate *polis* of Kytenion has gone in for some creative reworking of its collective history.

The Argives in the fifth century seem to have been unusually conscious of their city's past and to have had pretensions accordingly; even Thucydides, introducing a long and involved narrative of diplomacy in and after 421 BC, says (5. 28. 2, cp. 69. 1) that the Argive motive at this time was to secure the hegemony of the Peloponnese, a startling claim which recalls the old threefold division of the Peloponnese in mythical times (Argos, Sparta and Messenia). The equivalent passage of Diodorus, drawing on his source Ephorus, is fuller:

> a large number of cities joined together and selected the city of the Argives to hold the position of leader. For this city enjoyed a high position by reason of its achievements in the past, since until the return of the Heracleidae practically all the most important kings had come from the Argolid …
>
> (12. 75. 5–6)

Like Thucydides in his parallel passage Diodorus goes on more realistically to give the reasons for Argive prosperity at just this time. We may postpone for the time being a closer look at those reasons, and at Argive political

history generally in the fifth century; for the moment we should notice only the acknowledgement of a claim to hegemony grounded on the antiquity and splendour of the ancient kings of Argos. Strictly, Diodorus speaks only of the attitude of other people to Argos, but we can surely detect an echo of Argive self-advertisement in the talk about the ancient kings. The Homeric use of 'Argives' as one expression for 'Greeks'[10] no doubt helped to puff up Argive vanity (the same may have been true of the Achaians of the northern Peloponnese). From all this we can well imagine that the myth-minded Argives would be very prone to the making, and susceptible to the receiving, of appeals to ancestral kinship.

Certainly, Argos, though not a great colonizing agent in the archaic period, continued to feature prominently in kinship claims throughout classical and hellenistic history, for a special reason: the kings of Macedon claimed descent from Argos, and thus from the second half of the fourth century on, to say you were descended from the Argives was equivalent to claiming a connection with Philip and Alexander the Great. But Argive medism meant that this had to be handled in a subtle way. An example of this particular sort of late classical and early hellenistic snobbery is provided by an inscription asserting a link between Argos and Aspendos, far away in Pamphylia in southern Asia Minor (*SEG* 34. 282);[11] the (improbable) implication of this is that Argos actually founded Aspendos. For another example from the latter part of the fourth century (Nikokreon of Cyprus) see below p. 319f. But, as we shall see when we look at Macedon itself in the next chapter (p. 94), the claim that the Macedonian kings came from Argos is not a post-Alexander the Great fiction, but is already found in romantically embellished form in Herodotus, and is more tersely given as a motive for Macedonian royal action by Thucydides (who on this point may have been drawing on Herodotus).[12] Nor is it quite true that early Argos did not colonize at all: archaic Argos does not feature in modern lists of 'mother-cities',[13] but a fifth-century inscription or pair of inscriptions implies that the Argives were regarded, even at that relatively early date, as the founders of two Kretan cities, Knossos and Tylissos (ML 42 = Fornara 89).[14] This must reflect traditions about the migratory period of Greek history, and is comparable to the hazy but politically convenient tradition which made Athens the *metropolis* of Ionia (Th. 1. 12. 4), or that which made Euboian Chalkis the *metropolis* of much of Chalkidike in the north Aegean.[15] Pindar, in the ode already mentioned (*Nemean* 10) does make Argos a sort of colonizing state, by drawing (line 6) on the mythical tradition which connected Argos and Egypt *via* Epaphos the son of Zeus and Argive Io who in her wanderings ended up in Egypt (this is part of the Danaid story which forms the subject of Aeschylus' *Suppliants*); Argos in Pindar's words 'established many cities in Egypt through the efforts of Epaphos'.

## Argos in the fifth century BC

In the Persian Wars, the Argives medized. Strictly, they remained neutral, but Herodotus is emphatic that this attitude was tantamount to outright medism (8. 73, cp. 7. 150. 3).[16] The taint of medism did not, however, stick to Argos as it stuck to Thebes, and Argos always retained its traditional appeal within the Peloponnese for protection or insurance against Sparta. Shortly before the Persian Wars, the Spartan king Kleomenes I had defeated the Argives at the battle of Sepeia (494), after which Argive fortunes slumped because the city was 'widowed of its manpower' in Herodotus' vivid phrase (6. 83); 'the slaves took over', he continues, a startling statement which should perhaps be watered down to something like 'the Argives were forced to absorb members of their perioecic communities'. (Ar. *Pol.* 1303a6; *perioikoi,* 'dwellers-round-about', were usually inhabitants of subject communities with limited autonomy. The most important perioikoi were those of Sparta, but other places had them too.)[17]

Argive manpower difficulties are reflected in the evidence for loss of political control over places very near home. We have seen that Mycenae managed to prise away control of the Heraion for a brief while, and Tiryns was independent at about the same time, evidently a hostile independence (Hdt. 6. 83). But then the slow Argive recovery began. They fought the Spartans at Tegea alongside the Tegeans, although they were apparently absent from a subsequent battle at Dipaia fought between the Spartans against the Arkadians (Hdt. 9. 35 is the only source for these obscure and strictly undatable battles, which must, however, have been fought in the 470s or 460s). In the early 460s the Argives crushed and destroyed Mycenae and Tiryns and some other places (Diod. 11. 65; Paus. 2. 15. 4, 25. 6 and 8, 8. 27.1), and at the end of the decade the Argives allied with Athens, an act of clear defiance of Sparta.

Was this more than just evidence of shared fear of Sparta? Was it, in fact, a union of democracies? The Athenians at the time of the Argive alliance were in process of converting the arrangements of Kleisthenes into the more radical democracy associated with the name of Ephialtes (p. 22–25). The Argos of the Peloponnesian War was certainly a democracy of sorts (Th. 5. 31. 6),[18] but there is no secure earlier evidence; recently published inscriptions imply a redesignation and presumably also reorganization of the citizen body in about the mid-fifth century, and it is likely that this is evidence of a democratic reform of a 'Kleisthenic' sort in about 470–460.[19] In Arkadia, the western neighbour of Argos, Mantineia was synoikized under Argive influence (Strabo 337) at some strictly undatable time; this synoikism has sometimes been interpreted as democratic, and placed in the post-Persian Wars period. If that could be established without circularity, it would be further if indirect evidence for Argive democracy. Athenian influence in all this is plausible enough (after all, the Athenian changes associated with Kleisthenes made ripples in Ionia around 500 BC, and this is one reason for the Ionian Revolt from Persia); but the evidence for mid-century Mantineian democracy is shaky, and so is

the case for associating Themistokles in particular with the Peloponnesian changes, though he certainly stayed at Argos for a while and made visits from there to 'other parts of the Peloponnese' (Th. 1. 135. 3).[20]

Whatever the truth about all that, the Argive–Athenian alliance of 462/1 was taken seriously by both sides. At some unspecified moment 'many years after' the Persian Wars, both the Athenians and the Argives made overtures to the Persians (Hdt. 7. 151, mentioning Kallias as the Athenian ambassador), and 462/1 has its attractions: on this reconstruction both cities felt worried about Spartan anger and reprisals at what they had done, and both simultaneously looked east, in rather fourth-century style, for a possible protector.[21] At Athens, Aeschylus in his *Oresteia* of 458 inserted warm references to Argos which surely went beyond the needs of the plot, and he even seems to have transferred the action to Argos from Mycenae.[22]

We are now on the eve of the First Peloponnesian War, already discussed in an earlier chapter (Chapter 3, section on the First Peloponnesian War). As we saw there, the war had a religious aspect – a struggle for influence at some of the great panhellenic sanctuaries, specifically a struggle between Athens and Sparta for influence at Delphi, and between Corinth and Argos for influence at Nemea. It is the second of those struggles which now concerns us; this book follows the view which makes Mycenae 'in some sense an instrument for Corinthian pretensions and aggression in the northern Argolid'.[23] We have seen that in the mid-60s, on the eve of the First Peloponnesian War, the Argives attacked Mycenae; the reason, apart from general Mycenaean insubordination, was that 'they kept disputing with the Argives over the sanctuary of Hera, and claiming that they had the right to administer the Nemean Games by themselves' (Diod. 11. 65. 2). It was normally little Kleonai which administered those games, and an athletic or religious aspect to the Argive attack on Mycenae is confirmed by the report that the Argives were joined by, precisely, Kleonai (Strabo 377). That Corinth was the real object of the attack cannot quite be proved, though some victory dedications (helmets, shields) from perhaps the mid-460s, and celebrating an Argive defeat of Corinth, have been plausibly associated with this pre-First Peloponnesian War phase of already bad Argive–Corinthian relations *(LSAG*[2] 162 and 169 no. 18). We also hear of a Corinthian attack on Kleonai (Plut. *Kim.* 17. 2). When the war began, the Athenian landing at Halieis, on the coast south-east of Argos, was met and defeated by Corinthians, Epidaurians and Sikyonians (for whom see *SEG* 31. 369); this is further evidence for Corinthian interest in the Argolid.

The Argives for their part fought (one thousand of them) at the battle of Tanagra (Th. 1. 107. 5), and their dead were commemorated in the Kerameikos cemetery at Athens (Paus. 1. 29. 8 with ML 35; the Spartan victory offering, ML 36 = Fornara 80, was a gold shield and marble pillar dedicated at Olympia 'from the Argives, Athenians and Ionians'; note that the Spartans' inveterate enemies are named in first place).

By the end of the 450s, however, the Argives had had enough, and made peace for thirty years with the Spartans; see the introductory section, p. 81, for Thucydides' odd treatment of this treaty. Five years later, when the Athenians and Spartans made a more famous Thirty Years' Peace (446), a special clause allowed the Argives to establish friendly relations with the Athenians, if they wanted; this was written on a bronze stele at – again – Olympia. (Paus. 5.23.4. The point of this formulation was no doubt to rule out actual military alliance between Athenians and Argives.)[24]

There followed three decades of peace and prosperity for Argos. But it was not a period of isolationism, as shown by an inscription already mentioned (above p. 84 and n. 14): some time in the mid-century, Argos was involved, apparently as mother-city, in the affairs of two Cretan cities, Knossos and Tylissos. Bits of stone were found in both Argos and Krete, but what we seem to have is a single complicated Argive decree providing for joint expeditions, in which 'physical intervention by Argos in Krete is thought possible'. But the text is wide-ranging, and there are also provisions about sacrifices and about the ownership of real estate. All this is surprising, and a good example of how an inscription can remind us how little we know. Without it we would not have dreamt of either the colonial link, or the Argive interest in Krete at just this time: "it seems safe to put this remarkable extension of Argive interests around the year 450 or a little earlier" (both quotations from Meiggs and Lewis 1988).

The prosperity of the three decades 451–421 is epigraphically attested: enormous revenues were distributed by 'the Twelve' to phratries (kinship-groups; see above n. 19).[25] Archaeology also seems to confirm that there was plenty of money in fifth-century Argos: the Heraion was rebuilt. But what was the reason for this, and when? The starting point has to be a brief notice of Thucydides under the year 423 BC; he reports (4. 133. 2–3) that in that summer the temple of Hera near (he actually says 'in') Argos was accidentally burnt down because the priestess Chrysis put a light too near some woollen fillets and went to sleep and they caught fire. The Greek word for 'burnt down' is a strong one, and the easy and obvious move is to relate this conflagration to the archaeologically attested rebuilding of the sanctuary in the classical period. Easy but it seems wrong: the best archaeological opinion holds that the fire did not mark an epoch in the history of the sanctuary, and that building work there began in a leisurely way in the middle of the fifth century and went on into the fourth. This was a disagreeable dilemma on the face of it: either Thucydides exaggerated the fire, or he was right and the archaeologists are wrong to minimize the fire. But there is a third and preferable solution: the old temple went on being used while the new one slowly arose nearby.[26] If this is right then the first phase, at least, of the rebuilding of the Heraion may indeed be evidence of the prosperity which may have begun as early the 460s and was enhanced during and as a result of the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta. Thucydides (5. 28. 2) and Aristophanes (*Peace*, of March 421, lines 475ff.) agree that neutrality brought the Argives material benefits.

The Aristophanic speaker in the passage from *Peace* just mentioned complains that the Argives 'laugh at others in their distress, and get their daily groats by drawing pay from both sides'; this probably refers[27] to mercenary service by Argive individuals in the first ten years of the Peloponnesian War (the 'Archidamian War'). Although the official Argive position in that war was 'friendship towards both sides' (Th. 2. 9. 2), and although the Argos of this period was a democracy like Athens (see above, citing Th. 5. 31 .6), the only two private wartime Argive initiatives known to us happen to have an anti-Athenian complexion. Two items do not make a pattern, but they may help to explain the Athenian resentment which Aristophanes implies,[28] and they prepare us for the politically divided Argos which we meet in and after the year 421. First, an Argive called Pollis, specifically said to be acting in a private capacity, accompanies some Peloponnesians (three Spartans, a Tegean and a well-known Corinthian called Aristeus) on a mission to ask for money from the king of Persia for the war against Athens (2. 67: 430 BC). Along with the others, Pollis was intercepted and put to death at Athens. This, as Thucydides' language makes clear, was very rough justice, and cannot have gone down too well at Argos, even if Pollis (about whom we know nothing else)[29] had his enemies back home as he no doubt did. The second episode is from five years later, the Solygeia campaign of summer 425 BC: the Athenians attacked Corinthian territory but the Corinthians were tipped off about it – 'from [literally "out of"] Argos' (4. 42. 3).

After near invisibility in the first four of Thucydides' eight books, Argos and the Argives jump to prominence in the fifth book, after the Peace of Nikias (421) which ended the first ten years of the main Peloponnesian War. (See 5. 25–83: precise references will not usually be given for individual episodes.) The modern historian cannot, however, afford the space to match Thucydides' distribution of attention, even if it were completely obvious (which it is not) why he chose to give the diplomatic events of 421–416 such out-of-scale treatment. The Argives, with freedom of action at last and with accumulated wealth and manpower available (see Thucydides and Diodorus, as cited above p. 83), were an obvious choice as leader of those second-class powers, notably the Corinthians, who felt hard done by under the Peace of Nikias arrangements. An anti-Spartan plan and alliance was concocted, with Argos at its head; for a brief moment, when Mantineia and Elis joined in too, Argos was in a splendid position of power and influence right across the Peloponnese, a rival to Sparta indeed rather than in nostalgic fantasy. But the Tegeans declined to join a network which included their old enemy and rival Mantineia;[30] and some almost comic moments followed (including one set of ambassadors waiting for and intercepting another set on the road, 5. 37. 2), all of which must have made other Greeks, when they heard about it, wonder whether the new grouping really was a serious alternative to the grim old Spartan devil they knew. The first of these moments was when the Spartans themselves took a hand, by trying to persuade the Boiotians to join in and then to make the whole alliance pro-Spartan after all. This may have

been a wrecking strategy; it was predictably abortive. The Argives, afraid of being isolated, now tried to renegotiate their thirty-year treaty with Sparta but demanded the disputed Kynuria region back as part of a new deal; when the Spartans declared this off limits, the Argives (and this is the second comic moment) offered a rerun of the Battle of the Champions, an episode from the archaic period (cp. Hdt. 1. 82). The Spartans thought this ridiculous (*moria*, 'foolishness', a strong word) but went along with it. However, at this point the dynamic figure of Alcibiades began to take a hand at Athens and he talked the Argives out of their Spartan commitment and into a new Athenian alignment. The result of this was a quadruple alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantineia and Elis, which happens to survive on stone, an interesting check on the detailed accuracy of Thucydides, who emerges very well (Th. 5. 47 with *IG* $I^3$ 83, Tod 68, not in ML). Events – or rather, those individuals and factions who were most successfully manipulating events at any given time – were driving the Argives and Spartans towards war. The Spartans assembled a magnificent army of themselves and their allies, the finest Greek field force ever put together, says Thucydides, who surely saw it in his exile. Commanders on both sides parleyed and avoided a confrontation, to the wrath of their respective armies, who reacted in the different ways we have already noted (above p.81). The showdown was merely postponed: at the battle of Mantineia (418) Spartan military supremacy was re-established in a convincing manner, and doubters and scoffers were silenced. The battle was, like Delium (p. 162 below), a classic hoplite battle and is together with Delium the one for which we have the best description of any fought between the Persian Wars and the age of Xenophon. Both sides won on their right wings for reasons to do with the tendency, remarked by Thucydides in this context, of hoplites to slide to the right in the hope of protecting their right, unshielded, side. It was only Spartan discipline (they returned to help their defeated comrades of the left wing) which brought victory in the battle as a whole. There followed an oligarchic reaction at Argos and a formal alliance with Sparta, followed soon by a violent democratic counter-reaction (some oligarchs killed, others exiled); after the change of regime the Athenians helped the Argives by sending carpenters and masons to build their new, protective, long walls to the sea. Occasionally we are allowed such vivid glimpses of the (literally) concrete realities of interstate politics.

What are we to make of Argive behaviour in this period? Their startling and opposite foreign policy plunges (most conspicuously the readiness to be briefly tempted into a pro-Spartan alignment so soon after taking on the leadership of an anti-Spartan coalition) are surely evidence of disunity rather than mere dithering. But just how deep was the oligarchic–democratic fissure at Argos? It would be tempting to say that on the evidence of the swings recorded by Thucydides Book 5, it must have been very deep indeed and that these years anticipate the appalling carnage of the 370s (below). There is certainly ample evidence that there was more than one faction at Argos in and after 421, and this after all corresponds with what we picked up from the earlier books of

Thucydides (Pollis, the Solygeia episode). Identifying particular oligarchs or sets of oligarchs is not easy. One Alkiphron was Spartan proxenos at Argos and supported Thrasylos in his avoidance of battle at the pre-Mantineia confrontation (Th. 5. 59. 5); but it does not follow that his motives were crudely pro-Spartan, i.e. treasonable. What can be said of collective oligarchic activity? One thousand is the number both of an elite corps at the battle of Mantineia and also of the number of Argives who helped the same number of Spartans to suppress the democracy at Argos (5. 67. 2; 81. 2); readers of Thucydides from Ephorus in the fourth century BC to Arnold in the nineteenth century AD have been tempted to go further than Thucydides strictly entitles us to, and to identify the two lots of one thousand.[31] On any view there were at least one thousand pro-Spartan sympathizers and oligarchs of whom three hundred still remained to be deported by Alcibiades in 416 (5. 84. 1). So there were oligarchs, plenty of them, at ostensibly democratic Argos. But the extreme behaviour Thucydides records at Argos in Book 5 (oligarchic reaction, democratic counter-reaction) comes after a very heavy defeat, namely the battle of Mantineia, which is just the sort of moment when political volatility is to be expected. After all, there is evidence for right-wing reactions at Athens after the defeats of 413, 405 and 338 (Syracuse, Aigospotamoi, Chaironeia), but that is not normally taken to mean that the Athenian democracy was structurally unstable or that the divisions were normally so bad. And there is an argument the other way. A case can be made that Argive democracy was pretty stable by the year 421: it is rare for Thucydides to comment on ideological or constitutional considerations as motives for action (he normally prefers the language of psychology and power), but he does, twice in the course of only three chapters, specifically talk about Argive democracy and the way it was regarded elsewhere (5. 29. 1 and 31. 6).[32] The best conclusion may be that the political divides at basically democratic Argos were not so abnormal; what was abnormal was the exceptional strain of a five-year period of foiled hegemony and then defeat, following thirty years of calm and of relative introversion. But Argos in 421–416 certainly offers no support for the view that Greek *stasis* was a fourth-century not a fifth-century phenomenon (see further below pp. 190–2).

Thereafter, for instance in the Sicilian expedition of 415–413, the Argive commitment to Athens remained steady, and this naturally involved them in conflict with Sparta, or perhaps we should say, following an aside of Thucydides (7. 57. 9), that their secular hostility to Sparta pointed them naturally towards an Athenian commitment. For instance, in 414 the Spartans mounted an invasion of Argos which went first to Kleonai but then turned back because of an earthquake; the Argives then invaded the border territory of Thyreatis and took away large quantities of Spartan booty, which was then sold for not less than twenty-five talents (Th. 6. 95, a chapter which casually reveals much both about the normal character of neighbourly warfare, and, by implication, about Argive–Spartan relations during those long periods which were *not* covered in detail by Thucydides or any other historian).

## Argos in the fourth century BC

When the Athenians surrendered to Sparta in 404, and the Athenian democracy was replaced by the Thirty Tyrants (below p. 218), democratic exiles were taken in at, among other places, Argos. (See Diod. 14. 6 and Dem. 15. 22, with a story about the brave Argives telling some Spartan ambassadors, who had demanded the extradition of the Athenians, to be out of Argos by sundown on pain of being treated as enemies.) After this piece of defiance, it is not surprising that the Argives joined in the anti-Spartan coalition which fought the Corinthian War of 395–386 (for which see Chapter 15 below). The other main opponents of Sparta at this time were Athens, Thebes and Corinth. It was with the last of these that Argos now entered into a startling arrangement which in its initial phase (392) anticipated what in hellenistic times was known as *isopoliteia,* sharing of citizenship.[33] (It then developed in late summer 390 into outright union or merger, with the Argives definitely in the ascendancy.) In the early summer of 390 the Argives tried to hold the Isthmian festival, normally a Corinthian prerogative, 'just as though Argos were Corinth' (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 5. 1, who may, however, be exaggerating the degree of Corinthian subordination at this stage); Xenophon goes on to say that they were frustrated by the intervention of the Spartan king Agesilaos, but that they held the games again when he had gone. This not only shows how far Corinthian fortunes had sunk, but also illustrates the way the Argives seem habitually to have used festivals and religion as a mechanism of self-assertion. Not only is there the example of Nemea in the mid-century, already discussed, but it seems that the Argives at some early date took over the temple of Apollo Pythaieus at Asine in the Argolid (on the east of the Argolic gulf) and by Thucydides' time (5. 53) were running it themselves and deriving prestige – some of it manufactured by the distortion of mythology – from doing so.[34]

The traditional Argive–Spartan hostility continued in the new context of the Corinthian War, and the Argives tried to use against the old enemy yet another religious weapon, though of a different sort. In 388 Agesilaos invaded the Argolid, but the Argives fraudulently pleaded a sacred truce and went on doing so until Agesilaos got oracular ruling that this was invalid. This incident is discussed further below p. 214; here we can note the additional point that this was not the first time that the Argives went in for such quibbling: in 419 they invaded the territory of Epidauros and, in order artificially to postpone their own observance of the incapacitating festival of the Karneia, they declared that every day was the 27th of the month until they had finished the ravaging they had come to do (Th. 5. 54).

The Corinthian War ended with the King's Peace of 386, which also, by stipulating general autonomy (below p. 232), brought to an end such particular combinations as the Argos–Corinth merger. The internal consequences of this in Argos are not recorded for us, but 386–371 was a period of Spartan dominance in Greece and we would naturally expect

power to pass to 'oligarchies congenial to Sparta' in Thucydides' favourite formulation (5. 81. 2, about Argos, cp. the similarly worded generalization at 1. 19). All of that changed when Sparta was defeated by Epaminondas' Thebans at Leuctra in 371, a military upset with consequences away from the battlefield: a revulsion everywhere from Sparta and Spartan-sponsored regimes (Diod. 15. 40). If Argos conformed to the expected pattern, we would expect oligarchy from 386–371, then democracy. What we actually find is democracy at Argos attested by Diodorus under the year 370/69 (but his formulation 'while these things are going on' is loose, in the context); there is no statement or implication that this democracy was recent. He describes an appalling outbreak of *stasis* (Diod. 15. 57. 3–58), in a passage which derives from Ephorus, who probably in turn drew on Kallisthenes; but the description may ultimately owe something to Thucydides' paradigmatic treatment of *stasis* at Kerkyra.[35] The violence at Argos took an extreme anti-oligarchic form, which became known as the 'clubbing to death' or *skutalismos.* One obvious reconstruction would be that Diodorus' account is an abbreviated account of the following sequence: a pro-Spartan oligarchy at Argos fell from power in 371; it was replaced by a democracy; and it was this recently established democracy which in about 370/69 was incensed by demagogues to take horrible revenge on its former masters.

The Argives took a small part in the anti-Spartan operations recorded for the 360s but shared in the general exhaustion which followed the inconclusive (second) battle of Mantineia in 362 BC (below p. 265). At any rate, Argos was the find spot of an obviously important, but difficult, undated, and now lost inscription, in which the Greeks tell the (Persian) satraps that they have resolved their differences and achieved a common peace. They announce that they have no intention of crossing swords with the king of Persia provided he keeps quiet and does not set the Greeks against each other. If the satraps are rebels and the date is 362/1 BC, the inscription is evidence for the post-Mantineia mood at Argos; even though in the fragments of which we have copies, there is no mention by name of Argos and the Argives, or indeed of any other particular *polis* (R/O no. 42 = Harding no. 57).

Argive unhappiness and failure in the mid-fourth century is commented on smugly by Isokrates in 346 (*To Philip* 51–2): 'hardly a day passes that they are not compelled to witness their own territory being ravaged and laid waste', and when foreign enemies are not inflicting damage on them, they damage themselves, 'putting to death the most eminent and wealthy of their citizens'. This is not necessarily to be taken too seriously, especially in view of the archaeological evidence (see the work cited at n. 6) that the fourth century was actually a period of increased prosperity elsewhere in the Argolid (the southern region). The first of Isokrates' remarks may be no more than a reckless generalization from the battle of Orneai, a Spartan defeat of Argos in 352/1 (Diod. 16. 39); the second is presumably a rather out-of-date reference to the *skutalismos* of a quarter of a century earlier. But the general picture of Argive demoralization and dilapidation may well be right; in 344 the Argives,

like the Thebans, sent troops to help the king of Persia to recapture Egypt (Diod. 16. 44). This may be an indication that Argos was financially hard up at the time, though it is possible that there was an element of political sympathy too. Diodorus says that the Persian king asked for a particular Argive commander, a famous figure called Nikostratos (who imitated the Argives' mythical ancestor Herakles by wearing a lion's skin and carrying a club in battle); we happen to know that Nikostratos was extravagantly pro-Persian *(FGrHist* 115 F 124). Certainly Isokrates (12. 159) treated the Argive and Theban action as a betrayal of Greece, and we are reminded, as Isokrates surely meant us to be reminded, of 480 when Argos and Thebes medized.

The Argives had another unpopular friend in this period, Philip of Macedon (Dem. 19. 261, of 343 BC, alleging Argive flattery of Philip). Like the Persian connection, this could as we have seen (p. 84, cf. 82) be justified by mythology. In any case it paid off, in three ways. First, in the settlement which followed Philip's defeat of the Greeks at Chaironeia in 338, the Argives made some territorial gains at Sparta's expense, in the southern region which had for so long been disputed between the two powers.[36] Second, Argos acquired prestige from the new Macedonian dispensation, in the following way. Another result of Chaironeia was the establishment of the League of Corinth (below, p. 282), which was among other things a mechanism for resolving disputes. One such dispute between the islands of Melos and Kimolos (see R/O no. 82) was settled, 'according to the resolution of the Council of the Greeks', by the Argives, who thus played an arbitrating role which recalls their involvement with Knossos and Tylissos a century or so earlier. 'The position of arbitrator', says a great modern expert on the subject, speaking about Greek history generally, 'was one of considerable honour and influence'.[37] Third and finally we saw earlier in this chapter how the Argive–Macedonian connection led to the enhancement of Argive prestige in another indirect fashion, as individuals and states claimed descent from Argos and thus a link with Philip and Alexander.

# 8

# MACEDON, THESSALY AND BOIOTIA

## Macedon[1]

At Vergina in 1977, the Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos, excavating the royal Macedonian graves of the fourth century BC at Vergina, found a bronze tripod dating from the mid-fifth century (Fig. 8.1). This was an heirloom from the time of King Alexander I 'Philhellene' as he was later called; it was a prize won at the Argive games to Hera (*SEG* 29. 652; cp. 11. 330 = 30. 52). It recalls the earlier athletic successes of Alexander at Olympia, as described by Herodotus (5. 22). Alexander had to argue with the authorities before they would let him compete, but he convinced them that he was descended from the royal house of Argos (cp. above, p. 79). He came first equal in the foot race. This incident raises for the first time a question which is still being debated, and which arouses passions, two and a half thousand years later: were the Macedonians Greeks?[2]

For the fifth-century sophist Thrasymachus, King Archelaos (below p. 99) was a barbarian (DK 85, B2), and Demosthenes could call the Macedonians 'barbarians' (as at 14. 3, where Philip is the 'common enemy of the Greeks'). It has also been acutely pointed out that the title 'philhellene', which was perhaps given to Alexander I by writers of the fourth century, actually implies a *denial* that he was Greek. But the Macedonian kings could be regarded as more Greek than their Macedonian subjects. Thus Isokrates (5. 139) clearly implies that Philip, as a descendant of Herakles, is Greek. The argument is the same as that used 150 years earlier by Alexander – and just as impossible for us to test. What is clear is that Macedonian kings wanted to be thought Greek. When Philip in 346 settled the Third Sacred War (below p. 282), he was (personally, not the Macedonians as a race or *ethnos*) admitted to membership of the Delphic Amphiktiony, the body which managed the prestigious sanctuary at Delphi; and so he gained admission to the Greek fraternity. Alexander the Great also found Greek culture valuable if only as a way of patronizing his Macedonian peers: he remarked to a Greek fellow-feaster (Plutarch *Alex.* 51) that the Greeks seemed to walk among Macedonians as demigods among wild beasts.




*Figure 8.1* Bronze tripod from Vergina c. 460–450 BC

Evidence about ordinary Macedonians, in military terms the rank and file, is harder to come by. A section of Thucydides' narrative, too often neglected in this connection, is helpful if only because it shows the difficulties of categorization felt by Greek observers – even one who like Thucydides had strong personal roots in the area (4. 103). At one point he seems to distinguish between three sets of fighting men: the Greeks, the barbarians (Illyrians), and the Macedonians, who on this showing are neither Greek nor barbarian. But a few lines earlier he aligns the Macedonians more simply with the barbarians (both 4. 124. 1). And yet in the following chapter he seems to distinguish between the Macedonians on the one hand and the barbarians on the other (4. 125. 1). All this does not I think mean he is contradicting himself; his considered view is represented by the more complex threefold scheme.[3] But in any case it should be emphasized that this is just the view of one man, though not a man whose views on anything are lightly to be brushed aside.

Language and inscriptions take us further. A curse tablet published in 1994 is the strongest evidence of the Greekness of Macedonian so far discovered; it seems to show that Macedonian was a form of north-west Greek.[4] Spoken Greek was to spoken Macedonian as cultivated speech to a boorish patois. Unlike the Illyrians (Pol. 28. 8. 9 on the Illyrian *dialektos*), Greeks were intelligible to Macedonians without an interpreter, though a Macedonian commander who wanted his troops to understand him immediately would

speak 'in Macedonian' (Plut. *Alex.* 51). Little is known about *how* Macedonian Greek was spoken, except that for instance 'Philip' was pronounced 'Bilip' (*Etymologicum Magnum* 179). No Greek–Macedonian interpreters are recorded for Alexander's expedition, though hardly any interpreters of any kind are, so this is not significant; but Alexander's education, at the hands of Aristotle, and his reading – Xenophon, Euripides and especially Homer – shows him thoroughly imbued with hellenism at the cultural level. (For more on this see Chapter 19.)

There is much less evidence for the fifth century than for the fourth, when Philip and Alexander attracted attention to Macedon. But we may invoke a category of evidence which can be expected, over the next decades, to transform the social and political history of Greece as it transformed Roman history in the first half of the twentieth century: the scientific study of personal names, or onomastic evidence.[5] From such evidence it has been argued that the Macedonians spread outwards from an area bordering on Thessaly, where the archaic Greek poet Hesiod had put them; in other words the original Macedonians came from a zone of settlement close to Greece proper.[6] Gravestones show that by 400–350 some Macedonians had good Greek names (which they were given in the *fifth* century, of course) like Xenokrates, Pierion and Kleonymos.[7]

Classical Macedon was, however, organized in a manner unlike that of the Greek states who dominate the history of the period – that is, Sparta, Athens and the cluster of *poleis* round the Isthmus of Corinth. In Macedon the *ethnos* or tribe was what mattered; there was not much urbanization before the Peloponnesian War. There *were* Greek cities in the north Aegean, but many were colonies from seventh-century Euboia and Corinth. (This meant that until Philip II's time Macedon was short of good harbours.) The organization by *ethnos* not *polis* was not completely foreign to Greeks: Thucydides calls the Aitolians, who lived north of the Gulf of Corinth, 'a large *ethnos* living in unwalled villages' (3. 94). But there is no doubt that Macedonian social structure had some un-Greek features. From at least the middle of the seventh century the Macedonians had been ruled by kings, whose relationship to their subjects was basically feudal, resting on loyalty and consent: they ruled 'by law and not by force', as Arrian says (AA 4. 11. 6); and from Amyntas' early fourth-century alliance with the Chalkidians (R/O no. 12, quoted in full below, pp. 236–7), we see that 'the Macedonians' are interchangeable with 'Amyntas', and this shows that the Macedonian monarchy was not an unlimited autocracy (but on the other hand it was more substantial than the attenuated Spartan version of kingship, not least because in Macedon there was one king not two). As to feudalism, an inscription (*Syll.*[3] 332) shows Philip II giving away a hereditary lease, and Greek city land at Amphipolis was doled out to Macedonians (Arrian, *Indike* 18, a very interesting list of names;[8] and cp. R/O no. 49). As with the Persian kings, military service was expected in return. Arrian (AA 1. 16. 5) mentions grants of freedom from 'land tax, personal service, and other dues', all probably very old institutions.

The fifth-century kings of Macedon, and indeed those of the fourth century until Philip acceded in 359, imported Greek culture – Pindar and Bacchylides both wrote poems for Alexander I – while keeping at spear's length the Greeks who were actually manufacturing that culture. Alexander I Philhellene had medized (below) in the Persian Wars; philhellenism, not for the last time, does not imply co-operation with Greeks politically.[9] The Macedonian royal house was deeply involved with Persia: Gygaia, the sister of Alexander I, was given in marriage to a Persian called Boubares, and they lived off the revenues of a Phrygian city given to them by the Persian king (Hdt. 8. 136). This must have happened about the middle of the fifth century.

When Xerxes invaded, Herodotus has nothing to say about resistance by Macedon, and this probably implies that the Macedonians medized. In the 470s Alexander gave refuge to Themistokles when he was on the run to Persia, a tangibly anti-Athenian act at this date.[10] Alexander was probably right to think, as he evidently did, that he would be better off if the Persians rather than the Athenians ruled the Aegean: within a decade of the establishment of the Delian League, the Athenians began the expansion in the north, and the attempt to settle Amphipolis, on the River Strymon (Fig. 8.2), which at certain times in the next century and a half dominated their foreign policy almost to the exclusion of all else (Th. 4. 102. 2; scholiast on Aischines 2.31). In 478, perhaps, Alexander had captured the so-called Nine Ways near Amphipolis, perhaps in anticipation of the Athenian conquest of Eion, also near the mouth of the Strymon (above p. 18). But Alexander could not hold it against the Hedoni, local tribesmen, and this may have given the Athenians the idea that they could move in and plant a colony (465). The Athenian attempt was a fiasco; 10,000 colonists were killed[11] and the Athenians turned to Egypt and Sicily where they were sure of at least some local support. Not until the early 430s, at the acme of their power, did they manage to establish a presence at Amphipolis, and its capture by the Spartan Brasidas in 424 was one of the most damaging losses of the Peloponnesian War, the responsibility, if not the fault, of the historian Thucydides, who was commanding in the area (see p. 162).

Why did the place matter so much? One reason was timber, as Thucydides specifically says (4. 108. 1). Triremes need many different kinds of wood,[12] and plenty of it (for Greek anxiety on this score see R/O no. 12, quoted on p. 236f.). Attica could not satisfy the needs of a large standing navy, and inscriptions show that the Athenians got a cypress tree, perhaps used for the roof of the Parthenon, from the island of Karpathos in the Dodecanese (Tod no. 110 = IG $1^3$ 1454 = Osborne 2000b: no. 220, now known to be fifth century not fourth). But Thucydides also mentions 'other sources of revenue' from Amphipolis, which may refer to the mineral wealth of the region.[13] Thucydides also underlines the strategic importance of the place: enemies like the Spartans, if they held Amphipolis, could strike at Athens' north Aegean allies, provided that the Thessalians allowed a safe passage to the Strymon



*Figure 8.2* Amphipolis: view from the acropolis over the estuary of the River Strymon

area.[14] And if the north Aegean panel of tribute-paying allies succumbed to attack or subversion, the Hellespontine corn route would be at risk.

Alexander's interests and those of the Athenians were thus opposed (which did not stop him from minting copiously in coinage designed for easy trade with Athens),[15] and the opposition was inherited by every Macedonian king until Philip, who ended it by seizing Amphipolis for good. But no king of Macedon before Philip could afford to provoke Athens to outright invasion of his kingdom. That meant that the rulers of Macedon had to flirt from time to time with Sparta or whoever looked the strongest counterweight to Athens after the Persians had recoiled from the Aegean in the mid-fifth century. But the Spartans too needed Amphipolis, as the doorway to the north Aegean, Thrace and eventually the Hellespont (cp. above). And the Spartans, who normally had no fleet of their own and had no naval tradition, could not attack any other Athenian tribute district *except* the 'Thrace-ward region'. So Spartans at Amphipolis were not much more attractive from the Macedonian angle than Athenians. Therefore the Athenians and Spartans must be played off against each other, and their troops preferably used, not against *each other* (which might end in a definite result), but against Macedon's frontier enemies.

For it is a prime fact about classical Macedon, and one which explains why so large and rich a country counted for so little until so late, that it was a frontier province of the Greek world; beyond lay Illyrians, Dardanians and Thracians, and beyond *them* the drifting pre-Celtic populations of central Europe, undisciplined fighters but unlimited in manpower. There is some justice in the way Macedon, which had thanklessly insulated Greek culture from these destructive outsiders and nomads for so long, should finally, in the

persons of Philip and Alexander, have taken over that culture by diplomacy and conquest.

The great practitioner of that 'balancing strategy' was Alexander I's successor Perdikkas, who ruled *c.* 452–413. He changed sides nine times in his reign, and why not? Modern censoriousness at this excellent survival technique is out of place, and usually the result of the unconscious adoption of an ancient Athenian or Spartan point of view. His attitudes are best illustrated by this typical passage from Thucydides (4. 83: 424 BC; the details of the diplomacy are irrelevant):

> Then, too, the envoys whom Perdikkas had sent to Sparta had given the impression, while they were there, that he would bring into the Spartan alliance a great number of the places on his borders; and on the basis of this, Brasidas thought himself entitled to consider the wider implications in dealing with Arrhabaios. Perdikkas, on the other hand, replied that he had not brought Brasidas there to act as arbitrator in the differences that existed between him and Arrhabaios; his function was simply to destroy those enemies whom he, Perdikkas, pointed out.

Perdikkas' diplomacy was subtler than just pitting Athenians against Spartans and conversely: before the great Peloponnesian War broke out he shrewdly persuaded the Greek cities near Olynthus to coalesce into a federation (Th. 1. 58); this was an act designed to weaken the greater confederacy of the Delian League, since Athens' policy was always to keep its subject allies disunited (Th. 3. 10–11, in the mouth of some disaffected Mytileneans). Near the end of his reign Perdikkas may even have made an alliance with the Argives, who after the Peace of Nikias had again (see above Chapter 7 p. 88) started to take an individual line on foreign policy.

The Macedonian king during the second half of the Peloponnesian War was Archelaus, 413–399 BC. Thucydides praises him highly in general terms, but Macedon was only a secondary theatre in the Dekeleian and Ionian Wars (413–404), so he does not figure very much in the narratives of Thucydides or of his continuator Xenophon. In 410 the Athenians under Theramenes helped him to capture Pydna (below p. 211); and for his part Archelaus allowed the Athenians to export timber and oars from his kingdom (ML 91 = Fornara 161; Andok. 2. 11). The old balancing strategy of Perdikkas could, it seems, be shelved now that Athens was so much weaker: Archelaus could afford to give and receive real benefits.

Thucydides' praise of Archelaus, written not long before (or even shortly after) the latter's death in 399, tells how he built forts and straight roads, and reorganized the army, both infantry and cavalry arms, doing more for his kingdom than all his eight predecessors put together. The 'eight predecessors' agree with and may even be taken from Herodotus (8. 139);[16] but the similarity goes deeper. This is a rare example of Thucydides adopting the criterion of physical *erga* or constructions to measure a king's greatness, something Herodotus had regularly done (cp. for example Hdt. 3. 60 on

Samos). Archelaus' court indeed recalled some of the archaic tyrants, strong men and patrons of the arts like Polykrates of Samos himself. Archelaus gave a home to the Athenian poets Euripides and Agathon, and the painter Zeuxis decorated the palace at Pella, the new capital. Athenian pottery has also been found at Pella, for instance (*AR* 1981–2, p. 36) a vase depicting a contest between Athena and Poseidon. (The move from Aigai to the more central Pella looks forward to the satrapally or royally sponsored moves of fourth century and hellenistic times: cp. p. 212f.; also p. 48 on the way Sicily too simultaneously shows 'archaic' and 'hellenistic' features. It might be better to call the 'democratic', classical period of Greek history the anomaly.) At Vergina, a little later (fourth century), the quality of recently discovered fresco painting suggests an established tradition which might go back to Archelaus' time;[17] and continuity is also suggested by Pliny's statement (*Natural History* 35. 62) that Zeuxis gave Archelaus a painting of the Greek (originally Arkadian) god Pan, who was to be patron deity of the third-century Macedonian king Antigonos Gonatas.[18] Macedonian religion displays some characteristic local features, but that is also true of the regions of Greece such as Argos, Corinth or Arkadia.[19] And in any case it is to an archaeological find at a Macedonian site, Derveni, that we owe one of the most interesting of pre-hellenistic papyrus texts, a commentary in Greek on an Orphic hymn (fourth-century BC). There is nothing un-Greek about this, though it is arguable that the inscribed evidence for Orphism tends to come from religiously conservative regions: either colonial zones such as Sicily or Olbia on the Black Sea (above p. 55), or outlying areas of Greece such as Krete or Macedon – or Thessaly, to which we shall shortly turn. That said, it is perfectly true that, by the time of Philip and Alexander, Vergina, Pella and Amphipolis can hardly be called peripheral; and that new finds could upset the picture at any time. Thus it would be no great surprise if archaeological evidence for Orphism in Attica were to turn up (or be re-identified in museums), given that in the late fourth century the Athenian metic Theophrastus made his 'superstitious man' consult an *Orpheotelestes*, a kind of wandering Orphic priest (*Characters* XVI. 12). Orphism was not exactly mainstream Greek religion, if only because abstention from meat eating meant that Orphic practitioners could not participate in the shared eating ('commensality') which was a regular part of the normal ritual of Greek animal sacrifice. On the other hand, the central deities of Orphism (Dionysus, Persephone) are familiar members of the Greek pantheon, although their mythologies have been adjusted in startling respects. Orphism, then, was not mainstream, but not quite marginal either, and it has been suggested that we should think of it as a kind of optional extra, or as 'supplemental'.[20]

When Archelaos died, he had begun an intervention in Thessaly which, had it been carried through, might have pre-empted Philip's operations in the 350s (see Chapter 15, p. 221). As it was, Macedon was to endure, after 399, one of its most anarchic phases, a story which will be resumed in a later chapter (below, p. 236, cf. 258).

## Thessaly[21]

Pindar wrote the first poem of his career (*Pythian* 10) for a Thessalian patron in 498:

> Happy is Sparta; blessed is Thessaly.
> For from one ancestor has each its king,
> Sprung from great Herakles valiant in battle.

This opening places Thessaly straight away in the centre of Greek culture; the Aleuad dynasty in Thessaly is treated as a branch of the house of Herakles, that is, it is grafted on to the Dorian Peloponnesian tree. By the order of words the poet even hints that Thessaly is *more* fortunate than her sister Sparta.

The rulers of Thessaly, then, resembled the Macedonians in asserting blood ties with Dorian Greece. But then, Thessaly's claim to be considered as Greek was never in doubt: who could be more Greek than Achilles, whose Myrmidons came from Thessaly? Simonides had performed in Thessaly even earlier than Pindar, and we know of seventeen Thessalians who won at Olympia before the end of the fifth century, although it has been argued that fifth-century Thessalians preferred local to panhellenic games. These local games included those for Poseidon Petraios (Bacchylides 14) and for the Thessalian Homeric hero Protesilaos (Pindar *Isthmian* 1 line 58).

But to other Greeks Thessaly could seem an uncanny place. Thessalian religion showed a little more than the usual regionally specific deviations: not only are Thessalian burial practices unusual, but Thessaly was famous for its witches, down to the time of Apuleius and the *Golden Ass* (second century AD). The goddess Enodia was specially popular in Thessaly, particularly at Pherai, and she was sometimes identified with the sinister 'chthonian' Hekate (Sophocles fr. 535). Orphic gold plaques have been discovered at Thessalian Pharsalus, Pelinna and Pherai; but it is difficult to know how far to see this as evidence for Thessalian peculiarity. As we have just seen, Thessaly was not the only region where Orphism flourished; and modern work tends to play down Thessalian abnormality, so that here too (cf. above on Macedon) it may be facile to explain Orphic evidence in terms of its supposedly peripheral and religiously conservative culture. A recently published Pherai text (probably) runs 'send me to the bands (*thiasoi*) of the initiates (*mystai*). I have [? seen] rites … the initiations of Chthonian Demeter and the Mountain Mother'. The *thiasoi*, cult groups, are here attested for the first time on a gold leaf, and may imply that 'private mystery [=initiatory] groups were relatively widespread in the Thessalian plains during the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods'. These Thessalian initiates, like those in South Italy, seem to have been affluent people, to judge from the archaeological contexts in which the leaves were found. We

shall see below that Thessaly was a wealthy region. That is perhaps as far as it is safe to go at the moment.

*Polis* life was further advanced in Thessaly than in Macedon: there were seventeen *poleis* in Macedonia proper by the end of the classical period, as compared to 76 in Thessaly. Pindar speaks of 'the cities' of the Aleuads – and Greek inscriptions go back to earlier dates. (Extant ones start *c.* 550 BC, the date of a sacred law, and Pausanias (10. 16. 8) says that a statue dedicated by a Thessalian called Echekratidas was the first dedication ever made at Delphi.) But dynastically ruled Thessaly was like Macedon in some ways: a fourth-century monument to Daochos, ruler of Thessalian Pharsalos, says that he ruled 'by law not force' (*Syll.*[3] 274), a claim echoed exactly by Arrian about the kings of Macedon (above, p.96). There were, however, important differences: there was always a king, or claimant king, of Macedon; but there was not always a *tagos* of Thessaly (their word for ruler over the four *tetrads* of Thessaly).[22] Thus a fifth-century Thessalian inscription uses the phrase 'whether under a *tagos* or in an *atagia*', that is, whether or not there is a *tagos* (*Syll.*[3] 55 = Rhodes 2007 no. 388 ).[23]

At other times the great houses of the cities of Thessaly, the Echekratids of Pharsalos, the Skopads of Krannon, the Aleuads of Larissa, co-existed, feuded and intermarried: thus a sixth-century Skopas had a mother called Echekrateia,[24] and Pausanias' Echekratidas (above) was from Larissa not Pharsalos. It is even arguable that we should speak of a clannish 'Heraklid aristocracy' and not subdivide further.[25] Near the bottom end of the scale were the *penestai*, serfs, though it has been pointed out that the occasional use of these as cavalrymen means that they cannot have been a wholly depressed class.[26] In between was the cavalry-owning class proper, who took slowly but eventually to ideas which could be described as democracy (p. 104). A *demos* in the Athenian sense hardly existed.

Again and again in the fifth and fourth centuries the other Greek states tried to get a hold on Thessaly. Thessaly was important for several reasons. First, there is Thessaly's enormous fertility and wealth. (See Strabo 6. 5. 2. For the classical period, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1 is the key text, especially para. 11 on Thessaly's abundance of grain. Much of the chapter is a speech by Polydamas of Pharsalos, who is described at para. 3 as 'hospitable and magnificent in the Thessalian manner', and this speech itself contains a speech by Jason of Pherai, whom we shall meet later in the present book: see Chapter 17.) The two great plains of Thessaly, which as a whole is enclosed by high mountains (Hdt. 7. 129. 1), were eminently suited to grain production and horse breeding Second, a related point, Thessalian cavalry was the best in Greece: Xerxes had heard this (Hdt. 7. 196) and held a horse race there to see for himself (actually the Thessalian horses were defeated by Xerxes' own). And from a fourth-century Athenian alliance (R/O no. 44) we see that 'cavalry', *hippeis*, was the name of a class of Thessalian magistrate. (See further p. 295 for Thessalian cavalry in Alexander's time.) Third, control of Thessaly was a valuable asset strategically: its mountain circle did not make

for isolation because it was penetrated by passes, so that Thessaly opened the way to the north and thus eventually the Hellespont (cp. p. 97f. on Amphipolis); Xenophon makes Jason show awareness of the connection between Thessaly and Macedonian timber (*Hell.* 6. 1. 11). Fourth, central Greece, and in particular Boiotia, was not well off for harbours, but Thessaly had Pagasai, in myth the starting point for the voyage of the Argonauts to the Black Sea, and in real life the ancestor of hellenistic Demetrias and of modern Volos, still a port of economic importance. Fifth, for historical reasons, whoever controlled Thessaly controlled the Delphic Amphiktiony, an international committee which could impose fines for religious offences, and generally assert a practical moral ascendancy of an enjoyable kind over the Greek community (above p. 28). Moreover the Thessalians by tradition held the presidency of the Amphiktionic Council (*Syll.*[3] 175), a position which could be useful when it came to putting a motion.

Spartan designs on Thessaly and on central Greece date from the time of Kleomenes I of Sparta (in the late sixth and early fifth centuries): Pindar's bracketing of Sparta and Thessaly is not random, but may celebrate a deal between Kleomenes and the Thessalian Aleuads. Soon after the Persian Wars, as we saw earlier (p. 9, cf. 123), King Leotychidas of Sparta led an expedition to Thessaly, and ended the *tageia* of the Aleuads; at about the same time, Plutarch says, there was a Greek, perhaps a Spartan, fleet at Pagasai, a place whose strategic importance we have just noticed, and the Spartans tried to get control of the amphiktiony (see p. 20; Plut. *Them.* 22). Then in 462 (p. 22), a year of decisive foreign policy choices all over Greece, the Thessalians allied with Athens. Kimon called a son Thettalos, so perhaps he was responsible, though he is on record as saying that *he* has never toadied to the Thessalians (Plut. *Kim.* 14. 4).

Who if anyone was *tagos* in Thessaly in these years? Probably as a result of Leotychidas' intervention of 476 the *tageia* had passed from the Aleuads, Pindar's hosts. The next *tagos* was probably Echekratidas of Pharsalos (see Th. 1. 111). But in between we should probably imagine a gap in the *tageia*: Plutarch (*On the Malice of Herodotus*, 21) says that Leotychidas '*ended* the tyranny' (temporarily); and if Echekratidas was a Spartan nominee whose *tageia* went right back to 476 his Athenian alliance is harder to explain. Echekratidas' son Orestes (note the name Orestes, assertively anti-Dorian – it was the name of Agamemnon's son in a famous myth about pre-Dorian Greece, and perhaps a hit at Aleuad pretensions) was thrown out by 454 by an anti-Athenian or simply anti-Echekratid or even more simply anti-Orestes party; the Athenians failed to restore him (Th. 1. 111). There was certainly plenty of anti-Athenian feeling, for some Thessalians fighting for Athens at the battle of Tanagra in 457 (p. 32) changed sides (Th. 1. 107; Diod. 11. 79). But the alliance with Athens must have been renewed before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War when Thessalians fought on the Athenian side again (Th. 2. 22). The Spartans did not abandon their aims in Thessaly: in 426 they founded a colony at Herakleia in Trachis, which commanded the Thessalian

border (p. 163); and later in this book we shall follow this thread of Spartan policy further still (see p. 191 and Chapter 15, p. 222).

In the twenty-seven years *c.* 440 to 413 the *tagos* was Daochos of Pharsalos.[27] But this was not a period of straightforward centralized rule. As we shall see, one of the effects of the Peloponnesian War was to intensify political activity and pamphleteering. We hear of a visit to late fifth-century Thessaly by Gorgias of Leontini, the celebrated orator and sophist (DK 82 A 18 = Isok. 15. 155), and of actual interference by the Athenian oligarch Kritias (below). Gorgias is quoted by Aristotle as sneering at 'manufactured Larissans' (Pol. 1275b), which implies that citizenship and power was being further extended. In 404 Xenophon (*Hell.* 2. 3. 4) records a defeat of the Larissans by Lykophron of Pherai, who 'wanted to rule all Thessaly'. This man is in fact what the archaic Greek world would have called a *tyrannos*, a tyrant. Archaeological finds (see e.g. *AR* 1979–80, p. 40: city defences at Pharsalos) indicate that the Thessalian wealth commented on by Plato (*Meno*) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6. 1) was being used by the fourth century to modernize Thessaly, and especially its *towns.* So the old-fashioned horse-rearing aristocrats, in their baronial castles at places like Amphana, had their rivals, men with different and more up-to-date ideas. Jason of Pherai, a descendant of Lykophron, and called 'tyrant' by Diodorus (15. 60. 1) without equivocation, was certainly rich (Polyain. 6.1.2ff.). Lykophron's tyranny had a popular base: Xenophon (*Hell.* 2. 3. 36) relates how shortly before Lykophron came to power the Athenian Kritias tried to establish democracy and arm the *penestai.* The unrest looks like the precursor to Lykophron's seizure of power.

This incident of late fifth-century history is not trivial: Lykophron's own tyranny did not last long; he was opposed by an old-style *dynastes*, Medios of Larissa. Lykophron turned to Sparta for help. But Medios and the anti-Spartan coalition in the Corinthian War of the 390s checked him (see Chapter 15 for these events, specifically p. 222 for the expulsion of Spartan influence from Pharsalos, a Spartan garrison point in the early 390s). But Jason, as we shall see, was a figure of stature in the Greece of the 370s, dealing on equal terms with the Athens of the Second Athenian Confederacy and the Thebes of Epaminondas. He failed too, removed by assassination. But the failure goes deeper: Macedon succeeded where the tyrants of Thessaly did not, precisely because the *polis* life in Thessaly, which on the economic level made possible the rise of a tyranny, prevented one man from imposing his authority permanently like an Archelaos or a Philip.

## Boiotia

The geography of Boiotia might to a shallow observer seem to suit it for naval hegemony. That was the view of Ephoros at least, who said (F119) that Boiotia, situated on three seas (probably he meant the Corinthian Gulf and the Euboian straits north and south of Chalkis) was made by nature for *thalassokratia*, rule of the sea. But a contour map will show how hard that

would have been: the Corinthian Gulf ports, at the ends of deep valleys, have no mutual communication, and the eastern harbours are not much more accessible.[28] Mycenaean Boiotia had indeed been open to the greater world, much more so than in classical times: in the Thebes museum there are stirrup jars proving commerce with Minoan Krete, and there is even some lapis lazuli from Afghanistan, probably evidence of a Kassite connection.

Dark Age Boiotian emigrants to Anatolia are responsible for Boiotian-type place names like Erythrai and Mykale (cf. Boiotian Mykalessos) in Asia Minor, though the red, *erythros,* soil of Boiotian Erythrai and the red stone of the Ionian city make the name physically appropriate for both. In the historical period Hesiod's ancestors, emigrants from Boiotia, settled in Kyme in the Asiatic 'Aeolid', the area opposite Lesbos. But Boiotia was not a major colonizing agent because – and this is the fundamental fact about it – the soil of Boiotia was good, something which strikes the traveller who crosses Mt Kithairon into Boiotia from Attica, and there was plenty of it, especially in the two plains to the north and south controlled by Orchomenos and Thebes respectively. The *Oxyrhynchus Historian* says that classical Boiotia could put out paper forces of 11,000 infantry and 1100 cavalry. This is a high cavalry total, implying plenty of good land.

The character of Boiotian political and social life was the consequence of these agricultural riches: insularity. However amenable to overseas influence Boiotia may have been in the prehistoric period, classical, fourth-century and hellenistic Boiotia was in many respects conservative and introverted. This is well illustrated by the plentiful funerary monuments of hellenistic Boiotia, which retain features, such as the simple naming of the dead man without patronymic, which in other parts of the Greek world had long given way to more sophisticated formulae; and the Boiotians retained their local script until the age of Epaminondas in the fourth century.[29] A similar conservatism marks the techniques used by Theban pottery painters, who avoid foreshortening and make no attempt to achieve three-dimensional realism, thus lagging behind Attic rivals.[30] It is also perhaps a sign of Boiotian isolation that there were no tyrants in archaic Boiotia, and that by the Persian Wars Thebes, then the first city of Boiotia, was allegedly controlled by a *dynasteia*, a constitutionally irresponsible family government (Th. 3. 62).[31] Plataia, however, the main state south of the river Asopos, always looked towards Athens and its democracy: the connection actually went back to 519 BC when Kleomenes of Sparta told the Plataians to attach themselves to Athens (Hdt. 6. 108).

With oligarchy went federalism (though the connection was not a necessary one, since in the fourth-century league we find *democratic* institutions). Federalism is a convenient modern word, although as we shall see (p. 205) Greek vocabulary in this area was loose and untechnical. Nevertheless the modern word describes an ancient as well as a modern reality, namely an organized compromise between local and central sources of power. The concept of federalism was, arguably, Boiotia's great contribution to politics; not that they got much credit for this or anything else from the rest of the

Greek world. Boiotia's reputation for philistinism was a joke with which other Greeks never got bored, but neither in the visual arts[32] not in literature (Hesiod, Pindar) does the reality match the label 'Boiotian pig', a gibe recorded by Pindar himself (*Olympian* 6.90). (One suspects that Boiotia's real misfortune in this respect was mere proximity to Athens: for the Attic tragedians, in particular, Thebes functioned as a sort of 'anti-Athens'.[33]) And there were fine Boiotian historians: Anaxis and Daimachos of Plataia are only names, but the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who was perhaps a Boiotian, deserves in some ways to be put beside the Athenian Thucydides, whose continuator he was (above, p. 6). Finally, in the late fifth century Epaminondas was a pupil of the Pythagorean Lysis of Tarentum in South Italy, not a parochial education.[34]

Federal Boiotia probably began in the sixth century: there are Boiotarchs, federal officials, in 479 BC, whom there is no good reason to write off as an anachronism by Herodotus who mentions them (9. 15). The league was never dissolved in the fifth century,[35] despite the disgrace and demoralization caused by Theban medism in the Persian Wars, and despite a decade's loss of independence to Athens, in Boiotia as a whole, between 457 and 446. In the Persian Wars, however, the Boiotian League had evidently not ordered a general policy, because Plataia and Thespiai fought for the Greeks whereas the Thebans medized, a stain they were never to wipe out. In 367 Pelopidas at Susa, asking for a peace treaty from Artaxerxes II, is even said to have reminded him of Thebes' traditional friendship with Persia.

Boiotian history from 479 until the First Peloponnesian War of 460–446 is not recoverable in any detail. Thereafter things improve because one crucial phase and aspect of that war was Boiotian: we have described in an earlier chapter (above pp. 25–32) the events leading to the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta in 457, and the reasons why the Spartans and Athenians came to blows there. From the Boiotian point of view the most important consequence of this was ten years of Athenian control. The Athenians were not expelled from Boiotia until 446, and it was perhaps then (the date is, however, not certain)[36] that the Boiotian League was organized or reorganized. In a valuable description the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (Chapter 19, Chambers) gives the system essentially as it was in the 440s, although for instance he takes account of Plataia's destruction in 427, after which Thebes took over the Plataian votes. Thucydides also provides much information about federal Boiotia, mainly in the context of the Delium campaign of 424 BC in his Book 4 (below p. 162), but characteristically he gives no systematic account, rather he drops information into his narrative as the military and political account requires it.[37] There were four councils in each of the constituent cities, membership of which was oligarchic in the sense that there was a property qualification (Ar. *Pol.* 1278a 25), although the members got expenses for attending, something usually found in 'democratic' states. There were also four federal councils of 165 members, which were themselves sub-councils of a big federal council of 660; one of these sub-councils prepared the business for the others, a job which probably rotated. In Book 5 (Chapter 38. 2) Thucydides pre-supposes

the existence of both local and federal councils in Boiotia, but if we did not have the explicit evidence of the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* it would not be obvious that this is his implication.[38]

All this meant that a citizen of, say, Thespiai was also a citizen of federal Boiotia, in something of the way that in Attica demesmen of Sounion were also Athenians. There were important differences (see below), but both systems provided a kind of proportional representation: the number of councillors which each Attic deme sent yearly to the Council of Five Hundred depended on its population (below p. 140), and the number of federal councillors in Boiotia supplied by the cities depended on the size of the city and its territory. The allocation was achieved by a sophisticated system of groups or units comprising one or more cities. So, Tanagra provided one Boiotarch and sixty councillors, Orchomenos, two Boiotarchs and 120 councillors. After Thebes swallowed up Plataia in 427 (cf. above), Thebes controlled four Boiotarchs and 240 councillors. Orchomenos was the only state in Boiotia which had any natural claim to rule all Boiotia. The reasons for Orchomenos' special role were geographical: it controlled the northern plain and Thebes the southern; and also historical: Mycenaean Orchomenos, whose legacy is still visible in the form of a well-preserved tholos tomb like the 'House of Atreus' at Mycenae, had counted for at least as much as Thebes.

Despite some similarities with Kleisthenic Attica, Boiotia differed in that there was no great popular assembly made up of thousands. Still more important, the status of the constituent units of Attica and of Boiotia was not at all the same. Attic Sounion was not a *polis,* whereas Boiotian Chaironeia was both a *polis* and dependent on Orchomenos (Th. 4. 76. 3); such 'dependent *poleis*' are not a contradiction in terms provided we accept that independence was not part of the definition of *polis* but a luxury enjoyed by a handful of very large *poleis.*[39] The less centralized Boiotian system both reflected and, no doubt, helped over time to condition and consolidate the different and less centralized political reality. Theban control of Boiotia was not as obvious and inevitable as Athenian control of Attica. The Theban citadel, the Kadmeia, does not master or menace the Boiotian skyline like the Athenian acropolis, and there were always places like Orchomenos and even Tanagra which envied Thebes' leadership. Equally, there were others such as Plataia or Thespiai which looked to Athens instead (cf. Th. 4. 133, for alleged Thespian 'attikismos', support of Athens, an interesting word formed on the analogy of 'medismos', support of Persia).[40] It would have been absurd for any deme of Attica to think of rivalling Athens at any time. The Thebans, by contrast, even at the time of the 'Theban hegemony' of around the 360s, would have to destroy their rivals in order to claim to speak for Boiotia. (See below p. 193 for the unusually savage destruction of Orchomenos in 364/3.) However, it was precisely the lack of consensus about Thebes' – or anybody else's – leadership which in the fifth century led to federalism of so unusual and developed a kind, and which gave Boiotia the cohesion, and the manpower, to defeat the Spartans at Leuktra in 371.

# 9

# THE RUN-UP TO THE WAR[1]

### The problem: can we trust Thucydides? The Great Gap

Control of Boiotia, and the central Greek land empire generally, was lost to Athens in 446 as part of Pericles' deal with Pleistoanax. But the Athenians' command of the eastern seas was unimpaired, as is proved by the free hand they enjoyed in suppressing revolt on Samos in 440/39. Thucydides narrates the events of the next decade not as part of the 'Fifty Years' to which they strictly belong, but as part of the sequence of events which immediately caused the great Peloponnesian War. The Fifty Years, in the historian's causal scheme, were the underlying cause of the war, a cause which Thucydides saw as the process of Athenian aggrandizement which struck fear into Sparta. This is the 'truest cause' of Thucydides' famous statement (1. 23), which is the first explicit and conscious attempt to develop a theory of historical causation: 'the truest cause', he says, 'was one not much admitted at the time: it was the growth of Athenian power, which frightened the Spartans and forced them to war. But the publicly alleged reasons were as follows …' and Thucydides goes on to give them: quarrels between the Athenians and Corinthians over Kerkyra (modern Corfu) and Potidaia. (This contrast between true and publicly alleged causes was a favourite with Thucydides, who not only repeats it exactly at the beginning of his account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415, but also implies it when analysing Corinth's motives for making trouble in 421: 6. 6; 5. 30.) Later in Book 1 (Chapter 118) Thucydides closes the 'Fifty Years' by speaking of Athens' power 'rising to a peak plain for all to see', and of the Athenians (or Athens) 'encroaching on the Spartans' allies'.

The problem of the origins of the Peloponnesian War is partly a problem about Thucydides, on whose account we rely so heavily – and for the most part rightly. But did he tilt his account of the causes of the war in favour of Athens and to the disadvantage of Sparta? Thucydides' *History* is a subtle and complex work of art, in which both the speeches (more obviously) and the narrative (less obviously) are composed according to rhetorical principles, that is to say in accordance with techniques and rules originally developed for the purposes of forensic persuasion. Examples are: the devotion of less or more detail to an episode, including the gathering of a number of

repeated events under a single generalizing report; the displacement of an event from its logical 'home' in a narrative sequence; the outright omission of an otherwise attested event; the 'timeless' or undated mention of an event in a foreign or ostensibly irrelevant context; the counterfactual emphasis by the historian on what did *not* happen as opposed to what did, so-called 'presentation by negation'; the adoption of a particular point of view from which the narrative is presented ('focalization'). The study of the rhetoric of narrative is called narratology, and narratological methods have been applied first to modern and ancient novels, then to Homer and Euripidean messenger speeches, and most recently to Thucydides.[2] But Thucydides was not only a creative literary artist, he was an Athenian exile who had held a high military command in the first phase of the war he recorded. That he should have tilted his narrative for political, in effect patriotic, reasons is not in itself a new idea. Indeed it has recently been re-urged with new arguments though without the help of the new approach which narratology provides.[3] Recently, students of Thucydides have asked whether the rhetorical devices identified by narratology are relevant to Thucydides' account of the causes of the war, and whether they were deployed in the interest of a particular thesis. The difficulty is to choose between the temptation to detect 'sinister' political explanations and the need to keep purely presentational problems in mind.[4] For instance when we talk about Thucydidean 'omissions' we certainly have to remember that Book 1 was very heavily freighted indeed and that there was a limit to what Thucydides could put in. Again, narrative postponement is a suspenseful storytelling trick with a very old pedigree (it is sometimes called 'archaic narrative delay') and need not be evidence of political bias. Thucydides, like Homer, sometimes mentions things not when they happen but when they become most important or relevant. Finally, it is not absurd to hold[5] that the effect of recording an item out of context is to increase rather than reduce its prominence; though dislocation of an item surely has the effect that the reader or listener finds it harder to see that item as a link in a causal chain.

Thucydides' statement of the 'truest cause' is brief and clear, but not amplified in the kind of detail we would like, or rather with the level of detail we would like. He goes on to give extremely lengthy and detailed accounts of two 'publicly alleged reasons' (the noun is *aitiai*). What we would have liked is a full 'middle level' statement of the areas, above all the west (Italy and Sicily and the approaches to those territories), where the Athenian empire had on his account been expanding worryingly.

In terms of explanation at this middle level, Thucydides does – from the point of view of the prosaic historian – a much better job in the *Pentekontaetia* or '[narrative of the] Fifty Years' (1. 88–118) where he does at least give an account of how the Athenians grew in power to the point where they inspired fear in the Peloponnesians. But we shall see that this section has its gaps.

But before we deal with the *Pentekontaetia,* let us note a simple narrative feature which we may call the Great Gap, roughly 439–434. The expression

*Pentekontaetia* has some, though not complete, Thucydidean justification, because of a passage right at the end of the excursus (118), where he says 'in about fifty years'. These fifty years are roughly 480–430; so why does his *Pentekontaetia* narrative end with 439 and the settlement of Samos? As often happens, there is a possible sinister and a possible innocuous explanation. The innocuous one is one I suggested in the first edition of this book thirty years ago:[6] Samos was a full close, the last major assault on allied liberty which Athens was going to get away with (cf. above p. 37). It was thus not only a historical close but a suitable literary 'closure' for a long excursus. The sinister explanation is that those crucial five years cried out for special treatment and it was misleading of Thucydides not to give it, because he thereby got out of telling us about a number of items of Athenian misbehaviour which might have helped to explain why the Corinthians, friendly in 440 apparently (Th. 1. 44 and 45, where Corinthian speakers claim that they had passively supported the Athenian intervention on Samos by voting against war with Athens on the issue), were hostile in 434. For the purposes of the present book, which are mainly historical, it is not necessary to decide why the Great Gap exists (that is, to decide whether Thucydides' treatment of this period is tilted deliberately); all we need to do is note that it does exist and that Thucydides may need to be supplemented.

So let us start with the events in this period, which were likely to annoy Corinth or Megara but which fell in the Great Gap. They are all examples of so-called 'anachronies', things not described in their obvious position in Book l.[7] (I avoid tendentious words like 'displaced', so as not to beg the question about authorial political intention.)

The first 'Great Gap' item is an 'achrony' rather than a strict anachrony because it is strictly timeless (rather than dated but wrongly positioned): it is an Athenian alliance with Akarnania (2. 68). Now the general area in which Akarnania was situated was full of Corinthian colonies (cf. 2. 80 for Ambrakia), even though Akarnania was not itself a Corinthian colony. This alliance can be dated to approximately 438.[8] It may have been mere opportunism, for the Athenians made many alliances which never came to anything (cf. Th. 6. 13.2 where Nikias in effect says that the Athenians were unable to say 'no' to anybody). But it would be useful when the Athenians next got involved in Italy or Sicily, where another Corinthian colony, Syracuse, was growing richer and stronger. (It may also be relevant to Athenian fears that, as Livy tells us under the year 431, Carthage now encroached in Sicily for the first time: 4. 29. 8.)[9] So the Athenian alliance, although only a pawn penetration, was an offensive move against the Corinthians deep in their own, Adriatic, side of the colonial chess board; and it was perhaps defensively conceived with an eye to a further-flung Corinthian colony, Syracuse. All this makes it unlikely that the alliance ante-dated 440, when the Corinthians were still on reasonably good terms with the Athenians (see above for Samos). But equally, the alliance should not be dated too late in the 430s, because then it would be a little surprising if Thucydides had not found room for it at some point in

the Book 1 narrative. But see above for the danger of arguing from omissions in the already packed Book 1; Thucydides mentions it where he does (in Book 2) because that was where it was most relevant.

The second is Pericles' 'Pontic expedition' of 436, that is his expedition to the Black Sea, known from Plutarch (*Pericles* 20), not from Thucydides at all, so that this really is an omission. The voyage is an interesting bit of Athenian flag showing (cf. 4. 75 for Lamachos entering the Black Sea in the Archidamian War; Thucydides might have taken this opportunity to back-refer to Pericles, but he does not). Pericles' expedition is now firmly dated because of the mention of Sinope, a Black Sea port, in an Athenian casualty list, where Alope used to be read *(IG* $1^3$ 1180). So arrogant a gesture[10] will surely not have gone down well at Megara, because Herakleia Pontica (Xen. *Anab.* 6. 2. 1) and Byzantium (Ps.-Scymn. 717) were both Megarian colonies.

The third is the founding of Amphipolis in 437, mentioned by Thucydides but only in Book 4 (102) (cf. above p. 36 and 97 for the date and the prehistory: the Athenian disaster at Drabeskos in 465). Amphipolis as we have seen was (p. 97f.) a large place of great economic and strategic value to Athens in the short period (437 – winter 424/3) during which they actually possessed it, and thereafter they never stopped regretting its loss. The new foundation, controlling as it did the lower Strymon River and the best way to the Thracian interior, will surely have annoyed the Potidaians, Corinthian colonists, who were only fifty miles (eighty kilometres) away; that is, it was an Athenian encroachment on the Corinthian sphere of influence. But Thucydides does not say so.

Fourth, it is possible that the Athenians put financial pressure on Potidaia at some time in the mid-430s, rather earlier than the sequence of events reported by Thucydides. But this ingenious theory presupposes that the stone cutter mixed up the tributes of Skione and Potidaia and that nobody noticed this at the time or afterwards.

There is a good deal more evidence if we move away from the Great Gap period in either direction, i.e. back towards 478 or forward to 433. Generally, to take the earlier period first, Thucydides is very silent on the west in Book 1. Some of the evidence has been reviewed in earlier chapters, such as the epigraphically attested Egesta alliance (above p. 14f.: date controversial), and the foundation of Thurii, known from Diodorus (p. 59). Inscriptions record simultaneous alliances between Athens and Rhegium in south Italy and Leontini in Sicily; they were originally made in 443 but re-carved a decade or so later (ML 63 and 64 = Fornara 124–5). We can add perhaps Diotimos' activity in the Bay of Naples, known from the hellenistic historian Timaios (F98); Diotimos is evidently a 'western expert' because he recurs in Thucydides (1. 45) as the commander of the first expedition against Kerkyra. Other western items fall perhaps at the *end* of the 430s, namely the two interesting alliances (Th. 7. 33), with Artas of Messapia and with the people of Metapontium.[11]

Why was there this very decided and almost complete silence about pre-war Athenian probes in the west? Thucydides gives only a very unspecific hint of western diplomacy and activity when he says that, in the west, sides *had already* been taken when the war broke out (2. 7),[12] but this vague phrase actually refers to those western states which opted for *Sparta* (see further below)! A possible presentational explanation for the silence about Athens is that Thucydides already had in mind the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 which he intended to present as a piece of collective madness, and this could only be brought off if he kept earlier and perfectly rational Athenian interest out of sight.[13] Even if that explanation of Thucydides' handling is right, the result of that handling is that he has under-reported an important category of Athenian aggression in the last and tense half decade of the Fifty Years. The Corinthians, with their centuries-old western interests, must have found all this very disquieting.

Everything so far concerns Thucydidean avoidance of mentions of Athenian bits of imperialism or aggression in the west, but we have noticed Thucydides' general remark about pro-Spartan choices; and there is one specific item which is an exception to the general pattern of Athenian expansion, namely the foundation of Herakleia in Lucania, in southern Italy, by Sparta's daughter-city, Taras (*FGrHist* 555 Antiochus F11: above p. 47 and cf. p. 159). But this is rather indirect evidence for Sparta itself, because the Spartans do not seem to have the same close control of their colonies that Corinth and other places had. There is, however, a risk, which must be acknowledged, that our impression is distorted for reasons which have nothing to do with Thucydides and more to do with the almost complete absence of Spartan (and Corinthian) inscriptions to place alongside those from Athens.

## The four stated *aitiai*

We may now turn to the four *aitiai* or 'publicly alleged reasons' which Thucydides does talk about, two of them much more than the other two. They are Kerkyra, Potidaia (very full coverage of these), Aigina and Megara (very little, even less on Aigina than on Megara).

Working up in order of our knowledge, we may begin with Aigina. Thucydides' omission here may be polemical. Elsewhere (2. 27. 1), he says that 'the Athenians regarded the Aiginetans as most responsible for the war'; this is not of course strictly incompatible with the totally different emphasis in Book 1, because the allegation is only a report of what people said, and the people reported may not have meant it but have been looking for an excuse. So Thucydides, here as elsewhere (cf. 6. 54. 1), may have been combating what he saw as erroneous popular belief. The Aiginetans complained (1. 67) that they were 'not autonomous [as they ought to have been] according to the treaty', *spondas.* What *spondas?* There are three possibilities: 478, 458/7 (cp. Th. 1.108. 4) or most likely of all 446, the Thirty Years' Peace (cf. p. 37). If 446 is right there are still two possibilities, a special clause about Aigina or a

general autonomy clause in the Peace.[14] Either way, the exact form taken by the infringement of Aiginetan autonomy is unfortunately not recoverable.

The other complaint directed against Athens at the same time as the infringement of Aiginetan autonomy (1. 67 again) had to do with Megara, the so-called Megarian Decrees. Thucydides tells us more about this than about Aigina, but much less than about Kerkyra or Potidaia. Essentially the issue was an exclusion from the harbours and the *agora* (roughly, market) of the Athenian empire. Why is there not more in Thucydides? There are various possibilities:

We may say[15] that Thucydides gave the decrees no importance because in truth they had no significance, being purely religious. Most historians, since it was first and forcefully propounded in 1972, have refused to accept this view. The idea that religious equals trivial is anyway a very modern one. A passage of Plato attesting such exclusion in the case of certain polluted persons *(Laws* 871) anyway proves too much. It certainly shows that exclusion from 'harbours and *agora*' was appropriate for religious offenders, but it is equally striking that Thucydides leaves the religious places and shrines out. He certainly concentrated on the places where real economic damage could be done. But was it done? There is positive evidence not only in Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 515–39, cf. *Peace* 605–27) but in Thucydides himself (1. 120. 2, a speech of the Corinthians). So we can discount this theory.

The second modern explanation might start from the observation[16] that Thucydides had a general blind spot about Megara, and is 'not a reliable guide'. Hence his neglect of the annual invasions of Megarian territory, regularly mounted twice a year. (See the brief generalizing statement at 2. 31. 3, amplified at 4. 66.1, where for the first time he tells us that the invasions were *twice*-yearly; this 'iterative' technique of narration is in contrast with the 'singulative' technique accorded to the solemnly and regularly recorded Spartan invasions of Attica. But that may not reflect Thucydides' wish to play down Athenian aggression against Megara but merely his view that 'invading Attica was more central to Sparta's war strategy than invading the Megarid was to Athens'.)[17]

Again, it can be held that the Athenians and Peloponnesians did not actually come to blows over Aigina and Megara as they did over Potidaia and Kerkyra, and that is why Thucydides treats the two pairs differently.[18] There is some truth in this: Thucydides was after all, among other things, a 'Homeric' narrator of wars and battles. But if we are looking for a literary explanation for the Megarian ellipses, we need go no further back than Herodotus, against whom Thucydides was surely reacting throughout his work.[19] A full explanation of the background to the Megarian decrees would have involved Thucydides in saying something about Pericles' mistress Aspasia, who in the popular tradition[20] incited Pericles for trivial reasons to pass the decrees; women play this sort of role in Herodotus all the time, but this is not the kind of history Thucydides stooped to write. (Note the brief and unspecific way he refers, unusually, to 'disputes over marriage matters' as an issue leading

to conflict between the two Sicilian cities Egesta and Selinus, 6. 6. 2. More normally he passes over such topics altogether; thus it is from Aristotle not Thucydides that we owe our knowledge that the Mytilene revolt was in part provoked by a quarrel over heiresses: *Pol.* 1304a4ff.) A full account of the background to the Megarian Decrees would also have involved him in a complicated account of a religious quarrel, because the decrees were religious in form, a penalty for the cultivation of some sacred land. We might be tempted to say that here too Thucydides was side-stepping a Herodotean theme, because religion is certainly much more prominent in Herodotus than in Thucydides. But this would be wrong because Thucydides was capable of religious detail when it was necessary for the proper understanding of an incident (see e.g. 5. 49–50 for the affair of Lichas at Olympia, or the dispute over *botamia* of 5. 53; whatever the word means it is a religious term).

Finally we may consider a sinister explanation: this was pressure of an economically effective sort, although religious in form, but Thucydides was determined not to let the Megara issue be seen for what it was, hence (1. 139) speeches advocating the repeal are simply not reported but Pericles' is. This is not entirely Thucydides' suppression: the implication of the report that the Athenians resolved to 'decide once for all' (1. 139. 3) about the numerous Spartan overtures is that the *boule* or Council of Five Hundred, which handled diplomatic traffic, had kept these overtures, or a proper account of them, from reaching the assembly. Thucydides has a strange aversion to the *boule.* This can be partly explained as a 'Homeric' tendency to concentrate on the mighty individuals and the great collectives; but it may also, in part, be a symptom of Thucydides' own political prejudices: he perhaps wishes to give the impression that Athenian decisions were reached in impetuous haste by the Assembly alone (for very clear examples see 7. 10 and 16. 1).

Now we get on to Kerkyra and Potidaia. First, Kerkyra. A quarrel between Kerkyra, a daughter-city of Corinth, and Epidamnos, a daughter-city of Kerkyra itself, led to the first open clash, the battle of Sybota, between Athenian and Peloponnesian ships: Epidamnos had appealed over the head of Kerkyra to the 'grandmother' Corinth, while the people of Kerkyra asked for, and got, help from Athens. The Corinthians sent a delegation to Athens to try to prevent the second of these appeals from succeeding. One of their complaints against Kerkyra is specially revealing: the Kerkyraians, they say, 'do not pay us appropriate respect as their mother-city'. This theme, the ties between city and colony, and the ways they were reinforced, weakened or broken in the great war, is important to Thucydides,[21] and it is not accidental that it occurs thus early.

There is no doubt that the Athenians were entitled to accept Kerkyra as an ally. Thucydides tells us that they initially favoured the Corinthians but then on the second day held another assembly and decided to send help to the Kerkyraeans; but the squadron, a token force of ten ships, was given specific instructions (1. 45) not to break the Thirty Years Peace. But their scrupulousness about sticking to the peace was evidently overcome at

an unreported third meeting of the assembly when they decided to send a further twenty on top of the original ten, 'fearing that the first ten might not be sufficient' (1. 50). By reporting this in the middle of the battle description Thucydides masks its implications and importance. Certainly, we should agree that to report the arrival of the twenty reinforcements makes for excellent suspenseful narrative, and this literary explanation should be allowed full weight. Nevertheless it is striking that so politically important a decision as that to treble the commitment, evidently with no further regard for keeping the peace but only with the inadequacy of the original force in mind, is reported in the way it is – that is, as part of an exciting battle narrative rather than as what it was, a considered decision made at a third meeting of the Athenian assembly. Thucydides here masks Athenian aggression. We may accept a literary explanation for Thucydides' narrative manner, but even so we should not ourselves ignore the implications of Athenian behaviour.[22]

Finally, there is Potidaia. As we have seen, Potidaia was a Corinthian *colony*; it was situated at the top of the westernmost claw of the crab-like Chalkidic peninsula. Corinthian control was tight: the Corinthians sent out magistrates annually to govern Potidaia, *epidemiourgoi* (Th. 1. 56). (This very Roman-looking institution has another Dorian parallel, the man sent by Sparta every year to govern the offshore island of Kythera. The office was called *Kytherodikes*.) Despite this, the Potidaians paid tribute to the Athenians, who in 433/2 demanded that the Corinthian magistrates should be sent home and part of the walls pulled down. The Corinthians sent help to Potidaia; the Athenians sent a besieging force, and so Corinth and Athens clashed for the second time. Colonists of Corinth, but at the same time tributary to Athens, the Potidaians were pulled between competing and equally legitimate claims, and in his narration of this episode (contrast Kerkyra and the twenty extra ships) Thucydides cannot be said to load the dice in favour of either side. But we have already noticed the significance of what he does *not* narrate here: the somewhat earlier founding of Amphipolis a mere eighty kilometres away from Corinthian Potidaia.

We have seen in this chapter that Corinthian unease at Athenian expansion, especially in the west, was important in bringing about the Peloponnesian War. We may now turn, in the next chapter, to examine Corinth and the Corinthians more closely.

# 10

# CORINTH[1]

Corinth has featured repeatedly in our account of the preliminary hostilities; and in Thucydides' account of Spartan consultations with their allies it was the Corinthians who took the lead in urging open war. The evidence for the organization and internal politics of classical Corinth is meagre, and not in proportion to the city's importance. There are good reasons for this: Corinth was an oligarchy, and in oligarchies, unlike democracies such as Athens after 462, magistrates are not accountable to the same extent and there is less need to put up inscriptions showing what has been done or spent.[2] Second, Corinth was sacked by Lucius Mummius in 146 BC with Roman thoroughness, not to rise again for a century. Perhaps inscriptions were among the casualties. (It may also be relevant that Corinth used lead for public inscriptions at early dates.[3] Lead is more easily reused than stone, and texts more easily effaced.) Third, and less depressing than the first two, Corinth is not completely excavated (most of what the modern visitor sees is Roman) and there is still hope that the classical *agora* may produce evidence of the kind we want; though to get it, the excavators – the American School in Athens – will need permission to dig under the main square of the modern town. For the moment, classical Corinth, like archaic Chalkis on Euboia and for the same reason, has much to say but stays silent. Fourth and last, Corinth produced few historians or writers of any kind (the fourth-century orator Dinarchus may have been a Corinthian but he moved to Athens). And Corinth inspired little specific history writing, though Herodotus has much to tell about the archaic tyrants Kypselos and Periander and Thucydides' information about Corinth and Corinthians was specially good.[4] Antiochus, from Corinth's daughter-city Syracuse, who was a contemporary and source of Thucydides and who aimed to be the western Herodotus, must have included good material about the mother-city. Of works specifically about Corinth, Aristotle's *Constitution of the Corinthians* does not survive, nor does Theopompos' *Korinthiakos* (T48); apart from that there are only hellenistic prose versions of the archaic Corinthian poetry of Eumelos, and hellenistic treatises on the Isthmian Games, which were held nearby. Nor was Corinth rich in mythology, because the city had no Mycenaean past. The most famous mythical figures connected with Corinth are neither of them really Corinthian:

the Theban Oedipus grew up there, and Medea came to Corinth from Colchis at the east end of the Black Sea.[5] If Pindar in *Olympian* 13, a victory ode for Xenophon son of another great Corinthian athlete Thettalos, meant anything specific by saying that the Muses breathed sweetly over Corinth (line 22), he was perhaps thinking less of his own fifth-century period than of that of the Corinthian Arion who invented the dithyramb in the years around 600. Or perhaps Pindar was gracefully acknowledging that Simonides too had celebrated Xenophon's family the Oligaithidai. The general impression we have of fifth-century Corinth before the Peloponnesian War is of a stable, even slightly smug, oligarchy. But a fragmentary poem of Pindar (fr. 70c) seems, surprisingly, to hint at *stasis* in Corinth, and may be a prayer that it should cease: a reminder of how little we really know about Corinthian internal affairs.[6]

Corinth in its period of maximum power and influence, in the archaic age and the fifth century before the Peloponnesian War, does not seem to have been (unlike Sparta or Athens) a place with much ideological magnetism. That changed in the fourth century, when a politically and militarily debilitated Corinth acquired an importance of a new and different sort: the city became symbolically associated with anti-barbarian struggles, a panhellenic focus. First, Corinth was the location of a monument celebrating a famous victory over the Carthaginians (R/O no. 74). It was erected from booty sent by Timoleon, the Corinthian who went out to Sicily in the mid-fourth century, in effect refounded Syracuse, and defeated the Carthaginians at the battle of the river Krimisos in the late 340s (see below p. 270). Soon after this, Philip chose Corinth as the centre of his new league or 'synedrion' (338), the purpose of which was to fight another barbarian enemy, Persia. This is not coincidence: Philip surely had the Carthaginian parallel in mind.[7] Naturally, Corinth's central position also made it very suitable as a meeting place for Greek allies; already in the 390s the 'synedrion' of an earlier alliance had met at Corinth (Diod. 14. 82. 10), though this was not a panhellenic coalition in the anti-Persian sense, but one directed against Sparta.

Corinth, then, was always important even when no longer powerful, and indeed a powerful and assertive Corinth on fifth-century lines would have been less suited to the role of panhellenic symbol. At all periods, Corinth's strategic importance was enormous: by walling off the Isthmus (land narrows) of Corinth, as was done in the Persian Wars and again in the hellenistic period, the Peloponnese could be turned into an island, or a tortoise with its head tucked in, as the Roman commander Flamininus put it (Plut. *Flam.* 17.4). Polybius (28.11) called Corinth and Chalkis the handcuffs of Greece, and the importance of Corinth to Macedon, which this comparison indicates, goes back to 338 when Philip II made Corinth the physical centre of his new Greek league (see above).[8] There were military reasons, too, for Julius Caesar's choice of refounded Corinth as the site of a colony and the Roman capital of Greece, *colonia laus Iulia Corinthi*: even in Caesar's day, the Roman colonies had military or policing functions. Corinth controlled both

the north–south route joining the Peloponnese to central Greece and also the east–west haulage passage[9] on the site of the modern Corinthian canal. Corinth's peculiar position created *two* prosperous harbours, Lechaion on the west and Kenchreai in the east. A further strategic asset was the colossal citadel, the Akrokorinth, which is very hard to take by storm: its most famous capture, by Aratos of Sikyon in the third century, involved treachery. The Akrokorinth dominates the Isthmus region, and it is one reason why Aratos' home city of Sikyon just west of Corinth was never more than a second-rate power. As Plutarch says (*Aratos* 16) of the Akrokorinth: 'it hinders and cuts off all the country south of the Isthmus from intercourse, transits, and the carrying on of military expeditions by land and sea, and makes him who controls the place with a garrison sole lord of Greece'.[10] The Akrokorinth (see Figure 10.1) has its own water supply, the Peirene spring, which meant that the inhabitants could withstand long sieges.

All this makes it hard to see why Mycenaean Corinth was of no importance; the answer is probably just that, unlike Attica and the Argolid, it lay off the main routes of Mycenaean penetration. But by Homer's time its natural epithet was already 'the wealthy', as Thucydides noticed (1. 13). Partly this was the result of Corinthian trade and craftsmanship: Herodotus (2. 167) says that the Corinthians despised craftsmen less than did other Greeks (note the negative formulation), and a survey of Corinthian territory confirms the exceptional variety of goods manufactured there.[11] Corinth was also famously cosmopolitan: it was a centre for prostitution of two sorts, sacred and secular. The sacred prostitution at Corinth (Pindar F107 Snell/Maehler) is a link with



*Figure 10.1* Corinth: the temple of Apollo with the Akrokorinth behind

the east, possibly Cyprus.[12] But there was also Corinthian prostitution of a more normal sort, which the archaic tyrant Periander had tried to suppress; the famous fourth-century courtesan Neaira (subject of Demosthenes' speech 59) came from Corinth. 'Korinthiazomai', 'I act the Corinthian' (Aristophanes F 354), is supposed to have meant either to be a prostitute, or else to pimp or procure.[13]

It is, however, a mistake to pigeonhole Corinth as just a city of traders, craftsmen and luxury. On the contrary, Corinth was very rich in agricultural land, as the panoramic view from the top of the Akrokorinth makes clear. There was a very old quarrel between Corinth and Megara, and it was about borders; by the end of the archaic period Corinth had absorbed most of this frontier zone of good arable land, so that Strabo (380) can say of Krommyon, which is halfway to Megara, that it 'was once Megarian but is now Corinthian'. Nor was this a purely archaic problem: the border trouble with Megara in the 460s may reflect population pressure in the Corinthia.[14] A further sign of the importance of agriculture to Corinth is the quantity of fertility offerings to Demeter the corn goddess. These are in the Corinth museum.

The politics of Corinth reflect the prosperity of its agriculture and commerce. The Corinthians celebrated the fall of the Kypselid tyrants in the sixth century by building the great temple of Apollo – and also perhaps by reorganizing and strengthening their tribal system ('tribes' is a misleading but well-established translation of the Greek *phylai,* meaning the originally kinship-based subdivisions of the citizen body). The Corinthia, the territory of Corinth, was by now large: it included the lonely peninsular cul-de-sac of Perachora in the north, as well as the territory towards Megara in the north-west, towards Sikyon in the west, and Kleonai to the south. The new system was a blend of kinship and geography: after the change there were eight tribes and three geographical groupings (perhaps Corinth city, the northern districts of Perachora and the Megarian border, and the southward extension towards Kleonai and Argos).[15] In Kleisthenic Athens and in the Kyrene of Demonax (see p. 63), as also in the Rome of Servius Tullius, such 'tribal' changes, compromises between the criteria of family descent and physical residence, were a way of coping with new claimants to citizenship; and perhaps the same is true of Corinth, which needed to enfranchise immigrant craftsmen and the population of freshly incorporated and conquered areas, thus strengthening the citizen body. (The military aspect of Kleisthenic-type changes should never be forgotten.[16]) It is remarkable that this reform, which is so similar to that at democratic Athens, was the work of oligarchs, showing that there is nothing distinctively democratic about Kleisthenes' tribal changes, although Herodotus says that Kleisthenes 'established the tribes and the democracy', in that order (6. 131).

What Athens and Corinth had in common was perhaps the immigrant craftsmen who had been drawn to the cities in the salad days of their respective tyrannies. But Corinth went oligarchic, Athens democratic. Why was this? Perhaps the Spartans, who helped to eject the Kypselids, and tended

to favour 'congenial oligarchies' (Th. 1. 19), were better able to influence events at Corinth, which was geographically closer than was Athens; or perhaps the explanation is just that 506 is much later than *c.* 585 when the Kypselids fell. Classical Corinth possessed some of the potential ingredients of Athenian-type democracy: Corinth has what for Athens was a great catalyst of naval democracy, namely a colonial empire (in the north-west and north-east), comparable to Athens' possessions before 500 at Sigeion, the Thracian Chersonese, and on Euboia at Chalkis; but at Corinth external sea power did not lead to internal sailor power, perhaps because the fleet was not rowed by citizen Corinthians (we simply do not know about this). Again, Corinth's geographical position, like Athens', was accessible to outside influences and radical thinking. Corinth even had, by the classical period, long walls running down to Lechaion harbour, like those which joined Athens to Piraeus and which were conventionally associated with democracy (Th. 1. 107. 4 for the bracketing); and finally the Corinthians had a decent-sized navy: they lent twenty ships to the Athenians before the Persian Wars and contributed forty in the Persian Wars themselves, and they had ninety at the battle of Sybota in 433 (Th. 1.46). But by the mid-fifth century the oligarchs' grip was tight.

That did not change until the main Peloponnesian War of 431–404, one effect of which was to erode the Corinthian middle class.[17] Archaeology may illuminate the economic difficulties of these years: one Corinthian fishmonger, whose Carthaginian amphorae (wine jars with pointed bottoms, for easy shipboard storage) and exotic western Mediterranean merchandise (the scales of the fish can be identified) show that his was a high-grade delicatessen, went out of business in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. This was perhaps as a result of the Athenian blockade of the Corinthian gulf.[18] The Corinthians suffered badly from the war: in a naval building programme in 413 they could provide only fifteen ships (to which should perhaps be added another twenty-five operating in the Corinthian gulf).[19] The political result was longer delayed, but equally startling: in the 390s, by an amalgamation unthinkable half a century earlier, Corinth merged with Argos to form a single, *democratic,* anti-Spartan state.[20] The Corinthians, who had done so much to bring on the war by urging on the Spartans, were more damaged by it, and more permanently, than any other city. By the 360s Corinth risked falling under a tyranny again, that of Timophanes, brother of Timoleon who famously killed him, and one source for this episode says that the would-be tyrant had a following among the needy, *aporoi,* citizens (Diod. 16. 65. 3; Plut. *Tim.* 4–5 does not, however, stress this aspect).[21] Timoleon went on to fame as the refounder of Syracuse in the 340s (below p. 270), but Corinth could not provide Timoleon with more than ten ships in all, only seven of them actually Corinthian. It is interesting that two of the ten were Kerkyraian (Plut. *Tim.* 8; the tenth was from Leukas): much had changed since the old quarrel which had helped to precipitate the Peloponnesian War.

# 11

# SPARTA[1]

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek world looked to the Spartans as liberators (Th. 2. 8). It all went wrong, and in the course of this chapter and Chapter 12 we shall ask how the expectation arose, why it was plausible, and why it was in the event disappointed. But first, here is some background.

Sparta, a small city on the River Eurotas (see Map 1), at this time directly controlled a larger continuous stretch of land than any other single Greek city: in fact, most of the southern Peloponnese. Lakonia proper, the territory of the city of 'Lakedaimon' (as Sparta was often called), ran down to Sparta's harbour town of Gytheion and the peninsulas ending in Capes Tainaron (the modern Mani region) and Malea, and included at its heart the large and fertile district between the Parnon mountain range to the east and that of Taygetos to the west (Fig. 11.1). Indirect Spartan control extended well beyond Lakonia: the Spartans headed a loose but mighty grouping known to ancient writers as 'the Spartans and their allies', which modern scholars call for convenience 'the Peloponnesian League', but whose origin cannot (unlike its classical counterpart and rival the Athens-headed 'Delian League') be dated to a particular moment in history; most likely the Peloponnesian League crystallized by a gradual process in the second half of the sixth century.[2] That process has been described in an earlier volume in this series.[3] Yet another sort of Spartan control was exercised over those communities of Lakonia who were known as *perioikoi* or 'dwellers round about'. These people were self-governing, but had no foreign policy separate from that of Sparta, and served as 'Lakedaimonioi' in the army.[4] Since the eighth century the Spartans had also ruled Messenia, the western half of the southern Peloponnese, beyond Taygetos, an even larger and more fertile district. The subjugated population of Messenia tilled the land as serfs, *helots*, though there were some perioikic communities in Messenia and, conversely, Messenian helots were not the only kind of helots because there were Lakonian helots too, who had been subjugated even earlier. But it was the Messenian helots who made the big difference to Spartan history. The helots were directly responsible for Spartan military supremacy in Greece: a great helot revolt (the Second Messenian War) in the seventh century caused the Spartans to introduce for



*Figure 11.1* Sparta: a view of the ruins with Mount Taygetos beyond

their citizens a strict military discipline, the *agoge*.[5] Success in this long and demanding training period was one of the criteria for full citizenship, the other being ability to pay the (non-monetary) contributions to your *syssition* or mess; 'inferiors' or *hypomeiones* were those déclassé individuals who had lost economic and therefore political and social status. Spartan females (who probably had a better time than their counterparts in most Greek states, certainly than those in Athens) went through some form of the *agoge*, but the *syssitia* were a men's thing. Members of the resulting military elite were called the *homoioi*, the 'equals' or 'peers'; 'Spartiates' strictly described the group made up by 'peers' and 'inferiors' together, but is often used by the ancient writers as in effect a synonym for the 'peers'.[6]

It was the *agoge* which gave the Spartans their primacy in the Peloponnese and a reputation for invincibility beyond: in Diodorus of Sicily's universal history, only three of the remarkable human phenomena of Greek history are regularly called invincible, *aniketos*. They are Alexander the Great, the Silver Shields (a Macedonian elite corps of the early hellenistic period), and the Spartans up to the date of their defeat at the hands of the Thebans at Leuktra in 371. The other word habitually used by Diodorus (reflecting Ephorus; cf. also ML 95 and *Lys*. 28.7) was *aporthetos*, unravaged, and that was true (and most unusual for a Greek *polis*). This was partly thanks to Sparta's protected geographical position. Invincible and unravaged, Sparta was the natural power to be invoked by the Greek world as liberator in 431.

'Liberator' was a role familiar to the Spartans, or so they claimed: in the sixth century they had acted as political giant-killers, putting down tyrannies

in mainland Greece and even on the islands. They did not abandon this policy even after the debacle at Athens, when their deposition of the anti-Spartan Pisistratids[7] resulted in a regime even more vigorously hostile to themselves, which they tried and failed to overthrow in its turn. The evidence for the continuance of this policy into the fifth century comes from Thessaly, where king Leotychidas had put down the *tagos* in the 470s (pp. 11, 103). These early interventions are likely to have been motivated not by ideology or anti-tyrannical principle but by pragmatic dislike of the policies of the individual tyrants, such as Hippias of Athens' Argive and medizing alignments. But the facts were not in dispute and were conveniently available in the late 430s to justify Spartan action against a new kind of tyrant, the *tyrannos polis* or 'collective tyrant': Athens. (For Athens as 'tyrant city' see Th. 1. 122 and 124, a speech by the Corinthians delivered shortly before the Peloponnesian War.) Earlier Spartan history, in which the lawgiver Lycurgus spooks across the scene and across the centuries, is a prime example of what has been called 'invented tradition';[8] perhaps the myth of tyrant-hating Sparta is another instance of the phenomenon.

The interventions of the Spartans outside their borders after the 470s were erratic: they seem not to have been able to make their minds up whether to be an imperialist power or to be Little Sparta. One reason for this[9] was fear of the helots, who certainly outnumbered the Spartiates many times over, even if the 7:1 total handed down to us (Hdt. 9 28. 2) is suspect.[10] Thucydides, an acute social historian when he wants to be one, remarks that 'most of the dealings between the Spartans and their helots were of a precautionary character' (4. 80), and tells a suitably laconic story of two thousand specially manly helots who garlanded themselves (a symbol of liberty) and went round the temples as if they were being freed; but the Spartans did away with them and nobody knew what happened to them. If this story is believable,[11] it is powerful evidence against any attempt to show that helot–Spartiate relations were basically good.[12] The story is even more remarkable evidence for Spartan paranoia if the two thousand included or consisted of the more presumably tractable Lakonian helots,[13] because it shows that the Spartans assumed that even these helots felt deep resentment and hatred; but it is perhaps more likely that the 'disappeared' were the more aggressive Messenians,[14] a group whose hatred for Spartans will have been greater still, fuelled as it was by nationalism.[15]

Xenophon's story of the Kinadon affair (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3) is more detailed but hardly more chilling. He describes a conspiracy in the 390s of a number of subordinate groups, helots, *'neodamodeis'* (freed helots, see below), *hypomeiones*, 'inferiors' (a category to which the leader Kinadon himself evidently belonged, para. 11, cf. 3), and *perioikoi* (para. 6). The affair was suppressed with total ruthlessness. One phrase of Xenophon's, about how these people would like to 'eat the Spartiates raw', is no less effective for being an echo of Homer *(Iliad* 4. 35). What are we to make of this story? One scholar [16] minimizes the helot aspect, noting that Kinadon when asked about

his motive merely said that he personally 'wished to be inferior to nobody in Sparta' (para. 11): he said nothing high-mindedly ideological about being a freedom fighter. But helots are number one in Kinadon's list of support groups, ahead of *neodamodeis*, *hypomeiones* and *perioikoi*; the groups are clearly listed in descending order of threateningness.[17] And there is no reason why we should accept that Kinadon's stated motive, the wish to be inferior to nobody in Sparta, was the whole story. If he *were* a freedom fighter on behalf of an underclass or more than one underclass, the authorities would surely not want to broadcast the fact. They evidently broke him physically, and it is a familiar feature of such regimes that they need to discredit the victim as well as killing him, to avoid making a martyr of him. In his physical state Kinadon was no doubt too far gone to shout 'death to helot-oppressors' as he was flogged round the city. In any case it is relevant that the island of Kythera was occupied by the Persian Pharnabazos and the Athenian Konon a very few years after the Kinadon affair (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 8, see below p. 230);[18] in the Peloponnesian War, a mainland Lakonian site opposite Kythera, the island south of Lakonia, had been fortified by the Athenians so as to provide a refuge for deserting helots (Th. 7. 26. 2: 413 BC, cf. Hdt. 7. 235 for Kythera as a long-standing source of Spartan anxiety). Spartan foreign policy in the volatile 390s makes best sense on the supposition that the Spartans were unusually nervous about the helot threat at that time.

The perceived need for violent repression of helots conditioned the brittle and violent Spartan character throughout the classical period.[19] The Ionian Greeks turned to Athens 'in virtue of kinship and to *stop any attempt at violence* on the part of Pausanias (the Regent)'. So wrote Thucydides, describing a key moment in Greek history, the formation of the Delian League in the early 470s. The second and negative part of this formulation should be taken as seriously as the first, and the reference to violence should be interpreted literally and physically.[20] Spartan violence, or rather violence by Spartan kings and Spartiates, often takes the form of the threat or actual use of a stick or staff (roughly, *bakteria* is the prose word for this, *skeptron*, cf. English 'sceptre', is usually the poetic word). Kleomenes the king of Sparta at the beginning of the fifth century was alleged to have gone mad,[21] and one of the pieces of evidence for his madness was that he had taken to striking his fellow Spartiates in the face with his staff (Hdt. 6. 75). Kleomenes was a king, but the *skeptron* or *bakteria* was not exclusively royal: it seems in fact to have been part of the insignia of office of a Spartan officer (Plut. *Nik.* 19 4,[22] cf. para. 6 for the 'Spartan staff and cloak' as symbols of the majesty of Sparta). Other Greeks did not much care to be threatened by stick-wielding Spartans. In 411 BC a Spartan called Astyochos is nearly lynched when he raises his *bakteria* (the only occurrence of the word in Thucydides)[23] against Dorieus, a high-status Rhodian exile who is pleading for arrears of pay owed to some Syracusan and Thurian sailors, 'free men' as Thucydides significantly notes (8. 84). Their free status is, I have suggested, significant because a stick is not a proper weapon, but appropriate as a repressive device for coercing

or threatening a helot. An episode in Plutarch's *Life of Lysander* says it all: after Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian War in 404, the Spartan Lysander installed a military governor on the Acropolis, called Kallibios. This man raised his staff, *bakteria*, to strike Autolykos, an Athenian wrestler, but Autolykos threw Kallibios to the ground. Lysander showed no sympathy with Kallibios' rage at this, but reprimanded him and said 'you do not know how to govern free men' (Plut. *Lys.* 15.7, cf. p. 218). Like his fellow Spartan Astyochos, Kallibios had made the mistake of treating free Greeks as if they were something other than free – in fact, as if they were helots. A stick is something you use against an animal like a dog – or against a 'sub-human' group like helots. It is a way of asserting arrogant superiority. Herodotus (4. 3f.) has an illuminating story about a Scythian slave revolt which the Scythians could not get the better of after many battles; eventually one Scythian suggested taking up whips instead of spears, bows and arrows so as to remind the Scythians that they were only slaves, and this is said to have worked. But what worked against Scythian slaves, or against Spartan helots, was bitterly resented by free Greeks, hence the near-lynching of Astyochos and the counter-assault on Kallibios. This lack of discrimination and self-control (note the 'rage' of Kallibios) on the part of high-ranking Spartans, manifested again and again in threatening behaviour with *bakteriai*, is one of the reasons why Spartan liberation was not a success in practice. When they founded a large colony at Herakleia Trachinia (central Greece) in 426, excluding all Ionians and Achaians, people flocked in from all over Greece. But they were rapidly disappointed and the colony was a flop, because the Spartan governors treated the colonists 'harshly and sometimes positively unjustly' (Th. 3. 93. 2; see p. 164). A small and brutal, but tense and nervous, ruling elite was not suited to a role on the wider Greek stage: their helots had disqualified them for that.

But, psychology and sociology apart, the helots were as we have seen relevant in another, simpler way to Spartans' inability to commit themselves wholeheartedly to imperialistic and expansionist policies. There were simply too few Spartiates and too many helots (for Spartan manpower difficulties see more fully below, pp. 250ff.). Adventurous Spartan commanders – Kleomenes, Pausanias the Regent, Brasidas, Lysander – tried to turn the problem into the solution by recruiting soldiers from the nearest source, the helots themselves, whether Messenian or, less likely, Lakonian (above nn. 14 and 15). But the home government tended to resist this simple but dangerous solution, passing up chances to expand territorially if that meant that helots could stab them in the back – or eat them raw. (This was not invariably true: for literary reasons, Thucydides' narrative of Brasidas' northern operations in the mid-420s exaggerates the degree of his isolation and alienation from the Spartans back in Sparta, so painting him as a romantic loner, a sort of Spartan Hannibal.)[24] Roman experience suggests that these fears were rational: one cause of the Social War of 91–88 BC was Roman military dependence on the allies; this dependence was not adequately recognized and rewarded by extra

privileges such as citizenship, so the allies turned their fighting experience against Rome itself. Sparta had a recognized category of enfranchised helots, the so-called *neodamodeis* ('new members of the *damos*' or people; see above on the Kinadon affair), and there were other halfway groups (p. 251). But such occasional selective enfranchisement was itself no more, perhaps, than a cynical way of heading off despair, what the political scientist Herbert Marcuse has called 'repressive tolerance'.

The Romans, it has been said, suffered from a 'neurosis of fear' in their external relations.[25] The same could be said of the Spartans in their internal relations (which as we saw affected external relations too). One form this took was xenophobia. This should not be exaggerated: the Spartan Lichas (Th. 5. 50, cf. p. 225) has the Kyrenaian patronymic Arkesilas (see also below p. 224f. for Pharax and Lysander); and a remarkable passage in Herodotus (9. 76f.) makes Pausanias the Regent in 479 BC acknowledge a *xenia* (ritual friendship) with a man from Kos in the Dodekanese. What Pausanias actually says is that Hegetorides, the *xenos* in question, 'is bound to me by closer ties than anyone else in that part of the world'. This implies that Pausanias had other such *xeniai.* (This *xenia* directly anticipates that between the early fourth-century Spartan king Agesilaos and the Persian satrap Mausolus, not to mention the fusion policies of Alexander: see p. 309.) It is odd, and neatly illustrative of the contradiction in Spartan attitudes, that Herodotus can say of the Spartan-led Greeks in the same period that Samos 'seemed to them as far away as the Rock of Gibraltar' (8. 132. 3), while telling elsewhere of a Spartan, son of Archias, who was called Samios because of his father's Samian links (3. 55).[26] So is xenophobia just another myth about Sparta? This is so up to a point, but it does seem that by comparison with the Athenians, Spartans can reasonably be called xenophobic. Such at any rate was the educated Athenian perception: a comparison of Athenian and Spartan habits and philosophy is given by Thucydides, in the mouth of Pericles (2. 39. 1): 'our city is open to the world, and we have no periodical deportations in order to prevent people observing or finding out secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy'. (Thucydides here writes with feeling: he complains in his own person of the secrecy with which the Spartans conduct their affairs, which meant that no one knew for sure how many Spartans there were at the first battle of Mantineia in 418 BC: 5. 68. 2.) The connection between the Spartans' suspicious attitude towards foreigners and their fear of helots is made explicit by Thucydides in his account of the dismissal of an Athenian task force which the Spartans had actually requested to help them with rebel helots at Ithome in the later 460s: 'they were afraid of the boldness and revolutionary character of the Athenians, and reckoned that the Athenians were foreigners, *allophyloi*, who might be persuaded by the people on Ithome [i.e. the helots] to carry out some revolutionary project'. (The words for 'revolution' in this passage are both compounds of the root *NEO*, 'new'; novelty and revolution come from outside. No wonder that *NEO-damodeis* were also a source of worry.) The Athenians, deeply offended

at this U-turn in policy, broke off their alliance with Sparta and made other friends instead (Th. 1. 102; see above p. 22). We should very much like to know whether inconsistent and self-damaging foreign policy plunges of this sort represent vacillation on the part of the *same* members of the elite, or a split *within* the elite – one group prevailing at one moment, another at another.

Whether to use or repress helots, then, was one Spartan dilemma, which helps to explain the vicissitudes of Spartan foreign policy. But the Peloponnesian War, and the programme of liberation, created another more special dilemma. 'Liberation' meant taking the initiative, breaking up the Athenian empire.[27] But that would cost money. Spartan finances look pathetically primitive: an inscription (ML 67 = Fornara 132, from the 420s), recording contributions to the Spartan war fund, includes gifts of *raisins*:[28] no 6000-talent reserve, or regular tribute such as the Athenian Pericles boasts of in Thucydides' narrative (2. 13). Moreover, since the Spartans depended on personal service from their allies, they had to consult them constantly, whereas the Athenians had a freer hand because they had stopped holding congresses of *their* allies well before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. That Spartan deference to allied feeling was indeed a matter of necessity not sentiment is shown by their peace proposals at Athens in 425: in Thucydides' account (4. 20) the Spartans say that if Athens and Sparta do a deal the rest of Greece will do them honour. This is diplomatic language for joint hegemony and a proposed sellout of the Peloponnesian League.

Eventually (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21) the Spartans did copy Athens and go over to a system of contributions of money not men; but that was in the 370s. In the fifth century there was for a Greek state only one big source of income apart from taxing one's own citizens or allies: Persia. And this is where the special dilemma comes in: Persian finance might be available for the defeating of Athens, but not for the 'liberation' which Sparta's allies wanted, because the liberation envisaged included the freedom of the Greeks in the Persian king's Asia.[29] This explains the Persian king's response to Spartan requests for financial help in the 420s, in a message sent to Sparta by a man called Artaphernes who was intercepted by the Athenians. The king's letter said, in Aramaic, that although the Spartans had sent him numerous embassies they did not all say the same thing (Th. 4. 50: if reliable, this is further evidence of what would now be called the 'contradictory signals' which Sparta habitually gave to the outside world). He added that if they wanted to say something clearly they should send men back with Artaphernes. The exasperation sounds convincing: the king was waiting for the Spartans to make up their minds whether they wanted money or a claim to Asia Minor. They could not have both, and must opt unequivocally for one or the other. So the Spartans could not please both their allies and Persia, yet they needed them both. Eventually they plumped for Persian help, but at a time (412) when their potential critics inside the league were less effective (cf. pp. 120, 168 for Corinth). Even so, the Spartans

returned to Asia in the 390s, proving Alcibiades right (Th. 8. 46) when he told the satrap Tissaphernes that the Spartans would be less convenient allies than the Athenians if and when the war ended, because the Spartans came as liberators. The Athenians by contrast were unblushing imperialists and would respect Persian imperialist ambitions. It is hard to believe that Thucydides, when he wrote these words, had not lived to see at least the Spartan Thibron's Asian expedition of 400.

# 12

# ATHENS[1]

## Introduction: Athens' natural advantages

When a city rules an empire, it is natural to ask whether the imperial city was specially geographically favoured from the first. Rome, for instance, was sited on the first crossing of the river Tiber, controlling the route from Latium to Etruria; Corinth was a colonial power in the archaic period thanks largely to its position on the Isthmus (p. 117); and explanations of the greatness of Byzantium, from Polybius (4. 38) to Gibbon, have begun with geography. Sparta, as we saw in the previous chapter, is an exception, in that human factors, above all the *ag?g?* or system of military training, were even more important than geographical, but Athens is not. Athens' natural advantages were enormous.

In the first paragraph of his *Description of Greece*, Pausanias mentions the silver mines of Attica, at Laurion in the south-east. And Xenophon, at the beginning of his *Revenues*, lists Attic silver – alongside Attica's natural produce and its central position by land and sea – as one of its three natural advantages. That silver had helped to finance the fleet which won the battle of Salamis in 480, but it was important under the empire too: the building accounts of the Propylaia, the ceremonial gateway to the Acropolis, dated 434/3, record payments from the treasurers of a Laurion silver mine as well as from the *Hellenotamiai*, the treasurers of the Delian League (ML 60 = Fornara 118B; there is a similar payment in respect of the Parthenon in 439/8: *IG* l$^3$ 444 lines 249–50, heavily restored)[2] (see Figure 12.1). This neatly sums up the sources of wealth, external and internal, which paid for the great Acropolis-building programme. Still later, the Laurion mines surely helped to subsidize the Athenian war effort in the Peloponnesian War: they are neglected by Thucydides in his statement of Athenian finances in 431 (2. 13), but they feature in an inscription (*IG* l$^3$ 90) of 424/3. The Peloponnesians ravaged the mine district in 430 (Th. 2. 55), but it is hard to destroy a mine without explosives, and it was not until the Spartans envisaged setting up a fort on Attic territory at Dekeleia (p. 175) that there could be talk of seriously damaging Athens' mining revenues (Th. 6. 91).



*Figure 12.1* The Parthenon, Athens

The other product native to Attica, and important for its economy, was the olive, Athena's tree in religion and myth. From the olive branch, modern languages have derived a synonym for 'peace'; the reason is that the olive is the product par excellence of peaceful cultivation, because it takes fifteen to twenty years to achieve full production, and the destruction of olives was always the first task of an invading army. The great olive oil benefactions of the hellenistic age, when the oil was used to lubricate the skins of participants in the gymnasia of the Greek cities, are an index of profound peace. It was remarkable that in the Archidamian war (431–421) the Peloponnesians abstained from destroying those Attic olive trees which were regarded as sacred to Athena (Androtion, *FGrHist* 324 F39). All Greek states needed olive oil, not just to do the work of modern soap and artificial light, but as the equivalent of fat in the cooking and preparation of food (butter was for barbarians). In 'thin-soiled' Attica (Th. 1. 2) the olive was unusually important: its deep roots could penetrate the subsoil and get into the rocks,[3] enabling the tree to thrive where other plants could not. Grain and orchards do flourish in, for example, the Marathon plain, the market garden of modern Athens, but the inability of Attica as a whole to feed a large population gave the olive an additional role as an export, to be sent to south Russia to pay for Ukrainian corn.

All this concerns Athens' produce, not its position. But the geography more than the geology or the botany of Attica was to determine Athens' future. Athens' geographical advantages were not as obvious as those of Corinth, Rome or Byzantium, but the city owed to them much of its success and sometimes its survival. Xenophon was right to insist on them.

First, Athens is surrounded by a barrier of mountains, the first line of defence:[4] working clockwise from Eleusis in the west, Mts Aigaleos, Parnes, Pentelikon and Hymettos run round the city, imagined as the centre of the dial (the best place to get an impression of this is from near the Philopappos Monument on the Hill of the Muses). Parnes, to the north, turns into Kithairon, which guards north-west Attica. With some artificial help – the old Pisistratid strong point at Eleusis (p. 136), the fortresses planted along the Kithairon–Parnes range (p. 138), and the fourth-century 'Dema Wall' which closes the Aigaleos–Parnes gap – this was massive insulation from land attack.

The second of Athens' geographical advantages was its prime naval position (which is really what Xenophon had in mind). Athenian activity by sea was nothing new in the fifth century. In Mycenaean times, Thorikos on the east Attic coast was importing the black volcanic glass called obsidian from the Cycladic island of Melos, a reminder that there was and is a good little harbour nearby at Laurion; Attic submycenaean and geometric pottery has been found as far away as western Asia Minor;[5] and the archaic Athenian settlements at Sigeion and the Thracian Chersonese, and the sixth-century cleruchies on Salamis and Euboia, foreshadow the fifth-century empire. In part it was geography which made this possible. The carrot-shaped Attic peninsula dangles into the Aegean towards the Cyclades islands; there are more than a hundred miles of hospitable Attic coastline, with plenty of good harbours from Skala Oropou in the north-east, past Laurion, just mentioned, round Sounion with its dockyards. Those which survive are hellenistic,[6] but classical Sounion was fortified too (Th. 8. 4). Then comes Phaleron, and the best harbour of all, the three-bayed Piraeus, safe to use only after the Athenians had taken Salamis, opposite, from the Megarians in the time of Solon, or not long after.

Third, the Acropolis of Athens – a feature which, like some other masterpieces of nature or art, is so familiar that it is hard to see it with fresh eyes – was an obvious place of refuge, and also a centre for the politically unified but large and sprawling territory of Attica. Thucydides (2. 14–16) thought that the political centralization (*synoikism*) of Attica was achieved by Theseus, in other words in the prehistoric, heroic age of Greek history. He contrasts that centralization with the physical concentration brought about by Pericles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, a *synoikism* in another sense – a physical as opposed to a political synoikism. (For the distinction cf. 1. 10 where Sparta is implied to be politically synoikized but never physically synoikized, still inhabited 'by villages in the old Greek way'.) Thucydides was right to see the synoikism of Athens as a process which occurred in two widely separated stages, first the political and then, long after, the physical.[7] But there are certainly good physical reasons for the choice of political capital. The Athenian Acropolis, defensible, symbolically overbearing and provided with its own water supply, goes far to explain why Dark Age Attica did not remain, like Keos or Euboia, a coalition of small states.

## The Athenian myths of identity

Athens as a place of refuge in time of distress: this was a theme which, like synoikism, had a more than purely physical aspect. It was in fact the foundation of one of Athens' four great myths of identity, as we may call them. The others are gift of grain, autochthony, Ionianism. These myths, however flimsy their basis in reality, were certainly sources of Athenian moral strength and no doubt commanded respect outside Athens (our evidence is lopsidedly Athenian so this is harder to prove, but see below for Pindar). First, there is the suppliant theme. The Athenians thought of themselves as traditional helpers of suppliants; more than one fifth-century Athenian tragedy has this theme at its centre (the children of Herakles were supposedly protected by Theseus' son Demophon from the persecution of Eurystheus; the aged and blind Oedipus was taken in by Theseus himself at the Athenian deme of Kolonos, and so on; for treatments of the two myths just mentioned see Euripides' *Herakleidai* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Kolonos*). It is not fortuitous that we have plays called *The Suppliants* by both Aeschylus and Euripides. The 'help to suppliants' theme is put by Herodotus into the mouths of the Athenians before the battle of Plataia, when they are represented as (successfully) disputing with Tegea the honour of commanding the left wing of the Greek army (Hdt. 9. 27).[8] It is not surprising that the fourth-century orators dwell on this topic as they do. It is more surprising, given Thucydides' usual avoidance of traditional motives of Athenian self-glorification, that there is a clear if fleeting hint of the theme in Alcibiades' claim in 415 BC that 'we eagerly come to the aid of any barbarians or Greeks who call on us'(Th. 6. 18. 2).[9]

Second, there is the gift of grain. A young man called Triptolemos, so the myth ran, gave the gift of grain to the rest of the Greeks, setting out from Eleusis in Athenian territory. The myth was used in the fifth century to justify the request that the first-fruits of the harvest should be brought by other Greeks to Athens as a gesture of acknowledgement of this primeval benefaction (ML 73 = Fornara 140); and it was used again in the fourth century by an Athenian speaker, Kallias, at Sparta, as the basis of an appeal for alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 6, claiming that Sparta was Triptolemos' first stop). The myth is a strange one because as we have seen Attica was not fabulously fertile or corn-rich at any period. That does not seem to have reduced the myth's effectiveness.[10]

It should be noticed that neither of the two myths so far considered are simply presented as evidence of Athenian generosity; they imply Athenian superiority and are compatible with exclusiveness. Oedipus is received as a suppliant, and it is made clear that his help from beyond the grave will be accepted. But he does not thereby become an Athenian. The remaining two myths address the question of identity and exclusiveness more directly.

Autochthony is a double idea: it combines the idea that the Athenians were 'earth born' (*gegeneis*), sprung from the (in reality not very rich) soil of Attica; and the idea that they had always thereafter gone on living in the same place.

They were not immigrants but aboriginals. Any such aboriginal myth is liable to be nonsense historically (the Thebans also had an autochthony myth and so did the Arkadians) and the Athenian version is not an exception. But it was a useful way of scoring off the Spartans who were Dorians (see below) and therefore immigrants; the myth belongs in the classical not the archaic volume of this series because, whoever first thought it up, it was in the fifth century that it really took off.[11] For the Athenians to represent themselves as old by comparison with the Spartan newcomers was a bit of a paradox given the usual perception of Sparta as conservative, and given the reputation Athenians had as lovers of novelty (Kleon at Th. 3. 38.5) and as generators of unwelcome political 'novelty', i.e. revolution (Th. 1.102.3, cf. above p. 23). But the myth is firmly established in Herodotus (7. 161. 3) and in Thucydides, both in his own person (l. 2. 5 'the Athenians have always occupied the same land') and in the mouth of Pericles (2. 36. 1). Thucydides avoids the word 'autochthon' when speaking of the Athenians, but he is well aware of it because he uses it elsewhere (see 6. 2. 2 about the Sikan inhabitants of Sicily; this part of his work may draw heavily on a local Sicilian writer whose vocabulary was slightly different from Thucydides'). But it was Euripides in the *Ion* (perhaps 412 BC, cf. below p. 180) who gave it most emphatic and patriotic expression, not only when he makes the god Hermes in the Prologue speak of the 'autochthonous people of famous Athens' (lines 29–30) but by making Ion the son of the Athenian princess Kreousa, who had been raped by Apollo before the play's action begins. Kreousa was daughter of Erechtheus and thus a descendant of Kekrops, half-man and half-serpent, i.e. earth born.

The *Ion* is also valuable evidence for our fourth and final Athenian myth of identity, the idea of Athens as Ionian 'mother-city' of Ionia. Unlike the other myths, this had a substantial grounding in fact. The myth has two distinct but overlapping components, the idea that Athens was itself Ionian ('Ionianism'), and the idea that the Athenians actually colonized Ionia. The Athenians were indeed Ionians in the sense that Attic Greek was a variant of Ionic, and the Athenians were Ionians in their religion. But it seems that in the fifth century, particularly in the period from the Persian Wars to the end of the century (the period of maximum tension with Sparta), the Athenians became more self-conscious about their 'Ionianism'. This was surely because, like autochthony, the 'Ionianism' of Athens expressed difference from and opposition to Sparta, since the Spartans were Dorians. The suddenness of the change should not be exaggerated: already in the early sixth century Solon had called Athens the 'oldest land of Ionia'. The Athenians also responded, as early as 500 BC, to an appeal to help their Ionian colonists (*apoikoi*) in their revolt from Persia (Hdt. 5. 97. 2), the appeal of Aristagoras of Miletus. Some of this may reflect the position much later in the century when as we shall see (below) the Athenians had an interest in exaggerating their colonial relationship with Ionia; and in any case Aristagoras, a desperate man, had according to Herodotus made an almost equally strong kinship appeal to the Dorian *Spartans* (5. 49. 3, *homaimonas*).

But one detail suggests that the kinship factor was indeed important, the selection of a man with the name Melanthios as general (5. 97. 3): this was an evocative name which recalls Melanthos, one of the old Ionian royal family of Athens (Hdt. 1. 147; 5. 65). It has been argued[12] that the Athenians were ashamed of being Ionians (Ionia was synonymous with softness, cf. Th. 8. 25. 3) and therefore played down the Ionian element in their make-up. Certainly, Herodotus sometimes implies contempt for Ionians (he himself was half Karian, half Dorian Greek). But this view fails because it has to treat Euripides' *Ion* as exceptional and out of line: Athena at the end of the play in effect prophesies that Ion's sons will colonize Attica itself – after which his descendants will colonize the islands and the Asiatic mainland. Ion's stepfather Xouthos will go on to father Dorus the ancestor of the Dorians – a clear statement of Ionian priority but at the same time a possible panhellenic gesture because it makes Ion and Dorus half-brothers.

The second half of Athena's prophecy – the colonization of Asia – is a vigorous assertion of the other half of the Ionian myth, that which represented Athens as the founding 'metropolis' of Ionia. The reality was not so clear: Ionia seems to have been a place of mixed settlement and the Athenian claim to have been the sole founder was a great exaggeration of a drift of peoples across the Aegean, which was hardly state sponsored because it took place before Athens became *a polis.* The same may (as was argued in the archaic volume of this series)[13] have been true of many foundation legends; but the scale of the Athenian boast made it remarkable. By the 420s, inscriptions show that the Athenians were demanding religious offerings from their subject-allies as symbolic tribute to a mother-city. On Samos we find a cult of Ion himself which may not have been entirely voluntary and welcome in that the revenues of confiscated land were made over to Ion; but at the same time Ion was an obviously suitable recipient of Ionian cult so there may be a conciliatory aspect to the choice of dedicatee.

We have seen in an earlier chapter (p. 12) that Ionian kinship is given at the very beginning of the Athenian empire as one of the reasons why the Ionians looked to Athens for leadership after the Persian Wars (Th. 1. 95. 1); another reason there mentioned was fear of the violence of Pausanias the Spartan (above p. 124). A third reason, not stressed by Thucydides, was the Athenians' record as effective fighters in the Persian Wars. This Athenian achievement can almost be regarded as a fifth myth alongside the other four. Athenian speakers in Thucydides do not, with one exception (1. 73–4) make much rhetorical play with the theme, but they are probably very untypical. If Herodotus is right, the Athenians were beginning to invoke their achievements against the Persians even before the Persian Wars were over (Hdt. 9. 27. 5, the dispute between the Athens and Tegeans over the command of the left wing at the battle of Plataia). After listing such mythical claims as the help-to-suppliants motive (above), the speakers say 'we have spoken enough of such ancient deeds' and they proceed to speak of the battle of Marathon eleven years earlier. Now the glorious Athenian role in both 490 and 480–479 was no

invention; but the rhetorical tradition tended to forget about Athens' allies, such as the Thespians and Plataians from Boiotia ('fighting alone against the Persian', as Herodotus' Athenians say in 479). Pindar, a Boiotian, sang of the Athenians laying the foundation stone of freedom. In a way this 'fifth' myth brings us back to the first because the Ionians in 500 and 479 were like the old mythical suppliants whom mythical Athens had not turned away. The first Ionian appeal helped to bring about the Persian Wars; the second appeal two decades later helped to bring about an Athenian empire dedicated to extracting reparation from Persia (above p. 12).

## Demes and city

But as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, imperial Athens was predicated on the local strengths of Athens and Attica, and to these domestic aspects we must return. The political life of Attica was dominated by Athens. It was dominated, not monopolized: the obvious physical impressiveness of the remains in the city, and its consequent attraction for archaeologists, can easily lead, and has led into the past, to a neglect of the *deme*, the local population centre. This has been changing, for several reasons. One is that more work has been done on the Athenian council (*boule*) of 500 members, lists of whom have been turning up since the Americans began to excavate the *agora* in the 1930s. The *boule* was drawn from the demes in proportion to their population (see p. 140) and it now seems that in the time of Kleisthenes no more than one-quarter of known Athenians can be attributed to city demes.[14] (This calculation assumes that attributions remained constant between 508 BC and the fourth century BC, which is likely but not quite certain in view of the upheavals of the Peloponnesian War, after which there may have been some reassigning of individuals to demes.)[15] We should have expected the fraction to be approximately one-third, because Kleisthenes divided Attica into three, not four: coast, city and inland. Thucydides, as we have seen (above p. 131) was right to say that it was only with the Peloponnesian War that the real migration from country to city took place. It does not follow from this that in Pericles' time, country voters in the Assembly outnumbered city voters 3:1, because, as Aristotle noted (*Politics* 1318), farmers tended to stay away. But it *does* prove, and this is important, that many citizens of Attica may have looked to their deme first and their city second. Thus Thucydides says (2. 16) of the evacuation of Attica that the Athenians took it so badly because 'each man was virtually abandoning his own city'; this is on the face of it a paradox because they were going *from* their country demes *to* the polis.

Another reason why the relation of demes to city is now seen differently, and why demes now seem more important, is simply that more archaeological work has been done on deme sites, and more deme inscriptions have been found; the result of this was that in the mid-1980s two historians independently produced excellent full-length treatments of demes and deme life and religion.[16] In general, the further from Athens you go, the

more impressive the deme remains become. This surely suggests that in the more distant demes – Eleusis with its great sanctuary and fortifications, or Rhamnous and Sounion with their temples of Nemesis and Poseidon (ML 53 = Fornara 90B for the treasury accounts of Rhamnousian Nemesis) – the city's magnetic pull was less strong than in a deme close to the city like, say, Kolonos.[17] A deme like Sounion or Thorikos had many of the attributes of a city-state: the demes had their own liturgies, that is, counterparts at deme level of the arrangements by which individual wealthy Athenians financed




*Map 3* The demes of Attica



*Figure 12.2* Thorikos, Attika

the cultural life, and even the military defence, of their city – a blend of taxation and of self-advertisement for the individuals concerned.[18] A good epigraphically attested example of such a 'deme liturgy' comes from Aixone (Csapo and Slater 1995: 128 no. 51A; see also 125–6 no 50A, Ikarion). The City Dionysia, at which tragedies, comedies and dithyrambs (a kind of choral song) were performed competitively in March, had its deme equivalent in the Rural Dionysia, and these deme festivals called for outlay from wealthy individuals just like the City Dionysia. The term *Rural* Dionysia should not be taken too literally: we know that the city deme Kollytos put on a play by Sophocles, namely the *Oinomaos* (Dem. 18. 180).

Liturgies were a kind of obligation, though some wealthy men boasted of having greatly exceeded their obligations (Lysias 21).[19] 'Euergetism' or benefaction was generosity without strict obligation, though it too conferred prestige (cf. above p. 54). Euergetism, like liturgical spending, is found at deme level. One deme, Lamptrai, politely inscribes its gratitude to a man of Acharnai, only thirty kilometres away across Mt Hymettos. Yet the man is treated like a man from another *polis*. Acharnai, an unusually populous deme (see below) does seem to be exceptional: Pindar wrote two surviving victory odes for Athenian victors, one for the famous Alkmaionid Megakles, Pericles' uncle (*Pyth.* 7, cf. too frag. 137, a poem for Megakles' relative Hippokrates), and one for Timodemos of Acharnai (*Nem.* 2).[20] Timodemos' victory was in the *pankration* (wrestling and boxing) not in the more prestigious and expensive chariot race for which Megakles is praised. Nevertheless it is remarkable that in the course of the poem the victor's deme is celebrated in just the way that

Pindar normally celebrates the victor's *polis*: Acharnai is 'famous of old for its brave men' (lines 15ff., echoed perhaps by Thucydides at 2. 19–21). Again, an inscription shows that the demesmen of Acharnai consulted the oracle at Delphi in a way normally done by *poleis* (Robert 1938: 294 lines 4–8). But though Acharnai was exceptional in the degree to which it behaved like a *polis*, it was not unique in doing so. From Sounion, at the southern tip of Attica, comes a splendidly illuminating decree of the demesmen (*Syll.*$^3$ 913), which reads: 'It seemed good to the men of Sounion: since Leukios has given the demesmen land to build an *agora*, three men are to be chosen straight away to measure an area not less than 2 plethra by 1, so that there shall be broad space for the men of Sounion to *agorazein* …'(the last word is untranslatable: it has a range of meanings, from 'shopping' through 'promenading oneself' to 'holding an assembly in the *agora*'. Essentially it means 'to carry on all the activities usual in an *agora*'.). The formulae, 'it seemed good to', 'straight away', are copied from city terminology (and note the deme *agora*, something normally characteristic of a *polis*, cf. p. 71). Or should we say that the city copied the demes? After all, *euthunai*, compulsory accounts presented by magistrate, are an institution known from deme government (*IG* I$^3$ 244, Skambonidai) before they appear in the city. But perhaps city and demes developed in parallel; deme religion and *polis* religion seem to have a common Ionian origin.[21]

Rich deme evidence comes from Eleusis, one of the proudest and most important of the deme sites, partly because of its sanctuary to Demeter and Kore (Persephone) where the cults of the great Eleusinian mystery religion were performed, partly because of a too often forgotten feature of the place: its defences. The Peisistratids, who as we saw (p. 123) were on uneasy terms with the Spartans, had blocked off the main land route from the Megarid and the Peloponnese by enclosing Eleusis with a mud-brick wall. In the fourth century, as we learn from inscriptions (e.g. *Syll.*$^3$ 957), the 'defence of Eleusis' was the charge of detachments of cadets, *epheboi*; and Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle are mentioned together as important fortresses of Attica in a hellenistic text (*Syll.*$^3$ 485). Demosthenes' speech *Against Konon* gives in its opening paragraphs a brilliant snapshot of the vexations of life under canvas in such a posting – actually Panakton – including hooligans from the next door tent emptying chamber pots over you (Dem. 54. 1ff.). Eleusis was, like Acharnai, an exceptionally important deme. This is reflected in the honours conferred on outsiders by the Eleusinians, who behave like a miniature *polis*: an inscription records the privileges granted to two Thebans by the Eleusinians, preferential seats at the sanctuary, spectacles and – a very interesting phrase – 'freedom from the taxes over which the Eleusinians have control'. The phrase quoted recurs as a fourth-century and hellenistic formula in Asia Minor, where it is used by the cities under the Persian and Seleucid kings and satraps.[22] 'Taxes over which the city has control' implies a contrast with royal taxes, which the city is not competent to remit; the phrase thus signifies and asserts autonomy, albeit limited, in fiscal affairs, enjoyed by indulgence of a sovereign. In the

fourth-century east the sovereign is the satrap; for Eleusis the sovereign is the city of Athens.[23] Classical Eleusis, then, though only a deme, behaves something like a hellenistic *polis*, with *amour propre* but curtailed freedom. (There is, admittedly, a purely formal and honorific aspect to all this, and that is particularly true when demes receive privileges from foreign powers, rather than granting them: the people of Dekeleia, a deme in north Attica, were granted tax freedom and preferential seating at Sparta, though it is hard to see what Spartan taxes the Dekeleians could possibly have been liable to: Hdt. 9. 73.) Another deme with more than purely parochial status was Piraeus, whose *demarch* or chief magistrate was a *polis* appointment (*Ath. Pol.* 58), and which was regarded as a hyper-democratic place, to a degree that frightened even the Athenians themselves – that is, the Athenians of the city.[24]

Again, the visitor to Thorikos (Fig. 12.2), if taken there blindfold from the real city-state of Euboian Eretria, might well find it hard to tell the two apart, and might think that this was another place with the same independent status: there is a fortified acropolis, a theatre and a temple – just as at Eretria. But Eretria was a *polis* which could wage war on Xerxes of Persia if it chose, and it did. Recent excavations at Thorikos have added to the total of known deme inscriptions: a sacred calendar (*SEG* 33. 147) shows what a remarkably full religious life the deme enjoyed; the inscription lists no fewer than forty-two separate gods or heroes, including the local 'deme hero' Thorikos.[25] Another such religious calendar, from the deme of Erchia, was headed 'the greater *demarchia*' (*SEG* 21. 541, and these words probably refer to the duties of the *demarch*). This man combined many of the jobs of parish priest, village policeman, eponymous magistrate (ML 53, Fornara 90B, the Rhamnous accounts), and even tax collector: the debtor Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is bitten by a '*demarch* under the bedclothes' (line 37), and *demarchs* collected the *eisphora*, a capital tax levied by the *polis* of Athens.[26]

For the citizens of Attica (at least in classical times: it is notable, and sad in its implications for the vitality of deme life, that deme decrees are rare after the fourth century BC except from Rhamnous) deme routine was more immediate, though no doubt objectively less important, than what happened on the Pnyx, the meeting place of the Athenian assembly. One interesting section of the Thorikos inscription is the reference at the end, just before the stone breaks off (as so often with Greek inscriptions, at a particularly interesting point) to *elections* at deme level, something we should like to know more about. (For deme elections held at Athens, see *SEG* 33.103 line 27f.: Eleusis.)

On the most miniature scale of all, smaller even than the demes, were the Attic *komai* or villages. Even these had their *komarchs* or head men, though virtually nothing is known about these officials.[27]

Some inhabitants of Attica perhaps did not bother much with either deme or *polis* politics: the country house below the cave of Pan at Vari (the ancient deme of Anagyrous), whose remains were cleared and studied by the British School at Athens and published in 1973, gives the impression of self-sufficiency

– there is copious evidence for beekeeping at the Vari villa – and peace, a long way from the speechmakers of the Pnyx. That peace might be disturbed (as in Dem. 47, *Against Euergos*) by pirates, local rowdies, or litigants seeking what is nowadays politely called a 'remedy by self-help'; in which case the answer was to take refuge inside the fortified *pyrgos* or tower, whose foundations are still a feature of the Vari site.[28] It is disputed whether such isolated farmsteads were the norm, or whether Attica was a land of clustered communities in which the deme was the basic agricultural unit ('non-nucleated' or 'nucleated' settlement). There is evidence for both views, and generalization is perhaps premature; the evidence from one very thoroughly studied deme area, Atene, suggests that isolated farmsteads were reasonably common, but this deme was not exactly typical.[29]

All this shows is that Attica was far from being just a city with territory round it, but was a compromise between a centralized state and a federal one. The compromise is symbolized by Lysias' mention (23. 3) of the 'barber's shop by the Herms[30] in the Athenian *agora* where the demesmen of Dekeleia congregate' – an evocative phrase which evidently described a well-known social phenomenon, since it is almost exactly reproduced in an inscription from Dekeleia (*Syll.*[3] 921, lines 63–4). That need for compromise arose from a feature shared by much of the Greco–Roman world: ancient states, being reliant on agriculture, faced a permanent struggle to prevent civic assemblies from being dominated by the urban population; the Romans solved this problem by eventually allowing *dual* citizenship, that is, citizenship both of Rome and of the home community whose constitution would be modelled, in a municipal way, on that of often faraway Rome. Attica after Kleisthenes, which allowed a man to participate in the affairs of his deme, and also to join in making the city's decisions, was another such attempt to reconcile city and countryside. The main bridge between the two was the Council of 500 members, appointed annually from the demes in proportion to their population – so for instance Eleusis was allowed to send eleven councillors to the city council, and the great deme of Acharnai sent twenty-two, while some tiny demes like Pambotadai and Sybridai took it in turns to send a single councillor every other year. After 431 BC, when the population of much of Attica was evacuated into the city (above, p. 131), rural demes were less 'representative'; to reflect these changes in settlement patterns, which were never fully reversed, the system may have been overhauled at the end of the Peloponnesian War (after 403, when democracy was restored after a brief interval, pp. 218–19). Since most of our epigraphic evidence for 'bouleutic quotas', i.e. the number of councillors allocated to demes, is post-classical, and we have no non-epigraphic evidence at all, not all the detail known to us can safely be retrojected to the fifth century, before the suggested overhaul took place. But it is reasonable to assume that there was approximate continuity.[31]

The demes were organized into three groups (or *trittyes*): coastal, inland and city, and these were artificially aggregated into bigger units called tribes, *phylai*: a *trittys* of coastal, a *trittys* of inland and a *trittys* of city demes

went to make up one of the ten tribes of Attica, each of which sent fifty councillors to the council. In each tribe, as we have seen, there were a number of coastal, a number of inland and a number of city demes, about sixteen councillors from each type going to make up a trittys (only in the tribe to which Acharnai belonged was this system modified, because twenty-two out of fifty councillors is already well over a third). This system was devised not just with political but with military arrangements in view, and this is another way in which city and countryside were brought together: the demes and *trittyes* were often arranged along, and clustered at the ends of, the strategic highways of Attica, thereby making for easy mobilization, with the *agora* of Athens as the place of muster.[32] An example is the string of demes from Tribe Five, Akamantis, which run Thorikos-Kephale-Prospalta-Sphettos and thence to the city; the section from Thorikos to Sphettos is along an arterial road, which by Kleisthenes' dispositions was enclosed first within the coastal, then within the inland *trittys* of Akamantis. The theory is vulnerable or unprovable in some points of detail,[33] but the link between citizenship and military service was always strong in ancient Greece, so that the basic idea is perfectly plausible. (For *phylai* as military units at Athens see ML 51 = Fornara 101, line 5; Th. 6. 98,[34] cf. 6. 100. 1 for Syracuse.) A system of the kind here described presupposes a good network of communications, and it was the road building of the Pisistratids in the sixth century which created such a network. Roman Italy again provides an analogy: the roads built by people like Aemilius Lepidus in the first half of the second century physically facilitated the political and cultural unification of Italy in the course of the next 150 years.[35] Finally, the 'deme judges' (again an originally Pisistratid invention) dispensed a justice which was uniform for all Attica, but they travelled round the demes on a kind of assize circuit; they too must have been agents of unification. (They had been suspended after the fall of the tyranny in 510, but for their re-creation in 453 see *Ath. Pol.* 26.3.)

Symbolic of the unification of Attica – but also of the importance of the demes – was the commissioning of the same architect, a top man, to design temples of Nemesis at Rhamnous, of Poseidon at Sounion, of Ares at Acharnai and of Hephaistos at Athens (see Figure 12.4). Nemesis was suggestive of vengeance, specifically for the assaults on Greece and its temples by the Persians (cf. Fornara 90A = Pausanias 1. 33. 2–3, discussing the temple and noting that Nemesis punishes people who show *hubris,* deliberately insulting and usually violent behaviour),[36] and the Rhamnous site was geographically appropriate because the Persians had landed in 490 not far away at Marathon; Poseidon meant rule of the sea, and a temple to him at Sounion was a fitting piece of arrogance, visible far out in the Aegean Sea (cf. Fig. 12.3); Ares was the god of war and Acharnai was the most warlike deme and the one with the most manpower (Th. 2. 19–21, cf. above p. 137); while Athens itself, with its five-figure total of metics,[37] is audaciously presented as the smithy of Hephaistos. This huge fourfold piece of political iconography[38] was executed, we should remember, by a single hand and was therefore surely centrally



*Figure 12.3* Temple of Poseidon, Sounion



*Figure 12.4* Temple of Hephaestus (Theseion), Athens

commissioned; but it is equally significant of the proud standing of the demes that they were chosen as the vehicle for this glorious Attica-wide religious boasting.

## Council, Assembly, law courts

A more prosaic function of the demes, and one which survived the collapse of the empire in 404, was to supply councillors for the Council of Five Hundred. This important body prepared business for the Assembly (*Ath. Pol.* 45), and met far more frequently than the Assembly, perhaps on 250–300 days a year, whereas the Assembly met on only 40 or so in the fourth century and less than that in the fifth.[39] The Council had special responsibilities over finance and foreign affairs. Thucydides was not interested in the Council, and its near invisibility in his *History* cannot reflect the reality. For instance, there were numerous Spartan delegations sent to Athens in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War, and Thucydides says that the Athenians eventually decided to 'deliberate once for all about everything'. It has been suggested[40] that this loose formulation conceals blocking tactics by the Council, which may have stopped the Spartans from appearing to put their case before the Assembly. There is even evidence of occasional 'secret diplomacy' by the Council, i.e. action deliberately kept from the Assembly.[41] (See Dem. 2. 6 and *FGrHist* 115 F30a for a pact made 'in secret' between the Council and Philip of Macedon to exchange Pydna, which the Athenians held, for Amphipolis; and the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (9. 1) says that a trireme sailed from Athens in 395 BC under one Demainetos 'not on the instructions of the people' but after Demainetos had unveiled his plans in secret to the Council. (Cf. Diod. 13. 2. 6: possible plan to enslave Syracuse.) But despite evidence of this sort, the Council was normally the servant not the master of the Assembly. The interests of the two did not conflict because the Council was drawn from roughly the same pool of members as the Assembly, although there is slight evidence that members of the Council were more than averagely well-off.[42]

The Assembly met on the hill called the Pnyx, in the open air. In the fifth century the Pnyx could accommodate attendances of about 6000, out of a male population in 431 of about 40,000; and that total was regularly reached in the fourth century, as we know from the many attested grants of citizenship, for which (as for some other matters) a quorum of 6000 was required.[43] Though Thucydides makes the great Athenian leader Pericles say that 'few of us initiate policies but many judge them' (2. 40. 2),[44] a surprisingly large number of Athenians are in fact attested as having proposed decrees, at any rate in the fourth century, about 700–1400 in the years 355–322 BC.[45] Some scholars stress the ability of the Assembly to decide big issues such as foreign policy for itself;[46] others argue that elite politicians led and the Assembly followed.[47] A compromise view is possible: the Assembly and no doubt also the Council looked to and relied heavily on regional experts (men

like Diotimos for the west, perhaps Thucydides himself for the north Aegean), but the voters made up their own minds.[48]

The Assembly and Council were not the only instruments of popular sovereignty: the popular law courts, the *dikasteria*, had since about 462 (see above p. 24) been just as effective a means of democratic decision making. Since that date the function of the presiding magistrates had been reduced to a preliminary formality, and the mass panels of *dikasts* (nearer 'judges' than 'jurymen') reached their decisions without expert direction, on the basis of speeches not constrained by strict rules of relevance or evidence. Here, obviously, was scope for political use of judicial process. (Some would call it abuse of process; for what an anti-democratic critique would look like, see the remarks on clever tricks of orators in Diodorus' account of Egypt, 1. 76, taken from Hecataeus of Abdera, who was writing towards the end of the fourth century. Of this section it has been justly remarked 'that is the voice of the anti-democratic Greek as it may be heard at any time in the fifth and fourth centuries BC'.)[49] Not only could individual Athenian politicians be brought down by 'sycophants', i.e. malicious prosecutors – the word has inexplicably changed its meaning since antiquity.[50] New laws and their proposers could be impugned in the courts; and theoretically a law so impugned might be upheld without the Assembly having been involved at any stage.[51] There is a sense in which this last possibility makes the courts sovereign over the Assembly. But it is not plausible that the Athenians saw things in such terms: like the Council, the law courts were drawn from much the same social group as the Assembly. Indeed it has been well said that the advantages of the Athenian system of huge amateur courts was not only that in such numbers the dikasts were hard to bribe or browbeat, but that 'the courts and the people were as near as possible identical, so that an accused man felt that he was being judged by the Athenian people, not merely by some government official or according to an obscure written rule'.[52] The conditions were altogether lacking which in the modern USA led to clashes between the executive and the judiciary in the presidencies of F. D. Roosevelt and Richard Nixon.




*Figure 12.5* Ostrakon against Megakles, from the Kerameikos in Athens

Law courts and sycophants were efficient mechanisms for 'pruning the tallest poppies' (cf. Hdt. 5. 92 ζ 2–3; and Livy 1. 54), but there was an obvious risk of political withdrawal by the elite in the face of the tyrant demos.[53] Some people did withdraw, as we can see, though it is precisely their lack of overt political activity which makes the evidence for them elusive.[54] Thucydides makes Pericles defend Athenian democracy against the charge that it gave insufficient scope for men of outstanding talent (2. 37. 1), and it is true that there were ways in which elite values were reconciled with democratic ideology, and that there were indeed opportunities for able individuals to exercise leadership. Let us look at some examples.

## Elite values and democratic ideology

'Hippotrophia', horse breeding, entailed conspicuous expenditure and was politically suspect (Th. 6. 12. 2 and 15. 3). Pindar is explicit that victory in equestrian events at the panhellenic games was specially prone to attract blame from envious people, *phthoneonton* (*Olympian* 6 lines 74–6), and he notes specifically that Megakles the Alkmaionid had been brought down by envy (*Pythian* 7 line 19, an apparent reference to Megakles' ostracism: he is called 'horse breeder' on a recently published ostrakon (Fig. 12.5)).

But rather than rejecting athletic success altogether, the demos found a way of acknowledging it while making clear that the privileges enjoyed by victorious homecoming athletes were granted by the community: the 'prytaneion inscription' of the Periclean period (430s or thereabouts) says that athletes victorious in the four panhellenic games should, just as at other not necessarily democratic places in the Greek world, be granted free meals in the prytaneion or town hall (*IG* I³ 131).[55] The thinking behind this resembles that behind the epigraphically attested confirmation after the 460s of the religious privileges of old Athenian families like the Praxiergidai: the underlying message is that 'even the oldest privileges depend on the will of the people', which can also by implication withdraw them.[56] But it remains interesting and important that the demos does not altogether set itself against the aristocratic ideology of athletic glory. It is thus plausible that Euripides' Hippolytus (*Hipp.* lines 1016ff.; 428 BC) says he would like to be first at victories in the Greek, i.e. panhellenic games, but goes on to make clear that he does not regard this as inconsistent with some degree of political power.[57]

Horses were more than an upper-class luxury and means of display. They were also a military necessity: every military power, Athens included, had to have a cavalry force. But cavalry units, through history, have tended to be recalcitrant to discipline, because they are drawn from echelons of society whose members are used to the freedom of action which money and social position bring. Pericles' solution was to have the state advance a sum of money for the maintenance of the horse, so-called *katastasis* (see especially *Lys.* 16, speech against Mantitheos). The system was an elaborate one: the *boule* conducted periodic checks on the animal's military efficiency (*Ath. Pol.* 49),

and plaques survive with the name of the horse and its owner.[58] Despite all this, the cavalry class or *hippeis* (in Solonian terms the *pentakosiomedimnoi* as well as the *hippeis* proper) remained politically suspect, with some reason. Thus in the oligarchic revolution of 411 the oligarchs met at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Kolonos (Th. 8. 67. 2). One reason for this was the cultic associations not spelt out by Thucydides: this was Poseidon Hippios, the 'horsey'.[59] The cavalry were even more compromised in 404–403; the




*Figure 12.6* Grave stele of Dexileos (cast)

gravestone of a young cavalryman called Dexileos, who died in 395 BC, goes out of its way to make clear that he was too young to have participated in the recent oligarchies (Tod 105 = Harding 19C; Fig. 12.6).

Cavalry status was not alone in containing built-in tensions and even contradictions. The system of *choregia*, by which wealthy men paid for the performance of plays and dithyrambs (p. 137), was essentially one of aristocratic patronage, and it is arguable that it was never perfectly grafted onto the democratic plant.[60] The tripod monuments from the fourth century (the 'choregic monuments') celebrate the victory of the tribe, but the financial backer's name is often assertively prominent. Communities which depend on euergetism (institutionalized benefaction, see pp. 54, 137) must pay a certain price, in terms of recognition, for the cash they need.

### Generals and demagogues: fourth-century changes

Elite values and the egalitarian democracy thus co-existed uneasily. Let us look at the related issue of leadership.[61] Here too the democracy had to relax some of its inflexibility. After the 460s, most high offices of state were appointed by lot, with one extremely important exception, the office of *strategos* ('general', but they commanded by sea as well as land). This was an elected post, normally one from each of the ten tribes. There were no limits on re-election. Generals could be fined and deposed by the Assembly, as happened to Pericles towards the end of his life. This could happen if a general made the wrong decision or failed to carry out orders; but generals could also be punished for not using their initiative: three generals were punished on their return from Sicily in 424 BC because 'although it was in their power to conquer the island they had been bribed to depart'; we need not take the bribery accusation too seriously (Th. 4. 65. 3). This was an exceptional episode, but it does show that generals enjoyed, and were expected to exercise, considerable executive latitude in the field, as indeed we should expect given the slowness of ancient communications. Detailed supervision of generals by the Assembly was not possible. Nor, perhaps, was it desirable, given the low standards of ancient military security. A Syracusan speaker, reported by Thucydides, shows an unusual recognition of the problem: he recommends the appointment of a small number of generals with full powers, 'so that things which ought to be secret can be kept concealed' (Th. 6. 72. 5). Sometimes we hear of breaches of security, as when advance intelligence of an impending Athenian attack reaches Corinth via Argos, but ultimately, we must assume, from loose talk in the Piraeus (Th. 4. 42. 3). If taken literally, Thucydides sometimes goes very far in his implication that generals had untrammelled power. Some of this related to the admittedly exceptional Pericles; thus we read (2. 21. 3) that the Athenians were angry with Pericles and blamed him because he did not lead them out to battle 'although he was general'. If we had no other evidence, we would not guess from this passage that Pericles was one of a panel of ten; but for Thucydides' view of Pericles' quasi-monarchical position see the famous

summing up later in the book (2. 65. 7). Pericles apart, it seems clear that generals had special powers in relation to the Assembly. Pericles himself 'did not summon the Assembly or a military meeting (*xyllogos*)'[62] when murmured against in the way described above (2. 22. 2), and though this may have been just an exercise of personal authority, there is another passage (4. 118. 14), from a faithful transcript of an Athenian decree, which gives the generals power to summon, and perhaps by implication the power to prevent the summoning of, the Assembly. This may, however, have been true only in the special circumstances of the Peloponnesian War. Certainly the generals had direct access to the Assembly, and could propose motions: one inscription (*Syll.*[3] 132) opens with the formula 'by the motion of the generals'. The position of generals in the field is hard to estimate from Thucydides. He can say of Nikias before Megara that 'Nikias wanted' to do so such-and-such, with no implication that Nikias was carrying out anyone's wishes but his own (3. 51. 2), but this may be literary highlighting. Generals could call out levies of troops on their own authority, it would seem (4. 90), and we hear of detailed executive prearrangement between generals at this same period (3. 91.4, and for a botched link-up between different army groups see 4. 89). The three generals in Sicily in 415 debate strategy as if all the options are wide open (6. 47ff.); it has been countered that they were nonetheless engaged in considering 'how best to carry out the orders of the home government'. But only Nikias mentions their specific brief from the people to proceed against Selinus, and his views do not prevail; note anyway his subsequent letter to the Assembly (7. 11. 2), which mentions a brief to proceed against *Syracuse*: same phrase, different object.[63] Could generals be awarded more exceptional powers than normal, or power over each other? The three generals in Sicily are appointed as *strategoi autokratores*, generals with full powers, whatever exactly that means (6. 26. 1), and this stipulation is certainly relevant to their strategy debate just discussed. Sometimes one general is singled out as 'himself the fifth' or 'himself the tenth' (e.g. Th. 1. 61. 1). It has become orthodox to say[64] that this formula implies nothing about the seniority or constitutional position of the individual singled out, but though this egalitarian interpretation may be strictly correct, it is hard to avoid suspecting that some extra element of prestige and thus informal power is implied; for one thing the formula is also found in non-egalitarian contexts (cf. 1. 46. 2 for Xenokleides of Corinth, 'himself the fifth'). There is no sign in Thucydides of daily rotation of command by the generals, and this is a powerful argument for thinking that Herodotus is wrong to imply, explicitly and startlingly, that there was such rotation at the time of the battle of Marathon (6. 110). All in all, we are frustratingly dependent on the evidence of Thucydides, whose literary aims may mean he is not a wholly reliable guide. There is also the question of his own career and privileged access to what went on in the *strategeion* in the middle 420s, the period when he was himself a general. It is noticeable[65] that his information is unusually rich in Books 3 and 4, which cover precisely those years. But it seems safe to say that the conditions

of warfare, as well as the elected prestige of the generalship, meant that it gave scope to the outstanding individual, despite Philip II's gibe (below p. 199) that he was surprised that the Athenians could find ten generals a year when he himself had only ever found one, Parmenion. Regional knowledge and inherited connections helped: it is a touch surprising, in the radical democratic Athens of Kleon, to read that Asopios son of Phormio was sent out as general on a mission round the Peloponnese after the Akarnanians in north-west Greece had asked for 'Phormio or a son or relative' (Th. 3.7. 1); evidently the electoral processes were somehow compatible with gratifying a foreign request in this way.

A campaigning general far removed from the political centre would need help in the Assembly, and as military professionalism progressed with the Peloponnesian War (see Chapter 14, p. 196), we find a divide between the careers of *strategos* and *rhetor* or politician. If the generalship represents one route by which a talented individual could circumvent the egalitarian restrictions of Athenian public life, political demagoguery was another, and it is to the so-called demagogues that we must now turn. Demagogues differed from generals in important ways: they were not constitutionally recognized; they did not in any sense represent their tribes; indeed a demagogue could be a demagogue without holding any office at all. It is tempting to speak of the 'rise of the demagogues' and of the arrival of 'new' and professional politicians after Pericles' death in 429; the temptation is there because Thucydides speaks (see above all 2. 65) in terms of qualitative political change after that date. The collaboration in 425 between the politician Kleon and the general Demosthenes (Th. 4. 29–30: Pylos) looks like a departure and a portent of the fourth-century future. There is something in this, but we should remember that there had been mid-century generals like Myronides and Tolmides who are remembered only for their military achievements.

As for the demagogues, the word began life as a neutral description, 'leader of the people', but became disparaging.[66] There was surely nothing very new[67] about these more professional-looking politicians, though they scarcely feature in the sources before Pericles' death in 429 – unless we are to call Pericles himself a demagogue, and there are good reasons for doing exactly that, as we shall see (pp. 150, 153). The nature of those sources is part of the explanation: no comic play survives in anything like complete form from earlier than the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and Thucydides for artistic reasons delays the introduction of the arch-demagogue Kleon until Pericles is off the stage for good. Yet we know that Kleon was not only a vocal opponent of Pericles' war strategy, i.e. was politically active in Pericles' lifetime (Plut. *Per.* 33), but we think he may have contracted an advantageous political marriage as early as 440.[68] This makes it hard to draw any line between old and 'new', i.e. post-Periclean, politicians in terms of social standing; similarly we now know that the later and much vilified demagogue Kleophon was the son of a man high enough up the social ladder to have served as a general (ML 21).

It is an interesting question whether these 'new politicians' represented new wealth. Aristophanes ridicules them for being tainted by commerce but this is the standard stuff of ancient invective.[69] And there is specific counter-evidence: Kleon's father Kleainetos had been a *choregos*, or financial backer of a play, back in the 460s (*Syll.*$^3$ 1068), which puts them in the wealthiest and certainly not the newest category of Athenian propertied families. On the other hand, there is a neglected passage of Thucydides which may after all suggest a link between new wealth and generational change in Athenian politics: when talking of the effects of the plague on Athenian society (430 BC) he comments that 'those who had nothing, immediately inherited their property', i.e. that of the prematurely dead (2. 53. 1). Such widespread redistribution of property must surely have affected the composition and outlook of the propertied class.

A slightly different economic argument[70] holds that old-fashioned aristocratic politics of largesse (*dapane*) was replaced in the 420s by new conditions in which oratory and professionalism were valued. We shall look in a moment at the second half of this claim, that which concerns techniques. What of the economic half of the assertion? It is simply not true that the 'politics of largesse' disappears after 429. We may if we wish discount Alcibiades' politically motivated boasts about his athletic victories as untypical.[71] But there remains the more conventional Nikias, who led a lavishly expensive sacred deputation to Apollo's island of Delos at some date after 426 (Plut. *Nik.* 3).[72] Thucydides has a lot to say about Nikias, from Books 2 right through to the end of Book 7, but it is only after Nikias has been killed after capture by the Syracusans that the historian discloses that he was very rich (7. 86. 4). Nikias' wealth, and the outlay of that wealth in showy contexts like Delos, was surely as relevant to his political career as Alcibiades' financial embarrassment (6. 15) was to his. The true answer may, however, be that there was indeed a real shift in wealth and attitudes to wealth, but that it came, not in 429 where Thucydides puts it from nostalgic attachment to Pericles, but at the turn of the century with defeat in the war and the loss of empire. It has been shown[73] that the big drop in the number of Athenians who enter four-horse chariots at the panhellenic games comes after 400, whereas there is no falling-off in the last generation of the fifth century, as the 'no largesse after 429' theory would require. After 404 the propertied classes were hit hard economically and henceforth no longer wanted to spend their money in the old way, if indeed they still had it to spend (see below, p. 209).

Nor are the political techniques of the politicians of the 420s particularly new. Kleisthenes in the sixth century had 'taken the *demos* [people] into partnership', as Herodotus put it (5. 66. 2, though this may reflect the language and political atmosphere of the Peloponnesian War – that is, the period when it was said rather than the period it was said about). Pericles himself in the 460s had won over the people with jury pay. (Thucydides never saw Pericles at his demagogic debut, or he might have felt less dismay at the look of the great man's successors.) A strange story in Plutarch (*Moralia* 806)

about Kleon, at the beginning of his career, summoning his friends, his *philoi,* and renouncing their friendship, has been taken to show that Kleon took his role as 'people's friend' more seriously than did his predecessors; but this embarrassing-sounding scene is hard to visualize. More important, it is clearly false in its implications: the ambitious decree (ML 69 = Fornara 136) which enacted the raising of the tribute in 425 was moved by Thoudippos. Thoudippos is a very rare name at Athens,[74] but its occurrence in a speech of the fourth-century orator Isaios (Oration 9), as the name of the father of another Kleon, makes it very likely that Thoudippos is the son-in-law of the famous Kleon (and that the two Kleons are related as grandfather and grandson). This makes Thoudippos a *philos* of Kleon, because the word included relatives as well as friends. So much for Kleon's abandonment of his *philoi*: on the contrary he seems on this evidence to have used his son-in-law to push through a decree he wanted taken care of.

As for oratorical technique, the ancient literary sources (*Athenaion Politeia* 28; Plut. *Nik.* 8, Quintilian 11. 3. 123)[75] say that Kleon was the first to raise his voice, slap his thighs and use theatrical gestures – as if all politicians earlier than Kleon spoke in a monotone with their arms rigidly at their sides! (See already Homer, *Iliad* 16. 125 for thigh-slapping by Achilles.) But there are anyway other anecdotes which for what they are worth trace the origins of political professionalism to dates earlier than Kleon: a Byzantine lexicon called the Suda, for instance, makes Pericles the first to take a written speech into court, while for Aristotle (Cicero *Brutus* 46) oratory developed in the 460s in Sicily, a result of the fall of the tyrants there, an event which prompted litigation about land ownership. *Something*, however, must lie behind the feeling in the literary sources that politicians like Kleon were different, and perhaps the difference should be sought in the new and larger audiences assembled on the Pnyx as a result of the evacuation of Attica in 431.[76] Faced with an audience which included Dikaiopolis, the main character in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (see lines 1ff.), farting and grumbling as he watched the Spartans put a torch to the combustible parts of Attica, a speaker might well need to invent cruder techniques. But there was crudity in Athenian politics before Kleon.

On the positive side, though, these politicians got things done, and got them done in detail.[77] The use by Kleon, then absent from Athens, of his probable son-in-law Thoudippos to move the complex reassessment decree of 425 implies efficiency and a refusal to trust to luck. (For Kleon's connection with the decree – Thoudippos is not the only evidence – see below, p. 162, and for Thoudippos and Kleon see above.) Both Kleon and the equally detested figure of Hyperbolus (detested, that is, by Thucydides and Aristophanes) look a little different and more respectable when tested against documentary evidence. For instance, there is a long, sober and sensible-looking decree about the cult of Hephaistos, moved by Hyperbolus (*IG* I$^3$ 82); ostraka show that Hyperbolus' father had the good Greek name Antiphanes (ML p. 46), which refutes ancient charges of slave origin; and serious policy issues lay

behind his ostracism.[78] Hyperbolus was a failure but not a fool. These men, like the generals, were at the mercy of the Assembly – whose composition changed with every meeting – but knowledge is power, and their skills, and factual grasp of routine information, could not be overthrown except by superior skill and superior grasp, though they were unusually vulnerable by reason of their prominence to the irrational weapon of ostracism, which destroyed Hyperbolus (Th. 8. 73). Only once does Aristophanes play on the possibility that the demagogues, for all their populist pretensions, were actually an undemocratic force: in the *Wasps* of 422 BC (lines 715ff.) '*they* [the demagogues] insincerely promise to give you, that is the people, corn doles, and even to hand over Euboia to you'. Nowhere else is an 'us–them' mentality so clearly expressed; but their technical proficiency and factual command of state business must have enabled such men to acquire great and even lasting power at the Assembly's expense, despite their need to pose as agents of the popular, that is the Assembly's, will. For Plato in a marvellous metaphor (*Republic* 488) *Demos,* the personified people, was a huge, deaf, old sea captain, drugged and overpowered by ignorant riff-raff who take over the wheel themselves – true, except for the word 'ignorant'. Ignorance was not a fault of Kleon, or Hyperbolus.

In the fourth century, Athenian democracy was curtailed in ways harder to resist than a Hyperbolus, who could simply be got rid of: the institutionalized power of the men who administered the various state funds grew in the course of the fourth century, and in the days of people such as Euboulus and after him Lycurgus,[79] Athens became a less democratic place than it had been in the fifth century.[80]

The most important fund, whose commissioner in the middle years of the fourth century was Euboulus, was the *theoric,* from which pay was given for attendance at festivals. This move towards efficiency and specialization affected most departments of the Athenian state; thus five of the ten generals have distinct functions by about 350 (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1):[81] general in charge of overseas hoplite expeditions, general appointed for the defence of Attica, general for the Piraeus, and so on. (Some degree of informal specialization is detectable even in the fifth century, see Th. 4. 104. 4 for 'the general in Thrace', who on this occasion – 424/3 BC – was the historian Thucydides himself; cf. 4. 105. 1 for his Thracian influence and interests.)[82] And we hear for the first time of permanent salaried architects. (But note that, despite what has been said in this paragraph concerning the administration of *funds,* the fact that there was less political pay in the fourth century helped to dilute the democracy.)[83]

But these fourth-century 'apparatchiks', the men of the age of Eubulus (p. 274), were not the first Athenians to gain power by boring work on committees. And this leads to the last and perhaps greatest illustration of the truth that, despite egalitarian rules and checks, elite individuals could acquire substantial and direct power in the age of Pericles, namely Pericles himself.

Pericles' position is (*almost* everywhere: see below on finance) described by Thucydides as if his authority depended solely on charismatic qualities of leadership, but this cannot have been the whole of it. We know, for instance, that he was president of the commission for the construction of the great statue of Athena by Phidias, and of that for the Lyceum (*FGrHist* 328 Philochoros F121 = Fornara 116A, and F37), that he was on the Parthenon commission (Strabo 395), and that he was responsible in some capacity for the Odeion, a music hall which occasionally doubled up as a law court (Plut. *Per.* 13.9).[84] All of that is relevant to Thucydides' description of Athens under his regime as 'ostensibly a democracy, but actually one-man rule' (2. 65. 9). Pericles, no less than Kleon, was proof that knowledge, even or especially routine knowledge, was power, and it is that which makes Pericles the greatest demagogue of them all. Only Pericles, of all the speakers in Thucydides, is allowed a speech about anything so detailed and 'unethereal' as war finance, early in Book 2 (Chapter 13), where Pericles' self-imputed capacity to 'understand what was needed and to expound it' (2. 60) is better illustrated than anywhere else in Thucydides.[85] The confidence of Pericles' exposition is magnificent; but did he after all 'understand what was needed' in the sphere of finance? The first ten years of the Peloponnesian War, to which we shall shortly turn, were to raise serious questions about the depth of that understanding.

Pericles 'the Olympian' (Plut. *Per.* 8.3, 39. 2) was unique, and even below the Olympian level the scope for talented individuals to shine was limited, though far from negligible, as we have seen when examining the possibilities for military, political and eventually financial specialization by suitably qualified members of the elite. Some members of the elite, however, did not co-operate with the democratic system, nor did they merely opt out as 'quiet Athenians' like the 'wise but silent' men of Euripides' *Ion* (lines 598–9, of perhaps 412 BC; cf. Hippolytus' speech at *Hipp.* 983–1035, 428 BC). Instead, they actively preferred oligarchy.[86]

For most wealthy Athenians, as long as the empire was a prosperous going concern there were economic advantages to 'accommodating to the democratic *status quo*', as Alcibiades is revealingly made to put it (Th. 6. 89. 4) in the course of the same speech (delivered at Sparta) in which he casually remarks on democracy as 'acknowledged folly' (6. 89. 6). It was Alcibiades' father Kleinias who in the 440s proposed a decree tightening up the tribute payment (ML 46 = Fornara 98), showing that despite the nexus empire-democracy, Athenian aristocrats were thoroughly involved in maintaining Athens as a financially exploitative empire. Why should this not be so, after all, given the opportunity for the Athenian upper classes to enrich themselves territorially inside that empire? (For the contemporary evidence, which is epigraphic, see Osborne 2000b: 122 nos 239–45; for fourth-century memories of this sort of thing see below p. 245.) Kleon's alleged sneer that a democracy is no good at ruling others (3. 37. 1) does inadequate justice to the efficacy of a system on whose (if necessary violent) maintenance all social and economic classes at Athens were agreed.

The overt trouble came when the prosperity of the empire suddenly ran out, in 413 after the disaster in Sicily, when the fleet was lost. (For this as the immediate cause of the oligarchic revolution of 411 see below p. 179f.) But even before that there are signs of an oligarchic underground. In 458/7, at the time of the battle of Tanagra, there had been people who wanted to 'put a stop to the democracy and the Long Walls' (Th. 1.107.4); and the mutilation of the herms in 415 (see below p. 175) was seen as a threat to the democracy (Th. 6. 27. 3). These, admittedly, were exceptional moments of crisis, but there were structural features of Athenian life which must have worked against democracy even in more normal times. It is for instance of great interest that Thucydides, under the year 411, describes the political clubs, the 'sworn associations' (*xynomosiai*), as having existed *even before this time* (i.e. not just in the uneasy atmosphere of 411 itself) for the winning of lawsuits and elections (8. 54. 4). Given that most 'elections' were supposedly by lot, the reference is presumably to elections for the generalship, whose outcome could on this evidence be affected by cabals and intrigue (for other evidence for open manipulation see above p. 144: the Akarnanians and Asopios son of Phormio). This, surely, is less than perfectly democratic.

One solvent in this period was the teaching of the itinerant teachers of higher education known as the sophists (below p. 196f.). It has been well argued recently that 'the sophists' should not be treated as a unitary phenomenon or a coherent philosophical movement: there were phases of sophistic activity, and the truth seems to be that 'before 430, the sophists were a positive force for Athens' democracy. Afterwards they helped to destroy it'.[87] That was certainly true of some of the pupils of Socrates (cf. Aischin. 1.73 for Socrates as a 'sophist' who taught oligarchs) in the last decade or so of the Peloponnesian War. But it is to the beginning of that war that we must now turn, when Pericles was still at the height of his powers, the plague was in the future and the empire intact, and the enemies of Athens looked not to Athenian oligarchs but to the Spartans for their 'liberation'.

# 13

# THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR[1]

### Introduction. An important war?

Eight books of Thucydides, not to mention two of Xenophon, is a lot for a war which was (by international standards) on a small scale and arguably settled very little. That judgement needs explaining. By the end of the war the Athenians were on their knees. Nobody in Athens slept the night after Aigospotamoi in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 3). As an imperial power Athens was finished – apparently – and the Spartans had the undisputed leadership of Greece. The walls of the Piraeus and (in part at least) the Long Walls were pulled down to the sound of flutes.[2] But in the decade after 404 there was a remarkable turnaround as everybody realized just what the Spartans as victors would be like and what Spartan liberation actually meant. The result was the Corinthian War (below, Chapter 15), fought against Sparta by a coalition of Athens, Persia, Boiotia, Corinth, Argos, in fact a coalition both of the Spartans' former enemies and of their former friends. In this war the Spartans were able to prevail only as a result of a change of mind by the Persian king who realized that Athenian dominance in Greece would be more dangerous to him than Spartan; that is, the King's Peace of 386 was won with Persia's help and because of Athenian revived imperialism. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3. 5. 10) has the Thebans say at Athens in 395 'everybody knows you Athenians want to get back your empire'. This is not the place to give the details of the Athenian revival, but it should be remembered how very few years it was since those flute players had celebrated the end of Athenian naval dominance. From this tangled situation emerged eventually a second Athenian Naval Confederacy in 378, exactly a hundred years after the first. The eventual political history of the Greek states was fixed not by any of the above-mentioned powers but by one which was marginal in Thucydides' time, namely Macedon. Thucydides did, however, recognize (2. 100) the importance of Macedonian resources and the achievement of King Archelaus (413–399), who in some respects prefigured Philip and Alexander.

So if the end of the Peloponnesian War was not really the end of anything, where does that leave Thucydides' theme, 'the greatest ever war and commotion' (1. 1)? The break in 400 is not (arguably) a real one; some

modern historians prefer to put the real turning-point in the 380s.[3] We think of it as a new era, partly for the unconscious psychological reason that 399 is a new century. But these are BC dates and obviously irrelevant to people's perceptions at the time: there was no new millennium or even century to celebrate. The end of the Punic wars saw Rome in control of the whole Mediterranean from east to west. 1914 really was the end of something; the map looked irretrievably different four years later, Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and above all Romanovs having been swept away and the USA drawn away permanently from its nineteenth-century isolation. Despite all the suffering, the relation of 431 to 404 was not quite like that. True, Persia (like the USA after 1918) would from now on be a factor in inter-Greek affairs, to a degree that Persia had not been after the Persians were thrown back after their failed invasion in 479. But Achaemenid Persia itself disappeared seventy years after the battle of Aegospotamoi. Meanwhile the city-states went on with their ultimately small-scale wars.

So why should we read Thucydides? Here we should perhaps be frank and admit that in terms of the effect of the Peloponnesian War, i.e. the importance of Thucydides' theme, there *is* no real justification for the extravagant and lopsided treatment which the twenty-seven years 431–404 get in modern books. We should be bold and plead the analogy of the Trojan War. It seems that if the Trojan War did happen, it was a laughably tiny-scale affair. And yet for thousands of years readers have occupied themselves with just a few days of it, simply because it was written about by Homer. Thucydides, then, in a sense created the Peloponnesian War.[4] In other words we could give a purely literary answer and stop there; Thucydides (it can be said) is worth reading less for what he writes about than for he how he wrote it.

This would not be a disgraceful conclusion by any means, but in any case we should not be too ready to swing to the other extreme from Thucydides and deny the Peloponnesian War permanent importance, though we are entitled to refuse to let Thucydides' richness and relentlessness of detail determine our own distribution of attention. Certain great historical phenomena did come to an end in 404, though Thucydides himself did not, we think, live long enough to know that they were gone for good. The Athenian empire was imitated in some ways by the Second Athenian Confederacy, but it was not repeated. Levels of tribute, and the degree of control exerted, were on a far smaller and less threatening scale. Fourth-century Athens was a democracy but as we have seen (Chapter 12, p. 152) it was not the radical democracy of Pericles, Kleon and Aristophanes; nor could democracy be exported after the 350s. This chapter, then, explores the long and exhausting process by which the Athenians and Athenian institutions were dethroned.

First, a word about the labels given to the parts of the war.[5] Thucydides saw it as a whole, but even he subdivides for clarity. From the Peloponnesian point of view it was the 'Attic War' (5. 28. 2), i.e. war against Athens. As early as the time of Lysias (early fourth century) the first ten years were called the 'Archidamian War', named after the Spartan king who warned against it.

This phase was ended by an armistice in 423 and then by the Peace of Nikias in 421. There followed six years of uneasy peace. The 'expedition to Sicily' lasted from 415 to 413, and the final and following phase of the war (which for Thucydides is just 'the war which followed' the uneasy peace of Nikias period, 5. 26. 3) was called the Ionian or Dekeleian War, because there was much fighting off the coast of Ionia in these years and because Dekeleia in Attica was fortified by the Spartans between 413 and 404 (see below pp. 175 and 209).

## Resources and intended strategy

This section will discuss resources and intended strategy; the next section will analyse the course of the war, i.e. the strategy actually followed. This is an elementary distinction often missed. For instance much valuable work has been done[6] on the question of whether the Athenians kept to or departed from the policy laid down by Pericles on the eve of the war (1. 140–4). In a sense this is justified because Thucydides himself invites us to do it (2. 65, the appraisal of Pericles), where he says that 'they', i.e. the Athenians and/or their leaders, did everything contrary to what Pericles actually advised. So modern books tend to look at the post-429 period and try to test Thucydides' obituarial statement by identifying and explaining away apparent 'departures' from so-called Periclean strategy. But Thucydides in his appraisal of Pericles implies or assumes that Periclean policy was kept to *by Pericles,* which is to say the least disputable. We should never forget that Pericles' pre-war speech is intended to encourage; it is not a set of agreed war aims and policies which Pericles mechanically implemented as long as he could. The essential *rhetorical* point is best made by taking not Pericles' speech but that of Archidamus, earlier in Thucydides Book 1 (Chapter 81). There he seems to anticipate and agree with Pericles' assessment, but in Book 2 (Chapter 11) he says the Athenians will after all come out and fight. The difference is to be explained by the different contexts. In Book 1 it would be a hopelessly morale-lowering thing to say 'I have thought all along that this invasion business would be a waste of time.'[7]

I propose to take the resources of each side first and then talk about their proposed strategies. First the Athenians and their resources, above all their strengths in money and naval power.[8] Thucydides puts into Pericles' mouth a speech of civilian exhortation comparable to and in its way as rhetorically conditioned as military speeches of exhortation – except that the occasion envisaged is relatively calm and credible whereas the many pre-battle speeches in Thucydides and other historians have been generically doubted.[9] Pericles' speech of encouragement enumerates Athenian resources on the eve of the war. Unfortunately there is controversy about one crucial figure, the total of accumulated tribute (2. 13. 3). We should retain the higher figure, that is, Athenians possessed accumulated reserves of nearly 10,000 talents not 6000. There are some obvious absences from Pericles' list, notably the silver from the Laurion mines and the financial asset represented by the trierarchies.

This private wealth was a great advantage over Sparta, though note that new readings of the inscription recording contributions to the Spartan war fund (ML 67, cf. below) show that one probable Spartan was in a position to contribute a talent; there is also a mention of a trireme, showing that the naval factor was not totally absent on the Spartan side.[10]

Let us return to Athens and move from resources to strategy. The basic Athenian aim was to hold on to the empire but even Pericles himself was equivocal about whether to actually *add* to it. In Book 1 (1. 144. 1) he advised not to add to it while actually fighting the war, but in his last recorded speech (2. 62. 2) he was more confident and encouraging of aggression.

In any case, the rest of the 'First Speech' programme contains some very absolute recommendations which were perhaps not meant to be taken quite literally, for instance, the advice to abandon Attica. Now it is true that the Athenians abandoned Attica to Spartan invasions, to the extent of evacuating their livestock to Euboia (2. 14). But the abandonment was not complete: for instance, cavalry attacks successfully harassed the invaders (2. 22. 2 and 3 1. 2).[11]

Other Athenian initiatives in the actual war (they should not be called departures from anything) will be discussed below. The basic point is the empire and the unpopularity of it with Athenian subjects. The point had already been made by Thucydides in his glance forward from 479 to later developments (1. 99, prepared for at 1. 19, where Athenian tributary methods are contrasted with Spartan control), and is very forcibly reasserted at the beginning of the war (2. 8. 5). Could the Athenians weld together Ionianism in a positive way again as in 479 (1. 95. 1, cf. p. 12 above)? I shall suggest that the Athenians did try to do just that, when I discuss the purification of Delos in 426/5.

For the moment I turn to Sparta and Spartan resources and strategy. Athens just needed to win through, *perieinai*, *perigignesthai*. (For the idea see 1. 144. 1.) But Sparta had to do more – in fact to liberate, because Thucydides (2. 8) supplies us not only with Athens' problem but with Sparta's programme, the mirror image. He strikingly says that the goodwill of the Greek world inclined towards Sparta for this reason.

But that is to anticipate our discussion of Spartan strategy. For the moment let us start with Spartan resources, because the relative inadequacy of these was the big Spartan weakness. I stress *relative* inadequacy. The Spartans by any normal standards were well off; they were poor only in comparison with Athens and the tribute and tribute reserves. (Again, see 1. 19.) But note the important reference to political control of an indirect sort.

The fleet was a problem. Of course there were the Corinthians and their ships, so if we think of Peloponnesians not just Spartans the asymmetry with Athens will appear much less. There were two things the Spartans could do (apart from avoiding naval hostilities altogether and hoping that just because of an invasion of Attica the Athenians would lose their nerve as they had done in 446. But this would be very unsatisfactory; they needed positively to

break up the empire, and this meant trying to do something by sea. Thrace and the north were the only accessible areas from the point of view of the land army, i.e. to attack these was the only feasible alternative strategy and this was indeed done in the later 420s by Brasidas.) First, they could get ships from the west. Second, they could get money from somewhere, build a fleet, and pay rowers, or else pay pirates to interfere with Athenian shipping, i.e. privateering. Somehow the money may have been found to do this (see 2. 69 for Peloponnesian piracy).

As for the first option, this was contemplated at the beginning of the war (2. 7. 2) and we cannot be quite sure that it came to nothing. Thucydides uses a past tense ('those who *had chosen* the Spartan side'), and we should recall (p. 107) the Spartan foundation of Herakleia in Lucania, not far from Taras. In any case Thucydides expressly says that the Western Greeks were asked for stated sums of money as well as ships and this leads to the second option.

As for the second, there were several possible sources of money. The most obvious was Sparta's existing allies in Greece, perhaps including the odd rich individual Spartan. An inscription (ML 67; Fornara 132) lists contributions from Sparta's friends, but unfortunately we cannot be certain of the date: the orthodox date is around 427 but a strong case has been made for 413.[12] New fragments discovered in 1989 reveal several new items of evidence: first the Chians are in exile. Second, there were some Aiginetans paying. Third a man called Molokros (not Molobros) pays a talent. But the totals are very small and underline rather than contradict the idea that Sparta was hard up. Or they could look abroad, perhaps to the west again (see above), or eastwards, to ask for money from Persia. This was certainly done (cf. 4. 50 mentioning 'many' embassies). The idea had already been anticipated in the speech Thucydides gives to Archidamus before the beginning of the war (1. 82. 1). But it hardly fitted the liberation strategy, because Persia would expect something in return, namely the abandonment of Spartan claims in Anatolia (8. 46. 3). In the end Persian money was what won the war for Sparta; they could not do it alone. Another possibility was to help themselves to the temple treasures of Greece as recommended by the Corinthians (1. 121. 3). But this was risky. While it was one thing for the Athenians to borrow from Athena, it was much more shocking for Greeks to help themselves to money from the common sanctuaries of Greece.[13]

So liberation would need plenty of initiative. We shall look below at the various initiatives actually taken both with (Knemos) and without (Herakleia in Trachis) a naval dimension. But first let us look more closely at the greatest of all Spartan assets, which outweighed or ought to have outweighed any amount of revenue, namely goodwill. The liberation programme[14] was a brilliant appeal to Greek goodwill; a related idea was the Spartan claim to be a traditional opponent of tyranny. In the archaic period, the tyrants had been individuals; now there was a tyrant city in Greece, or so Spartans and their friends could claim (1. 122. 3, in the mouth of a Corinthian speaker).[15] Indeed we can legitimately wonder whether the archaic Spartan role as political

giant-killer (1. 18. 1 for an authorial statement) was a mere retrojection from the Thucydidean period: the best attested Spartan deposition of a tyrant was at Athens itself, the expulsion of the Pisistratid Hippias. But the motive for this is likely to have been dislike of Hippias' foreign policy alignments (with the Argives and the Persians) rather than a principled objection to tyranny as such. It is true that the idea of Spartans as tyrant haters is already present in Herodotus (5. 92. 1, in the mouth of another, earlier, Corinthian), but this interesting chapter may itself be of roughly Peloponnesian War date. However all that may be, the theme of the next section will be 'liberation betrayed' or how Sparta squandered the goodwill accumulated, largely by the unimaginative brutality of individual Spartans.

## The Archidamian War

There are two stories about the Archidamian War. The first is in Thucydides; the second is not (though it has to be pieced together from little bits of evidence in Thucydides along with other evidence). The first is essentially military, the other is not. It is in fact religious or ideological. To put that another way, the first is a story about battles for territory and attempts by one side to kill people on the other side; the second is a story of a struggle for goodwill, Greek *eunoia*. The first is a more or less conventional story of technical military failures and successes, the second is a more interesting human one about betrayal. The story of the Archidamian War and indeed the whole Peloponnesian War can be seen as a story of liberation betrayed.

The first story has the Spartans more or less annually invading Attica and getting nowhere, so trying more ambitious probes, none of which succeed. Meanwhile the Athenians, despite invasions and the plague (429), do an effective asset-stripping job in the north-west, taking the Corinthians' north-western empire away from them and then moving more directly west, in the first Sicilian expedition. The Athenians also fend off attempts to break up their own empire, though at a huge financial cost because of the expense of sieges in this pre-artillery age (see below p. 202f.). The turning point of the war, on this traditional or Thucydidean view, was Pylos and Sphakteria in 425, a spectacular Athenian success which depressed Spartan morale because of the capture of 120 Spartiates, and which led to helot desertions. All this was only partially compensated for by Delium (the Boiotians defeated the Athenians in 424) and the glamorous Spartan Brasidas' successes in the north. Despite these latter two, the Spartans were only too happy to make a truce in 423 and then peace (the Peace of Nikias) in 421. That is essentially the story to be found in the modern books.

Now for the other story. It does not contradict the first; it is just an equally valid but fundamentally different way of looking at the same decade. On this view Athens has one big material asset or pair of assets, capital plus empire; Sparta has one big moral asset, the goodwill resulting from the generally felt dislike of the Athenian empire. This moral factor (to quote Napoleon) is to

the material factor as three to one. So both sides need to stick their respective alliances down by means of sentimental or religious glue. The available religious categories are Dorianism and Ionianism,[16] and the story of the Peloponnesian War is a continuation of a struggle fought throughout the Pentekontaetia at a level different from, if not higher than, that of conventional warfare.

Let us first elaborate the conventional story. Our discussion of the origins of the war (Chapter 9) was mostly about Corinth, but Sparta had other powerful allies too. Above all there was Thebes. In view of the parallels between Potidaia (where the Corinthians try to involve the Spartans in a private war) and Plataia (where the Thebans do the same), it is a little arbitrary of Thucydides to put the one episode (Potidaea) in Book 1 as part of the prelude to the war and the other (Plataia) in Book 2 as part of the war proper.[17] The Theban attack on Athens' ally Plataia, its subsequent siege, and eventual capitulation and fate, fill much of Thucydides Books 2 and 3. The Spartans took a hand in the final stages of Plataia. They sent five 'judges' (*dikastai*) who simply asked the Plataians whether they had 'rendered any good service to the Spartans and their allies in the war'. Elaborate speeches followed from Plataians and Thebans; the Spartans then merely repeated their question and killed the Plataians, one by one, when they answered 'no' (3. 52. 4; 53. 2; 68. 1).

The Spartan invasion of Attica, which begins early in Book 2 (2. 10ff.), set the tone of the first half of the Archidamian War. The Athenians moved their flocks across to Euboia (above), and this raised Euboia's economic importance still further. As if in recognition that this was a war brought about at the prodding of Corinth, much early Athenian activity was devoted to stripping Corinth of assets in the north-west – Sollion, Astacus, Kephallenia. But there was also an Athenian raid on Methone in Messenia, foiled by Brasidas, an Athenian raid on the Megarid, repeated twice a year (4. 66. 1), and some diplomacy in the north where the Odrysian Thracians were won over. In 430, Athenian energy was blunted by the plague. Peloponnesian pressure on Plataia increased in 429; also this year there was a Spartan initiative, a large expedition in the north-west under Knemos (2. 80).

It was not until 428 that the Spartans got an opportunity to start the liberation programme, with the revolt from Athens of Mytilene on Lesbos. Mytilene was harshly dealt with, but not as harshly as Kleon would have liked. Juxtaposed with this we have the fall of Plataia (above).

The Athenians speculatively pursued their western interests in 427–425 (3. 86ff. and 115, also 4. 65). Twenty ships were sent under Laches and Charoeades, then forty more under Sophocles and Eurymedon. The total (sixty) is notable; its significance will become clear later (below, p. 173). After a conference at Gela in 424, the Sicilians put aside their differences (4. 58–64). Nikias tried to take Megara in 427 and, more ominously, the small Cycladic island of Melos (3. 91). (Dorian Melos had been neutral at the beginning of the war: 2. 9. 4. For the more famous later Athenian attack see below p. 168) The motive for attacking the Melians now was nakedly expansionist, to round off the naval empire irrespective of ethnic origin or

neutrality of the victims; but there is a possibility that Melos had offered some provocation by contributing financial help to the Spartans at about this time (ML 67, depending when we date it, see above). In any case the Athenians thereafter regarded Melos as tributary (ML 69 = Fornara 136 of 425, an optimistic assessment).

After their Mytilene failure the Spartans needed to go north to attack the Athenian empire. Also they wanted to stop the Athenians using their food store on Euboia. So they founded Herakleia in Trachis. At least those are the motives Thucydides gives (3. 92–3; but see below). Demosthenes[18] carried out land operations in the north-west in these rather chopped-up final sections of Book 3. A chapter (104) on Delos provides some narrative relief from the fighting.

The decisive year of war was 425, the year of Pylos and Sphakteria (4. 1–42). Demosthenes, who had done well in the north-west after some reverses, got permission to use the fleet as he liked. So he occupied Pylos, a promontory at the north end of the bay of Navarino, and fortified it. The Spartans foolishly landed a hoplite force on Sphakteria, a long island to the south of Pylos. They were captured by Kleon. The Spartans sued for peace but Kleon persuaded the Athenians to turn the offer down. Kleon, having thus declined the diplomatic solution, was committed to the military one, and against expectations he brought back 120 Spartiates as prisoners.

This produced great buoyancy, two identifiable manifestations of which are unreasonable anger at the generals who had been commanding (4. 65) and the Kleon-inspired Tribute Reassessment of 425 (p. 151). Thucydides does not mention the second of these, perhaps because it was over-optimistic and had no great effect.[19] The Athenians now moved against Kythera and made it tributary (4 talents, a cheeky thing to do, given that Kythera was so close to Sparta, with some claim to be a Spartan colony),[20] and then against Megara (4. 66).

Everything so far had gone Athens' way, but now the balance began to tip in favour of Sparta. Brasidas, on his way north, saved Megara by a whisker. The strategy of the Delium campaign (an attempt by Athens to return to the mid-century position by re-annexing Boiotia) collapsed with an Athenian defeat at the hands of a Boiotian army which was persuaded to fight by Pagondas, one of the two Theban Boiotarchs. In the north Brasidas, by force or rhetoric, won or won over Akanthos, Amphipolis and Torone. A year's truce followed in 423 (4.118. 5 seems to say that it was extended beyond the year). About now, Skione went over to Brasidas. His reception there was ecstatic, the inhabitants receiving him (4. 121. 1) 'like an athlete'. The Athenians claimed (122) that Skione was taken two days after the 423 truce and Thucydides, with (para.6) an uncharacteristic adjudication between rival versions, endorses this. The point is of some interest in view of the subsequent fate of Skione (below, p. 165) and the way its treatment was remembered against Athens. The Athenians then passed a savage decree on the motion of Kleon to capture Skione and slaughter the inhabitants (also 4. 122. 6). Fighting between the

Peloponnesians and Athenians continued in the north, though the armistice seems to have been effective elsewhere. The deaths of Kleon and Brasidas at Amphipolis, which was the most serious of the territorial losses which the Athenians were now trying to make good, removed two main obstacles to permanent peace. The Peace of Nikias was made in 421.

That is the conventional story. Now it is time for the other. The background is truly archaic.[21] Tyrants like Kleisthenes of Sikyon had interested themselves in the panhellenic games, and the Alkmaionids rebuilt the temple of Delphi (Hdt. 5. 62). The 'athlete' comparison just mentioned is a good starting point, because athletic success was crucially linked to success of other kinds. This certainly seems true in the First Peloponnesian War of 461–446. We have seen (pp. 27ff.) that that war contained a level of conflict unmentioned by Thucydides, namely conflict between Corinth and Argos for control of the Nemean Games, and that there is a parallel struggle between Athens and Sparta in that period for control of or influence at Delphi. The only times the Spartans really exerted themselves in the First Peloponnesian War were over Delphi (Tanagra; the Second Sacred War). All this should be remembered when we consider the motives for the Spartan foundation of Herakleia in Trachis in 426 (3. 92), because the identical phrase is used there as in the run-up to Tanagra (1. 107), 'they were appealed to by Doris, their own metropolis' (i.e. founding city). It is plausible to suppose that there was an amphiktionic aspect to the founding of Herakleia in 426. And in fact there is evidence from the fourth century, when the relevant Delphic lists begin, that Herakleia did indeed have an amphiktionic vote, one of two Malian votes. Surely an additional and powerful Spartan motive for the founding of Herakleia was their desire to increase their influence in the amphiktiony.[22] This does not cancel; rather it supplements the motives given by Thucydides, namely that Herakleia would be useful for an attack on Euboia and for the passage to Thrace.

This theme, influence at a panhellenic sanctuary, is old indeed. A newer theme, or one which became fully active and political only after 478, is the theme of Dorianism versus Ionianism. This is a propaganda theme linked to another essentially fifth-century Athenian claim, the claim to be autochthonous or indigenous (see above Chapter 12, p. 132f.). Much of Athenian fifth-century imperial propaganda is aimed at cementing Ionianism, hence the stress on Delos, though note that this simultaneously had some attraction for the Dorian islanders in the Athenian empire like the Rhodians.

We can now return to the position at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Olympia at least was strongly Dorian, hence the Mytilene appeal of 428 was staged significantly at Olympia (3. 9ff.). And Delphi, or at least the oracle there (1. 118), had come down squarely on Sparta's side. The great Spartan drive to capitalize on *eunoia* took a religious form fairly soon. The foundation of Herakleia in 426 was partly (see above and p. 28) designed to give the Spartans another vote in the amphiktiony, and the Delphic oracle certainly supported the project. Equally significant is the strongly Dorian

flavour. Note the explicit support for Sparta's 'mother-city' Doris (both Th. 3. 92. 3 and Diod. 12. 59. 4) and the link with Herakles ('because Herakles their ancestor, in ancient times had made his home in Trachis', Diod.12. 59. 4, not in Th.), a link reflected in the name Herakleia. It is also interesting and relevant that one of the oikists was called Alkidas, an alternative name for Herakles.[23] Thucydides characteristically does not make the connection, though we owe to him our knowledge of the fact of Alkidas' appointment. About this time there occurred an event of considerable importance in the formation of Spartan foreign policy, the return from exile of king Pleistoanax, who favoured peace (possibly summer 426. For the fact see 5. 16, see below p. 165.)

In reply to Herakleia the Athenians purified Delos (3. 104, winter 426/5) and re-established the festival held there, the markedly Ionian festival called the Delia (for the Ionian aspect cf. 3. 104. 3).[24] The purification of Delos had various motives. The immediate motives were twofold: it was purification for the plague (Diod. 12. 58. 6), and it was a reply to Dorian Herakleia. There are other background reasons: the purification asserted continuity with the splendid expansionist foreign policy of the Pisistratid tyrants (Th. 3. 104. 1); and it evoked a great Athenian hero Theseus, who was connected with the original Delian festival (Plut. *Thes.* 21). But we are entitled to stress the Ionian aspect in particular; note that Ionian kinship is specifically mentioned at just this time as part of the motive for the first expedition to Sicily (3. 86).

Let us go back to Sparta. The Spartans are trying to undermine the Ionian tyrant city by liberating Greece (3. 32. 2) and by playing the ultra-Dorian card (3. 92). But look what happens both times. The story of the Spartan failure in the Peloponnesian War is the story of what people found Spartans to be like in reality. The simple and significantly reiterated expression is that Spartans behave badly, *ou kalos.* It is first said by some other horrified Greeks about Alkidas' cruel and offensive attempts at liberation (3. 32), then twice more about the offensive way the Spartan governors were regarded as behaving at Herakleia, behaviour which wrecked the colony after a promising start (3. 93, Alkidas again, among others, runs the place harshly and *ou kalos*; and 5. 52, more Spartans behaved *ou kalos* at Herakleia; see above p. 120). Add their narrowly Spartan conception at Plataia, epitomized by the brief question put to the Plataians (see above p. 161). Note that we find this criterion applied by Agesilaus in the fourth century on two notable occasions: Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 32, 5. 4. 32; see below pp. 239 and 241, cf. 224, for the episodes of Phoibidas and Sphodrias. It was only when a plausible liberator like Brasidas turned up that Sparta begin to look at all attractive, and Thucydides clearly indicates (4.81) that hopes that others would resemble him were fallacious in the event. Or rather for the most part. Thucydides is never predictable or crude, and his treatment of the energetic Spartan Salaithos, who did his lone and audacious best (contrast Alkidas) to liberate Mytilene, is admiring (3. 25).

On this view 425 and the loss of the Spartiates is an unreal hinge;[25] the real trouble was that the Spartans had already been found wanting by the

Greeks who looked to them so eagerly at the beginning of the war. Pylos was in fact just an excuse. The Spartans had lost the struggle for the goodwill of Greece. But even this is not the whole story. Thucydides himself, despite his very full coverage of Pylos and his stress on the urgency of the Spartan desire to get back the Pylos prisoners (5. 15. 1), shows delayed and perhaps uneasy awareness that there were other and equally specific explanations for the Spartan wish to quit the war. At a very late narrative point, in fact in the context of the final peace negotiations, he mentions two such considerations. Both of them had in fact been operative for several years past, though he had not mentioned either of them before. First, King Pleistoanax had returned from exile five years earlier and wanted peace (above p. 164). Second, the Thirty Years' Peace of 451 between the Spartans and Argives was on the point of expiry, and the Spartans did not want two wars on their hands (5. 14. 4). Thucydides calls it the 'Thirty Years Peace' between the two states although (as we have seen, p. 81) this is in fact his first reference to it. We surely have to assume that the imminent expiry of this peace had been in some Spartan minds well before 421.

### The Peace of Nikias; Mantineia campaign; Melos; Persia and Amorges[26]

The years from 421 to 415 were years of unstable peace ('the suspicious truce' as Thucydides calls it, 5. 26. 3). Both sides were exhausted. For the atmosphere of jubilation at the prospect of peace, see Aristophanes' *Peace,* produced at the City Dionysia in 421 BC. The ratification of the peace on the twenty-fifth day of the Athenian month Elaphebolion (spring, roughly March) was less than a fortnight after the end of the festival. Peace was to last for fifty years; if it had run its course it would have expired in the year of the battle of Leuktra (371). Essentially each side was to give back its gains, except that Plataia was to stay Theban on the grounds that it had not been acquired by force (cf. 3. 52. 2), and similarly Megara's harbour Nisaia was to stay Athenian (17.2). The main terms (5. 18) were that Amphipolis and the fort of Panakton (on the Athenian–Boiotian border) were to be returned to Athens. Actually Athens got neither back – one reason for tension. Skione was left for the Athenians to do what they liked with; this was innocent sounding but actually deadly. It will be recalled that Brasidas had been welcomed there as a liberator, and that the Athenians voted savage reprisals. Now (5. 32) we get the sequel: the decree was carried out. Thucydides reports this curtly; there is no Skione Debate or Dialogue (contrast his handling of the decisions about Mytilene or Melos). But it was remembered against the Athenians (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 3). It might with equal justice have been remembered against the Spartans, who coolly abandoned a city which their liberation propaganda had seduced.

The main point of the Peace of Nikias is that the Athenian empire was intact. In other words the Spartans had in the most obvious sense lost the Archidamian War. The Spartans for their part got very little; they got

a breather and they recovered their men from 'the island', i.e. Sphakteria (5. 24; the Athenians later regretted this, 35. 4). The result was that the Spartans' reputation fell and they were held in general contempt because of their reverses (5. 28. 2). The final clause allowed for renegotiation, between Sparta and Athens, of points which might subsequently seem unsatisfactory (5. 18. 11); the limitation to the two powers caused great offence among Sparta's allies (5. 29. 2). It confirmed the suspicions of a sell-out first voiced (if Thucydides can be trusted) in 425 at the time of Pylos (4. 20. 4), and echoed in Aristophanes' *Peace* (line 1082). But it is possible that the offending clause of the Peace of 421 was just sloppy drafting.

Even before the signing of the treaty, the Peloponnesian allies were displeased (17. 2), and their open hostility (22) made the Spartans reinsure themselves by an actual alliance with Athens as well as a mere peace (23–4). We would like to know more about the political position at Athens which made this possible so soon after a decade of war. A key element, in Athens as in Sparta (above), was the expiry of the thirty-year Argive peace treaty with Sparta. Which way would the Argives jump?

What follows in Thucydides is an elaborate piece of detailed diplomatic history in which the Corinthians initially dominate the narrative but then slip right out of sight. Thucydides needs to get us to the Mantineia campaign of 418 in which the Spartans smashingly reasserted their power and military strength to all the doubters in Greece (5. 75).

There were two phases. In the first, the Corinthians apparently act against the Spartans; in the second they act in a pro-Spartan way. The Corinthians first try to get an anti-Spartan coalition going. Their motive is said by Thucydides (5. 30. 2, in an echo of 1. 23, the famous expression of the true and openly declared causes of the whole war) to be ostensibly the desire to do the right thing by Corinthian allies in Thrace but actually resentment that they had not got back Sollion and Anaktorion, among other unspecified grievances. Bringing in the Argives was easy enough at first; they had long-standing and romantic wishes to 'rule the Peloponnese' (Th. 5. 28. 2, with the fuller Diod. 12. 75; see above, p. 83). Arkadian Mantineia also came in (29). The Mantineians had grievances against the Tegeans which had recently reignited (cf. 4. 134 where they actually come to blows) and they hoped to do down the usually pro-Spartan Tegeans by bringing in the bigger powers. Similarly the Eleans came in because of grievances against neighbouring Lepreon (5. 31), whose side Sparta had taken. But then things began to unravel for this new coalition. The Tegeans not surprisingly refused to join. The Corinthians panicked (32. 4, no more *philonikia*, aggressive enthusiasm). The Boiotians and Megarians (31. 6) may not have been happy with the way Sparta had behaved but they thought Spartan oligarchy more congenial than Argive democracy. So they sat on their hands for the moment. The Corinthians' attempts to bring them in got nowhere (32).

A new year now began at Sparta (36. 1: October) and with it a new situation, Kleoboulos and Xenares, the new ephors, were opposed to the Peace of Nikias.

It now becomes plausible for the Corinthians – the majority of whom really wanted not to do the Spartans down in any serious way but to goad them back into war – to try to apply pressure by the opposite tactic to the hostile one hitherto pursued. That is, the new ploy is to try to bring over powerful allies on to the Spartan side, presumably in the hope of thus influencing the Spartans away from their Athenian alignment.[27] The Corinthians and some others, including the Boiotarchs themselves, tried to interest the Boiotians in this but because of problems about federal communications the idea was turned down (38): the Boiotian decision-making councils (above Chapter 8, p. 106) did not relish the idea of intriguing with a state in open disaffection from the Spartans (38. 3). We should note that this shows that the Spartans were still held in awe.

The Argives in their turn now became worried; they feared they would be 'left alone' (40. 1). (Fear of such isolation is rather a theme of these suspicious diplomatic to-ings and fro-ings). So they turned to Sparta (40). But at Athens there was general outrage at the razing of the fort at Panakton (42), which was supposed to have been returned to them. The Spartans tried to brazen it out at Athens by saying that at least the place was no longer actually hostile to Athens because it was destroyed. Alcibiades, who now appears for first time in Thucydides' *History* (43), persuaded the Argives to tear up their agreement with Sparta. There followed the quadruple alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantineia and Elis (47, cf. *IG* $1^3$ 83). The Spartans were excluded by the Eleans from the Olympic Games of 420 because they had not paid a sacred fine (49–50). Despite general fear of an armed Spartan intervention, the games passed off without incident; cf. p. 27 above. It is usually thought that the Spartans remained excluded from the Olympic Games for the next twenty years until their successful war of revenge against Elis in about 400 BC (p. 228). But no ancient source says this explicitly, and the idea is most unlikely: if the most powerful state in Greece was really excluded for such a long period from the most prestigious event in the religious calendar, we should surely have heard about it. It is better to assume that the Spartans found a face-saving way of paying up.[28]

It was now high time they re-established their prestige (57) and so they marched in full strength against Argos. Their splendid army (60. 3) was not allowed to engage with the Argives. An interesting chapter follows: the Spartans keep discipline though they were cross; the Argives stone their commander Thrasylos who had to flee to an altar for refuge. Surely we are meant to draw a comparison to the Argive disadvantage. The culmination was the Mantineia campaign, a triumph for the Spartan agoge. Thucydides found it difficult to ascertain Spartan numbers (68) and it seems that he got them wrong by a whole *level* and that his totals should be doubled. The Spartans and Argives now made peace and an alliance. At Argos (76) there was a switch to oligarchy (cf. Th. 1. 19). Perdikkas of Macedon, himself supposedly of Argive descent, contemplated following suit (5. 80, an interesting statement of the kinship motive, as we have seen, p. 84 and n. 12). But almost immediately

the Argives (82) overthrew their oligarchic government, and returned to the Athenian side.

That is the end of this packed episode. The main message (75) is that Sparta was still militarily supreme. Thucydides may intend the further message that Corinthian troublemaking was all ineffective malicious bluster.

The Athenians now attacked and reduced Melos. They had already tried once (3. 91, cf. above p. 161). Thucydides makes clear the allied involvement in the suppression of Melos (84. 1). There is an important point here: the Athenians kept their empire in being partly by playing Aeolians against Ionians (hence Aeolian Mytilene helped to suppress Ionian Samos' revolt in 440) and now the Aeolians and Ionians were used against Dorian Melos.

The juxtaposition with Sicily is striking – aggression against a small island followed by failure against a large and powerful one – but the chronological closeness was hardly Thucydides' invention. In fact the writing was on the wall for Athens not because of the hubris which Melos represented but very possibly through another involvement altogether, far away in Karia. The Persians were brought into the war in the end because of Athenian support for the rebel Amorges and possibly his natural father Pissouthnes. Some time after 423 the satrap Pissouthnes revolted (cf. ML 70 for the renewal of the peace of Kallias, ruling out a date for the Athenian break with Persia much earlier than 423). At some point Lykon the Athenian actually helped Pissouthnes with mercenaries (Ktesias *FGrHist* F15 para. 53). By 413 the Athenians were certainly deeply compromised with Amorges. (Th. 8. 5. 5 and 8. 28. Possibly ML 77 = Fornara 144 is also evidence, payment to a general at Ephesus.) Thucydides keeps us in the dark about all this before his Book 8 opens in 413 (and Lykian evidence has recently been interpreted as indicating that Amorges' career began fifteen years earlier than Thucydides implies, and that he is attested as fighting *against* the Athenians back in 428); but it was a development which would ultimately settle the entire war (see further below p. 180).[29]

## Athens and the west, especially 415–413

The *Peace* of Aristophanes is, as we have seen, good evidence for the atmosphere in 421 shortly before the signing of the Peace of Nikias. His *Birds* of March 414 attests a different sort of euphoria. Note the name of one of the central characters in the play, Euelpides, 'Mr Optimism'; the word recurs adjectivally in an important chapter of Thucydides, that which describes the hopes of various categories of Athenian (6. 24. 3).

*Birds* is a fantasy and the Sicilian expedition or disaster was cruel fact. But there *is* a whiff of fantasy about Thucydides' opening statement that, first, 'the Athenians were ignorant of the size of the island' (6. 1. 1). This was factually false (there had after all been a biggish Athenian expedition to Sicily as recently as 426, see above) but it is interesting because it ranges Sicily with other fantasy islands.[30] Islands were commonly the locations of

utopias and writings about marvels (so-called 'paradoxography'): examples are Scherie in the *Odyssey* (Book 6), and Pindar's Island of the Blest (Pindar, *Olympian 2.* 70–1). Both of these were located in the west; Homer does not actually specify that Scherie was an island, but the classical inhabitants of Kerkyra (Corfu) identified their island as the Homeric Scherie (Th. 1. 25. 4; 3. 70. 4). In the *Odyssey* (20. 383) one of the suitors suggests flinging the unknown vagabond, really Odysseus, on to a benched ship and sending him *to the Sicels.* This means 'into slavery' but it is also a way of saying 'barbarian bogey-men over the seas'.[31] See above, pp. 37–42, and esp. 328 n. 73.

It was the west generally – not just Sicily but Italy, especially South Italy – which drew the Greek imagination. Sophocles, in fragmentary plays, interested himself in the Venetic region of north Italy (the main relevant play known to us was the mostly lost *Antenoridai*),[32] and in that aspect of the Minos legend which brought the king to Sicily in search of the absconded craftsman Daidalos (cf. the fragmentary *Kamikoi,* possibly a satyr play but conceivably a proper tragedy); when Minos was killed his followers were supposed to have moved to Iapygia (Messapia) in the hinterland of Taras (Hdt. 7. 170).[33] Even prosaic Thucydides says (4. 24) that the straits of Messina, between Italy and Sicily, were where Charybdis was supposed to have been. Sicily and the west were a land of cockaigne. The Athenians do seem to have unreal ideas about what they could expect; even in the chapter about hopes (6. 24, cf. above), where the ordinary throng and the soldiers are said to want a never ending supply of *misthos,* pay, Thucydides also says that the men in their prime of life had a *pothos* for the unknown. The word *pothos,* a longing for what is absent, is used by Pindar for the desire felt by the Argonauts for their ship the Argo, i.e. the romantic voyage ahead of them (*Pythian* 4. 184), and it would be used again by the Alexander historians as a word for Alexander's longing for the unknown.[34] We may compare Nikias' remarkable complaint that the Athenians 'had a disastrous passion for the absent', a poetically charged expression (6. 13; for *duserotas* as a word for unlucky love cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 193. The word was specially appropriate to the god Pan.)[35] In addition to hopes and longings for the unknown there was fear, maybe irrational, of the unknown as well; it was not just a question of Athenians going west but of fear that Sicilians might come east. (See 6. 6. 2, reported speech of the Egestaians, also 10. 1 and 18. 1, speeches of Nikias and Alcibiades, cf. the Syracusan Athenagoras at 36.4.)[36] Dionysius I of Syracuse (below, p. 224) occasionally did just that. See also below pp. 179, 182 for Sicilian (Syracusan and Selinuntine) naval help to the Peloponnesians as early as summer 412.

The booty factor, however (to come down to earth), is where we should start. This was one of the things Athenians had always wanted from the west. Another was the 'abundant [shipbuilding] timber of Italy' which is given by Alcibiades as one of the Athenians' motives for the expedition (6. 90. 3); this gets some confirmation from an Athenian inscription mentioning timber from Thurii *(IG* I[3] 387 lines 100–1). Note also that timber stored by the Athenians at Kaulonia in Italy was burnt by the enemy (7. 25. 2). Lokri,

not far from Kaulonia, was important to Athens partly for its proximity to the timber-rich Sila forests. Lokri itself may have provided pitch, valuable for shipbuilding: pitch is mentioned in the hellenistic dossier of inscriptions known as the 'Lokri tables'.[37]

And there is also desire for grain, perhaps. But militarily this was a disadvantage, because provisioning was a worry which the enemy would not have (cf. Nikias at 6. 20. 4: the Syracusans have plenty of grain of their own and do not need to export it). Similarly the fact that the Athenians did not control their own timber supplies meant trouble at the end: the fleet was badly waterlogged and timbers rotted, and could not be replaced (7. 12. 3, letter of Nikias to the authorities at Athens).

But in prospect in 415 there were plenty of tempting commodities like grain and timber to be had. But was it all realistic? Nikias thought not. The debate at the beginning of Thucydides Book 6 (Nikias, Alcibiades, Nikias again) is not just young vs. old, positive and dynamic versus pacifism. It is quite wrong in fact to regard Nikias as advocating a pacifist line. What Nikias wanted was war but in a closer and more manageable and logical theatre, Thrace and Chalkidike (6.10. 5, cf. 5. 83.4 for just such a northern operation by Nikias, projected but apparently abandoned).

Was it diplomatically realistic? That is, could the Athenians rely on friends when they got over there? Much, contrary to Thucydides' narrative at the points where we would expect it, *had* been done. And here we need to stress the Italian as well as the Sicilian factor. Note in particular the appeal of the Syracusan envoys to the Italians in winter 415/4 'not to ignore what the Athenians were doing, because the Athenians were plotting against them too' (6. 88. 7; cf. the speech of the Syracusan Hermokrates at 6. 34. 1 and 4).

The friends and allies of each side are worth listing. On the Spartan side were Taras (Tarentum; see 6. 34.4 and 44. 2) and the recently founded Herakleia in Lucania nearby (for the foundation see *FGrHist* 555 Antiochus Fll and p. 43 above). Then there was Lokri, usually aligned with Syracuse (6. 44. 2 again; the Lokrians' tentative pro-Athenian stance of 5. 5. 2, brought about by the Athenian Phaiax somewhat earlier than 422, was highly uncharacteristic and must have lapsed by 415). That the Lokrians and Syracusans should both lean towards Sparta is natural; we may recall the story that the Dioskouroi were 'lent' by Sparta and helped Lokri to defeat Kroton at the battle of the Sagra River in the sixth century (above, p. 47). To these Italian friends of Sparta should be added, in Sicily, those who 'had chosen' the Spartan side (2. 7. 2) before the outbreak of war in 431.

Let us now consider Athens' western friends. In Italy, Greek cities and powers on the Athenian side included Rhegium (ML 63 = Fornara 124), Metapontion (Th. 7. 33. 5, a curiously delayed item, and 57. 11), and Thurii (7. 35 and 57. 11). Further north, there are the Greeks of Campania (the Naples region). Athenian interest in this very desirable region goes back to the 440s or 430s, when Diotimos son of Strombichos visited Naples and instituted a torch race (*FGrHist* 566 Timaios F98; cf. Th. 1. 45 showing

that this man held another western command a few years later: he was one of the leaders of the Athenian squadron sent to Kerkyra in 433). Strabo (246), briefly but believably, attests a more solid Athenian presence at Naples, an actual contingent of settlers, perhaps sent out somewhat earlier than Diotimos' visit.[38] During the Sicilian expedition the Campanians sent cavalry to help the Athenians (Diod. 13. 44. 1–2, not in Thucydides). We shall come back to the military importance of this cavalry aspect. For the moment we should note as so often the importance of the kinship factor: Sicilian cities like Naxos and Leontini, founded by Chalkis in Euboia, remained close to their Chalkidic kin among the Campanian Greeks, who had also settled from Euboian Chalkis back in the eighth century, and it is a plausible guess that it was these Sicilian Chalkidians who helped to bring the Campanian cavalry to help the Athenians.[39]

But Athens also had non-Greek friends in Italy such as Artas the Messapian ruler, discussed in an earlier chapter (p. 46 above) where we noticed the background of tension between the Tarentines and their Messapian neighbours. So Athenian cultivation of Artas was a good way to bring pressure against Taras. In central Italy, the Etruscans sent help to the Athenians (cf. 6. 103 for three pentekontors from Etruria, and 7. 53–4 for their usefulness in the actual fighting at a late stage in the expedition; see also 7. 57. 11). The Athenians also had contacts with Carthage (6. 88. 6; and cf. the fragmentary inscription ML 92 = Fornara 165, from 406 BC).

In Sicily the Athenians' initial friends included: Leontini (ML 64 = Fornara 125); Kamarina (Th. 6. 75. 3; as we have seen, Kamarina had in the middle of the fifth century reorganized its citizen body on what look like Kleisthenic Athenian lines);[40] Katana (Th. 7. 57. 11 and Justin 4. 3. 4); and finally, most importantly, and most controversially, Egesta, far over in the west of the island (pp. 54–6). The epigraphic evidence is ML 37, an inscription whose date is disputed. The traditional date is 458/7 but it is now thought by many to date from 418 (above p. 14f.). On the new late dating, it is surprising, but not an insuperable difficulty, that Thucydides – the obvious place would have been 6. 6. 2 – does not refer to this alliance if it was really so recent. But there is no doubt that an alliance was eventually made between the Athenians and the Egestaians (6. 10. 5 and 18.1),[41] or that it was the Egestaians who lured the Athenians over to Sicily with delusive promises of big financial backing (6. 6. 2, 8. 1, 46 and 47). In Sicily itself, as in Messapia, the Athenians were willing to play the barbarian card (7.1.4 for Archonides the Sikel king, 'a powerful friend of the Athenians').

The Athenians, then, had a formidable line-up of alliances in both Italy and Sicily. But what actually happened when the Athenians got to South Italy? We may here anticipate and flash forward a little to the fleet's arrival (6. 44): their supposed friends the Rhegines refuse to admit them to their city. And generally the Athenians had a serious problem about the neutrality of the Sicilian and South Italian cities; the wealthy and powerful Sicilian city of Akragas was the most notable of these (7. 33. 2, 58. 1).[42] We must always

make allowances for unattested changes of political regime, pro-Athenians ousted from power by anti-Athenians, or just one set of Rhegines out-voting on this occasion their previously successful opponents, some of whom may in fact have contributed financially to the Athenian cause in 415 (below n. 49). It is also possible that Thucydides, wishing to heighten the drama with a narrative of high hopes rapidly dashed, has slightly exaggerated the coolness of the welcome extended to the Athenian invasion fleet (again, see below n. 49, on attitudes at S. Italian Metapontion). But in Rhegium's case the reason for the arctic reception of the Athenians may be that they were simply intimidated by the scale of their armament as it appeared over the horizon. It was all very well to make alliances with Athens but this looked alarmingly like a conquering fleet; Hermocrates had warned of this at Gela in 424: the Athenians may come again 'with a larger force one day' (4. 60. 2). Whatever their reasons, the people of Rhegium in 415 got nervous, and said they would follow whatever seemed good to the other Italians. (This is possibly a very early hint of the Italiote league which is a feature of the history of the region in the fourth century.)[43]

The size of the Athenian force brings us back to the question, how plausible was the whole idea, given Athens' resources? Idea of what, should be the first question. Conquering the whole island was the retrospectively stated motive for the earlier expedition in the mid-420s (4. 65); at least it was the reason why the Athenians punished Sophocles and Eurymedon. We hear of similarly ambitious plans in 415 (6. 1. 1 and 6. 1, 'subduing Sicily', 'bringing the whole of it into the empire'). That was the 'truest cause' of the 415 expedition (6. 6. 1, echoing 1. 23. 6 where the same phrase was used about the whole war). Ostensibly the plan in 415 was to help Egesta against Selinus, and to re-establish the people of Leontini, driven out by Syracuse; but note Thucydides' vague and potentially more sweeping addition – taken from the actual decree – about 'settling things in Sicily in whatever way seemed to them to be best for Athens' (6. 8. 2). Again Nikias at one point speaks of 'attacking Selinus, the main objective against which we were sent', but in his later letter home to Athens he refers to 'Syracuse, against which we were sent' – similar phrase, different objective (6. 47. 1; 7. 11. 2). There is some ambiguity in all this, and it has been suggested[44] that the more limited set of objectives was correct and that Thucydides came to see that his 'truest cause' had been mistaken. This may well be right, but one can see how the elasticity of language like 'settling things best for Athens' could have led to a real lack of clarity at the time, not just an uncertainty or alteration in the mind of Thucydides. There can thus be no single answer to the question, could the expedition have succeeded? The more limited aims set out above were perhaps viable, the bigger aim was not, mainly for the reason attributed to Nikias (6. 11. 1): Sicily was just too far off and too populous for direct rule, however much money the Athenians threw at it.[45]

Financially, the Athenian situation is hard to evaluate. Nikias (6. 12. 1) implies there had been recovery in both money and manpower in recent years,

but his speech is not offered as that of a very *wise* warner.[46] Corroboration has been looked for[47] in an Athenian inscription (ML 78 = Fornara 146) which may relate to the initial round of decisions about Sicily, and attest a remarkable 3000 talents 'set aside' for the expedition. But other interpretations are possible.[48] The Egestaians promised money, but Thucydides signals very early on that these promises were empty (6. 8. 2, see below). Thereafter Thucydides is not very helpful about financial detail; the visually brilliant departure of the fleet (6. 31. 1) is described in superlatives and impressive language (see below), but a few more figures would have helped; all we get is for instance (para. 3) 'great expenditure by the trierarchs and the city', in that order, and the statement (para. 5) that if anyone reckoned up all the expenditure 'a great number of talents would be found to have been taken out of the city'. But the whole Sicilian expedition does not consist of this vague sort of description. More solid are the statements about expenditure subsequent to the initial departure of the expedition: the Athenians get 30 talents of silver from home in summer 414 and another 120 are brought by Eurymedon the following winter (6. 94. 4 and 7. 16). And by summer 413, after the sending of reinforcements to Sicily, and as a result of Spartan activity in Attica (see below for the fortification of Dekeleia), the Athenians were in so bad a way financially that they had to send 1300 Thracian light-armed troops home because they could not afford them (7. 27. 1). But generally there is simply not enough financial information to allow us to cost the expedition at any stage. For instance, an important inscription (*IG* i[3] 291) lists financial contributions to the Athenians by Sicilian and south Italian communities. The total is not trivial, at least 250 talents. But the date is disputed between 415 (the traditional date) and 427–424. In my view the case for 415 is stronger, in which case it is possible that Thucydides has exaggerated the Athenians' difficulties in Sicily by presenting as dramatically gloomy a picture of their financial plight as possible, and playing down the extent of local help.

As for the size of the Athenian fleet at the outset, we have one precious chapter, postponed until just before the fleet arrives in western waters (6. 43): 130 triremes, 100 of them Athenian – everything down to one horse-transport. (The original fleet proposed was only 60 ships (6. 8. 2) and it would have been perfectly sensible to have voted for that expedition because that was the total Athenian commitment back in the 420s (above, p. 161). The irony was that Nikias, wanting to talk them out of the expedition, pushed the numbers up.)

Information on the Syracusan side is even more scrappy: the account of the expedition is largely 'focalized' through the Athenians, i.e. presented from their point of view. Thus the Syracusans are said by Nikias to have spent more than 2000 talents on the siege (7. 48. 5). This may, however, be a conventional figure (cf. 2. 70. for Potidaia, and cf. ML 55 = Fornara 113 for Samos; and compare the 'seven cities' of Sicily at 6. 20. 3 which are just a conventional number).[49]

We are best informed about cavalry numbers:[50] Athenian deficiency in this arm was the second of the five weaknesses or mistakes which destroyed the Sicilian expedition. (The first to make itself felt was the cold welcome given by places like Rhegium, above p. 171.) Cavalry deficiency meant that even successes could not be followed up. As we have seen (above, p. 145), the Athenians had had a properly organized cavalry force since the middle of the century. But Nikias (6. 20–22) urgently stresses Syracusan superiority and the need to counter it, though we have to allow for Thucydides touching this speech up afterwards when it became clear that cavalry deficiencies had helped to wreck the expedition. It was, however, a relative deficiency not an absolute one; the total achieved by, among other things, getting mounts locally was 650 (6. 98) but the Syracusans had a mighty 1200 (6. 67); that is they outnumbered the Athenians on horseback by nearly 2:1. Again note that Thucydides does give numbers but he does not do what I have just done and place them side by side and draw the 2:1 point I have just drawn. What more could Athens have done? Part of the problem was lack of horse-transports[51] (and horses get sick on sea voyages), and partly they needed cavalry to defend Attica. But Nikias may be right that more light-armed troops would have helped.[52]

The first two weaknesses, then, were the neutrality of people who had been expected to behave as allies, and Athenian cavalry inferiority; the other three were the failure to follow up initial surprise, above all by wintering at Katana, the recall of Alcibiades and the Athenian decision not to recall Nikias when he asked for this but to send reinforcements, thus reinforcing failure. Once the expedition got across the Adriatic after the excited departure, these problems began to bite, one by one and cumulatively. But the moment of departure itself was a magnificent moment, described by Thucydides in appropriate detail. Prayers were offered up, and libations poured from gold and silver cups (6. 32. 1); we may think of Pindar's picture of the departure of the Argonauts, whose captain Jason, on the ship's stern, 'took a golden bowl in his hands, and called on Zeus the lightning-wielder, the father of the Ouranidai ...' (*Pythian* 4. 193f.).

But then, once they had crossed the Adriatic, came the rejection at Rhegium (above), which evidently depressed morale, as did the discovery that the financial promises made by the Egestaians were worthless; the envoys sent ahead to Egesta had in fact been duped by lavish hospitality, along with the crews of the triremes which conveyed them (46, cf. already 8. 2). There was then an important exchange of views between the three commanders on the spot, Nikias, Alcibiades and Lamachos (6. 47ff.). Nikias recommends that the Athenians merely show the flag, after attacking Selinus 'against which we were sent' (a reference to the Egesta–Selinus quarrel of 6. 6). Alcibiades says they should roll up Sicily on to Syracuse (48). Lamachos recommends an immediate all-out attack on Syracuse (49). It is not until a whole book later (7. 42) that we get a hint that this third strategy is right in Thucydides' view. But Lamachos adds his vote to Alcibiades. Almost immediately after

this (6. 52. 2) comes the first introduction of the cavalry harassment theme (see above).

The next setback was the loss of Alcibiades (53, 60–1, cf. 27–9), whose command had, since the expedition's departure, been tarnished by suspicion for his supposed part in the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries; the profanity may have consisted, in part, of their performance in a private house.[53] Alcibiades is much less likely to have been involved in an even more spectacular affair at this time, the mutilation of the herms (i.e. square pillars carrying images of Hermes): Hermes was after all the god of travel among other things, and whoever carried out the mutilation did not want the expedition to sail at all. The elimination of Alcibiades was bad for morale though he had not done anything marvellous yet, and if Thucydides thought Lamachos' strategy was right then he must also have thought that Alcibiades must have been wrong.

The Syracusan cavalry now came and jeered at the Athenians (6. 63). So their commanders felt they had to fight. They carried out a ruse to get the Syracusans into the open. The decision to fight was tricky (see 6. 64. 1 and the accusative and infinitive constructions which show this is what the generals, not Thucydides, thought).[54] It is very significant that in the battle which now ensues the Athenians win but cannot pursue because hampered by the enemy cavalry (6. 70. 3). This defeat prompted the Syracusans to accept the suggestion of Hermokrates, 'one of their cleverest minds and an experienced and courageous man', that military authority should be concentrated in fewer hands: three generals were now appointed instead of the previous fifteen, no doubt one (instead of five) for each of the three Dorian tribes (6. 72). Hermokrates himself was one of them, and though he and his colleagues were deposed the following summer (6. 103. 4) the new tighter system was kept, and Hermokrates remained influential (7. 21 and 73).

Then comes the third source of Athenian weakness, the decision to winter at Katana, thus losing surprise (6. 72. 1 and 88: the Athenians spent part of this winter at Naxos, 6. 74. 2). Alcibiades had meanwhile made his way to Sparta where he urged the Spartans to fortify Dekeleia in north Attica and to send a Spartiate commander to Syracuse; they decided to act on the second suggestion immediately, and Gylippus' mission was the result; and for the longer term they applied their minds to Dekeleia (6. 88 and 93; for the actual fortification of Dekeleia, 7. 18–19, and for the economic damage to Athens this caused, 7. 27–8). In Sicily, the Athenians tried to wall off Syracuse, which made it necessary for Syracuse to start counter-walling (6. 96). But Lamachos was killed, quite suddenly (6. 101); this comes as a shock to the reader. Nikias, sick with kidney trouble (specified at 7. 15. 1), was left in sole command. The initiative ebbs away to the other side. Gylippus arrives just in time, preceded by Gongylus the Corinthian, who prevented the despondent Syracusans from holding an assembly about ending the war (7. 2.1); 'so close to danger did Syracuse come' (7. 2. 4, cf. the similar expression at 3. 49. 4 about the last minute reprieve of Mytilene, see above p. 161. Over Syracuse, Thucydides

may have exaggerated the 'nick-of-time' aspect.). The Syracusans now won the race of the walls by taking their counter-wall past the Athenian wall one night, so putting an end to any Athenian chance of taking Syracuse (7. 6. 4); this was in an important sense the decisive moment of the campaign, and Thucydides emphasizes its importance by choosing long words which seem physically to represent the wall itself ('stylistic enactment'). The Athenians were now cooped up in their base at Plemmyrion, and the first weakness starts to be felt again: they get picked off by cavalry while foraging for firewood, atrocious for morale (7. 4. 6).

Now 'the Athenians' have a final chance to recall Nikias and so put right the fourth weakness, after Nikias writes a depressing letter (7. 10–15; but who are 'the Athenians'? See below, p. 114 below, p. 339 n. 21 for Thucydides' suppression of the restraining role of the Council here: the effect is to leave the reader with a stronger sense of the irresponsibility of the Assembly in thus over-hastily reinforcing failure.) But they do not recall him. They promote two men on the spot as interim support and appoint two new commanders, Demosthenes and Eurymedon (7. 16). Eurymedon set out immediately with 120 talents and ten ships, and went straight to Sicily (7. 16 and 31); then he returned to liaise at Kerkyra with Demosthenes (7. 26) who had meanwhile spent the winter assembling the main reinforcement fleet of sixty-five ships (7. 20. 2; this was increased by fifteen from Kerkyra but reduced by ten given to the Athenian Konon at Naupaktos, making seventy. See 7. 42. 1 where the total is given on arrival in Sicily as seventy-three because of two extra provided by Metapontum at 7. 33 and the single ship in which Eurymedon returned from Sicily to Kerkyra.)[55] But Gylippus had meanwhile captured Plemmyrion, which was among other things a depot for money and supplies, and this is singled out by Thucydides as a great setback for Athens. Shortly before the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, there was a sea battle in the great harbour of Syracuse (40–1). The Athenians were defeated because of strengthened Syracusan prows, an innovation surely borrowed from the mother-city Corinth (36. 2; on this sort of topic Corinth was a good source of information for Thucydides).[56] On arrival, Demosthenes, we are told (7. 42, interpretation of which is a well-known problem), did not want to have the 'Nikias experience': 'for when Nikias arrived he had been formidable, but he footled around wintering at Katana'. The focalizer must be or at least include Thucydides himself because of the nominative and finite tense construction (contrast 6. 64 already mentioned above, p. 175). That is, Thucydides thought Lamachos had been right.

Demosthenes tried a daring throw, the night battle at Epipolae.[57] It was a disaster (7. 44–5). Demosthenes now wanted to leave Sicily altogether; he was obviously right, but Nikias refused. He was 'too much given to divination and that sort of thing' (7. 50: there was an eclipse of the moon). But did he know something that others did not? (For a 'fifth column' of Athenian sympathizers at Syracuse see 7. 48. 2 and 49. 1, with emphatic repetition of phrasing. Cf. Polyaenus 1. 43 for slave insurrection, deserters received

by the Athenians.) Eurymedon was killed in a naval engagement (7. 52. 2). Nevertheless there were still some Athenian successes, helped by the Etruscans (7. 53). But then follows the great and final sea battle in the harbour (7. 70–1, a lengthy and classic set piece of pathetic battle description). After the Athenian defeat, Syracusan drunkenness (7. 73. 2, one of only two instances in Thucydides, 6. 28. 1 being the other) allows the Athenians temporarily to escape. Thucydides' narrative of the start of the pathetic retreat, including a comparison of the defeated army to the population of a sacked city taken after siege (7. 75. 5), is perhaps influenced by literary and artistic representations of the fall of Troy: the same chapter (para. 4) contains the only mention of the shedding of tears in the entire *History*. There is, it must be admitted, some hyperbole here: for instance, the figure of over 40,000 in flight is seriously inflated, and it seems that Thucydides may, with uncharacteristic lack of caution, have omitted to subtract the many casualties up to that point. The almost complete slaughter of the expeditionary force follows; the ugly climax – mud mixed with blood – takes place in the bed of the Assinaros River (84). Nikias and Demosthenes are taken prisoner and executed (86. 2). Nikias is let off lightly by Thucydides (7. 86. 5), presumably because the historian admired his personal and civic qualities as he evidently did. Thucydides at this moment of intense emotion breaks his normal rule of avoiding metricality and writes an iambic line which could have come out of a tragedy by Sophocles (7. 87. 5, *kai tois diaphthareisi dustuchestaton* 'and most wretched for those who had been destroyed'). The same final chapter contains an apocalyptic allusion to divine displeasure, wrapped in a Homeric and Herodotean echo (*panolethria*, a pregnant word for utter destruction which recalls the gods' anger against Troy, cf. Hdt. 2. 120. 5). The theme of divine vengeance is artfully and cumulatively fed into these last chapters: Nikias addresses the theme directly in his final rallying address (7. 77. 3), and there is a brief and glancing suggestion that the troops feel that the thunder and heavy rain tend 'towards their destruction' (the word for 'towards' is the tiny word *epi*, hard to translate without overdoing the suggestion of perceived divine anger, which is, however, certainly present: 79. 3). And the hint of panic (Pan-ic, the special fear induced by the god Pan) is a little less agnostically presented in this context than it was in Book 4 (with 7. 80. 3, where the second element in *phoboi kai deimata* has a redundant and poetic feel to it, contrast 4. 125. 1 where by the adverb *asaphos* Thucydides seems explicitly to say that the army's fear on that occasion was irrational and baseless).[58]

So ends Book 7 of Thucydides; but the book numbers are not Thucydides' own, and the first chapter of Book 8 should be read as an integral part of the story (note especially the echoes between 7. 64. 1 and 8. 1). That chapter stresses Athenian resilience in face of catastrophe (note also the surprising implication of Thucydides' remark towards the end of Book 8, that the Sicilian disaster only *seemed* great by the year 411, 8. 96. 1).[59] 'Catastrophe' is the word given in modern Greek history to the euphoric invasion of Asia Minor by Greek forces in 1920 and their utter defeat in 1922 at the hands

of the Turks led by Atatürk. Militarily, there are some striking parallels with the Sicilian expedition of 415–413.[60] But in 415 the main Syracusan enemy of the Athenians were not only fellow Greeks but a fellow democracy against whom there could be no ideological leverage (7. 55, but see below p. 179 and n. 67).

What, finally, did Thucydides think? It has caused unease among commentators that in passages written with apparent hindsight he seems to suggest that the expedition need not have failed if Alcibiades had stayed in Sicily (2. 65. 11, 'it was not so much an error of judgement …', cf. 6.15); but this has seemed in contradiction with the whole thrust of the presentation in Books 6 and 7: not only is a presentiment of failure implicit from the start (we may here recall 6. 1. 1, Athenian ignorance of the size of the island) but we have not been given the impression in the course of the narrative that Alcibiades' strategic plan was the right one (see above). Perhaps Thucydides meant that Alcibiades' charisma would have made a vital but unspecifiable difference. We can save Thucydides from outright contradiction by insisting that 'not so much an error' still implies that it was an error.[61] As for Alcibiades, we can admit that ambiguous presentation was appropriate for an ambiguous figure; in the present 'unitarian' climate of Thucydidean studies, there is a pronounced reluctance to convict Thucydides of any inconsistency whatsoever and a pronounced impatience with compositional arguments – that is, explanations in terms of changes of mind by Thucydides over time.[62] Nevertheless different emphases, if not absolutely inconsistent judgements, are detectable. Some of them reflect the genuinely fluid reality: in this category we might want to place not only Thucydides' various assessments of the slippery Alcibiades, but also co-existence, in his account, of both radical ambitious plans for Sicily and more limited, conservative ones (see above p. 172). Other changes of emphasis should perhaps be put down to the literary and rhetorical demands of the subject matter: the language at the end of Book 7 seems devastatingly final and the 'closure' absolute (unduly so in modern editions which break the printing at the end of the book), but the impression of finality is soon corrected. Thucydides was perhaps 'carried away'. One wonders if the 'Sicilian books' were meant originally for recitation: the whole *History* is announced as a possession for ever *rather than* a prize composition for 'immediate hearing' (1. 22. 4), and this does not quite exclude immediate hearing, just as 'not so much an error' does not exclude error. Thucydides is clever with his negatives.[63]

### 413–411; the oligarchic revolution at Athens

Thucydides' attention now moves away from Sicily and back to Athens; we should not follow him immediately. At Delphi, the Syracusans put up a treasury (a building in a sanctuary), 'from the great Athenian defeat' (Paus. 10. 11. 5).[64] In summer 412, Hermokrates fulfilled hopes and fears supposedly expressed by various speakers in 415 BC (see above p. 169), by arriving from

the west to help the Peloponnesians with a fleet of twenty Syracusan and two Selinuntine ships (Th. 8. 26). But in summer 411 he was deposed by the *demos* at home (Th. 8. 85. 3, Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 27 supplies the word *demos*).[65] This 'demos' was a more radically democratic regime which had come to power in perhaps 413/12 after a revolution (Ar. *Pol.* 1304a 27, making a connection with the Athenian defeat; Diod. 13. 34. 6–35 with some confusion between a demagogue Diokles and an archaic lawgiver of the same name).[66] Thucydides had insisted that Athens and Syracuse were very similar sorts of place, above all because they were both democracies (7. 55, 8. 96). His comparison is not altogether convincing.[67] But there is a real similarity in that the outcome of the fight to the death of 415–413 destabilized democratic politics at both places: victory led at Syracuse to a switch to more extreme democracy, defeat led at Athens to a temporary switch to oligarchy. Hermokrates,[68] who returned to the east Mediterranean in a private capacity, eventually (408) lost his life in fighting at Syracuse; he was suspected of wanting to make himself tyrant (Diod. 13. 75. 5). Among his supporters was Dionysius (13. 75. 9), who was to be a tyrant indeed, and whose story we shall resume in a later chapter (see pp. 215ff.).

Thucydides' eighth and last book covers the years 413–411, the first phase of the so-called Ionian War. One of the two main themes of the book is Athenian military recovery; by the end of the book (8. 106), they have won a naval victory at Kynossema. The other theme is what Thucydides (8. 98. 4) calls 'the oligarchy and the *stasis*' which dominates Chapter 63 onwards, though even earlier (47) we have been put on notice that the theme of Alcibiades' return from exile is linked with the abolition of the democracy which had thrown him out.

The book begins with popular Athenian indignation, 'as if they had not voted for it themselves', against the orators who had proposed the expedition, also against the oracle-mongers and soothsayers. Thucydides is here clearly sneering at the masses for blaming their advisers instead of accepting their own responsibility. But we should not be too quick to follow him. If it is right (as suggested above, p. 143f.) that the 'western experts', elite people like Diotimos and Euphemos, were leaders of opinion and provided the Assembly with regional 'facts' and advice, the mass of Athenians were surely to some extent justified in now turning on the providers of those facts and that advice.

In any case the Assembly did in 413 accept some responsibility and need to improve its decision-making processes, by appointing supervisory officials with the unprecedented title of *probouloi* (8. 1. 3); their precise functions are not known but they were surely meant to impose economies. There were ten of them, which looks democratic enough (one from each of the Kleisthenic tribes, presumably), and the only two whose names are known are men with good democratic credentials: Sophocles (Ar. *Rhet.* 1419 a 25) and Hagnon the oikist of Amphipolis (Lys. 12. 65). Nor did they supersede the workings of the *boule* of Five Hundred. But the *probouloi* were part of an effort by the democracy to impose self-restraint, and this has been rightly described as

having a 'quasi-oligarchic flavour'.[69] The immediate crisis was or was perceived to be imperial, the threatened break-up of the empire (8. 2. 2; 4). There were some creaking noises as we shall see, but the break-up did not happen. It was perhaps in this context that Euripides produced his *Ion*, at the end of which play Athena prophesies that Attica will be named after Ion's four sons and that their descendants will colonize the islands and Ionia (lines 1575ff.). The stress on the four sons is interesting: they were the eponymous tribal heroes of Athens in the days before Kleisthenes, and though they did not matter much at Athens after Kleisthenes, in Ionia itself their names were still used for civic subdivisions in the fifth century. Was Euripides' message conciliatory?[70] (See above p. 133.)

The Spartans set in motion a programme to build and requisition their allies to build ships to a projected total of 100. The Athenians reacted with amazing vigour and promptness (8. 4), getting hold of timber from Macedon to build a new fleet, the first essential (Andok. 2. 11, cf. ML 91 = Fornara 161, line 30). The Persian factor, a dominant theme of this book of Thucydides as of none of the previous seven, starts to feature very early on (8. 5): Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap in western Asia Minor, promised to help the Peloponnesians. In order to satisfy the Persian king, he needed to recover arrears of tribute and bring in Amorges dead or alive (8. 5. 5); both these aims had an anti-Athenian aspect, because the Athenians stood in the way of Persian exaction of tribute and because they were backing Amorges (cf. 54. 3, but the Athenians had been involved with him for some time, see above p. 168). Tissaphernes' satrapal counterpart in north-western Asia Minor, Pharnabazus, pursued a similar line of action (6. 1), and we can be confident that they thought the king would approve of this new vigorous anti-Athenian policy. Had the Persian king been following the events in Sicily and already decided to capitalize on them? It has been suggested that he already knew that the Athenians had overextended themselves by sending reinforcements to Sicily, and that he took action even before the news came through of the final defeat.[71] The Athenians were lucky in that the news came through at the end of the summer of 413 when there was no immediate fear of enemy attack.

Essentially Book 8 of Thucydides is a story of Spartan opportunities missed. Thucydides waits till the end of the book (96) to make this point explicitly: he comments 'what convenient enemies the Spartans were'. The plums hoped for at the outset were going to be Euboia (5. 1) and Chios (5. 4, 6ff.). Euboia was important not least as a supplier of food (2. 14, picked up at 8. 96. 2, Euboia said to be more important to them than Attica itself). Chian loyalty to Athens had already been suspected once (4. 51); we now know Chian exiles paid to the Spartan war fund at some time, perhaps now;[72] and Chios had a considerable navy (non-tribute paying but autonomous and ship-providing, in the formulation of 7. 57. 4). So a Spartan force set out for Chios under Alkamenes with twenty-one ships (8. 10. 2). But the Athenians were still feared, as we see from the secrecy with which the Chians

feel obliged to act (7), and note that the masses at Chios do not know what is going on and it is necessary to conceal it all from them (9. 3). This shows that the regime at Chios was oligarchic, but also that it was an oligarchy unsure of itself, and afraid of what the people might think. Incredibly, so soon after the Athenians' humiliation, the Spartans mess it up: the Athenians chase the Peloponnesians ashore at Piraeon and kill Alkamenes. The Spartans were understandably discouraged that their first venture of the Ionian War had gone wrong (11). We are hardly a dozen chapters since that Sophoclean iambic line at the end of Book 7.

But now Alcibiades takes a hand. He tells the Spartans that it will be easy to persuade Ionia to revolt (12. 1). We should be wary of this: when Thucydides says that somebody thought it would be 'easy' to do this or that, we can be confident that they are going to be proved wrong.[73] And in fact by the end of the book the break-up of the Ionian wall of the Athenian alliance has not taken place. Alcibiades exploits rivalries inside Sparta (12. 2). Thus Alcibiades' friend Endios and King Agis are on bad terms, and later in the book we hear of sharp disagreements between Pedaritus and Astyochos (38–9): Pedaritus actually writes a letter to Sparta complaining of Astyochos' feeble or possibly (he says) corrupt behaviour.

So Alcibiades and the Spartan Chalkideus sail out and they do manage to get Chios to revolt (14. 2), also Erythrai and Klazomenai. There is now panic at Athens; they touch the 1000-talent emergency fund (15. 1) and liberate some Chian slaves (15. 2, cf. 40, with the inscription at L. Robert 1938: 118–26). This use of the slave weapon is notable. The only other instance we hear of in Thucydides is at Kerkyra (3. 73), though it is possible that the Athenians did it to Syracuse (see above, p. 171 on Polyaen. 1. 43). Perhaps it was commoner than our sources let on.[74] The Athenian Strombichides sets out and makes his base at Samos (16.1), 'the key to the all-weather Aegean crossing' as it has been called.[75] The city of Athens was in a sense located at Samos in 411 (see the remarkable Chapter 76, including the deposing and electing of commanders by the dissatisfied fleet during the oligarchic episode back home) and Samian loyalty to the end of the war was exceptionally recognized at the eleventh hour by a grant of full citizenship to all Samians (ML 94 = Fornara 166). In the immediate context of 412 and the beginning of the Ionian War we should note in particular the democratic revolt at Samos (21), soon after the Athenians arrive and with their help. (This passage incidentally is usually taken to be evidence that Samos was an oligarchy up till now and perhaps since 439, but the word *dunatoi* for the people against whom the revolt happened need not mean oligarchs.)[76]

Then (17) the Spartans bring over Miletus; Chios and Miletus were to be the Peloponnesian bases for a while now, and this important moment, the revolt of Miletus, was the signal for the first Spartan–Persian treaty (18). It was absurdly favourable to the Persian king because it gave him all his ancestors had possessed. This was rectified later, in the third treaty (58). This first treaty was an important moment in Greek history, the first link in a chain

which would in a few decades promote the Persian king to arbiter of Greek affairs.[77]

There was stalemate on Lesbos (23); Chios was now under close siege from Athens, and the Chians felt the damage very badly (24). In a land battle at Miletus (25), the Athenians were victorious, and the Argives defeated.[78] There was a gathering of naval forces now, note the arrival of 22 ships from Sicily under Hermokrates (26, cp. p. 179). Thucydides now (27) makes a remarkable judgement about a battle of Miletus that never happened. Phrynichus, he says, showed himself intelligent, *ouk axunetos*, in not engaging the Peloponnesian fleet. This for Thucydides is a strong word of praise. But there is an important point here: from the figures Thucydides himself supplies (cp. above p. 168 on the cavalry statistics in Book 7, given but never synthesized by Thucydides himself) it seems that the Athenians had something like naval parity with the Spartans at this point. That is, not only was Phrynichus wrong, but Thucydides' own judgement is wrong and that is disturbing. He says explicitly (30. 2) that the Athenians controlled the sea, and it has been demonstrated[79] that the Athenians had sixty-eight ships off Miletus to the Peloponnesian eighty, most of these eighty inexperienced apart from the Syracusan twenty. So Phrynichus ought to have had a go.

Instead, things went on for the moment as before; Tissaphernes brought pay for the Spartan fleet as he had promised, but reduced the amount for the future (29). Another treaty was concluded between Persia and the Peloponnesians, somewhat more advantageous to the Peloponnesians than its predecessor (38), and the Spartans brought over the large and wealthy island of Rhodes (44), an important development. Locally, the family of the Diagoreioi led this pro-Spartan and oligarchic revolution (cf. *Hell. Oxy*. 18 Chambers, where their enemies call them 'the tyrants'); this was the family of Diagoras the Olympic victor for whom Pindar wrote one of his best victory odes, the seventh *Olympian*, and of his son Dorieus whose Olympic victories were signalled by Thucydides (3. 8. 1). The defection of Rhodes was a bad blow for the Athenians; it was not reversed until 394, a decade after the end of the Peloponnesian War. In the interval (408/7), the three cities of Rhodes, namely 'Lindos, Ialysus and chalky Kamiros' (Homer *Iliad 2.* 676), synoikized, and a new city called Rhodes was built in the north of the island. (For the fact see Diod. 13. 75.1, and cf. *Syll.*[3] 110, an interesting decree found at Lindos, in which 'all the Rhodians' honour an Aiginetan who had worked as an interpreter at Naukratis in Egypt. This inscription seemingly dates from shortly before the synoikism.) The new city had a glorious future ahead of it, especially in the hellenistic period (Diod. 20. 81), and in the fourth century the Rhodian synoikism was the probable model for other synoikisms in the south-east Aegean, notably Kos in the 360s (Diod. 15. 76) and even, across the water, Persian-held Halicarnassus at about the same time as Kos (below p. 212f.).[80]

Let us return to Thucydides, and the events of winter 412/11. From this point (47) on we have a move to the seizure of power at Athens by

the Four Hundred oligarchs, and the imperial aspect of this revolution is a corresponding move (e.g. Chapter 64, Thasos) to impose oligarchies on the allies. This produced some reflections by Phrynichus on the whole subject of 'what the [Athenian] allies want' (48): he regards Alcibiades as out for himself, and Thucydides seems to endorse this. Phrynichus goes on famously to say that the allies would really like to be free both of oligarchy, i.e. Spartan control, or democracy, i.e. Athenian. But they had no particular love for oligarchs (he said) because they put the democrats up to their tricks and under oligarchies you get violence and people put to death without trial.

The oligarchic episode of 411 has undeniable interest – as Thucydides says (68) it was not easy to deprive the Athenian *demos* of its liberty after about a century from the fall of the Pisistratid tyrants, since when it had not only not been subject to anyone else but had, during half that period, been accustomed to rule others. Nevertheless the oligarchic movement at Athens inevitably remained an episode only, since most of the thetes were away from Athens at the time – at Samos, where the oligarchic movement both began (47) and ended (73–6) earlier than at Athens itself. The oligarchs, that is, were exploiting a supposed cleavage between hoplite and thete which closed up again when the two classes were reunited physically.

The movement towards oligarchy was given impetus at first by a belief that a change of government at Athens was the king of Persia's wish: here was a way of atoning for Amorges and (as the oligarchs' delegate from Samos to Athens, Pisander, is made to urge at 53) of pulling in Persia on Athens' side, something which Alcibiades (48. 1), hopeful of engineering his own return to Athens, claimed he could bring about.

At Athens an extreme oligarchic coup was pushed through, the old Council of Five Hundred being paid off (69. 4), in an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty, brilliantly conveyed by Thucydides (66). The switch to oligarchy at Athens was prepared for by Pisander, who went round the political 'clubs' (54; see above p. 154 for these); when the coup happened (62ff.) the ground had evidently been well laid. The crucial meeting took place at the deme site of Kolonos (67); there is no great mystery about the location[81] if we accept an attractive modern suggestion that the site was associated with the cult of Poseidon Hippios, the 'horsey';[82] there will on this hypothesis have been a cavalry involvement in the oligarchic revolution. Thucydides, as elsewhere, has reported an item of religious significance without explicitly bringing out that significance. Similarly, he hardly hints at the intellectual sophistic element which was undoubtedly present and important at the time: his only mention of sophists is in a different connection altogether (3. 38. 7), and in Book 8 there is just one glancing and indirect allusion to the theme of 'restoration of the ancestral constitution, *patrios politeia*'[83] (for the nearest approach see the reference to the *patrioi nomoi*, the 'ancestral laws', which the oligarchs are said to be subverting: 76. 6. The contemporary sophist Thrasymachus has the *patrios politeia* theme, DK 2 p. 324.). There is a very different version of events in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (*Ath. Pol.* 29–34).

Whereas Thucydides (65–6) insisted on the speciousness of the claim of the Four Hundred oligarchs that they proposed to demit power in favour of a larger body of Five Thousand, the *Constitution of the Athenians*, by contrast, hesitating between two sources (Thucydides and an apologetic tradition), both denies and asserts the real existence of the Five Thousand (32, para. 1 for the assertion, para. 3 for the denial). His phrase (para. 3) that the Five Thousand existed 'in word only' is, however, decisive, and correct. An attempt has been made[84] to save the author from outright self-contradiction by pointing to an alleged parallel in the famous passage (2. 65), where Periclean democracy is said to have been a 'democracy in word but really one-man rule'. Here – it is urged – it is not the existence but the importance of democratic features which is being denied. But the analogy is imperfect: if Thucydides had said that under Pericles Athens was a democracy 'in word *only*', he could indeed be said to have denied that it was a democracy at all. The presence or absence of the word 'only' thus destroys the supposed analogy, and we are left with a contradiction in the account in the *Constitution of the Athenians.* Thucydides' account should therefore be preferred.

The revolution of the Four Hundred failed because of internal differences between the oligarchs, on two issues, the exact degree of popular participation to be permitted, and the attitude to Sparta. On the second point, the original idea of the oligarchs had been (63. 4) to continue the war, if necessary making financial contributions from their own personal resources. Yet as soon as they took power they made overtures to the Spartan king Agis at Dekeleia (70. 2). They even fortified a part of the Piraeus called Eetioneia, not with the aim of keeping the Samian democrats out (for the rapid Samian reaction against oligarchy see above p. 181), but as their critics said later (90) of letting the Spartans in. Foremost among those critics was Theramenes, son of the Hagnon mentioned above as a *proboulos*; Theramenes also led the question on the issue of popular participation, taking a more moderate and constitutionalist line than his associates (though he gets no credit for this from Thucydides, whose portrait at 89 is hostile;[85] nor from Lysias, who unjustly calls Theramenes the 'man most guilty of the oligarchy' of 411: 12. 65). The evidence for Theramenes' moderate position is to be found partly in the *Constitution of the Athenians* where (Chapter 29) there is preserved a proposal by one Kleitophon to 'seek out the laws of Kleisthenes' and legislate for the new regime according to them; this is a clear attempt to establish the new order on a more than arbitrary footing. It is in fact an attempt to restrict political voting rights to hoplites, i.e. to establish a 'hoplite franchise'; this is the meaning of the phrase used (Th. 8. 65) about the Five Thousand: 'the people best qualified to serve the state either in their own proper persons or financially'. Now there is good reason to regard Kleitophon as an associate of Theramenes, with whom he is bracketed not just by the *Constitution of the Athenians* but also by Aristophanes (*Frogs* 967), for whom they are both pupils of Euripides; Kleitophon also moved in Socratic and Platonic circles, like many of the identifiable oligarchs of 411 and 404–403.[86] But the most

compelling reason for regarding Theramenes as a convinced and consistent advocate of the hoplite franchise is in the speech given him by Xenophon at his trial in 403, where he is made to use language very like that quoted above from Thucydides (8. 65): Xenophon (*Hell.* 2. 3. 48, cf. 2. 3. 17) makes Theramenes say that he has 'never altered his view that the best constitution is that which is in the hands of those *who can serve the state with horse or shield*'. Note that Theramenes in 403 also objected to the attitude of his colleagues to Sparta (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 42, where he singles out the subsidy by Athens of the Spartan garrisons): the parallel with his attitudes in 411 is thus complete – see above on Eetioneia – and shows the injustice of the contemporary charge of political opportunism against Theramenes, who was called the 'boot for both feet' (*kothornos*, Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 31). Theramenes' later part in the recall of Alcibiades was a disinterested piece of statesmanship as far as we can see, and his behaviour at the Arginusai trial was, as we shall see, more creditable than Xenophon allows (below p. 188f.). But he cannot avoid bearing some of the blame for the political divisions which weakened Athens in this last decade of the war.[87]

Once firmly in control, the Four Hundred sent ten men to Samos to reassure the armed forces there and 'explain' that it was the Five Thousand who had acted and not the Four Hundred only (72). Chaereas, sent to Athens by the Athenians at Samos, gave an exaggerated picture of abuses at Athens (74). The result was a hardening against the oligarchs (75). Further imperial losses – Byzantium (80), probably Selymbria and other places too – did not help the image of the oligarchs. The sailors at Samos now wanted to sail to Athens but Alcibiades stopped them (86). The Athenian oligarchy now began to disintegrate (92). The fortification of Eetioneia, already mentioned, destabilized the Four Hundred: it was a mistake by the oligarchs to allow so many strong hands to assemble in one relatively remote place. The wall was pulled down at the instance of Theramenes (92. 10). But still, by bluff, promises, and appeals to patriotism – 'la patrie en danger' – the Four Hundred managed to hold on for the moment (93). The fatherland was indeed in acute danger: a Spartan fleet under Agesandridas moved from Megara against Athens, but sailed past Piraeus (where hasty defences had been mobilized), rounded Cape Sounion, and anchored at Oropos (95). From here they attacked an Athenian force at Eretria and, partly thanks to Eretrian hatred of and treachery towards Athens, the whole of Euboia was lost to the Athenians (95–6), a very bad moment for them.[88] They were still terrified that the enemy might attack Piraeus. Thucydides now slides away from the Athenian focalization and offers a powerful and lengthy counterfactual analysis of his own: 'if the Peloponnesians had been more daring, they could easily have done this' (for once, cf. above p. 181, that 'easily' seems to be genuinely meant). And that, he adds, would have forced the fleet in Ionia to come to the help of the city, so that the Hellespont, Ionia, and the whole Athenian empire would have been theirs. But the Spartans showed themselves, as so often, to be extremely convenient enemies.

The Four Hundred were now formally deposed and a genuine regime of Five Thousand was set up instead; Diodorus actually calls it 'Theramenes' constitution' (13. 38. 2). What this short-lived regime amounted to is controversial. Because Thucydides, apparently forgetting for the moment his contempt (8. 89) for the individuals such as Theramenes who had propounded it, later (97) praises it as a 'moderate blend of the few and the many', some scholars[89] have been reluctant to admit that, under the Five Thousand, democratic rights to vote in the Assembly and the law courts (*ekklesiazein kai dikazein*) were denied to the thetes. But the expression 'moderate blend' (*metria xynkrasis*) is the language of the 'mixed constitution', and in Greek political life such constitutions generally denied the franchise to elements lower than hoplites on the social and economic scale (cf. Ar. *Pol.* 1294a35 on *mixis*). By calling the regime of the Five Thousand a blend of the few and the many, Thucydides need not mean that the many enjoyed substantial political *rights*, merely that under that regime the *interests* of the few and the many were blended.[90]

'So ended the oligarchy and the *stasis*' (98. 4). The military crisis had been avoided by a whisker. The run-up to the Kynossema campaign follows, a result of the Spartan decision under their new commander Mindaros to turn to Pharnabazus in Hellespontine Phrygia and stop dealing with Tissaphernes (99). The battle of Kynossema (described at 104–5, a clear and excellent narrative battle description) was a lift to Athenian morale, though the losses were not overwhelmingly greater on the Spartan side, 21 to 15. But by 108–9 the Peloponnesian garrisons have been driven out of Antandros, Knidos and Miletus. The Athenian empire was still in being and had inflicted a major naval defeat on its enemies.

Finally what generalizations can we extract? First, although the Athenians were so obviously vulnerable and weakened, the break-up of the Athenian empire did not occur with the speed which we would have expected if the pro-Spartan goodwill of 431 (2. 8) still held. That is, people were now wary of both Athens and Sparta, so to that extent Phrynichus was right (8. 48). In Ionia, and no doubt elsewhere too, people tended, understandably enough, to open their gates to whatever powerful army or navy showed up on their doorstep.[91] Certainly appeals to democracy versus oligarchy cut little ice, to judge from the case of Chios. And events on Lesbos show Athens able to play one city off against another; Methymna goes over to Sparta so Mytilene switches back to Athens.[92] But the liberation theme was not quite dead yet.

This leads to a second point: although Persia was now a definite factor in the war for the first time that Thucydides has acknowledged, and although it is clear that Darius is very angry indeed with Amorges and his allies the Athenians, it is noticeable that the Persians or at least the satraps are not keen to back Sparta unconditionally. Here Alcibiades' advice to Tissaphernes (8. 46) is very relevant. The Athenians, if we take the long view, will make (he says) suitable 'partners in empire' for Persia (cf. p. 318) but the Spartans will come as liberators, so be careful of your interests in Asia Minor. This is

perhaps the first time that the distinction is made between the Greeks of Asia and those of the mainland.[93] The key verb of advice is *tribein*, wear both sides down. This half-heartedness of Persia, plus Persian arrogance in expecting the Greeks to behave like slaves (8. 84. 5) and to put up with garrisons, was discouraging for the Ionians.

But third, we should make some allowance for the factors Thucydides himself stresses in connection with Spartan failure to capitalize on the revolt of Euboia (8. 96), namely Athenian dynamism and Spartan dilatoriness. Also, perhaps Athens had learnt to be a bit more humane: the Selymbria settlement stresses due process of law (ML 87 = Fornara 162): we hear of no more massacres like those at Skione or Melos.[94]

## 411 to Aigospotamoi and the Athenian surrender

Six months after the fall of the Four Hundred, the Athenians won the sea battle of Kyzikos in the Hellespontine region (March 410; Thucydides has now ceased to be our main literary source; his place is taken by Xenophon's *Hellenika* and Diodorus Siculus Book 13). Kyzikos restored Athenian morale and even, if we can believe Diodorus (13. 52ff), induced the Spartans to sue for peace. It also meant the end of the Five Thousand, because it removed the need for any form of government tighter than full democracy. The location is significant: Thucydides (8. 80) had signalled a shift to the Hellespontine from the Ionian theatre of operations. Both these strands – intermittent Athenian successes, Hellespontine operations – continue through most of the rest of the war. Alcibiades now set up a customs station at the Hellespont, a *dekateuterion* (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 22). The word means a tithe and recalls the old tithe of the Kallias decrees (ML 58 = Fornara 119; it also looks forward to the levying of a tithe on goods from the Black Sea twenty years later: *Hell.* 4. 8. 27). So it was a strongly imperialist move.

The successes of Alcibiades and the other generals based in the Hellespont created a certain awkwardness in the years 410–407: they were too strong and too successful to be deposed, but they were politically compromised by involvement with the regime of the Five Thousand.[95] The solution was to leave them in place – but not to reinforce them or entrust to them the main thrust of the Athenian war effort. Hence their failure to follow up the Kyzikos success immediately: they could not be sure of backing from home. Instead, Thrasyllus was sent to Ionia, further south (409); and it was only when he achieved nothing and the Hellespontine generals were doing obviously better than him – they recovered Byzantium and Chalkedon in 408 – that the tension was resolved and Alcibiades could return to Athens in 407 (Theramenes was behind the original motion of recall: Diod. 13. 38). Alcibiades correctly thought that the key to the war was in the Hellespontine, not the Karian or Ionian region. Hence Pharnabazos, whose satrapal base was at Daskyleion near the Hellespont, predominates in Xenophon's early pages, rather than Tissaphernes, who had been so prominent in Thucydides Book 8.

Epigraphic evidence that Athens was flirting with Tissaphernes sometime in this period, perhaps in 408, is not seriously against this (*IG* I$^3$ 113).

But within months Alcibiades, or rather his second-in-command Antiochus, had lost the sea battle of Notion (late 407 or early 406) and Alcibiades was now finished. Athens, however, was not: the new board of generals was able to defeat the Spartans convincingly at sea, at Arginusai in 406.

The Spartans had seemed, at the end of Thucydides' narrative (411) to have won the competition for the favour of the satraps: by abandoning their claims to Asia Minor they had secured the financial help which they needed for any naval initiative. But since then, things had not gone their way, and Xenophon (1.4) records two significant moves under the year 407, shortly before the battle of Notion: the Spartans appealed directly to the Persian king via an envoy called Boiotios; and Cyrus the Younger, son of Darius II (reigned 424–404) was given overriding powers in the west of the Persian empire to wage war on the Spartans' behalf. He got on well with the Spartan commander Lysander and this winning combination is a reminder of how important these questions of personality could be. Xenophon's reference to Boiotios is brief and cryptic (he merely says it was successful) but it is an attractive modern suggestion[96] that this delegation reopened the issue of the freedom of the Greeks, closed on the face of it since 411 when they were recognized as Persian property: Darius' alarm at Athenian successes (and his other preoccupations: Media, the Kadusii near the Caspian Sea and troublesome tribes in the Anatolian interior) mean that it seemed to him worth making concessions to the Spartans about the autonomy of the coastal Greeks. If so, the Persians miscalculated: Alcibiades was right to prophesy that an unconditionally victorious Sparta would, one day, make life very difficult for the Persians in Asia Minor (above p. 186).

The effects of Cyrus' arrival were immediately felt: Notion was a Spartan success, though as much because of Antiochus' blundering as because of Cyrus' money. The Athenian victory at Arginusai in 406, however, showed that money could not make up for an indifferent commander: in that year the Spartan commander was not Lysander but Kallikratidas, whose defeat is attributable to his own poor generalship, not to Spartan seamanship, which Xenophon surprisingly says was superior to the Athenian (1. 6. 31).

Arginusai was chiefly memorable for its Athenian aftermath: the generals failed to pick up the survivors and the dead bodies out of the water (Xenophon has survivors, but Diodorus 13. 100 speaks of the dead; probably both were right). The generals' plea that a storm made that impossible was set aside, and they were condemned to death (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 6–7) en masse in a notorious demonstration of popular sovereignty (for this issue cf. p. 144). Only Socrates put up resistance; he happened to be the foreman of the *prytaneis* on the crucial day (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 7. 15 and *Mem.* 1. 1. 18, 4. 4. 2; Plato *Apology* 32b and *Gorgias* 473e). In Xenophon's version, Theramenes gratuitously attacked the generals; this is another instance of the malice felt towards him in some

quarters: in Diodorus' preferable account[97] Theramenes' speech against the generals is a counterattack, a defence against a denunciatory letter.

Deprived of Alcibiades' services as a result of Notion, and of the victors of Arginusai by the subsequent trial, the Athenians, who between 410 and 406 had looked like winning the war after all, could now hardly fail to lose it. Just before the final defeat, which was at Aigospotamoi on the Hellespont in 405, we glimpse Alcibiades for the last time, warning the Athenian generals against recklessly beaching their ships where they would be exposed to attack by Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1. 25–6). His help was rebuffed; the battle was won by the Spartans, who did accept outside help (see below for the Dioskouroi); and the Athenians now faced starvation. It was not Aigospotamoi, but the severing of the corn supply, which ended the war. Alcibiades was assassinated shortly afterwards, in Phrygia.[98]

The Athenians accepted what they could not resist,[99] the obligation to surrender their fleet (except twelve ships), to pull down the Long Walls, and to join the Peloponnesian League, 'following the Spartans wherever they led' (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 20). The Spartans erected monuments or inscriptions in Apollo's two great sanctuaries at Delphi and Delos. The symbolism of the Delos decree (R/O no. 3) is unmissable: in Spartan dialect and script it announces that the Delians are given back their autonomy, their sanctuaries and their sacred funds. No clearer signal could have been given that Athenian control of the Aegean was being liquidated after three-quarters of a century. At Delphi (Paus. 10. 9. 7–10 with ML 95 = Harding no. 4), a remarkable victory monument included statues of the Dioskouroi (Kastor and Polydeukes), Zeus, Apollo, Artemis and, represented in the act of crowning Lysander, the sea god Poseidon. The Dioskouroi were supposed to have helped Lysander to win the sea battle of Aigospotamoi (Plut. *Lys.* 12); they rather specialized in such 'epiphanies' or miraculous interventions, especially at sea (*Homeric Hymn* no. 33).[100] As at Delos, the message is that the Spartans have replaced the Athenians: it is hard to think of a human being who had been portrayed at Delphi in such prominence and company since the Athenian statue group commemorating Miltiades' victory at Marathon (above, p. 19).

# 14

# THE EFFECTS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

### *Stasis* and other upheavals; system building and treatise writing; professionalism

The first discussion, by any historian, of the effects of the Peloponnesian War is near the beginning of Book 2 of Thucydides, who describes what it meant to the Athenians to evacuate Attica (2. 14ff.). That evacuation is not likely to have been complete; but for many of the inhabitants of the rural demes (and for those with homes in the town but fields to work in the country), the beginning of the war did mean a change in immemorial living habits. This concentration of human beings within the city is one cause of the more aggressive character which Athenian oratory and politics took on in the age of Kleon (Chapter 12, p. 151). But Thucydides' generalizations about the war went beyond Athens. In Book 8 he described at length the *stasis* at Athens in 411. It was not, however, this revolution at Athens but horrific events on the Adriatic island of Kerkyra (modern Corfu) which elicited his main analysis of the pathology of *stasis* (3. 82–3); only one half chapter of Book 8 is written in the 'Kerkyra' vein (8. 66. 2–5; there are other scattered comments, for example at 8. 89. 3). In the famous Kerkyra section (which, may, like the Sicilian narrative discussed at the end of Chapter 13 above, have been intended initially for recitation) he famously remarks that 'war is a violent schoolteacher' (3. 82. 2); it is accompanied by *stasis* because of the bitterness generated by the economic hardships of war. On this view, the end of the war should have lowered the incidence of *stasis.* Modern writers have not agreed; it is held that there was more *stasis* in the fourth century than in the fifth, because in the fourth century the Athenians and Spartans were no longer there to keep control and act as policemen.[1] If they did have such a controlling role in the fifth century, it was a peacetime role, if Thucydides was right: he says (3. 82. 1) that in time of peace there was neither the excuse nor the motive for the democrats to bring in the Athenians or the oligarchs to bring in the Spartans, and he contrasts this with the wartime situation he is about to analyse. One of his speakers, the Athenian Euphemos at Kamarina in Sicily, does indeed suggest (6. 87. 4) that the prospect of Athenian intervention did impose a degree of restraint everywhere (not just in Sicily), and he seems to be

thinking of the whole period of the Athenian empire's existence, rather than just the Peloponnesian War period. So he supports Thucydides' authorial view that, before the wartime polarization of party struggle and the hope of outside help which the war brought with it, people thought twice before indulging their political hatreds. As for the Spartans, at the very beginning of the fourth century we find Herippidas, a Spartiate officer, putting down *stasis* at Herakleia in Trachis by summarily executing the five hundred 'authors of the discord' (Diod. 14. 38, under 399 BC). This, we may suppose, is the kind of prompt and brutal police action which happened fairly often in the fifth century.

The problem of *stasis* raises two acute and related problems of evidence which beset any attempt to trace change in classical Greece. First, if a phenomenon is newly attested after about 430, can we be sure that it is really new, or is it just that before 430 we do not have the sort of detailed evidence that Thucydides and Aristophanes provide thereafter? Second, if the evidence suggests a change between the fifth century and the fourth, might that not be because from about 400 we have evidence of a kind not available before that date, such as oratory, philosophical treatises surviving complete, specialized treatises on siegecraft? Let us examine the *stasis* problem more closely. In fact there is no shortage of evidence for *stasis* in the Greek world well before the Peloponnesian War. Pindar's *Pythian 4* closes with a plea to King Arkesilas for the recall to Kyrene of Demophilus, evidently exiled as a result of *stasis* (line 285, *erizon*; cf. p. 64); and Ergoteles of Himera, in the twelfth *Olympian*, is explicitly said to have left his native city, Knossos on Krete, because of '*stasis* which sets man against man' (line 16). Closest in spirit to Thucydides is a Pindar fragment (F109 Snell-Maehler) which speaks of 'angry *stasis*, giver of poverty'; Thucydides was to put it the other way round, making poverty the provider of *stasis.* As for fifth-century philosophers, we may have no treatises complete, but a number of the fragments of Democritus of Abdera indicate that he thought about *stasis* in a Thucydidean sort of way.[2] At first sight, the best support for the view that *stasis* was more widespread in the fourth century might seem to be offered by Aeneias Tacticus, the author of a surviving treatise *On siegecraft*[3] which is as revealing about politics as about warfare. He takes it for granted that a standard (and cheap) way for an enemy to take a fortified city is to exploit internal subversion; conversely, a city under attack needs to maintain 'harmony', 'concord' (Greek *homonoia*), for instance by alleviating debt without actually cancelling it which would alienate creditors (14.1). Now Aeneias himself wrote in the middle of the fourth century: he knows about the Athenian Chares' scandalous meddling on Kerkyra in 362 (11.13, cf. Diod. 15. 95, note that Kerkyra is again a focus for *stasis* as in the previous century); on the other hand Aeneias shows no knowledge of Philip, Alexander or the Successors.[4] It is usual and plausible to identify him with the Aeneias of Arkadian Stymphalos mentioned by Xenophon in the *Hellenika* (7. 3. 1, cf. *Anab.* 4. 7. 13). If that is right, there is an interesting prosopographical tie-up with the Aeneias of Stymphalos who

featured as chorus trainer in Pindar's sixth *Olympian* (line 88), a poem with not only a Syracusan but a Spartan[5] dimension: this was an old family with international connections. But this fourth-century date for *Siegecraft* does not solve our problem because although Aeneias naturally draws heavily on his own times for examples, many others are taken from the fifth century or earlier (2. 3ff. for fifth-century Plataia, 4. 8ff for Pisistratos, 11. 12 for early Sparta, 31. 28, the Ionian Revolt of 500–494; he cites both fifth- and fourth-century *stasis* at Argos (cf. 11. 7–9, 17. 2, which may refer to events of 417, Th. 5. 82–3)). Argos was notorious for a shocking fourth-century episode called the *skytalismos* or clubbing to death at Argos in 370 BC (Diod. 15. 57, cf. p. 87 above). The democratic mob, after killing a thousand of the *epiphanestatoi* or oligarchs, turned on their own leaders, the demagogues, and executed them as well. It *may* be that Aeneas had this in mind in one of his two passages (11. 7).[6] He goes on in the very next chapter to mention *stasis* in Arkadia, also about 370. Again, in Corinth in the 360s one Timophanes tried to set himself up as tyrant, but was killed; we happen to know of this because the tyrant killer was the famous Timoleon, the refounder of Syracuse two decades later (Diod. 16. 65, Plut. *Tim.*, cf. below 270). In next-door Sikyon, Euphron was more successful, seizing power with the support of mercenaries and the democrats (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 44–6). There is in fact some reason to think that the Peloponnese, at least, was exceptionally unstable after 375 (or 371, see n. 7). Diodorus' source Ephorus (Diod. 15. 40) expressly links the *stasis* and political convulsions of this period, some of which he lists, with the 'autonomy clause' (below p. 232) of the King's Peace, renewed in 375;[7] this in Ephorus' view produced a surge of anti-oligarchic and anti-Spartan feeling in the Peloponnese. Nor was the phenomenon confined to the Peloponnese. It is striking that Xenophon, describing events of 375, thinks it worth saying that Timotheos on Kerkyra did *not* stir up trouble, enslave anyone, or drive anybody into exile, or change the constitution (5. 4. 64). There may be an implied contrast not only with usual practice at this time, but also specifically with Chares at the end of the 360s, for which see above.

One large and important area was certainly as prone to *stasis* in the fifth century as in the fourth, namely Sicily and south Italy (for Thurii and Akragas cf. Th. 7. 33 and 7. 50). It is in the Sicily of the 420s that we first hear of the agitation for redistribution of land (Th. 5. 4.2: Leontini). From this turbulent region the tyranny of Dionysius arose, a possibility envisaged in general terms by a speaker in Thucydides, Athenagoras the Syracusan (6. 38. 3). This tyranny, for which see below, Chapter 15, was witnessed at first hand by Plato, and the experience surely influenced his presentation of tyranny in the *Republic*.[8] His aim in the *Republic* was to 'save the city'[9] by constructing an ideal society immune from change – especially subversion and takeover from within – and strong enough to avoid being overwhelmed from outside. The reason is surely that Plato's lifetime had seen extreme examples of both internal *stasis*, such as Athens in 411 or Argos in 370 (above), and external coercion, of which a sample is given by Diodorus a few chapters after the

Argos episode: Boiotian Orchomenos was destroyed by the Thebans in 364/3; the male citizens were killed and the women and children sold into slavery (15. 79). Such enslavement was rare between Greeks in the fourth century, but practised occasionally by Philip, for instance at Olynthos in 348. Or we may think of the wholesale Athenian eviction of the Samians from their island in the mid-360s; the refugees, who were not restored for forty-four years, were taken in by Greek cities all over the Mediterranean, as we know from the post-restoration Samian decrees thanking those who had been their hosts in time of need (below p. 261). Such awesome reversals of fortune help to explain the changeless theoretical aspirations of Plato. It is significant of his dislike of the violent present that his dialogues are so often set in the past: the *Theaetetus*, which discusses the concept of knowledge, starts with Theaetetus dying of wounds and dysentery after the battle of Corinth in 369; the dialogue then leaps back in time. Such nostalgia should not, however, be pressed as evidence that things really were better in the lifetime of Socrates (who was executed in 399).

Plato was hostile to the extreme democracy of Athens (the sketch of democratic lawlessness in Book 9 of the *Republic* could have been inspired by the trial of the generals after Arginusai); and this hostility was shared by his pupil Aristotle, who, however, approved, at least theoretically and guardedly, of majority decision making (*Politics* 1281ff.).[10] Disillusionment with democracy affected thinkers less profound than Thucydides (see p. 179 for his treatment of the popular reaction to the news of the disaster in Sicily), or Plato or Aristotle. Xenophon's *Hiero*, an imaginary dialogue between Hiero of Syracuse and the poet Simonides, discusses tyranny, and tries to show how it could be compatible with happiness (Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias* denied this) and even with justice – provided that the tyrant is beneficent. This is not a profound conclusion, but it does raise the question, where did Xenophon himself stand politically? Does the *Hiero* indicate contempt for democracy? Xenophon's own cavalry background may have conditioned his view of democracy,[11] but the denunciation of 'troublesome demagogues' in the *Hellenica* (5. 2. 7, said about Mantineia in Arkadia) should be handled cautiously because there is a problem of 'focalization' or viewpoint: Xenophon does not make it clear if he endorses the Mantineian opinion he is quoting. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* presents an ideal ruler and military commander, the founder of the Persian empire. This treatise by no means advocates the polar opposite of democracy, and may even have influenced Plato's picture in the *Laws* of Cyrus' Persia as a blend of monarchy and democracy.[12] So too the briefer *Agesilaos* finds the qualities of ideal king in Xenophon's friend, the Spartan king from 400 to 359. This admiration for the Spartan king does not proceed from a partisan bias in favour of Sparta – on the contrary, it has been shown that Xenophon is very ready to criticize Sparta and Spartan behaviour.[13] It proceeds, more simply, from admiration for Agesilaos personally and from the same interest in good one-man rule as is displayed in the *Hiero* and the *Cyropaedia*. These works, and Isokrates' 'Cyprian orations' (the *Evagoras*, the

*Nikokles*, cf. also what is said about Theseus in the *Helen* 31–7), are important as the first surviving prose treatises on kingship, *peri basileias*, which were to be common in the hellenistic period. Xenophon's Cyrus is a leader who rules, not by divine right, or by oppression, but by a title conferred by his own exertions (*philoponia, askesis*), which made him a kind of servant of his people: Herakles was the divine model for this conception. 'Glorious servitude' was a slogan used (Aelian, *Var Hist.* 2. 20) to describe hellenistic kingship. These doctrines were part of the kingship theory associated especially with the Cynics (a sect of popular philosophy founded in the fourth century by Antisthenes): they believed in renouncing social life – a deep paradox for a Greek, with his developed sense of participation in *polis* life, and one which shows how in some quarters the idea of the *polis* was coming to seem bankrupt.

All this might seem to be evidence of a fourth-century disenchantment with democracy, but the qualification above, that Xenophon's treatises (and those of Isokrates), are the first *prose* treatises, is important. Already in the first half of the fifth century, Pindar in *Pythian* 1 had urged the real-life Hieron of Syracuse – the subject of Xenophon's imaginary *Hiero* – to 'guide your people with a rudder of justice, and forge your tongue on an anvil of truth' (lines 86ff.); similarly *Pythian* 5 begins and ends (lines 109ff.) with praise of the virtues of King Arkesilas of Kyrene; and Pindar wrote an encomium of the 'bold-planning' Macedonian Alexander son of Amyntas (F120–1). Such praise and exhortation is a reminder that, as we have seen in earlier chapters, Syracuse, Kyrene and Macedon were places where kingship under one name or another was well-entrenched for much or all of the classical period (for *basileus* used of Hiero see, for example, *Olympian* 1 line 23, 'Syracuse's horse-loving king'; but Pindar also cheerfully calls Hiero a 'people-guiding tyrant', *Pythian* 3 line 85). But that said, there is something more systematic, practical and professional about the prose treatises of the fourth century. The vogue for such writings extended even to Sparta, which also had its kings: one Kleon of Halikarnassos wrote a *logos* (probably a pamphlet or a speech) used by Lysander in about 400 BC when he sought to reform the kingship there, suggesting it be made a 'career open to talent', i.e. to himself (*FGrHist* 583 T 1). Kingship is just another profession and a subject for systematic analysis: if Kleon's treatment emancipated itself from the need to hang the subject from the peg of individual rulers in the manner of Pindar, Isokrates and Xenophon, it would be ahead of its time, anticipating the direct, general professional handling of Plato and Aristotle. But we know too little about this interesting *logos*, though its author knew what he was talking about: he came from a city, Karian Halikarnassos, which had plenty of experience of Persian-sponsored one-man rule, and which the Hekatomnid satrap Mausolus made his capital twenty-five years later (the Hekatomnid family were appointed satraps of Karia a very few years after 400).

The fourth century is indeed an age of increased professionalism (in the sense of specialized and technical knowledge, rather than with the necessary implication of paid as opposed to unpaid) and systematization in general: it is

after all the age of Aristotle. The change is, however, one of degree: the process had already begun in the fifth century, when the first of the Hippocratic medical treatises were written down (the name of the great founder of the school of medicine became shorthand for the literary productions of the school as a whole); when Hippodamus of Miletus wrote the first known book on town planning (Ar. *Pol.* 1267bff.); when Damon and Glaukos of Rhegium wrote musical treatises (Plut. *Mor*. 1132e); when the Syracusans Korax and Tisias wrote about rhetoric (above pp. 49, 146); when practitioners of the arts like Sophocles who wrote a monograph on the Chorus, Polykleitos the sculptor who wrote an influential book about the 'Canon' or 'Rule',[14] and Parrhasios the painter expounded the theory behind their practice.

## Military theory and practice

One sphere in which differences are perceptible after the Peloponnesian War is that of military theory and practice.[15] It might be better to say that differences were perceived by fourth-century observers, and perhaps exaggerated by them for rhetorical purposes. Thus Demosthenes in the *Third Philippic* makes the contrast between what is evidently the Peloponnesian War period and his own day:

> I am told that the Spartans and everyone else fought for four or five months in the summer; they would invade, ravage the countryside with a citizen hoplite army and go home again. But now Philip leads an army not just of hoplites but of light-armed troops, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and he campaigns summer and winter through.
>
> (9. 48ff.)

The orator–politician seeks to rouse his fellow citizens to greater efforts by this alarming picture. So too a speaker in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, trying to galvanize a Spartan rather than an Athenian audience, comments on the single-mindedness of Jason the ruler of Thessalian Pherai (6. 1. 15), who 'uses night as well as day … and rolls morning and evening into one'. Again there is a comparison, this time implied rather than explicit, with more normal, seasonal and leisurely methods. Something must lie behind these altered perceptions, but it is difficult to know how much allowance should be made for the speaker's needs and sentiments, which certainly include a degree of nostalgia as well as a desire to frighten. The citizen hoplites of the fifth century were far from universal, thus Thracian light-armed soldiers were hired by the Athenians at the time of the Sicilian expedition (Th. 7. 27 and 29). Nor was winter campaigning unheard of even in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (cf. the Corinthian operations described at Th. 2. 33). So what had really changed by the fourth century?

At Athens at any rate, a new sort of relationship developed in the 420s between a politician and an army commander, between Kleon and the *strategos*

Demosthenes (the 'other' Demosthenes, not the fourth-century enemy of Philip). These were both exceptional individuals it is true, and therefore a bad basis for generalization, but their co-operation foreshadows the fourth-century Athenian divide between the military man and the politician (cf. *Lys*. 13. 7, Ar. *Pol.* 1305a7 and Isok. 8. 54–5 for contemporary awareness of the change). The Peloponnesian War was partly responsible for this: generals now had to think up new methods of fighting and this called for focused energy and specialized thinking, in fact for professionalism. Phormio in 429 actually *wants* to fight in the open sea because he is confident that his by now highly trained sailors can cope better than the Peloponnesians with choppy conditions; yet only a few years earlier, at Sybota, the fighting is at close quarters and resembles a land battle, a *pezomachia*, in its clumsy absence of tactical manoeuvring – just like the battle of Salamis in 480 (Th. 2. 83 and 89; contrast 1. 49 and 74). In other words a year or two of war brought more change than had been seen in the entire *pentekontaetia*. (The final sea battle at Syracuse in 413 was another affair that resembled a *pezomachia*, Th. 7. 62, but that was not through the choice of the Athenians.) Phormio was not a politician, though he fell a victim to politics, disgraced for alleged financial misbehaviour (*FGrHist* 324 Androtion F8). But even a 'professional' sailor like Phormio needed the essentially political skills of rhetoric (Th. 2. 89, a speech of encouragement which may be inauthentic in detail but which surely stands for a speech that was really delivered). So too the Spartan Brasidas, 'not bad at speaking for a Spartan' (Th. 4. 84. 2), is actually presented as a brilliant orator; and there is reason to think he was not a bad politician either: for purposes of literary highlighting and to stress his romantic isolation in the north, Thucydides has (I have argued elsewhere) played down the extent to which he secured backing for his mission from the home authorities.[16] This was no simple soldier stabbed in the back by the politicians. But though Brasidas is a reminder that it was only at Athens that the careers of the soldier and of the politician had started to part company, he does seem, as far as our imperfect evidence permits the conclusion, to have been a truly exceptional soldier and a notable military innovator. For instance, the 'hollow square' tactic which helped him to extricate his troops from a difficult situation in Lynkestis in 423 BC is not attested earlier (Th. 4. 125. 3–4).

Another way in which the Peloponnesian War changed attitudes was by the campaigning demands it made:[17] long periods away from home must inevitably increase professionalism, just as at Rome the professional army of Gaius Marius naturally resulted from the protracted Spanish fighting of the second century BC. Xenophon's *Anabasis* has much that is relevant. Tissaphernes (2. 1. 7) employs Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthos, as specialist adviser, and one Koiratadas of Thebes (7. 1. 33, admittedly a somewhat comic figure) is found at Byzantium at the end of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, 'asking if any city or tribe needed a general'. We find 'tactics' offered as part of the curriculum of the 'sophists' (above, p. 154), the professional teachers who professed to make even virtue into a teachable science – Plato's *Protagoras*

is the key text. Socrates was different from these men because he took no fee, because he was less pretentious – and because he was better. Plato and Xenophon report the claims of sophists to give education in military matters (Plato *Euthydemus* 271d, 273e, 290c; Xen. *Memorabilia* 3. 1. 11ff.), though Xenophon shows that the 'art of generalship' which a man like Dionysodorus professed might turn out to be merely 'tactics' in the *Greek* sense of the word, i.e. drawing up troops in formation, not the modern sense of 'how to win a battle'. (Contrast *Cyrop.* 1. 6. 14 with its sensible plea for the study of topics like medical care, strategy and discipline.) By contrast, Plato's *Laches*, set early in the Peloponnesian War, soon after the battle of Delium in 424, discusses the concept of courage: a simple definition offered early on is that a man is courageous when he stays in the battle line resisting the enemy and disdains flight. Tyrtaeus would have said the same thing two centuries earlier. The dialogue begins, it is true, with a discussion of *hoplomachia*, i.e. fencing with hoplite weapons; but this is scornfully dismissed on the grounds that if it were any use the Spartans would go in for it. (This is an interesting point: Spartan citizens, because of their favourable economic position, were for a long time exceptional in going in for single-minded training, being, as Xenophon puts it in a good phrase (*Lakedaimonion Politeia* 13. 5), 'craftsmen of war'. By the time Aristotle wrote his *Politics* (330s), that had changed: 'when the Spartans were alone in their strenuous military discipline they were superior to everybody, but now they are beaten by everybody: the reason is that in former times they trained and others did not' (*Pol.* 1338b).

The transition from amateur to professional comes with Xenophon himself, who wrote treatises like the *Horsemanship* and the *Cavalry Commander* (not to mention the *Cyropaedia,* which covers leadership in its widest sense), which offer solid technical advice – yet their author seeks to avoid the stigma of professionalism. This is shown by his attitude to his only known predecessor in the genre, one Simon 'Hippikos', whom Xenophon looks down on as *hippikos*, horsey, i.e. a professional cavalryman by contrast with Xenophon himself who, as a landed gentleman and amateur, wrote his treatises ostensibly for the instruction of his younger relations. But the surviving fragments of Simon's treatise[18] show that Xenophon drew on Simon. This is a warning to us not to distinguish too sharply between 'amateur' and 'professional'. Much depended on social class.

A more comprehensive military handbook was the *Poliorketikos*, 'how to defend yourself under siege against an attack', of Aeneias 'the Tactician', already discussed from the political point of view (above p. 191). Militarily, the stress is on resourcefulness, an old idea ('guileful Odysseus') which co-existed unproblematically with the upright ideal of Achilles who hated 'like the gates of Hades the man who conceals one thing in his heart but says another' (*Iliad* 9. 312f., a speech addressed, in effect, to Odysseus). The *rusé* leader is much in evidence in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Hellenika* – Agesilaos (*Hell.* 3. 4. 11; 5. 4. 48f.) sends notice along one line of march demanding that provisions be prepared – and then takes a different direction to throw the

enemy off. Economic difficulties lie behind the ideal of the general as 'good at providing' (Xen. *Mem.* 3. 1. 6; *Hell.* 3. 1. 8 about Derkyllidas who because of the number of tricks up his sleeves was nicknamed Sisyphus, after the death-cheating trickster of Greek mythology). Even as late as the period after Alexander the Great, Eumenes of Cardia is a good example of the resourceful 'Odysseus' type, and a debt can be traced in his behaviour to Xenophon's writings.[19]

One reason, however, why generalship was slow to develop as a science before the fourth century, and why handbooks did not flourish before then, is that the conditions of ancient warfare placed practical limits on the powers of generals, especially during the course of a battle, i.e. once an action had been joined. This in its turn had several causes.

First, a conventional classical Greek battle was fought without reserves, by citizen hoplites. The reconstruction of hoplite battles is a difficult and disputed topic; Delium (424), Mantineia (418) and the first Athenian–Syracusan battle (415, see 6. 69–70), are some of the best descriptions we have – all from Thucydides – but even he takes a lot for granted. 'There was a fierce struggle and shoving, *othismos*, of shields', says Thucydides of Delium (4. 96. 2). But was that all? Herodotus, speaking of the battle of Plataia 479, has the expression 'until it came to the *othismos*', and Thucydides describes people 'fighting out in front' in the early stages of the 415 battle in Sicily (6. 69. 2): evidence like this has been taken to imply that there was an initial and perhaps prolonged phase of scattered individual and disorganized combat,[20] after which opposing groups of heavily armed infantry troops joined ranks and the melee became general. It is difficult to be confident about the usualness of the first phase, but in the second phase it is sure that solidarity and holding the line counted for everything. This type of fighting was owed (in theory at least) by the citizens on behalf of their territory, and this perhaps inhibited the holding back of *part* of the forces available, as a reserve. That attitude was, however, disappearing in the fourth century: Aeneias has a special section on reserves (Chapter 38) and Diodorus Siculus has much to say about reserves in his accounts, from good sources, of the Greek warfare in Sicily against Carthage (late fifth and early fourth centuries; see, for example, 13. 54, Selinus in about 409). There are plenty of examples in Alexander's day, for instance his sieges of Halikarnassos, Miletus and Aornos. The relevance of reserves to a general's powers is this: with reserves kept back in his hand, it was possible for him to pick the critical moment to throw in reinforcements, so that more now depended on his judgement and timing. The Theban Epaminondas' famous deepening of the hoplite phalanx to fifty at Leuktra in 371 was really a deployment of a strategic reserve.[21]

A second reason for the relative powerlessness of a general during a battle is the essentially democratic expectation that the commander should lead from the front. This meant that a general in the thick of a battle could do little about directing its course. Hence messages are very rarely recorded as having reached the commander during a battle; usually something goes wrong, cf. for

example Parmenion's message to Alexander who over-pursued at Gaugamela (p. 308f.).

A third reason why the fifth-century general could not achieve much is political: the powers of a city-state general were limited by the desire to avoid conferring autocratic power on one man. Even in Sparta, the kings could be, and were, called to account for misdemeanours in the field,[22] although discipline was maintained until the return home (cf. Th. 5. 60 and 63: King Agis declined battle in 418, causing indignation in his army. The Spartans and their allies followed Agis out of respect for the law, but loudly blamed Agis. When the Spartans got home they considered fining him a huge sum (100,000 drachmai) and demolishing his house, but then relented and merely restricted his powers as commander still further: he was always to be accompanied by ten 'advisers'.). At Athens, generals were liable to deposition, and though it is possible (Chapter 12, p. 148) that their ability to take strategic initiatives was greater than is sometimes believed, still they were mostly appointees for one year only, and were of course a panel not a despot. ('I congratulate the Athenians', said Philip sarcastically, 'for finding ten generals every year; I have only ever found one, Parmenio': Plut. *Mor.* 177c, cf. p. 149.) Even Timoleon, who was sent to Sicily from Corinth as *autokrator* (i.e. with unrestricted powers) in the mid-fourth century, was in constant touch with the home government (cf. Plut. *Timol.* 24. 3, 16. 3 for advisers and reinforcements); and I have argued that we should not exaggerate the degree of Brasidas' isolation and alienation from the Spartan authorities at home. Nor was the distinction between home authorities and armies in the field always a simple one. Nikias in Sicily is represented by Thucydides as worried about the future reaction of the Athenian troops who now clamour to go home; he says that when they get back, they will be just as loud in clamouring that their generals had been bribed to withdraw from Sicily (Th. 7. 48. 4). The 'army as *polis*' was an older and more widespread phenomenon than an exclusive concentration on Xenophon's *Anabasis* would lead us to suppose.[23] Contrast the methods of the fourth-century Age of the Dictators, with the classical fifth-century Athenian position: even allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, Demosthenes' *Third Philippic*, quoted above, is not a bad picture of Philip's position, unimpeded by committees or campaigning seasons; and for the concentration of power cf. Demosthenes' first *Olynthiac* (1. 40): 'he has entire control over everything, being at the same time general, master, treasurer'. Alexander, it is true, discusses problems with his general staff, but often overrides their advice once elicited. This is only partly the result of the monarchic character of the Macedonian military tradition (with which Jason's Thessaly or Dionysius' Syracuse are comparable). Even the city-state commanders of the fourth century were noticeably more free than their fifth-century predecessors from interference by their political masters. So Chares in the 350s campaigned recklessly in Asia Minor, winning victories over the Persian king – until the latter wrote to the Athenians ordering them to make him desist; and Chabrias in 379 was recalled, as the result of a

similar complaint, from service in Egypt, then in revolt from Persia. These instances show both the freedom of fourth-century generals, and also – in the rapid compliance of Athens with requests for their recall – the limits of that freedom.[24] Such additional freedom as can be detected in this period is in part the product of sheer lack of money (cf. for example Dem. 49 for Timotheos' astonishing financial expedients before his campaign of 373): this meant that Athenian commanders, not fuelled in their campaigning by the old tribute of the Delian League, had to use their wits – like Iphikrates, also in the 370s, who had to put his soldiers to work on the land at Kerkyra for their rations (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 37). The same Iphikrates had maintained an army for nearly five years at Corinth, twenty years earlier.

We may pass now from theories of generalship and the limitations on generals in practice – the second, as we have seen, impeding the development of the first – to the realities, and especially the novelties, of warfare in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The first salient feature of the period is the use of mercenary soldiers, the professionals par excellence. Questions of definition arise immediately; by the fourth century, the sharpness of the line between citizens and mercenaries was growing fuzzier, as Theban, Athenian and Spartan commanders and kings like Pammenes, Chabrias and Agesilaus in effect hired themselves and their troops out to Persian kings and satraps, but without ceasing to be Thebans, Athenians and Spartans who might once again fight for their own *polis*; we need the concept of the 'citizen mercenary'[25] for this sort of phenomenon. The vocabulary of mercenaries is in any case fluid; words like *epikouroi* (helpers), *xenoi* (foreigners) are found alongside *misthophoroi* and the perhaps more pejorative *misthotoi* (for which see Th. 4. 129. 2 and 5. 6. 4, both times about Thracians), both meaning roughly 'hired men'.

The idea of mercenaries was hardly new – archaic tyrants like Pisistratus had relied on mercenaries. It is not an accident that the use of mercenaries, common in one autocratic phase of Greek history (the archaic), revives in another (the fourth century). Polybius (11. 13. 5–8) explicitly makes the connection between tyrants and mercenaries, and Xenophon makes Hiero admit *(Hiero* 10) that there is no way in which a tyrant can avoid dependence on mercenaries. This is borne out by real-life Sicilian history: Gelon has 10,000 mercenaries in the early fifth century (Diod. 11. 72. 3). So like the increase in the powers of commanders, for example Jason of Pherai, this fourth-century phenomenon is in part a product of contemporary monarchism. The big difference, however, between archaic and late classical use of mercenaries is this: in the archaic period mercenaries tended to come from a few, always notoriously impoverished, parts of the Greek world such as Krete, Arkadia or the northern Peloponnese. In these places mercenary service was a kind of alternative to colonization, both being a form of emigration to escape poverty. (The same is true of piracy, which persisted as the 'national pastime'[26] in Krete, Aitolia and Illyria until well into the hellenistic period; for its prevalence in the fourth century see p. 246f.) In the fourth century, by contrast, mercenary

service has ceased to be the near monopoly of the 'fringe' areas just mentioned, because economic problems had now hit the great mainstream *poleis* of Greece as well. A study[27] of perhaps the most famous mercenary army of all time, the 10,000 of Xenophon's *Anabasis* (p. 190 above), has shown by examining the origins of individual commanders and men that whereas Arkadia and Achaia hold their own as centres for mercenary recruitment – something to which the Arkadian Lykomedes alludes with pride (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 23, cf., for Krete, *Syll.*[3] 600 of 200 BC, among much other hellenistic evidence) – nevertheless Athens and Sparta provide large percentages of the officers.

Persia's role in all this is important: near the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Pissouthnes has a mercenary force (Th. 3. 34. 2), a mixture of Arkadians and 'barbarians' (possibly Karians),[28] and the Athenian Lykon has a mercenary force a few years later *(FGrHist* 688 Ktesias Fl5 para 53). And Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus have mercenaries early in the phase of the war after the Sicilian expedition, the so-called 'Ionian War' (Th. 8. 25. 2[29] and Diod. 13. 51. 1). Moreover, references in Xenophon's *Anabasis* to developed and detailed terms of service – one 'daric' per month for men, four times that for generals – imply a fairly long evolution before 401. But the fourth century is the great age of mercenary service, leading to complaints by Isokrates about the 'roving bands of mercenaries' whom he considers such a menace[30] to orderly civic life (see, for example, 5. 120f.; letter 9. 9; 4. 168). The most notable achievements of these mercenaries were in foreign service: already in the 390s we hear of the sub-satrap Mania's force of mercenary soldiers (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1. 13), but above all it was in the Persian attempts to recover Egypt, in revolt since 404, that mercenaries were indispensable on both sides (Diod. 16. 44: a total of 35,000 on the two sides when Egypt was recovered in 343). It was the activity of Iphikrates of Athens, as well of Xenophon's 10,000, which made this difference to the nature of warfare: as we saw, he kept an army for five years in Corinthian territory and this was subsidized by Persia (*FGrHist* 328 F 150; Ar. *Wealth* 174). It was not only mercenary service which was changed, but social attitudes: returning mercenaries helped to dissolve racial prejudice: in 401 a soldier is sent packing from Xenophon's army because he 'has pierced ears just like a Lydian' (Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 31) – but by the end of the century such racial dislike was being overcome: 'the man whose natural beauty is good is nobly born, though he be an Ethiopian', says a character in a lost play of Menander (F 612 Koerte).

The second salient feature of fourth-century warfare is greater flexibility and lightness of armour. Iphikrates was the innovator here too: his force is described (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 16) as composed of *peltasts*, i.e. soldiers armed more lightly than hoplites, with a crescent-shaped *pelte* or light shield, which did not have the inside strap that made the hoplite harder to separate from his shield and was perhaps the single piece of equipment most responsible for making the hoplite formation a cohesive force. Iphikrates added light boots (Diod. 15. 44) which took his name, 'Iphikratids', like Wellington boots. This kind of light-armed fighter may have originated in Thrace (cf. Th. 7. 27.1);

but Demosthenes' experience of Akarnanian fighting methods in Aitolia is also relevant (Th. 3. 98), a lesson learnt by Kleon at Pylos not long after; and (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 2. 1) 5000 sailors were so equipped by Thrasyllos (409). The most famous victory won by such troops was the destruction, in combination with Athenian hoplites, of nearly half a regiment of 600 Spartans at Lechaion (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 5.11ff.): it was the *combination* of light and heavy armed troops that was unbeatable.

There were economic reasons for the decline of hoplite fighting: hoplite armour was expensive, and the lighter the armour the cheaper. But it would be wrong to say that hoplite fighting dies out with the arrival in a big way of the mercenary and the *peltast*: the decisive battles of Leuktra (371), Mantineia (362) and Chaironea (338) were all fought with regular infantry.

A third feature of fourth-century warfare, related to the other two, is training. We saw that the Spartans had once been thought peculiar in their dedicated training system. Certainly Athens (as Socrates remarks, Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 15, cf. Th. 2. 39, from the *Funeral Oration*) bothered very little with infantry training (cavalry, as so often, were different: Xenophon's equestrian treatises show, in the complex manoeuvres they describe, that much trouble was taken here; and naval training was always at a high pitch, cf. Th. 2. 84ff.). Some time in the 330s the Athenians reformed the *ephebate*, a compulsory two-year national military service. But the first epigraphic evidence for this is to be dated 334/3, not (as has been wrongly claimed) in the 360s, although there is some literary evidence – a mention of *sunepheboi* in Aischines (2. 167) – that the institution existed in some form in the mid-century and no doubt much earlier too.[31] The Athenian state, it would therefore seem, had until the mid-fourth century been a little casual about military training; but individuals like Iphikrates in the early part of the century (Polyain. 3. 9. 32; Nep. *Iphik.* 2) trained their soldiers in sham manoeuvres, never letting them be idle.

Elsewhere the idea of training was fast catching on – hence the elite corps we find at various places: at Thebes in the 370s (Plut. *Pelop.* 19. 3); Arkadia in the 360s (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 22); Argos (Th. 5. 67); Syracuse as early as the 460s. But the great exponents of professional training were the autocratic military innovators of Sicily, Thessaly (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 1. 5ff. for Jason's personally conducted training sessions in full armour) and above all Macedon. Diodorus (16. 3. 1) describes Philip's drilling and manoeuvring which resulted in a proper 'standing army' as Demosthenes calls it (8. 11), and like the Roman commanders Scipio Africanus or Marius he is said to have cut down on camp followers and made his men carry their own provisions.[32]

Sicily's contribution to professionalism was in the field of siege warfare and use of artillery. Generally, Greeks were slow to make technological innovations, partly because as long as slaves could be used to perform dreary routine functions, the impulse towards mechanization was lacking. But the military pressures of the late fifth century – the Peloponnesian War in Greece, the Carthaginian Wars in Sicily – made the combatants more inventive, just as in the First Punic (Carthaginian) War a new kind of boarding bridge was

invented by the Romans before the battle of Mylai (Polyb. 1. 22), when they were taking to the sea for the first time against a more experienced enemy. Even at the siege of Plataia in the early 420s, and at Delium (Th. 4. 100), there is some very ingenious machinery used – pipes for blowing fire, and so on. But the absence of artillery from the detailed military narrative of Thucydides is one of the strongest arguments for thinking that it had not been invented before the end of the fourth century (the 'engines', *mechanai*, of, for example, 7. 43. 1 will have been simple battering rams or covered mobile huts for protecting attackers).[33] In 399 BC non-torsion artillery for shooting bolts was invented (Diod. 14. 42. 1); torsion artillery comes in at about the middle of the fourth century:[34] the machines with which Philip was repulsed by Onomarchos in the Third Sacred War (below, p. 279) were probably non-torsion stone-throwing devices. Torsion weapons feature in inscriptions before the end of the century (*IG* $2^2$ 1467 B col. ii 48–56, mentioning springs made of hair. Women's hair was best.).[35]

The effect of this on the defenders of besieged cities was to transform the art of fortification. Aeneias the Tactician mentions artillery only once (32. 8), when he suggests mining and sapping beneath the ground on which catapults among other things rested. But archaeology shows that the arrival of artillery made far more difference than Aineias implies: city circuits were now greatly strengthened; sprawling, contour-hugging circuits ('Geländemauer' circuits) were built to deny the vantage of high ground to the besiegers; crenellations became normal, sally ports are more frequent (with the object of making a raid on the siege engines outside), and we find zigzag 'traces' (a trace is the line a wall follows on the ground), designed to catch the attacking enemy 'on the hip', i.e. on his exposed shieldless side (so-called 'indented trace').[36]

Much of the military change so far reviewed in this chapter is the result of economic pressures: mercenary service, *peltast* equipment and methods, and so on, have partly economic causes. Other specifically fourth-century features of warfare have more general political explanations (cf. above on training and generalship). It is time now to turn from the strictly military results of the Peloponnesian War to its more general effects.

## Political developments

Politically, democracy was everywhere in retreat, apart from a brief period after Leuktra in 371 (see above, n. 7). The year 447 had been the high point of Athenian democratic influence. The Athenian fleet, the vehicle of the proselytizing democracy, was much reduced in 404, and although Athenian maritime ambitions were soon to revive, as we shall see, and though case histories like Miletus show that strong democratic factions could survive the fall of Athens,[37] still the Athenians were never again able to export and impose democracy on the old scale. Internally, the Athenian democracy became less radical (above p. 152): the powers of executive officials (and of the Council) were enhanced at the expense of the Assembly. Theoreticians like Theramenes

and Isokrates found intellectual justifications for welcoming such changes, often by manipulation of the idea of the 'ancestral constitution' which was identified with many a reactionary programme (p. 183).

Since the Athenians were less influential abroad than they had been, it was natural that political systems other than democracy should be tried. The most obvious was oligarchy,[38] which traditionally the Spartans had tended to sponsor. The Spartan victory in 404 had brought oligarchic and often Spartan-superintended regimes to power in places like Thasos, the east Aegean and – the best example of all – Athens, with its Thirty Tyrants (p. 218 below). The Spartan general Lysander was the author of the policy of imposing such regimes, which were often called decarchies, i.e. ten-man juntas;[39] Athens conforms in a rough way to this model because, as has been well said, 'there is no difficulty in thinking of the Thirty as a larger decarchy for a larger state'.[40] Spartan imperialism was harsh, though wildly popular with the propertied class in a place like Samos,[41] where Lysander was accorded cultic honours, though perhaps only after his death.[42] The democrats at Samos had been obstinately and heroically loyal to Athens right down to the end of the war (see the Athenian inscription honouring them for this, ML 94 = Fornara 166) and the gesture now made to Lysander is part of the reaction. But Spartan methods were not generally acceptable: even Lysander recognized this when rebuking the *harmost* Kallibios for raising his stick against a prominent Athenian: 'you do not know how to rule free men' (Plut. *Lys.* 15. 7).[43] The dominance, in the Greek world as a whole, of the conservative propertied class had to wait for its final entrenchment until the hellenistic and Roman periods when it found guarantors even stronger than the Sparta of Lysander.

The extreme experiences of Athenian democracy on the one hand and Spartan-sponsored oligarchic regimes on the other, neither wholly satisfactory, led to a search for yet other kinds of political system. One was tyranny of an old-fashioned kind. It had been characteristic of archaic tyranny that it went hand in hand with urbanization, for example at Corinth and other cities on the Isthmus. Now, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, we find tyrannies in places like Thessaly which had avoided tyranny earlier. Thessaly's fourth-century tyrants were not unique: some of the satraps, like the Karian Mausolus, resemble archaic tyrants like the Athenian Pisistratids in their wealth, their artistic patronage, and in the way they determined the political character of the cities they controlled without necessarily dismantling their self-governing institutions[44] (there were archons at Pisistratid Athens, ML 6 = Fornara 23; and there was an Assembly at Mausolan Iasos, see *Syll.*$^3$ 169, which opens 'it seemed good to the council and assembly … to confiscate the property of the men who plotted against Mausolus'). Even in the developed states of mainland Greece there were fourth-century tyrants, like Euphron at Sikyon (a place which had already had a century of tyranny in the archaic age, evidently without having been inoculated). Xenophon's account of this man's funeral honours

(*Hell.* 7. 3. 12) as 'benefactor and founder of the city' shows that tyrants were not automatically detested by classical Greeks; nor we can we explain away the phenomenon of Euphron by seeing him as a straightforward champion of the people.[45] The great seminary of tyrants, however, was Sicily, especially Syracuse, which returned to tyrannical rule under Dionysius I in 406, only a few years after the victory over the invading Athenians.

But in the long run it was not a mushroom tyranny of the Jason or Euphron type which did most damage to the Athenian democratic ideal, but a fourth type of regime, the traditional hereditary monarchy of Macedon. This was not fortuitous: perhaps Philip succeeded where Jason failed precisely because of the cruder, less urbanized, less developed *polis* structure of Macedon compared to Thessaly. Philip, a purer type of autocrat, had no civic assemblies to obstruct him (see, for example, Dem. 18. 235). In Macedon, then, few concessions were made to Greek political forms. In this respect the monarchy in Epirus[46] in mountainous north-west Greece seems to have been more progressive. Even before about 385, the Molossian tribes had combined with the neighbouring Thesprotians and Chaonians to form a Molossian state with a king and officials called *prostates* (president), *grammateus* (secretary), and tribal representatives called *demiourgoi*; also *hieromnemones*, some kind of cult figure. (See for all this *SGDI* 1334–67; also *SEG* 23. 471: fifteen *synarchontes*, federal officials. This inscription shows that Orestis was part of the federal organization, that is, the *koinon* or federation embraced an area which would later be Macedonian territory.) So Epirus was a blend of straightforward tribalism, Homeric kingship (the Molossian kings claimed descent from Achilles' son Neoptolemos, a theme developed in the *Andromache* of Euripides),[47] and the apparatus of Greek constitutional government. The process was said to have begun with King Tharyps (perhaps a variant of the name Arybbas) who, in the fifth century, gave the Molossians 'laws, a senate, and annual magistrates' (Justin 17. 13; the essential point may be right though the phraseology is perhaps a bit too Roman, cf. Tac. *Ann.* 11. 19 on the 'senate, magistrates and laws' imposed by Corbulo on the Frisii in the first century AD).

The coalition of states represented by the fourth-century Molossian *koinon* or League leads to the fifth regime characteristic of the period, namely federalism. Terminology is far from exact or technical and it would be a mistake to think that every mention of a *koinon* (literally 'common thing') indicates federalism. Sometimes it just means 'community'; thus Thucydides (1. 89. 3) speaks of 'the *koinon* of the Athenians', which hardly means more than 'the Athenians'. Again, the near-silence of Aristotle on the subject of federalism might be felt disturbing if it really was an important feature of the fourth century. But none of this justifies scepticism about the existence of ancient Greek federalism; for instance the first secure attestation of the Aitolian league is an inscription of the 360s, found in the 1930s, which mentions the 'koinon of the Aitolians', who were a loose conglomeration of *ethne* or tribes, and this is clearly a different sort of usage from Thucydides'

reference (above) to the Athenians just after the Persian Wars. (Federalism is found typically but not necessarily in regions settled by *ethne* as opposed to *poleis*, but there are important exceptions to this, such as the Chalkidic league, already mentioned (p. 96), the Arkadian,[48] and the Boiotian, on which see below.) As for Aristotle, his silence is not quite complete, because he does once refer to the Arkadian league (*Pol.* 126la29, on which see n. 48).

Federalism is not much heard of in archaic Greece: the Ionian, Aitolian and Karian leagues, as such, did something to co-ordinate resistance to Persia, but seem to have been religious rather than political entities up to the fifth century.[49] Nor did the Delian or Peloponnesian 'Leagues' – despite their modern names – contribute much to the development of federalism. The Boiotian League, whose origins we have traced and whose great period we have yet to record, is the earliest and most important of the great confederations, and we may anticipate discussion of the Theban hegemony by saying that one of its most permanent legacies was the export of the federal principle. (For Arkadia see Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 38, although Xenophon systematically under-reports the Arkadian League, which was directed by Thebes against Sparta;[50] for Aitolia see R/O no. 35 = Harding 54; and for the Lokrians see *SEG* 12. 280.) Finally, an inscription (R/O no. 57 = Harding 74) attests a Boiotian *synedrion* or congress in the 350s modelled on the Second Athenian Confederacy,[51] and including ex-Athenian allies like Byzantium. This organization is concrete evidence of the way the Thebans, in their Aegean policy of the 360s, capitalized on Athenian unpopularity, stealing the Athenians' allies and institutions (see p. 262).

The great hegemonical powers disliked and distrusted such federal groupings within their own sphere of influence:[52] the Arkadian League was anti-Spartan, and after the battle of Leuktra in 371 the Spartans did not have the military power to dismantle it as they had dismantled the smaller Arkadian conglomeration in 385 (p. 235 for Mantineia). But this policy was not peculiarly Spartan: the Athenians intervened on the small, federally organized island of Keos in perhaps the 350s, to force them to administer their affairs *kata poleis*, by cities.[53] For federalism as a political advance see below p. 265: it was a way of achieving unity without force, and it was, through the representative principle, actually more democratic than many of the primary assemblies of the so-called democracies.

Politically, then, the disillusionment with the 'superpowers' Athens and Sparta, and above all their inability through relative weakness to impose a uniform political pattern on large parts of the Greek world, as the Athenians had done in the fifth century, and as the Spartans were to do after the Peloponnesian War and diminishingly down to about 380, led to a willingness to seek other kinds of political organization and to turn to other, external, saviours. Thus the secessionist states which fought Athens in the Social War[54] were democratic regimes at the outset: they turned to Persia, and soon ceased to be democratic. But it is important that Rhodes which turned against democratic Athens was originally itself a democracy.[55] For this paradoxical

revulsion an explanation must be sought in terms of Athenian policies (see further p. 272). This is serious evidence of disillusionment, and shows that it was no longer true, if it ever had been, that 'the *demos* everywhere is favourable to Athens' as Diodotus had once supposedly claimed in Athens in 427 (Th. 3. 47). Again, for Polybius, who is concerned to defend collaboration with Macedon, 'those who brought Philip into the Peloponnese, by humbling the Spartans, allowed the Peloponnesians to breathe again' (18. 14), because relieved of fear of Sparta. This exaggerates the Spartans' capacity to damage anybody after the 360s when the Thebans deprived them of Messenia; but the psychology of 'Philippizing', as of 'medizing' (cf. above on Rhodes) cannot be understood unless we grasp how little affection was felt for the Spartans and Athenians and their methods. Equally, the short-sighted rejoicing in Greece at Alexander's destruction of Thebes was caused not just by traditional dislike of Theban medizing in 479 (the Athenian oath taken before the battle of Plataia, carved in the fourth century, contains a clause vowing to 'tithe the property of the Thebans': R/O no. 88 = Fornara 57) but because of the hatred which Theban imperialism had aroused in the mid-fourth century (Isok. 5. 49ff. for this).

But none of this flirting with different political systems, or with outside kings and satraps, would have been possible if any of the great city-states had been strong enough to stop it at source by imposing a firmly based and permanent imperialism. That they were none of them strong enough to do this requires an explanation in economic terms, and it is to the economic effects of the Peloponnesian War that we now turn.

## Economic changes

The Peloponnesian War had been won because of Persian money. Without it, neither of the combatant Greek powers could prevail decisively. Economic weakness among the Greek states was, therefore, not simply *caused* by the Peloponnesian War, but was shown up by it: even Athens, with all the human and financial resources listed by Pericles (Th. 2. 13), could not survive twenty-seven years of war. The contrast with Rome is instructive: what impressed Polybius was inexhaustible Roman citizen manpower, which enabled the Romans to fight Carthage for decades without let-up (6. 52). Polybius neglects, but we should not, to emphasize *Italian* manpower, the result of the Romans' policy of integrating subject Italy and recruiting the peoples of Italy for their own war machine. Throughout the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians did little to integrate their subject allies in this way: only Plataia (Th. 3. 55) and Samos (ML 94, see above) were granted citizenship on equal terms.[56] As the emperor Claudius said, contrasting Rome with Athens and Sparta, the Greek states failed as imperial powers because they 'treated their conquered subjects as foreigners' (Tacitus, *Annals* 11. 24, for the thought cf. already Dion. Hal. *Roman Antiquities* 2. 17. 1–2).

We may begin with Athens, and with manpower. We have noticed that Athenians are found serving as mercenaries in the early fourth century (the Ten Thousand). For Isokrates, the mercenary problem (which he exaggerated, see n. 30) was a spiral: Greek poverty meant that it was necessary to use mercenaries themselves instead of expensively furnished hoplites, and poverty was the inducement to sign up: but these mercenaries exacerbated the problem, creating social unrest and increasing Greek poverty. So far as Isokrates was concerned, he was right that one cause of the phenomenon of the fourth-century mercenary was *penia*, poverty, and in particular the difficulty which the Greek states of the period found in feeding a large resident population. In Athens' case, imperialism and the search for grain imports had always gone together. In the fifth century the Athenians had imported corn, and policed its passage from distant suppliers, at the same time shipping off surplus mouths to the cleruchies. They could no longer do quite that in the fourth century, but we do find them getting rid of mouths in other ways: thus their most unpopular single imperialistic venture of the century, the establishment, maintenance and reinforcement of the cleruchy[57] sent to Samos in 365 and after (see p. 260) should probably be seen in part as a colonizing[58] venture designed to relieve pressure on the food supply at home; drought and corn shortage are attested at about this period (Dem. 50. 61: 361, and 20. 33: 357/6).[59] Demades was to call Samos an *aporrox*, an off-shoot of – or, perhaps, drain on – the city (*Ath.* 99d). If the latter is the right sense, there may be a reference to surplus mouths. And an inscription (R/O no. 100 = Harding 121, of 325/4) shows that the Athenians sent a colony to the Adriatic region under the sentimentally appropriate leadership of one Miltiades (the name of the sixth-century founder of the Athenian settlement on the Thracian Chersonese) 'in order' as the text revealingly says (lines 217ff.) 'that there may exist for all time for the people its own commercial outlet and supply of grain'. At this period, too (see above for the late 360s) there were acute corn difficulties in Greece, relevant to the docility of Greece under Alexander: Kyrene supplied grain to the Greek states and to Alexander's mother and sister (R/O no. 97 = Harding 116).

Other ways of getting rid of population were by mercenary service, already noticed, and by other kinds of voluntary emigration. Thus the collapse of the Athenian empire, a large-scale employer, led to a diaspora of sculptors, potters, jobbing architects and builders, and so on. (There is no big architectural project in Greece proper between the end of the Acropolis-building programme at Athens, at the end of the fifth century, and the Temple of Asklepios at Epidauros in the late 370s.) Some of these men went to Italy and Sicily,[60] others to the courts of satraps and kings elsewhere (thus contributing to the diffusion of hellenism in places like Macedon and Anatolia): people like the Athenians, Philistides and Theodorus, whose signatures happen to survive on statue bases from Asia Minor.[61] Others switched to executing private commissions in the Kerameikos, the cemetery quarter of Athens (this is the

great age of the Attic funeral monuments or *stelai*); still others returned to working on the land.

The population point is worth dwelling on, because population is one index of prosperity. But at Athens[62] the graph is not simple, as we shall see; and in any case the population of a state may diminish absolutely over fifty years, but if its capacity to feed even those mouths has diminished even faster, then it may be right to call that state overpopulated at the end of the period but not at the beginning. And that seems actually to be true of Athens between the late fifth and mid-fourth centuries.

Thucydides (2. 13) implies that there were 43,000 adult citizen males (25,000 hoplites, approximately 18,000 thetes), which we should multiply by two and a quarter to include women and children. But the Peloponnesian War led to a steep immediate drop: with the 25,000 hoplites above, compare the 9000 hoplites mentioned by Lysias (20. 13), a figure which rises to around 11,000 in the Corinthian War of the 390s (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 17, not a full turnout). The hoplite population was perhaps back to *c.* 14,500 by 322 (Diod. 18. 10) but dropped again with the emigration to Asia in Alexander's time. Figures for corn consumption confirm these population totals in approximate terms: from Eleusis inscriptions we see that 400,000 bushels (*medimnoi*) were produced annually from internal sources in the fourth century, and Demosthenes in the *Leptines* (20. 31ff.) says that another 400,000 came from the Black Sea *alone*, which he says was equal to the total produced from all other outside sources put together. Even assuming that Demosthenes has here exaggerated the importance of the Black Sea say *twice*, that makes a grand total of 1,600,000, i.e. 400,000 + 400,000 + (2 × 400,000) from all sources. At a consumption rate of 6 *medimnoi* per head we might guess at a total population of a quarter of a million; this is not impossible (if we allow 100,000 slaves and 40,000 metics). To sum up, the *pentekontaetia* is a period of great prosperity, and Athens' population reaches its maximum in *c.* 432. Then the plague and war casualties caused a heavy drop. In the fourth century it rises again steadily (such post-war demographic recovery can be paralleled from more recent times), hence the need for emigration, of the various kinds we have listed.

If we turn to Athens' economic condition generally, there is an obvious sense in which Athenian citizens were less prosperous now, with no empire, i.e. no overseas possessions for the rich and no cleruchies for the poor (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2. 8. 1 or Plato *Euthyphro* 4 for individuals who lost estates in 404). If we understand the strength of the desire, at all social levels, to get all this back, we have the key to Athenian foreign policy in 400–350.

On the other hand, all Attica was now Athenian again, and we have an inscription (*IG* $2^2$ 1237, *Syll.*[3] 921) from precisely Dekeleia – the fort in north Attica occupied by the Spartans for the last ten years of the war – which reflects the physical recovery by Athens of these more distant demes, and their reorganization in the 390s (the inscription is a document about the powers of 'phratries', which were religious groups with a family base).[63]

But there is evidence that the 390s in particular were a lean time financially, thus a Lysianic speech (Lys. 30. 22) says frankly that when times are hard the Council listens more readily to denunciations of the rich. And it is significant that ostracism is not heard of after Hyperbolus (Th. 8.73: 416, see p. 11 for its leniency.).

But the gloom should not be overdone, as it is by those scholars who speak of a more or less permanent 'crisis' in fourth-century Attica.[64] A favourite Marxist explanation of the economic difficulties of the fourth-century Greek states is that land was being 'grabbed' by *latifondisti*, i.e. big capitalist proprietors who were forcing out the peasants and smallholders. This explanation tends to fasten on Attica, because that is where the evidence is – though it is actually more true of Sparta (below). At Athens, the hypothesis of accumulation of estates was based partly on the number of *horoi* (markers indicating a debt charged on the land), which were thought to show an indebted peasantry. But it has been shown[65] that these encumbrances usually just represent routine raising of money, by reasonably prosperous people, for such purposes as raising dowries, leasing out property of children underage, etc. Another supposed piece of evidence is a remark by Dionysius of Halikarnassos who says (in his introduction to Lysias' *Oration* 34) that in 403, 5000 Athenian citizens owned no land; but this does not prove an agricultural crisis, merely that people of hoplite status had slipped to the level of thetes. Finally, it can be proved positively,[66] from the epigraphic record of land sales, that Attica was still very much a land of small estates; such 'accumulation' as did take place was in different demes (Dem. 50. 8).

There is also evidence of increased entrepreneurial activity by individuals in the Laurion silver mines by the mid-century – just as Xenophon recommended in his treatise on the *Revenues* (350s): individuals of substance like Diotimos of Euonymon, a leading politician and an enemy of Macedon;[67] or early in the century Demosthenes' guardian Therippides (*SEG* 28 (1978) no. 205), and also members of the families of Nikias and Kallias, are all known to have leased mines, and some of them made fortunes out of it (cf. Hyperides *Euxen.* para. 34: 60 talents). The excavations by the British School at Athens at Agrileza in the Laurion mining region of a large and handsome fourth-century installation for the washing and processing of silver (*AR* 1979 and following years) confirm this picture of a well-organized and well- (though privately) subsidized activity in the mining districts.[68]

Turning to the Spartans, their economic problems in the period 425–370, expressed in manpower difficulties, seem to get worse. The evidence is, however, controversial and will be dealt with in a later chapter (16) because the Peloponnesian War did not immediately worsen them; on the contrary, if we can believe Diodorus (14. 10), the Spartans after acquiring an empire in 404 'levied tribute upon the peoples they had conquered and … now collected yearly from the tribute more than a thousand talents'. This is an improbable total (much too high), and in any case the Spartans' old problem, how to possess and administer an empire at the same time as holding down their

own subject population of helots, jumped back to prominence soon after 400, when a massive revolt, the 'Kinadon affair', was quashed only by brutal repression (3. 1. 3; cf. p. 123f.).

In Boiotia the economic effects of the Peloponnesian War were the opposite of those at Athens, the relation being that of two children on a see-saw: Boiotia went up as and because Athens went down. The *Oxyrhynchus Historian* gives an example (Chapter 20 Chambers): he describes the Thebans as profiting, indeed profiteering, from the economic difficulties which the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia brought to Athens; what happened was that the Thebans bought up refugees, slaves and other 'things to do with the war' at a cheap rate, and looted the evacuated country estates of wealthy Athenians, taking even the tiles from the roofs (there is archaeological confirmation of this at one excavated private house, the so-called Dema house).[69] This Boiotian prosperity, due to the war, is one explanation of the Boiotian manpower explosion – 11,000 infantry, 1100 cavalry on paper at least (p. 105) – of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Another reason for Theban prosperity in particular is the Theban annexation of Plataia in 427 (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 19 Chambers).

Corinth, by contrast, suffered from the war: we have noted the dwindling of the Corinthian navy and the evidence of the fishmonger's shop which perhaps went out of business early in the war as a result of Athenian blockades (p. 120). The result of this eroding of the middle class was the submerging of Corinth in a – previously unthinkable – democratic union with Argos in the late 390s.[70] Corinth was never again a major power after the Peloponnesian War.

Concentration on the city-states of old Greece may, however, be misleading because there were plenty of other places in the Greek or hellenized world of the first half of the fourth century which were *not* suffering from economic depression: fourth-century Thessaly – always a fertile and desirable area – and Macedon are treated elsewhere in detail (Chapters 8, 17); as is Sicily, in a bad way until the activity of Timoleon but flourishing thereafter. In Macedon at least, Archelaus' work of reconstruction (Th. 2. 100, mentioning road building and military reorganization) was possible largely because hostile Athenian and Spartan interference had been mostly eliminated from his kingdom by the war, which was therefore much to his advantage. For instance, the Athenians never got back Amphipolis after 424: Amphipolis is found supplying a Corinthian commander with four triremes for use against Athens in 411 (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 10. 4 Chambers), and it eventually passed to Macedon in the 350s (p. 270). We even find the Athenians *helping* Archelaus to get his hands on Pydna (Diod. 13. 91, cf. ML 91 = Fornara 161). Towards the end of the war Archelaus was even in a position to encroach on Thessaly, thus anticipating Philip II (below p. 277 and p. 279). Archelaus' death in 399 may seem to have ended this energetic phase in Macedonian internal history, and the following decades were certainly anarchic politically;

but the human resources available to Philip in 359 must have been steadily growing in just those difficult decades.

In Persian Asia Minor, prosperity is thought to manifest itself in abundant civic coinages, if they are evidence of prosperity, and it is not clear to me that they are.[71] A surer indicator is expensive monumental building like the Nereid monument and the Limyra caryatids in Lykia, the mausoleum at Halikarnassos in Karia, the temple of Athena at Priene and that of Artemis at Ephesus, and the physical transfer of city sites so as to accommodate large populations. Halikarnassos is the best attested example of a city physically as




*Figure 14.1* The temple of Artemis, Ephesus




*Figure 14.2* The temple of Athena (reconstructed) at Priene



*Figure 14.3* Labraunda: general view

well as socially enlarged by the addition of village populations from round about; but there are other possible candidates too.[72] This was done at the instance of wealthy satraps. Building work of this sort was to the advantage of individual Greeks, in that it created a market for their skills, and offered payment on a scale not available in their home states.[73] Skilled Athenians, for reasons already reviewed above, gravitated eastwards in numbers after 400, but they were not alone (cf. Stephanus of Byzantium, entry under 'Monogissa' for the activity in Karia of the sculptor Daidalos of Sikyon). The resulting art was often hybrid (as at Labraunda in Karia where Doric and Ionic orders were mixed), resembling effects at some other half-hellenized places (p. 56).

## Religion: change, and the absence of it

We may end this account of the effects of the Peloponnesian War with the religious changes it brought. But before discussing innovation in religion, the continuance of conventional beliefs and practices should be emphatically stressed, just as a balanced description of the hellenistic age ought to give space and prominence to the survival of the worship of the old Olympians no less than to the novel and the *outré*. The pious Xenophon, rather than the agnostic and very exceptional Thucydides, is the characteristic figure of the age: his belief in divine punishment for wrongdoing,[74] and his belief in oracles, are normal. It is an error, but a common one, to suppose that Delphi's 'medism' in the Persian wars damaged the oracle's reputation:[75] the Spartans approached Delphi as a matter of course at the beginning of the Peloponnesian

War (Th. 1. 118. 3); and at the site of the Dodona oracle in Epirus (northwest Greece, see Fig. 14.4) ascertainable building activity starts only in the fourth century, though the oracle was allegedly the oldest in Greece. Inscribed metal strips have been found there, asking about journeys, marriage, childlessness (in Euripides' *Ion*, the visit to Delphi of Kreousa and Xouthos to consult about childlessness is an authentic touch) and so on; there has been an exciting recent increase in the volume of evidence from Dodona.[76] They mostly date from about 500–300 BC, with a noticeable increase in the fourth century. The kind of question asked of the oracle at Dodona leaves no doubt that religion for ordinary Greeks was no empty form. Here is an example (probably one of the latest in date, but typical of the everyday character of the inquiries throughout the period): 'Agis asks Zeus, Naos and Dione about the blankets and pillows which he has lost, whether someone from outside may have stolen them'. Two new items seem to be inquiries by slave, one of whom 'asks the god what he should do about his freedom' and another 'will Kittos get the freedom from Dionysios that Dionysios promised?'.[77] A background of belief, rather than cynicism, is implied by Xenophon's story (*Hell.* 4. 7. 2) about an approach by the Spartans to Zeus at Olympia in about 387 to ask about the religious validity of a quibbling attempt by the Argives to plead a sacred truce. Zeus said it was invalid, but the Spartans approached Apollo at Delphi to ask him 'if he agreed with his father' (he did). No doubt the reason for seeking a second opinion was that Delphi had greater oracular prestige than Olympia.

Oracles feature extensively in both literary texts and on inscriptions. By contrast, the practice of 'binding' an enemy by means of cursing tablets is hardly mentioned at all in literary sources: there are just a handful of effectively Athenian references to spells and incantations (Plato, *Rep.* 364c and *Laws* 933a, and an indirectly attested mention by the orator Dinarchus, see Harpokration, entry under *katadedesthai*); otherwise the evidence consists of the lead tablets themselves.[78] They are found all over the classical Mediterranean world, but as so often where epigraphy is concerned, it is Athens which supplies the most and the earliest evidence. The tablets mention names and families well known from Athenian political history: Phokion, Hipponikos, Kallias the Torchbearer;[79] and a late fourth-century lead tablet found in the Kerameikos, the cemetery suburb of Athens, curses a rich batch of famous Macedonians or their supporters – Pleistarchos, Eupolemos, Kassander, Demetrios of Phaleron (*SEG* 30. 325). But such inscriptions are a feature of Athens in both the fifth[80] and the fourth centuries; they cannot therefore be regarded as evidence of superstitious 'regression' in the post-Peloponnesian War period.

This raises the general question of religious innovation and 'new cults'. The best attested new cult at Athens was not the consequence of the Peloponnesian but of the Persian war fifty years earlier, namely the Arkadian cult of Pan (Hdt. 6. 105); his worship seems to have been assimilated to the older cult of the Nymphs.[81] The Thracian cult of Bendis, made famous by the torch race in the god's honour at the opening of Plato's *Republic*, is well attested at Athens by the time of the Peloponnesian War (see *IG* $1^3$ 136, a decree of the Assembly



*Figure 14.4* The oracular temple of Zeus at Dodona

regulating the cult), but Athenian relations with Thrace had been 'close but bloody'[82] for most of the fifth century and indeed back into the sixth, the time of the tyrant Pisistratus.[83] So we should not (see p. 332f. n. 31) assume that newly or better attested means new. We can be more confident about the newness of the worship of the healer god Asklepios at Athens, because we have the inscription definitely recording its introduction in 420/19 (*IG* $2^2$ 4960); this is only a few years after the great plague and the temptation to connect the two phenomena is hard to resist (cf. above p. 69 for Isis).

Proper discussion of the last new religious phenomenon of the early fourth century, namely ruler or benefactor cult, may be postponed for the moment (see p. 306f.); but we may notice that the first human beings to get such divine or heroic honours are Athenians and Spartans from the time of the Peloponnesian War. We have already (p. 204) noticed Lysander at Samos, whose cult may have been posthumous, as was that of Brasidas at Amphipolis in the late 420s. But the same passage of Thucydides (5. 11.1), which attests in interesting detail the posthumous cult to the Spartan Brasidas as *soter*, 'saviour', tells us that the Athenian Hagnon, oikist or founder of the city in 437, had received cult there before Brasidas who replaced him, and we know that Hagnon was still alive in 413, many years later than the transfer of cult away from him. The important conclusion would seem to follow[84] that the 'cult buildings of Hagnon' mentioned by Thucydides were erected in Hagnon's own lifetime, and that cult was paid to him as a living human being between 437 and 422. Oikists or founders of colonies had traditionally received religious honours after their deaths (as heroes rather than as gods, a lesser form of cult). Their achievements in establishing Greek settlements in hostile areas were thought somehow superhuman. That political activity, by powerful representatives of city-states, should be regarded in the same way as the achievements of oikists, by the smaller *poleis* (Amphipolis, Samos)

with which they interfered at the time of the Peloponnesian War, and is an expression of the powerlessness felt by factions in those cities, compared to their 'godlike' or 'heroic' liberators. This is a thoroughly hellenistic sentiment, and illustrates the way men like Lysander anticipate the autocratic future. We must now return to those particular activities of Lysander which caused him to be so treated – that is, to the mainstream of narrative history after 404.

# 15

# THE CORINTHIAN WAR[1]

## Introduction and summary

After the Athenians surrendered in 404, the unanimity of their enemies soon dissolved. Ten years later, the Spartans were to be engaged in a war against their former allies the Persians (who were now assisted by an Athenian naval commander and crews), fought in the east Aegean from the beginning of the 390s, and in a simultaneous war against a coalition of Boiotia, Corinth, Argos and Athens, fought in mainland Greece from 395: the so-called Corinthian War. This is an astonishingly rapid reversal of fortune, made possible only by, first, infirmity of purpose at Sparta – where concessive behaviour alternated with brutality – leading to, second, general suspicion of Spartan motives among the Greek states and in Persia; in third place there is Athenian imperialistic ambition, which was quick to revive after an apparently total defeat. Fourth and last there is the element of chance – the accident of death which removed Darius II from the Persian throne in 404, causing dynastic convulsions in which the Spartans felt able to interfere (since they were freed from their dominant preoccupation of nearly three decades, the great war against Athens). This interference incurred the anger of the winning candidate for the Persian throne, Artaxerxes II.

Of these four factors, we are well enough informed about the first and third, because of the biographical interest which attached to Lysander (considered as a figure in domestic and Athenian politics) and therefore also to the opponents of his methods; and because Athenian internal history is so richly documented in these years (there is much relevant information in the speeches of Lysias as well as the historians and inscriptions). For the fourth we have Xenophon's *Anabasis.* The second is the problem: how to isolate the precise areas of Spartan penetration which made them seem so threatening to their former friends. Here too Lysander is a crucial figure; but his activity when he moves away from Sparta and Athens becomes more elusive, though no less important (hence the qualification, above, that we are well informed about him being considered as a figure in Spartan and Athenian politics). Yet there is evidence for Spartan expansion in central and northern Greece, and for Spartan interference in support of Dionysius I in Sicily, and even

for links with Egypt, all of which though scrappy is just coherent enough, when combined with the source material for Asia Minor, to show that some people at Sparta had very wide ambitions; probably Lysander was the man responsible for resuming the old policy of central Greek imperialism (p. 221f.). To understand the years 405–395 it is not enough to accept the restriction of an Athenian viewpoint, if that means neglect of the Asiatic cities (including the strategically vital island of Rhodes), Thessaly, Macedon, Thrace, Syracuse and Egypt.

## Athens in defeat: the Thirty Tyrants

Suspicion of the Spartans by their former allies does, however, begin with Athens, on whom at the time of the city's surrender in 404 all eyes were for the moment fixed: would the Spartans obliterate Athens now that it was open to them to do so? The Boiotians and Corinthians pressed for destruction (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 19), and there were Spartans of that way of thinking too (Polyain. 1. 45. 5). Lysander, however, prevailed and the Spartans imposed their traditional solution, an oligarchy – the Thirty Tyrants (above p. 204). Among the motives felt by members of the Spartan decision-making elite, distrust of the Thebans must be included,[2] because as we have seen (p. 211) the Thebans had already profited by Athenian losses in the war and would have profited still more if Athens had been wiped out, something which would produce what Polyainos (cited above) calls a 'larger and stronger Thebes'. The Thebans and Corinthians for their part were not willing (cf. p. 33) to see Athens become a 'faithful satellite' of Sparta.

The eight months which followed (April 404 to the end of the year) are an ugly period of Athenian history, the regime of the Thirty Tyrants. After a while the Spartans were obliged to shore them up with a Spartan garrison of seven hundred men, paid for by the Athenians (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 13), with a *harmost* (governor, literally 'fixer'),[3] Kallibios, in charge. His arrogance and brutality, as we have seen (p. 125), was unacceptable not only to high-spirited Athenians but to Lysander himself. But Athenian democrats in exile had been taken in at Megara, Argos and above all Thebes (Diod. 14. 6; Dem. 15. 22; Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 1, etc.), and there was little that the Spartans could do to discipline such expatriates. There is no real inconsistency in the Theban attitude (helping citizens of the *polis* they had so recently voted to destroy): the Theban vote for the destruction of Athens had been cast from desire to prevent Athens becoming a political annexe of the Peloponnese; now that that had happened, and the moment for removing Athens from the map of Greece had passed, there remained only the less radical way: to loosen the Spartans' grip on Athens by overthrowing their nominees. The democrats under Thrasybulus took Phyle in the north-west of Attica, a fortress only just over the border from Boiotia but with, on a clear day, a heartening view of the Acropolis and its individual buildings. From there they moved down to Piraeus and defeated the oligarchs (who advanced from the city

to meet them), killing Kritias the leader of the pro-Spartan party (end of 404). Eventually King Pausanias of Sparta intervened, formally overturning Lysander's arrangements and allowing the exiles to return (September 403)[4] – though any oligarch who wanted it was given safe passage to Eleusis where a pocket of them held out until as late as 401. But the period of oligarchic extremism at Athens was over by late 403, as was, for the moment, the period of Lysander's greatest influence. To speak of his fall or even of his eclipse goes too far,[5] but it is certain that after 404 the Spartans switched to less harsh methods of control, and not just at Athens either. Pausanias was tried for what he did at Athens, but was acquitted on a split vote which shows that the elite was seriously divided (Paus. 3. 5. 2).

Pausanias' intervention had been pointedly boycotted by the Boiotians and Corinthians (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 29–30) – the first open sign of disaffection, and one which the Spartans were later to hold against the Thebans at least (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 5). But that same passage is evidence for another grievance against Thebes, also dating from the end of the war: the Thebans had claimed a sacred and specially reserved 'tenth part' of the booty collected at Dekeleia (this was the 'tithe' dedicated to Apollo at the end of the Peloponnesian War). This incident must date from just after the end of the war, i.e. from even earlier than the allies' refusal to march on Attica with Pausanias. It is an early symbolic challenge to Spartan dominance. These two episodes – and the all-important third, the harbouring of the exiles – show how soon feeling began to build up against the Spartans.

How rational was this feeling? Here we move to areas less easy for the historian to penetrate (cf. above), the areas, other than the well-documented Athens, where the Spartans were applying pressure on a scale sufficient to alarm their former friends.

## The true cause of the Corinthian War: Spartan expansionism to all four points of the compass

First, with regard to Asia Minor and the Aegean Diodorus says (14. 10) that *harmosts* and oligarchic governments were established everywhere in Greece; a little later (14. 13) he amplifies this a little, distinguishing between the ten-man juntas (decadarchies or decarchies) set up in some places, and the more general 'oligarchies' in others. There is no way, however, in which we can press the distinction, except to say that the decarchies are likely to have been composed of Lysander's personal adherents (cf. 13. 70 for his earlier soliciting of the influential men of Asia Minor at a meeting summoned at Ephesus). Of the eastern cities it is only at Samos (to the reduction of which Lysander had proceeded after the conclusion of the siege of Athens) that a decarchy is firmly attested; here as we have seen (p. 204) Lysander's expulsion of the democrats was viewed with rapture by the oligarchs. Despite the poverty of the evidence, modern doubts about Diodorus' generalizations[6] are misplaced: this whole period 405–395 is so patchily attested in general that silence about

other decarchies does not prove they did not exist. In any case Xenophon speaks of Lysander's desire, in 396, to 'restore the decarchies which the ephors had abolished in Asia Minor' (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 2). This abolition is itself of interest: it marks the end of the phase of tightest control by Lysander, and should be dated to late 403 or early 402,[7] when it is certain that Lysander's influence at Athens gave way to that of the more conciliatory Pausanias. It is in favour of this dating that Lysander's man Sthenelaos had been removed from Byzantium by 402 (Diod. 14. 12ff; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 2 for the original appointment in 405); and there is evidence of loss of control by Lysander at his former headquarters of Ephesus in 403/2 (Tod 97 = Harding 5, reception of Samian exiles) and at Miletus (Diod. 13. 104, about the same period).

In Asia Minor and the islands, then, Lysander's methods were abandoned before the end of 402. But the Spartan presence in the east Aegean did not, at that moment, cease to give the Persian king and his loyal satraps cause for irritation. This was because when in 401 Cyrus moved into revolt against the new king Artaxerxes II, his brother, it was with help from precisely the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1. 1ff.). (Cyrus had also built up a force in Thessaly without detection by helping Aristippos, a dynast of Larissa, to collect mercenaries and then calling on him for some of them later.) The expedition against Persia which followed, the *Anabasis*, failed in its object (to replace Artaxerxes by Cyrus) at the battle of Kunaxa, when Cyrus was killed. The Greek force, the Ten Thousand (p. 5), made its way back to the Black Sea and thence to Greece; but some of Cyrus' mercenaries remained in Asia, to be picked up by an official Spartan commander called Thibron who arrived in Asia Minor with the aim of liberating the Ionian cities (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1. 3–4). How had this mission of Thibron come about? The status of the Ionian cities is crucial in this period. It seems that though Cyrus was satrap of Lydia from 403 to 401 when he revolted, the Ionian cities were somehow exempted from this satrapal arrangement, and they or the revenues from them were allotted to Tissaphernes instead.[8] Now Xenophon tells us, in the context of the beginning of Cyrus' revolt, that at that time the Ionian cities had revolted from Tissaphernes to Cyrus, who was the Spartans' friend, a friendship which survived Lysander's supersession – necessarily: Cyrus needed mercenaries and could not be too choosy about the exact flavour of regime at Sparta. Hence it was not just Artaxerxes but Tissaphernes who had good reasons for resenting Spartan behaviour in the years immediately before 400; for Cyrus had planned with Spartan help to usurp Artaxerxes' throne, but he had also deprived Tissaphernes of the prestige and profit of the Ionian cities. So when the western satrapies were eventually freed from the threat of the Ten Thousand, by their return and partial disbandment, it was natural that Tissaphernes should seek straight away to recover the Ionian cities – and equally natural that it should be to Cyrus' allies the Spartans that they in turn should appeal for help (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1), hence the mission of Thibron, and the origins of the Sparto–Persian War of 400–390.

We have anticipated a little, in order to make the point that Spartan policy in Asia continued to be dynamic even when not directly determined by Lysander. The relevance of Asia to the enmity felt towards Sparta in *Greece* is this: the presence of Spartan troops in Asia throughout the first half of the 390s (under Thibron, then Derkyllidas in 399–397, and finally, from 396, King Agesilaus, p. 226) was a constant threat not just to Persia but to the Greek states: strategically, any power which controlled the Anatolian seaboard and its harbours could thereby hold down the mainland of Greece with much greater ease[9] (hence Greece caused Alexander little trouble once he had secured the ports of Asia Minor and Phoenicia). The alarm thus produced in Greece is one cause of the Corinthian War. So when Agesilaus tried to imitate Agamemnon by sacrificing at Aulis opposite Euboia for his new oriental war in 396, the Boiotarchs disrupted the sacrifice, showing what they thought of Spartan ambitions in the east (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 5). As for the coincidence of interests between Persia and the Greeks other than the Spartans, this was recognized by the sending, in 396, of the Rhodian Timokrates by Pharnabazos the satrap, to make trouble for the Spartans back home (see p. 229).

But Spartan policy in Asia Minor is not the only cause of the Corinthian War, and we must now move from the first area of Spartan post-war expansion, namely the East, to the second, which is central Greece and the northern Aegean. Here too it is Lysander's hand which can be detected in the first instance, but here too, other Spartans kept the pressure on, even at times when Lysander was no longer at the front.

The island of Thasos, in the north Aegean, like Samos in the east, received Lysander's attentions: he tricked and slaughtered the democrats there (Nep. *Lys.* 2.2; Polyain. 1. 45. 4; Plut. *Lys.* 19, where 'Miletus' is probably an error for 'Thasos').[10] Thasos had been part of the old Athenian empire, and Spartan reprisals here were predictable, especially since the controlling groups on Thasos, again as on Samos, had been conspicuously loyal to Athens (Nepos, as above). But there is evidence that Lysander's northern activities were much more ambitious and geographically extended than this: Plutarch in his valuable *Life of Lysander* says that he made a journey to Thrace and laid siege to Aphytis in the Potidaia region of Chalkidike (Plut. *Lys.* 16 and 20; all of this can be put in 405–404). But the most interesting evidence is the speech *peri politeias* of 'Herodes', a problematic literary production whose date is disputed between the late fifth century BC and the second century AD, the time of the Athenian intellectual Herodes Atticus (to whom the pamphlet is attributed). Even if the later date is right and the speech is fiction, it is agreed to be generally and specifically well informed about Thessalian affairs after the end of the Peloponnesian War and is therefore usable with caution by the ancient Greek historian.[11] The speech urges the citizens of Larissa in Thessaly to join Sparta in fighting Archelaus king of Macedon, who (para. 6) 'possesses the land which our fathers handed down to us' (a reference to Perrhaibia, the buffer area between Thessaly and Macedon, usually in classical times an appendage of Larissa, Th. 4. 78. 6,[12] cf. Strabo 440, but now temporarily

Macedonian, see p. 253). The speech also shows (para. 24) that Archelaus, presumably after Aigospotamoi in 405 when his Athenian connections must suddenly have seemed valueless, had applied to join 'the Greeks', i.e. the Spartans, but was snubbed although he offered money (something which for a change the Spartans did not need).

Some Spartans, then, were involved in very high-powered diplomacy in Thessaly and Macedon immediately after the war, and given Lysander's presence in the north at just this moment (above), it is plausible to associate him with it. But again it would be wrong to connect central and north Greek expansion with Lysander exclusively, since in about 400 the Spartan Herippidas was sent to deal with *stasis* at Herakleia in Trachis, the large colony founded by the Spartans in 426, partly in order to control the southern approaches to Thessaly (above p. 158; for Herippidas, see Diod. 14. 38. 3–4). In Thessaly proper, a chance reference in, again, Diodorus (14. 82), reveals that there was a Spartan garrison at Pharsalos in Thessaly, a surprising and significant northern presence; and Lykophron of Pherai was an ally of Sparta in the late fifth or early fourth century (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 24). Outward-looking and confident Spartans, then, were at this period able to assert themselves against their opponents (and there were always cautious opponents of this sort of thing), and to resume an old Spartan policy of central Greek, specifically Thessalian, expansion (pp. 28, 32 and 103f.); the ultimate objective may have been easy pickings in Macedon and Thrace. After the outbreak of the Corinthian War the Spartans lost their strong points at Pharsalos (Diod. 14. 82) and Herakleia (to the Boiotians, who inherited Spartan ambitions in Thessaly, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 3. 3 for the impressive Theban allies in 394, and see generally pp. 236, 256); but in the light of all the above we should not be surprised to find the Spartans moving north yet again in the 380s (see p. 238f. for their Olynthian operations). So there were grounds for much Boiotian discontent at what Spartans were up to on Boiotia's northern borders.

The third area of Spartan involvement is in Sicily, and this involvement should be recognized as a cause of the Corinthian War: Isokrates (8. 99) offers explicit support for the idea that the Spartans' 'subversion of the free governments of Italy and Sicily' made them very unpopular at this time.[13] In Sicily, an almost incessant warfare with Carthage had directly followed the repulse of the Athenian attack (Diod. 13. 42–3); here a tyrant, Dionysius I, had established himself at Syracuse since 406, first getting himself elected as one of the panel of generals, then as sole general, by the Kleon-like device of attacking the competence and integrity of his colleagues and rivals; Aristotle adds an element of class struggle, treating Dionysius as a champion of the poor against the oligarchs: he 'attacked Daphnaios and the rich' (*Politics* 1305a 26ff, cf. Diod. 13. 96. 3 for Daphnaios). Finally, as Diodorus explicitly says, he imitated an older Athenian, Peisistratos (Diod. 13. 95) and demanded a bodyguard – the familiar old tyrannical tune, as Plato called it (p. 48). But even so Dionysius' position was not firm, so after settling Athens, the Spartans sent one Aretes to Syracuse, ostensibly to help the Syracusans

to recover their liberty, but actually to help consolidate Dionysius in power (Diod. 14. 10, cf. 70). Again this is not an isolated instance of Spartan–Syracusan involvement: not only is there Gylippus who had saved Syracuse in 414/13, and the Syracusan Hermokrates who had fought for Sparta in Ionian waters soon after (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1; above pp. 175–6), but late in the Peloponnesian War we hear of one 'Dexippos the Lacedaimonian' who had, remarkably, been 'put in charge of Gela by the Syracusans' (Diod. 13. 93), and whom Dionysius tried to suborn. Dexippos, however, seems to have been a more honest man than Aretes – or else his Spartan masters had not yet seen the advantages of installing a 'faithful satellite' (to adapt Xenophon's phrase about Athens) at Syracuse. He would not co-operate and Dionysius ran him out of Sicily, fearing that he might restore Syracusan liberty; after which we hear no more of Dexippos. Aretes, however, *was* willing to play the double agent and *agent provocateur*; he incited the opponents of the tyranny and got their confidence – then informed on them to Dionysius. He killed one himself, Nikoteles of Corinth, 'a leader of the Syracusans' (Diod. 14. 10).

This Spartan help to Dionysius came at a difficult moment for the new tyrant: the fighting with Carthage had ended less than gloriously with a negotiated peace (405) under which Carthage retained a strong presence in Sicily and had the right to levy tribute on various Greek cities, for instance Akragas, Gela and Himera. Dionysius still needed to justify his ascendancy by military means, since it was a military crisis which had created that ascendancy, so he started a campaign against the Sikels. But discontent at Syracuse was running too strong and there was a revolt. At one moment the tyrant, under siege in his own citadel, actually agreed to leave with only five ships. But in the end he held out, by a mixture of nerve, concessions and cunning. This was the delicate position which had been reached at the point when we hear of Aretes' activity. It is clear, then, that the survival of Dionysius' tyranny owed something to the dominant group at Sparta; and that here in the west they played out successfully the same hand which was to fail in the east at Kunaxa, when they supported Cyrus' attempt on Artaxerxes' throne. Dionysius did not forget to show gratitude towards, nor did Artaxerxes easily overcome his grudge against the Spartan government which had authorized these various intrigues (p. 226 for Artaxerxes). Again, we may suspect the influence of Lysander, whose diplomacy in this period included a visit to Dionysius (Plut. *Lys.* 2).[14]

Aretes appears to have been sent on his own; but as Dionysius' power grew and he prepared to renew the war against Carthage in the years up to 396, support for him became, from the Spartans' point of view, less of a gamble, and we find them sending him more solid help: thirty ships under Pharax as admiral (396). Pharax too disappointed the hopes of those Syracusans who associated Sparta with the word 'liberation', but unlike Aretes he did not bother to disguise his mission, announcing that he had come to help Syracuse and Dionysius to fight Carthage, not to overthrow Dionysius (Diod. 14. 63; 70). The progression Dexippos, Aretes, Pharax is interesting: were

there three different types of Spartan? Or were there three stages in Spartan loss of scruple at this strongest period in the history of Spartan imperialism? It was probably the latter, though we do find another Pharax fighting for Dionysius' son Dionysius II some decades later (Plut. *Dion.* 48–9; *Tim.* 11), and Theopompos said of some Pharax that his lifestyle was more Sicilian and self-indulgent than Spartiate (F 192). All that might suggest that Pharax the admiral had special qualifications or connections to suit him for his Sicilian job.[15]

So Spartan interest in the west was kept up throughout the years after 414, taking more positive form with the end of the Peloponnesian War. Communications between Sicily and Old Greece were fast and frequent in this period, the age of maximum Sicilian involvement in mainland Greek affairs: thus when the Persians began to mobilize a fleet against Sparta in 397 it was a Syracusan, Herodas, who brought the news to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 1).

From the Spartan point of view, backing Dionysius paid off; we shall see that the King's Peace of 387/6 was brought about by simple Spartan superiority at sea, a superiority to which the Persians contributed most obviously; but the Syracusan contribution was twenty ships (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 26), enough to give the Spartans a clear numerical margin over the Athenians. Aretes may, as Diodorus says (14. 10), have brought Sparta into disrepute, but the events of 387/6 showed that he did well, judged by the usual short-term Spartan criterion 'what is best for Sparta' – the criterion applied by the Spartans at Plataia in 429 and by Agesilaus at more than one crisis in his reign (Th. 3. 68; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 32 and 5. 4. 32; cf. p. 161).

How was all this viewed by the other Greek states? The Athenians were anxious enough to win Dionysius over in this period: an inscription (R/O no. 10 = Harding 20) records honours to him from 393 BC, and Konon had an Athenian embassy sent to Syracuse at about the same time (Lys. 19. 19) – all without success, as 387 was to show, when Dionysius (above) repaid the debt incurred through Pharax's mission of 396. The Athenians did not give up trying: in 368 they succeeded in getting an alliance with Dionysius (R/O no. 34 = Harding 52), who then died almost immediately. But by that time the Athenians and Spartans had moved into alliance with each other and against Thebes (after Leuktra, 371), and so Dionysius' new Athenian alignment was not necessarily anti-Spartan. So fear of the old Dorian axis Sparta–Syracuse (cf. above Chapter 13, p. 175) makes it plausible to add fear or jealousy over Sicily to the reasons which made the Athenians ready to fight the Spartans in 395.

Then there is Corinth. The Corinthians were unmoved perhaps by what was going on in the east Aegean or northern Greece, but never indifferent to the west, especially their colony Syracuse. (In 414 Gylippus the Spartan had been preceded in his arrival by Gongylus the Corinthian; and Timoleon who reestablished Syracuse in the mid-fourth century was sent out by Corinth.) We may recall that one of the men liquidated in 404 was Nikoteles

the Corinthian, for whose assassination the Spartan Aretes is explicitly said to have been responsible. How did the Corinthians like this? Corinthian hostility to Sparta in the 390s may well have been fuelled by the activities of Aretes and Pharax. (Cf. Isok. 8. 99, quoted above, p. 222.)

The fourth and last area of Spartan expansion is the least well-documented, namely Egypt. We have only two hard items of evidence on this, a visit by Lysander to the oracle of Ammon in the western desert in about 403 (which is suspiciously soon after Egypt fell away from Persia in 404); and material help sent by the rebel Pharaoh to the Spartans in 396 for their war against Persia (Diod. 14. 79. 4: equipment for 100 triremes and 500,000 measures of grain). It is tempting to connect these two pieces of evidence and suggest that Lysander's interest in the African continent was not purely religious – in fact he was investigating possibilities, such as that the Spartans might support yet another emergent opportunist, just as they were supporting Dionysius and as they were shortly to support Cyrus who was, like the new ruler of Egypt, a rebel from Persia. Lysander's brother was called Libys (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 28), which might suggest family ties with north Africa; compare Lichas son of Arkesilas (a royal name at Kyrene: Chapter 5, and for Lichas see Thuc. 5.50 and above p. 126).

So the Spartans were pushing out, with Lysander detectable each time as the driving force, to all four points of the compass, to the east (Samos, etc.), to the north (Thessaly, Macedon, Thasos, Thrace), to the west (Syracuse), and to the south (Egypt), almost a *Weltpolitik.* Of these directions of penetration, it was the eastern and southern which must have particularly alarmed and annoyed the Persians. From the point of view of the Boiotians, Athenians and other Greek states there was another risk, that of encirclement. If the Spartans could get through Thessaly, Macedon and Thrace to the Hellespont, at the same time establishing themselves in Asia Minor (the Hellespontine Phrygian satrapy was especially important in this respect), working up to the Hellespont from the other side, they could by a pincer movement secure the straits permanently, and would be able to control the food supplies of states which like Athens got their corn from the Black Sea. The Boiotians were not so dependent; but the purely military threat of a Sparta so well and widely entrenched was enough to justify Boiotian nervousness (cf. p. 302 for the strategic importance of Asia Minor for control of Greece proper).

## The Corinthian War

These then are the 'true causes' of the Corinthian War, the growth of Spartan power in the areas we have discussed, to the point where it 'alarmed the Greeks' (to put things in Thucydidean language) 'and compelled them to war'.[16] But it was the Persians who moved against Sparta first.

The mission of Thibron, to help the Ionian cities, was directed against Tissaphernes, now satrap of Lydia; but under Derkyllidas who succeeded Thibron (399–397), the war was broadened out in a northerly direction,

as Derkyllidas promptly made a truce with Tissaphernes and attacked the Persian satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. (For this satrapy and its capital Daskyleion see pp. 75, 78.) Derkyllidas' reasons for this were partly personal – a grudge against Pharnabazos dating back to 407 when the satrap had caused him to be punished for some military offence (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1. 9). By 397 (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 13) the two satraps have suffered enough damage to their territory and have made common cause to 'throw the Greeks out of the King's land'; the king must by now have been getting clear messages of alarm from both of his western satraps. Full-scale war still need not have happened, though, were it not for the king's own personal hatred for the Spartans, whom the contemporary Deinon says he regarded as the 'most shameless of men' (*FGrHist* 690 F19). This is an obvious allusion to the Spartan assistance to Cyrus.[17] These anti-Spartan emotions of Artaxerxes were to be an important factor in the years that followed, however irrational those emotions may have been (because sometimes, see p. 231 on the year 392, they were indulged against Persian interests).

The Persian king, then, ordered a fleet to be built (in 397: Diod. 14. 39. 2; for the date Philochoros F 144/5; Isok. 4. 142) with the Athenian Konon as commander. Since escaping from Aigospotamoi, Konon had been staying with King Evagoras of Cyprus (Isok. 9. 52). This was the fleet of which Herodas the Syracusan brought news to Sparta (above p. 224). The Spartans for their part now stepped up the war, this time sending their new king Agesilaos, accompanied by Lysander, on what Xenophon represents as a grand crusade against Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 4; but see below for Agesilaos' real intentions, which may have been more modest). In between his accounts of the oriental activities of Derkyllidas and of Agesilaos, Xenophon inserts (3. 3) the Kinadon affair (see more fully p. 123), perhaps only because it did actually happen about this time and the accession of Agesilaos offered a suitable pause in the narrative; but perhaps also because the suppression of Kinadon, and with it the dashing of the hopes of his potential supporters including helots (p. 124), explains how the Spartan authorities felt they could safely send a large expedition abroad, something from which fear of helot trouble had always tended to deter them. Fear of helots was to be equally relevant to the Spartan decision, later in the 390s, to abandon Asia Minor after all (p. 231). The Kinadon affair reminds us that Sparta was not a normal imperial power.

The manner of Agesilaos' departure – his solemn sacrifice at Aulis opposite Euboia, in imitation of Agamemnon, provoked an incident whose importance we have already noticed, the disruption of the sacrifice by the Boiotarchs. Were the Boiotarchs right to be so sensitive at just this moment? That is, were Agesilaos' aims really as ambitious as Xenophon makes out? In favour of Xenophon, it is not conceivable that the historical fact of the sacrifice was an invention by the historian, so to that extent the symbolism of Aulis is inescapable: it indicates plans for conquest on a grand scale, rivalling the Greek war against Troy. But it is striking that when Agesilaos actually arrives

in Asia the first thing he does is to offer Tissaphernes a more realistic deal, mere 'autonomy for the Greeks in Asia' (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 5). We have seen (p. 188) that the so-called Treaty of Boiotios in 407 had probably reopened this question of autonomy, and if that view is right it helps to explain why neither Xenophon, nor the principals in the affair, show any surprise at what would otherwise be a sudden denial of all the Sparto–Persian diplomacy of Thucydides Book 8. What was Agesilaos up to? Perhaps the Aulis incident was merely gesturing, designed for Persian consumption, and designed to speed up the diplomacy on the real issue, which was indeed the autonomy of the Greeks on the Asiatic seaboard: much had happened since Boiotios' mission, including the accession of a new Persian king, and we know from Herodotus (7. 151: the Argives, probably soon after the accession of Artaxerxes I, check that their friendship with Persia still subsists) that Persian kings were not necessarily thought to be bound by what their predecessors had done. Or perhaps the actions of Agesilaos, whose true aim was no more than to detach a cordon of rebel satraps from Persia,[18] have misled Xenophon, who was always prone to sentimental 'panhellenism', that is to thoughts of a Greek war against Persia.[19] In favour of the view that Agesilaos wanted the friendship of individual Persians, while posing as champion of hellenism against the Persian empire as an institution, is the series of 'guest-friendships' and romantic attachments which he formed in Asia – the invitation to Pharnabazos to secede, the relation with the son of the Persian Spithridates (both Xen. *Hell.* 4. 1), and the guest-friendship with the young Mausolus of Karia (Xen. *Ages. 2.* 26; with this compare *Hell.* 5. 1. 28: the Persian Ariobarzanes and the Spartan Antalkidas). This ambivalence – one attitude to individuals, another to the institution – also runs through Xenophon's writings, and it anticipates the policies of Alexander, who destroyed the Persian empire, but promoted its personnel and sought to perpetuate its ruling blood by the marriages of himself and of his officers.[20]

But the deal with Tissaphernes was only temporary (three months' truce according to Xenophon, *Ages.* 1. 10); whatever Agesilaos' motives may have been, Tissaphernes' were simply to gain time to send to the Persian king for an army. The result was a smashing Spartan victory, the battle of Sardis (395), which led to Tissaphernes' downfall and death. This was the climax of Spartan land achievement. But the Persian naval offensive should not be neglected – as it is by Xenophon: it is only from Diodorus (14. 79. 5) that we learn of a vital event in the south-east Aegean, the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta (396), encouraged by the spectacle and prospect of the Atheno–Persian revival by sea: Diodorus describes a Persian naval success against the Spartan Pharax at Kaunos on the Asiatic mainland, and then says that the Rhodians received Konon and his fleet after expelling the Peloponnesians. The revolt of Rhodes is highly relevant to Athenian readiness to join the war against Sparta when the time came, because of Rhodes' advantages of situation: these were both strategic (cf. Dem. 15. 12) and economic (see Th. 8. 35. 2 and Dem. 56 for the Egypt–Rhodes–Athens corn route).

Tissaphernes' replacement was a high court official, Tithraustes, who in the king's name offered Agesilaos what he had asked Tissaphernes for, the autonomy of the Greeks – on condition that Agesilaos sailed home (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 25). But Agesilaos, his head perhaps turned by the victory at Sardis, moved on to Pharnabazos' country and there tried to seduce Pharnabazos from his Persian allegiance. Xenophon's account of Agesilaos' movements in Asia ends with the strongest statement in all his writings of Agesilaos' intention to 'go east as far as possible' (spring 394). That is, he was still planning extensive conquest.

There is no checking the truth of this because Agesilaos was recalled by crisis in Greece, where suspicion of the Spartans had developed into war. The news of Sardis can only have strengthened those suspicions.

The *alethestate prophasis,* truest cause, of this war has been discussed at length above. The *aitiai,* the precipitating causes, were as trivial as any believer in Thucydidean theories of causation could wish; they are given by the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (Chapters 19ff. Chambers.) and by Xenophon (*Hell.* 3. 5) in slightly different versions. Two small central Greek peoples, the Lokrians and the Phokians, had come to blows over some disputed land. The anti-Spartan party in Boiotia, led by Ismenias, incited some Phokian individuals to invade Lokris, and the Lokrians then complained officially to Boiotia. The Phokians in their turn appealed to the Spartans, who at first tried to get the combatants to accept arbitration, but then moved in on behalf of Phokis. Lysander, back now from Asia ahead of Agesilaos, crossed to Phokis and invaded Boiotia as far as Haliartos. Xenophon says blandly that the Spartans were happy to go to war not just because of their grievances against the Boiotians (the tithe of Apollo, the refusal to invade Attica in 403, to which we can add the failure of the Boiotians and Corinthians to participate in Sparta's campaign against Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25) and the Aulis incident) but because things were going well for them and they had no other wars on hand (*Hell.* 3. 5. 5).

We have seen that for a full understanding of the deep causes of the war we must go much further afield than the superficial account of Xenophon (though in fairness to him he does (3. 5. 5) contrast the 'pretext' presented by the Phokian appeal with the real Spartan motive, which he sees as a desire to get their own back on the Thebans). But there is still the question of how the final coalition (Boiotia, Athens and the others) came about. Here the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* gives valuable evidence on the state of the internal parties in the various cities, but even he gives too much weight to trivial and personal factors (which is not to deny the importance of personal ambition). In his account (Chapters 9–10 Chambers) these internal and parochial differences were the key: Timolaos the Spartan sympathizer at Corinth had his enemies whose politics naturally took an anti-Spartan form, similarly at Argos. He is at pains to deny that Persian bribery was a cause. This is a reference to an event which, as we observed earlier, knits together the Sparto–Persian War and the Corinthian War: in 396 Pharnabazos, after and no doubt

as a result of the Rhodian revolt, sent a Rhodian called Timokrates to Greece to encourage hostility to Sparta, by spending money in the right places. The *Oxyrhynchus Historian* is right to say that this money was accepted at Athens, for example (against Xenophon, who says it was not, *Hell.* 3. 5. 2); but right also to say that hostility to Sparta in Greece was long-standing (*palai*, 10. 2), so that Timokrates did not simply 'cause' the war. We have examined the causes of that long-standing hostility in the opening pages of this chapter. Our only quarrel with the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* should be that he rejects the 'Timokrates' explanation, not in favour of a Thucydidean explanation in terms of Spartan expansion but in favour of a Herodotean account of domestic enmities and impulses in the states concerned. In any case the relevance to the Corinthian War of Persian money can be denied only if we concentrate on Timokrates; the fleet which was building up in the south-east Aegean was commanded by an Athenian – but paid for by the Persian king.

The main surviving part of the *Oxyrhynchus History* opens in 396, with an account of the atmosphere in Athens. The author distinguishes between the propertied classes there, who wanted peace, and the 'many' who (wanted war but) bowed to the opinion of Thrasybulus and his associates that trouble should still be avoided. So officially the Athenians disowned the trireme which one Demainetos took across the Aegean to Konon. By 395 the atmosphere there had changed; we saw above that the revolt of the Rhodians was a crucial event which must be the explanation why the Athenians now felt able to compromise themselves whereas they had not felt able to do so in 396. In 395 the Thebans came to Athens to ask the Athenians to join the war against Sparta. The Athenians, as we have seen, were now able, if they wished, to get involved (because events at Kaunos and Rhodes had shown Konon and the Persians to be achieving successes by sea, and because of the promise and protection of Theban help by land). But were the Athenians willing? The Thebans thought so, if Xenophon has reported them rightly: they remarked 'everybody knows how anxious you Athenians are to recover your empire' (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5 10; see also the authorial 3. 5. 2, where something is slightly amiss with the text but the thought must be similar to that put into the mouth of the Thebans).[21] The Thebans were right[22] and the proofs of it must now be given.

We can go back even before the end of the Peloponnesian War, to the battle of Arginusai in 406, when Diodorus says that the Boiotians, as well as the Euboians and the other Greeks who had fallen away from Athens, fought vigorously for Sparta because they knew that the Athenians 'would take their revenge on them if they should once regain their sovereignty' (13. 99. 6). And there had been a number of incidents and gestures after 404 which showed that imperial ambitions were not dead. At first the Athenians were obliged, by the terms of their surrender, to 'follow the Spartans by land and sea'. Accordingly they participated in some Spartan operations against Elis in 402 and 401 (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 21ff.) and even supplied a cavalry force of 300 for Thibron's expedition to Asia in 400 (3. 1. 4). The latter, however, is

not quite straightforward because Xenophon says that the *demos* hoped to be rid of these men, obviously as being suspected oligarchic sympathizers. Two inscriptions attest the revival of an independent spirit: one (R/O no. 2 = Harding 5 of 403/2) honours loyal Samians (cf. p. 220 for the mention of Ephesus and Notion) and the other (Tod 98, after 404, not in R/O or Harding) renews diplomatic honours to pro-Athenians from Thasos. So there was half-hearted Athenian fulfilment of their military obligations to the Spartans, and the Athenians did not disguise their gratitude for the services of democratic sympathizers in other states. The inscription, passed in 401, recording rewards for the liberators of the democracy after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants (above p. 218), also fits into this picture (R/O no. 4 = Harding 3); one category of honorand was 'those who remained with the People in Piraeus'. But the most revealing text about Athenian ambitions in the 390s is Andokides' *On the Peace* (3. 12ff.), delivered in 392, which speaks frankly (3. 15) of the Athenians' desire to recover 'the Chersonese, the colonies, and the overseas possessions and debts' (above p. 16f.).

So the Athenians were willing, as well as able, to respond to the Theban appeal; Thrasybulus, who had played safe at the time of the Demainetos episode in 397, was the man who proposed the Boiotian alliance; this shows that his caution in 397 was due not to some congenital 'moderation' in foreign affairs but to prudence and a weighing of immediate risks;[23] after all, as Xenophon makes him remark (*Hell.* 3. 5. 16), the Piraeus was still ungated in 395. That is, he was as keen for war as was Konon. Indeed, inscriptions show that the aggressiveness of Thrasybulus' Boiotian alliance has been understated by Xenophon, who in the same paragraph implies that the alliance was with the Thebans only, not with Boiotia as a whole. But an inscription (R/O no. 6 = Harding 14) reveals that it was in fact an alliance between the Athenians and the *Boiotians.* The importance of this is that, since the inscription records that the Athenians pledged themselves to fight as soon as an enemy attacked Boiotia, the Athenians were at war with the Spartans by the very fact of concluding the alliance, since at that moment Lysander was on Boiotian soil (3. 5. 17).

Lysander was killed at Haliartos in Boiotia, almost immediately after mounting his invasion. It was high time Agesilaos returned home. His Asiatic policy was near collapse. If he wanted friendly satraps, he had made some personal conquests, but politically he had drawn a blank (Pharnabazos' refusal was courteous but firm, *Hell.* 4. 1. 37). If, on the other hand, he really wanted to succeed where the Ten Thousand had failed, the chance was denied him because of events at home. Worst of all, the war at sea was now to be decided: the Spartan fleet was crushed at the battle of Knidos by Pharnabazos and Konon in August 394 (an eclipse makes the date certain) and the victors, who promised the autonomy for which the Spartans had negotiated in vain, were welcomed in the east Aegean cities and islands as liberators; they then moved into west Aegean waters, occupied Kythera and threatened Sparta's own coastline (398: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 8). Persian money

now paid for the refortification of the Piraeus (cf. R/O no. 9 = Harding 17) and for the operations round Corinth (p. 202).

On land, two great hoplite battles were fought in 394, at the Nemea River (in Agesilaos' absence) and Koroneia (after his return: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 3). Both battles were strategically indecisive, though technically Spartan victories, and the war in this theatre settled into a stalemate: the anti-Spartan coalition now occupied Corinth, where a democratic revolution led to a political union with Argos (pp. 91, 211 and n. 70). Despite a brief Spartan recapture of Corinth's western port of Lechaion, Iphikrates maintained a strong mercenary and *peltast* (light-armed) presence at Corinth (p. 201), which the Spartans could not dislodge. Though the war took its name from the operations round Corinth, it was not here that it was to be decided but at sea, in the south-east Aegean and at the Hellespont.

The occupation of Kythera could not be ignored at Sparta where the Kinadon affair was so recent (pp. 123, 226); for Kythera in hostile hands was a notorious threat to Spartan security (Hdt. 7. 235). So the Spartans, unable to force a conclusion by land and in grave trouble by sea, sued for peace, offering to clear out of Asia for good: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 14, 'the Spartans will not dispute with the Persian king for the Asiatic Greek cities'. This offer was made to a new plenipotentiary, Tiribazos, whose command was parallel or superior to the ordinary Sardis satrapy held by Tissaphernes, Tithraustes and then Autophradates. These peace terms were negotiated between the Greek powers and Persia, at conferences held at Sardis (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8) and then Sparta. (Andok. 3. The date, 392, is secure from Philochoros, F 149.) But Artaxerxes, unable to overcome his dislike for the Spartans (p. 226), refused, against Tiribazos' advice, to agree to the peace although it gave him all he wanted, and Tiribazos was then replaced by Strouses who was given orders to continue the war against the Spartans. Equally, atavistic Athenian hatred for Persia, a hatred which could now come back into the open, caused the peace to be rejected there as well: the co-operation between Konon and the Persians had been a historical anomaly, for which the Knidos victory had now removed the need. Hence when Evagoras of Cyprus moved into revolt from Persia about this time, he got help from Persia's nominal allies the Athenians (Xenophon, *Hell.* 4. 8. 24, notes the paradox). There is even epigraphic evidence from 393 (R/O no. 11) that the Athenians sought to represent the Knidos victory as the result of co-operation not with Persia but with Cyprus (since Evagoras had helped Konon); that is, the Persian aspect of Knidos was soon felt to be an embarrassment.

So the war went on. What ended it was the Persian king's realization that by using the Athenians against the Spartans he had driven out fire with fire. The Theban assessment of Athenian desire for empire was now rapidly and sensationally vindicated. Not only did the Athenians make an alliance with Evagoras but with a far more serious Persian rebel, the ruler of Egypt (Aristoph. *Wealth* 179); and though initially Pharnabazos and Konon seem to have kept their promises of autonomy (R/O no. 17 = Harding 28A), we

soon find Thrasybulus extracting money from Asia Minor cities (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 30: the Aspendians killed him in his tent. *Lys*. 28 shows he took money from Halikarnassos as well.). And an inscription (R/O no. 18 = Harding 26) mentions a 'five-per cent tax [*eikoste*] in the time of Thrasybulus' (with this compare the imperial *eikoste* of 413 BC, Th. 7. 28. 4). Finally, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4. 8. 27) shows that he set up a ten per cent tax (*dekate*) at Byzantium on traffic coming through the Hellespont, another gesture with fifth-century resonances (cf. ML 58 = Fornara 119 and Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 22: Alcibiades had instituted a 'tithe station' (*dekateuterion*), i.e. a sort of custom house after the battle of Kyzikos in 410 BC).

Artaxerxes reacted to this by sending down Tiribazos again, with the opposite brief to Strouses' – that is, the war was now directed against the Athenians. The war was decided in two areas, both of them economically important to Athens. (Lysias' speech *Against the Corn dealers* (22) may be evidence of corn difficulties at Athens in the Corinthian War period,[24] but in my view the indications of date are much less certain than is normally assumed: the reference at para. 14 to capture of ships by Spartans in time of truce may be merely illustrative; it need not be a reference to the King's Peace and its antecedents.) The first relevant place is Rhodes, which returned to the Spartan side (Diod. 14. 97). The second was the Hellespont, which the Spartan Antalkidas seized with Persian and (as we have noted) Syracusan help (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 29: this must have brought back strong memories of Aigospotamoi and its aftermath). An interesting Athenian inscription (R/O no. 19, not in Harding) honouring Phanokritos from Parion near the Hellespont suggests that militarily the outcome was avoidable: Antalkidas could have been foiled if the generals had only acted on the information which the man supplied.

## The King's Peace

The result was the King's Peace of 387/6.[25] This document, the text of which is given by Xenophon, decreed (with the preamble 'Artaxerxes thinks it good that') 'the cities of Asia were to be the king's, including the islands Cyprus and Klazomenai'. (These two places were singled out for special mention because the Athenians had conspicuously interfered in both places; see p. 224. for the help to Evagoras and for the inscription Tod 114 about Klazomenai.) 'The other Greek cities, great and small, are to be autonomous', though the Athenians were to keep their cleruchies Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 31).

This is a very general and dictatorial document, and it is a likely modern suggestion[26] that a more detailed version spelt out further requirements like a stipulation for the return of exiles (cf. 5.1. 34: Corinth). It has, however, been shown that, contrary to earlier views, the peace did not restrict Athenian naval activity.[27] We can add perhaps that the provisions about Asia may have been clarified a little:[28] the distinction between 'islands' and 'Asia' was not simple, since many of the islands (Samos, Rhodes, Chios, Lesbos, and even Tenedos;

all but Kos[29]) owned *peraiai* or possessions on the mainland opposite. It is possible that some of these were now forfeit to Persia, but different *peraiai* may have called for different solutions.[30] In any case, this problem surely needed to be sorted out at the level of detail.

The King's Peace was a triumph for the Spartans:[31] the autonomy clause meant the break-up of the hegemonical organizations which had been building up around Athens (under Thrasybulus, a very recent development) and around Thebes (this was of longer standing: cf. p. 107 for the centralization of Boiotia upon Thebes). Moreover the union of Corinth and Argos (p. 231, cf. 91) was now ended; and the Spartans had a free hand to discipline and dismantle anti-Spartan groupings in the Peloponnese which, as we shall see, they immediately did at Mantineia in Arkadia. Their own organization, the Peloponnesian League, counted as a free and voluntary organization and was therefore not vulnerable to the autonomy clause (but for the view that Spartan control was a violation of autonomy see Thucydides' Pericles at Th. 1. 144. 2). It was not for astonishingly many years after 386 that anybody had the obvious idea of interpreting Spartan domination of Messenia as a violation of autonomy and so invoking the clause against them (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 27 and 36: 367 BC).

# 16

# THE KING'S PEACE TO LEUKTRA; THE SECOND ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY[1]

### After the King's Peace

Xenophon and Isokrates both speak of the Spartans as the guardians of the King's Peace (*Hell.* 5. 1. 36; *Paneg.* 4. 175), and whether or not this role was explicitly awarded to them in some version of the peace itself, it is certain that their prestige was much enhanced after 386. So says Xenophon (in the passage just cited); Diodorus, whose source Ephorus was a native of Asiatic Kyme and so had his mind more on Asia, says that the Spartans came into disrepute for their abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks (15. 19, under 383). There is no real contradiction here: the prestige which Xenophon had in mind was a matter of power not ideology, a prestige, that is, conferred by purely military hegemony in Greece itself (not just in the Peloponnese but in the north). As for Asia, it ceased to interest Xenophon much after it had been evacuated by his hero Agesilaos. Before examining the Spartans' use, in Greece, of their position, we ought to ask how scrupulously the Greeks (that is, the Spartans and Athenians) henceforth kept out of the Persian empire, as the peace had demanded. Certainly Artaxerxes' agents Tiribazos and Orontes were able to recover Cyprus unimpeded by Greek interference (Diod. 15. 8ff). In Egypt, however, Tithraustes and Pharnabazos failed very badly in a campaign of 385–383, and part of the reason for this was the presence, on the side of the rebel Pharaoh Akoris, of Chabrias the Athenian with a force of mercenaries (Isok. 4. 140). He cannot be regarded as wholly independent of the Athenian state, since he was to comply with an order of recall in 380/79 (cf. p. 199f.). Officially, the Athenians' attitude after 386 to the authors of their brief imperialistic fling of 394–386 was disapproval: Demosthenes (24. 134f.) records the trial and condemnation of two of the principals, Agyrrhios and Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (not the famous Thrasybulus). But this disapproval is hardly evidence of repentance so much as of anger that things had gone so wrong: the honours to Phanokritos (above p. 232) imply not only a belief that the fighting could have turned out differently but indignation that it did not. Whatever the truth, the Athenians had lost their striking power, and could work only indirectly through men like Chabrias.

During the following decades we do hear of occasional Athenian activity on the Asiatic mainland, and it is worth listing this, although – even after the Athenian naval revival of the 370s – it never adds up to very much. Thus Chabrias seems (*Hesperia* 1961: 79ff.) to have fought at Aianteion in the Hellespont, i.e. in the Persian king's Asia, in perhaps 375; and Timotheos in the mid-360s had some dealings with Ionian Erythrai (*IG* $2^2$ 108, cf. Dem. 15. 9 for the occasion). Perhaps that was the kind of thing Demosthenes had in mind (8. 24: 341) when he spoke of Athenian generals visiting places like Chios and Erythrai looking for money. The reference to Persian Erythrai here is certainly surprising. But the Athenians observed the 'Asiatic' clause of the King's Peace, more or less (although we shall see that fear of the Persian satraps was highly relevant, at least as relevant as fear of the Spartans, to the adhesion of many eastern islands to the new Athenian confederacy of the 370s; see p. 242). That formal Athenian observance is illustrated by an inscription in which the Erythraians, immediately before the King's Peace, plead with the Athenians not to let them 'be handed over to the barbarian', i.e. the Persian (R/O no. 17 = Harding 28A). The Athenian answer is lost, since the stone breaks off, but it cannot have included much concrete encouragement.

As for the Spartans, their only breach of the 'Asiatic' clause of the King's Peace was the help they supplied to the Persian rebel Glos in Ionia at the end of the 380s, a curious but not incredible episode (Diod. 15. 9). But this did not come to anything; and it was not until Agesilaos went to Egypt in the great Satraps' Revolt of the later 360s that the Spartans did anything actively anti-Persian.

So Diodorus was not far wrong to speak of the abandonment of Asia (the *political* abandonment, that is; socially and culturally Asia Minor was far from being cut off from Greece);[2] since the Athenians were temporarily powerless and Spartan aggression was henceforth confined to the Greek mainland.

Here the Spartans had used their ascendancy under the peace to move against Arkadian Mantineia, a democracy – and an irritant (for this campaign, in 385/4, see Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2). Diodorus treats this as a breach of the 'autonomy' clause of the peace, but legalists at Sparta could no doubt have painted Mantineia, which was a concentration of villages, as being itself in violation of those concentrated units. But legalism does not characterize Spartan behaviour within the Peloponnese: Xenophon gives the Spartan motive as mere desire to punish the Mantineians for various past military offences, all of which added up to a demonstration of independence, and this motive, rather than any sincere anxiety to enforce the King's Peace,[3] was surely nearer the truth: Mantineia was to be made an object lesson. If the peace could be invoked in justification, so much the better. Phlious was also dealt with in this period (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 3, cf. 7. 2); Xenophon records this in a disproportionately long chapter designed, like one of Thucydides' paradigmatic set-piece passages, to make a general point; here the point is that once disciplined, Phlious stayed loyal.

More disturbing to the peace of Greece, both in its implications and its unexpected side effects, was the Spartans' ready reception of an appeal from north Greece, where the death of Archelaus of Macedon without a strong successor (399) had postponed for over forty years the unification of upper Macedonia, lower Macedonia and Thessaly under a Macedonian king. There follows a rapid series of kings and regents: Orestes son of Archelaus, Aeropos – first as regent for Orestes, then as king – Pausanias, and then (by 392) Amyntas, father of the eventual unifier Philip II. This was a situation which the other interested powers, great and small, Greek and barbarians, could be expected to exploit, and they did. We noted Spartan diplomacy with Thessaly and Macedon in Archelaos' time, and the maintenance of a Spartan presence at Herakleia and Pharsalos until 395. Then, as we saw, the Corinthian War checked Spartan expansion: the Spartan garrison at Herakleia was slaughtered and Herakleia was taken over by the Thebans. But after the King's Peace it seems that Herakleia again fell under Spartan control (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 9, Herakleiot troops fight for Sparta at Leuktra). In the intervening years, others had begun to test the water: the topic of Theban interest in Thessaly, vital for the understanding of the 360s, will be treated in the next chapter. For the moment we may recall (p. 222) that as early as 394 the Boiotians' Thessalian allies had included Larissa, Krannon, Skotoussa and Pharsalos (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 3. 3). Another beneficiary from Macedonian weakness and the temporary Spartan recoil was the Chalkidic League, centred on Olynthos: an inscription (R/O no. 12 = Hatzopoulos 1996 vol. 2: 19ff. no. 1 = Harding 21) of perhaps 392 shows that Amyntas signed a fifty-year treaty of alliance with the league, including guarantees of mutual assistance against invasion, and negotiated with it as a commercial equal. Since this book contains many references to inscriptions, it is worth quoting the occasional one in full, and this is a specially interesting one for several different kinds of reason: it illuminates the politics of a very dark period of Macedonian history (and also illuminates the rise of Olynthos, a state which will feature frequently on later pages of this book); it is evidence for the character of the Macedonian monarchy (cf. p. 96 and 206), in that 'Amyntas' and 'the Macedonians' are interchangeable; it is valuable evidence for Greek federalism, because 'the Chalkidians' are a federal entity and explicitly call themselves a *koinon*; it reminds us of the resentment felt by Greeks for neighbours, here Amphipolitans (and the other peoples listed); and it underlines the importance of shipbuilding materials in the lives of the Greeks, most of whom lived only a few miles from the sea and often relied on ships for their livelihood and for their political independence. Here it is (tr. from R/O):

> Treaty with Amyntas son of Arrhidaios. Treaty between Amyntas son of Arrhidaios and the Chalkidians. They are to be allies against all comers for fifty years. If anybody proceeds against the territory of Amyntas or of the Chalkidians with warlike intent, the Chalkidians are to help Amyntas and Amyntas the Chalkidians …

> There shall be export of pitch and of all building timbers, except firs, whatever is not needed by the *koinon*; and for the *koinon* there shall be export even of these, on telling Amyntas before exporting them and paying the dues that have been written. There shall be export and transport of the other things on paying dues, both for the Chalkidians from Macedon and for the Macedonians from the Chalkidians.
>
> With the Amphipolitans, Bottiaians, Akanthians, and Mendaians friendship shall not be made by Amyntas nor by the Chalkidians apart from the others; but with a single opinion, if it is resolved by both they shall attach them jointly.
>
> Oath of the alliance: I shall guard what has been established by the Chalkidians; and if any one goes against Amyntas, into his land for war, I shall go to support Amyntas.

This agreement was evidence of the weakness, but also of the prudence, of Amyntas, for he was to need Chalkidic help in the early 380s when his kingdom was attacked by another would-be gainer from Macedonian disorders, the barbarian Illyrians (Diod. 14. 92). A pretender arose and Amyntas was actually driven from his kingdom for a while, recovering it with help from 'the Thessalians', and surely also from the Chalkidic League,[4] to whom Diodorus (in the same passage, cf. 15. 19) says he made a grant of valuable land, presumably as a reward or payment for services rendered. This land they refused to give back when Amyntas' position improved and he asked for it back. The mention of the Thessalians is important as showing, not only that nobody in Thessaly had an interest in seeing next door Macedon fall prey to Illyrians (Livy 33. 12. 10 – Flamininus' reproof to the Aitolians who wanted Philip V destroyed – is good on Macedon's role as a shock absorber, keeping Illyrians and others out of Greece), but also that the Thessalians, though their land was often the object of the covetousness of others, nevertheless had more than passive potential and could sometimes act energetically and concertedly on their own account. 'The Thessalians' is unsatisfyingly imprecise, but the career of Jason of Pherai – who was to collide with the Spartans as early as 380, on Euboia (see p. 239) – shows that pan-Thessalian action was indeed conceivable at this time, the early 380s.

The refusal of the Olynthians to return the land which Amyntas had given them, and the concern of the other Chalkidic cities, notably Akanthos and Apollonia, at the growth of Olynthian power, caused them, and him, to appeal to Sparta. Xenophon (5. 2) speaks only of an appeal by the Chalkidic cities, while Diodorus (15. 19) speaks only of the Spartan alliance with Amyntas. Xenophon's account must be true as far as it goes – he gives a speech by a named Akanthian individual, Kleigenes. All this looks circumstantial. But Diodorus cannot be dismissed either: we are told by Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 2. 15) that the Thebans and Athenians were considering allying themselves with Olynthos, something which they would be much likelier to do if Olynthos' enemy were, as Diodorus says, a king of Macedon – who was not a party to the King's Peace – than if the Olynthians' prime

enemy were the Greek cities Akanthos and Apollonia,[5] since in that event the Thebans and Athenians would be in breach of the 'autonomy' clause and would risk Spartan reprisals.

However, the Thebans and Athenians did not get as far as actually making the Olynthian alliances which Kleigenes (Xenophon, as cited above) had said they were contemplating: the alliance between the Athenians and Olynthians is now generally dated in the 370s (Tod 119, not in R/O or Harding),[6] and a hellenistic papyrus fragment (*P. Oxy.* 1. 13 = *FGrHist* 135), implying alliance between the Thebans and Olynthians, is worthless as historical evidence, since it is clearly fabricated on the basis of Xenophon's account rather than being independent evidence in support of him. (We should note, however, that the Thebans' *interest* in Olynthos looks forward to their northern ambitions of the 360s, cf. p. 236 on their Thessalian alliances of 394.)

It was therefore an act of pure and unjustified aggression when the Spartan commander Phoibidas, on his way past Thebes to Olynthos, accepted the invitation of the pro-Spartan faction to seize Thebes by a coup, and throw in a garrison (382). The most justification the Spartans could plead (since the Thebans had stopped short of alliance with the delinquent Olynthians, the violators of their Chalkidic neighbours' autonomy) was that the Theban government had declared that 'no Theban should participate in the Olynthian campaign on the Spartan side' (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 27). But though the Spartans, like the Romans, always took a serious view of their allies' military obligations, this did not amount to a Theban breach of the King's Peace.

In fact, as with Mantineia, the Spartans were merely consulting their own interests;[7] Xenophon (5. 4. 1) regarded the occupation of the Theban citadel, the Kadmeia, as an impiety for which the Spartans were later punished by the divine vengeance of Leuktra. But if legalism is out of place, it would be no less wrong to regard the northern expedition as some kind of aberration on the part of 'the conservative Spartans':[8] the preceding chapter has shown that Olynthos was just the latest in a line of Spartan adventures in the north. Diodorus simply and correctly says of the Olynthian campaign that the Spartans 'decided to extend their control to the regions about Thrace' (15. 19, Loeb translation). We should observe also the evidence (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 3. 9) for *Thessalian* individuals serving as cavalry in the Olynthos campaign out of a 'desire to make themselves known to Agesipolis'. Thessaly is never long out of Spartan thoughts (cf. p. 239 for Oreos on Euboia).

The Olynthians were forced to sue for peace in 380, after fighting which had not all gone the Spartans' way (*Hell.* 5. 3. 26). The settlement which followed was less harsh than might have been imposed, though there is no special need[9] to see in this a domestic Spartan reaction against the 'hard line' policies of Agesilaos: the Olynthians now had to accept Spartan military leadership and to supply forces when required, a regular settlement for a defeated city outside the Peloponnese (cf. Athens in 404), and one which gave the Spartans all they wanted. They did not (p. 250) have so many Spartiates available that they could relish garrisoning two major cities at once, Olynthos as well as Thebes. Agesilaos'

whole strategy of control, *philetairia*, i.e. 'support of supporters' (Xen. *Ages*. 2. 21), depended on using force economically; Phlious (above) is the textbook example.

It was the occupation of the Theban Kadmeia – the 'side effect' of Olynthos, of which we spoke earlier – which caused the trouble. To seize and hold down another major Greek *polis* was difficult and rare: boundary disputes were the commonest causes of war, and such disputes did not usually imply any contesting of the right of the enemy *polis* to an independent existence. By that standard Phoibidas' action was an outrage – but though he was fined (Diod. 15. 20), Agesilaos insisted that he be judged by the criterion of Spartan interests (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 32, cf. p. 164) and so we find Phoibidas re-employed (5. 4. 41) as *harmost* of Thespiai. More important, the Kadmeia was not evacuated; as Plutarch observes (*Pelop.* 6), the Spartans 'punished the offender but approved the offence'.

For Diodorus, 380 was the climax of Spartan power (15. 23. 3f., cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5. 3. 27): Thebes was garrisoned, the Corinthians and Argives were cowed, and the Athenians were still unpopular because, Diodorus revealingly says, of their policy of installing cleruchies in the territory of defeated states. (This shows that fifth-century memories were still alive.) We can add as evidence of further buoyancy that the Glos episode (p. 235) falls at about this time and that the Spartan *harmost* of Thebes, Herippidas,[10] was even able to check the encroachments on Euboia (Oreos/Histiaia) of a new, Thessalian, power, Jason of Pherai (Diod, 15. 30). The point which the Spartans had now reached resembles in many respects 395: their military successes were precisely what aroused against them the forces – unpopularity leading to hostile military coalition and war – which were to undo those successes. There is also a parallel with 405/4 (noted by Plutarch, *Pelop.* 6 and 13). On that earlier occasion it was the Athenians who had needed help from the Thebans to get rid of their Spartan garrison and of the oligarchs whom the Spartans were maintaining in power; now the Thebans were to need and get help from democratic Athens: this was the famous 'liberation of the Kadmeia'.

The Athenian reaction to Spartan expansion in the 380s was generally circumspect: an alliance with Hebryzelmis, king of Thrace, in the mid-380s (Tod 117 = Harding 29, not in R/O) perhaps reflects Athenian desire to keep some influence in the north where the Spartans were looking so dangerous. An alliance with the Chians in 384 (R/O no. 20 = Harding 31) is explicitly framed in accordance with the King's Peace;[11] but it is of interest as showing the mood of the powerful east Greek islanders: Persian authority on the Asiatic mainland (which is clearly visible from islands like Chios) was now undisputed, and fear of satrapal encroachment was strong enough on the adjacent islands to overcome both the suspicion felt towards the Athenians and the memories of the cleruchies of Delian League days (cf. Diod., cited above. And Isokrates shows that we should add Mytilene and Byzantium to Chios, as Athenian allies who remained loyal after 386: 14. 28). For the moment the Athenians were not strong enough for their friendship to be

worth much, but that was soon to change. Isokrates in the *Panegyricus* of 380 urges war against Persia under Athenian leadership, and that work explicitly makes the point (4. 163) that the eastern islands look to the Athenians as their protector, and that they *must* act or else Persia and the satraps will move in. However, the spirit of technical deference towards Persia, which had been shown in the Chios treaty, was maintained in 379 when the Athenian Chabrias was recalled at Persian insistence from Egypt where he had been fighting on the rebel side (Diod. 15. 29).

## The Second Athenian Confederacy[12]

In that year 379, however, the wheel of Spartan success ceased to revolve. In winter 379/8 a group of Theban exiles, including the young Pelopidas, entered the city and assassinated 'the tyrants' (the Theban protégés of Sparta). This dramatic liberation was achieved with Athenian help (Diod. 15. 25. 1), which was immediately followed up by a second and larger Athenian expedition. Xenophon implies that Athenian help was given only on a small scale and perhaps unofficially (*Hell.* 5. 4. 10: 'Athenians from the borders' is his only reference), but Diodorus speaks (15. 26.1) of a large and formally voted expedition and this is likely to be right. (A surviving speech of the somewhat later orator Dinarchus confirms this, with its mention of a decree of Kephalos, voting help for the liberators of the Kadmeia: 1. 39.) However, Xenophon was right to imply that the Athenians were extremely nervous about the whole affair: the two generals who had participated in the original liberation were tried and condemned (*Hell.* 5. 4. 19). But the Spartans had been provoked and the Athenians had to look for their own safety, which they did by constructing a system of alliances, with Chios, Byzantium and various islands (cf. Tod no. 121, not in R/O; R/O nos. 23 and 22 line 20 = Harding 34, 37, 35; Diod. 15. 28. 3). This is the beginning of the Second Athenian Confederacy,[13] whose origins should thus be placed in 379/8. Xenophon wholly neglects to record the foundation of the confederacy, one of the most celebrated omissions in all his *Hellenika*. But both he and Diodorus, who does record it (15. 28ff.), describe a raid on the Athenian Piraeus by the Spartan Sphodrias at about this time (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4. 25ff.; Diod. 15. 29). Since Xenophon's account is so gappy, and since the Sphodrias raid makes sense as a Spartan reaction to the threat of a resurgent Athens (which is preferable to the reverse chronology which would see the Athenian alliance as a response to Sphodrias), it is best to follow Diodorus and put the formation of the new confederacy first and Sphodrias second. This very early chronology for the first stirrings of the new naval confederacy received some epigraphic confirmation in 1972 with the publication of an Athenian alliance (*SEG* 32. 50, dated to 379/8, the archonship of Nikon) with some state whose name is lost, perhaps Methymna: at R/O no. 23 = Harding 37, lines 4–5, the Methymnans are already allies. If this inscription has been correctly interpreted here, it at least weakens attempts to put the beginnings of the new system of alliances as late as winter 378/7.[14]

The formal conclusion – oath swearing with Byzantium and others – occurred in summer 378 and in February 377 the Athenians issued the 'charter' of the confederacy (as it will be called for convenience, although it was not a foundation document since by 377 the confederacy was already under way). This inscription (R/O no. 22 = Harding 35) has been called 'the most interesting epigraphical legacy of fourth-century Athens'.[15] There is an immediate problem, whether the confederacy was framed in deference to the King's Peace: a deliberate erasure early in the text means that the relevant lines cannot be used without circularity of argument. But other evidence has been thought to exist. The charter contains (lines 24–5) a reference to alliance 'on the same terms as the Chians and Thebans'. Similarly a separate alliance with Byzantium (Tod 121 = Harding 34, not in R/O) contains the phrase 'as with the Chians'. The obvious assumption is that in both inscriptions the reference is to the alliance with Chios of 384 (R/O no. 20 = Harding 31, cf. p. 239), and if that assumption were certain it would follow that the new confederacy, like that alliance, was not intended as a breach of the peace. However, the cross reference to the alliance of 384 is not quite certain: the reference could be to another Chian alliance of 378, the stone recording which has not survived.[16]

Despite this minor difficulty about the King's Peace, the charter document is nevertheless highly informative about Athenian fears and aims. Thebes is (alongside Chios) mentioned in the charter as a model for future alliances (cf. *IG* $2^2$ 40 = Harding 33 for negotiations involving Thebes in perhaps mid 378). Democratic Athenian goodwill towards the Thebans was at the root of the new confederacy, and to parade their name on a manifesto in 377 was an obvious gesture to make. But there are qualifications to be made to this enthusiastic picture, which are ominous for future Atheno–Theban relations. First, it is notable that in the charter the Thebans are not called Boiotians. That is, the Athenians recognize no claim by the Thebans to suzerainty over Boiotia. Second, the inscription speaks (lines 72–5) of ambassadors going to Thebes to persuade the Thebans of whatever good they can, and it is plausible to see here a reference to what Xenophon darkly calls 'the rekindling of the Theban business' (*Hell.* 5. 4. 46), that is, the reunification of Boiotia under Theban hegemony. In other words the embassy was to tell the Thebans to keep their hands off the rest of Boiotia. If we could believe Isokrates' *Plataikos* (14. 29), Theban attitudes after the liberation of their city gave cause for Athenian concern in another respect also: the Thebans are accused of readiness to show servility towards the Spartans despite the recent occupation. This is a hint at a possible and from the Athenian point of view very unwelcome Theban rapprochement with the Spartans. But the *Plataikos* is an abusive anti-Theban pamphlet, unreliable in other ways,[17] and dates from a time (373) when an open Athenian breach with the Thebans was much nearer.

There is no darkness or obscurity about the main enemy against whom the confederacy is directed: the Spartans (lines 9ff.) are to allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous. The Spartans had acquitted Sphodrias just as they had let Phoibidas off lightly (5. 4. 34), and for the same reasons. And for

the Athenians the Sphodrias affair meant war (5. 4. 63). As for the Spartan reaction to the events at Thebes, this took the form of an invasion under King Kleombrotos (5. 4. 14) and cf. above: there is no good evidence that the Thebans were inclined to be concessive. The hostility of the Spartans is unproblematic.

This specifically anti-Spartan programme is, however, more muted at lines 46–51, which say that 'if *anybody* makes war against signatory states, the Athenians and their allies will retaliate with all available force'. Who is here envisaged? Probably not the Thebans (despite what was said above about the Athenian desire to limit the consequences of the liberation); surely, if there is a specific reference at all, Persia and the satraps are meant. In places like Rhodes, Chios and Amorgos, all early members of the confederacy, people had less to fear from the Spartans than from the much closer threat posed by Persian satraps like the Karian family, the Hekatomnids: a new and aggressive satrap, Mausolus, succeeded in Karia in precisely 377 (Fig. 16.1). The question of Athenian deference to the Persians (p. 241) goes beyond the narrow issue of the presence or absence, in the charter, of formulae about the King's Peace.

So much for the charter in its foreign aspects (though see also p. 246 on pirates). We may now look at the system of representation and guarantees.




*Figure 16.1* Detail from a statue of Mausolus

The Athenians' aim in both spheres was to avoid the perceived excesses of their fifth-century empire; and in one respect (the provision for arbitration) they may have anticipated enlightened hellenistic methods for settling and avoiding disputes.

In the sphere of representation the allies' powers were in theory wide. The old Delian League had only one chamber, which made it easy for the Athenians to bully the allies separately; so the fourth-century league was to have in effect two chambers: Athens, and the allies. The separate allied chamber, or *synedrion*, could put proposals before the Athenian Assembly, rather as the Council of 500 could (cf. R/O no. 33, lines 10ff., about Dionysius of Syracuse; or R/O no. 41 = Harding 56 of 362/1, lines 12ff.). In a decree of 375 BC (Tod no. 127 = Harding 42), the Kerkyraians are not to be allowed to make war or peace except in accordance with the wishes of the Athenians and the majority of the allies.[18] So the first area of competence was the admission of new members to the alliance.

The second area is tribute. From an inscription of the early 330s (R/O no. 72 = Harding 97 from Tenedos) it seems that *syntaxeis*, financial contributions (see p. 245), might even at late dates in the confederacy's history be fixed by the *synedroi*. However, in 346/5 we find the people of Ainos in the north Aegean agreeing their tribute payment with the Athenian general Chares, apparently without reference to the *synedrion* (Dem. 58. 38).

Third, the charter (line 46: certain money to be the common property of the allies) implies a common treasury, and since tribute has not yet been introduced, this must mean that the allies were expected to have control of such matters as fines and penalties for the infringement of the guarantees in the charter.

Fourth, the allies had certain judicial powers: infringement of the guarantees are to be judged 'among the Athenians and allies' (lines 57f. of the charter), which probably means, not that there was a joint Athenian and allied court, but that Council, Assembly and *synedrion* participated in treason prosecutions of normal type.[19] A rare and remarkable decree of the allies, preserved on stone, decrees loss of civic rights for the perpetrators of wrongful evictions (R/O no. 29, not in Harding). It also seems to refer to arrangements for arbitration, an institution whose great period lay in the hellenistic future,[20] and this and some other bits of epigraphic evidence have been used to reinterpret the Second Athenian Confederacy in a more positive light. The inscription (it is fragmentary) runs as follows:

> ... in accordance with tradition, and to the Panathenaea a cow and panoply, and to send to the Dionysia a cow and phallus as a commemoration, since they [i.e. the Parians] happen to be colonists of the people of the Athenians. Write up the decree, and the reconciliation [*diallagai*] which the allies have decreed for the Parians, and place a *stele* on the Acropolis [at Athens]; for the writing-up of the *stele* the treasurer of the people shall

give 20 drachmas. Also invite to hospitality in the *prytaneion* tomorrow the envoys of the Parians.

In the archonship of Asteius (373/2); on the last day of [the month] Skirophorion [roughly June] …

with … of Thebes putting to the vote: Resolved by the allies: So that the Parians shall live in agreement and nothing violent shall happen there [?]: If any one kills unjustly [?], he shall be put to death; and those responsible for the death shall pay the penalty [?] in accordance with the laws … or exiles any one contrary to the laws and this decree

(tr. from R/O)

The background to the passing of the decree in the second paragraph is not certain, given the fragmentary state of the text, but on a recent and attractive new interpretation,[21] the Parians made the offerings voluntarily,[22] and not after seceding from the Confederacy and then being coerced back in. The *diallagai* refers on this view to settlement of internal Parian disputes, not to disputes between the Parians and the Confederacy. It does seem possible that the Confederacy anticipated the hellenistic institution whereby 'foreign judges' were called in to settle disputes, an alternative to force.[23] If so the Athenians deserve some credit for the fact.

What does all this add up to? The situation under the fourth head, judicial arrangements, is not straightforward. The provision for the settlement of disputes, if it has been correctly read into the text we have just discussed, is a positive feature. And the allies were involved formally in the policing of infringements of guarantees. But (as we have seen) the idea was that they could do so only by participating in an essentially Athenian case. And in such actual cases as we do hear of, 'the allies' do not appear at all: for instance it was the Athenian Council of Five Hundred which condemned a man to death for killing an Athenian *proxenos* (R/O no. 39 = Harding 55, lines 37–8, about Iulis on Keos), though Iulite rebels are said (lines 29–30) to have acted contrary to the interests of the allies as well as of the Athenians. We may contrast the League of Corinth formed by Philip II of Macedon in 338/7, which was formally invited to try Kallisthenes and some Chian traitors (Plut. *Alex.* 55. 9; R/O no. 84 = Harding 107; cf. below p. 299).

On the second item, tribute, we saw that men like Chares sometimes settled tribute levels themselves. In any case, the levying of tribute was itself a breach of one of the guarantees. The third, the treasury, mattered little once tribute started to be levied, in 373 (see further below, pp. 245 and 248).

As for the first and most general head of competence, we saw that some inscriptions do show that procedures of consultation were followed in the early years. But not every Athenian ally was also an ally of the Confederacy. So the inscribed text of the purely Athenian alliance with Amyntas of Macedon (Tod 129 = Harding 43, not in R/O) has no mention of the allies, possibly because an alliance with such an autocrat can hardly have been welcome to northern confederacy members like Ainos or Abdera. (Similar considerations

may also explain a purely Athenian alliance with Thracian kings: R/O no. 53 = Harding 70.) And allied opposition to the peace with Philip in 346, the Peace of Philokrates (for which see below p. 275), was brushed aside, though the allies were represented in the negotiations in the person of Aglaokreon of Tenedos. Or there is the decision (Tod 158 = Harding 58; not in R/O) to send cleruchs to Potidaia. Naturally, no 'allies' feature in the preamble because cleruchies contravened the charter. However, this kind of evidence is tricky: of two decrees concerning Dionysius from the same period, one does, and the second does not, imply allied involvement (R/O no. 33; R/O no. 34 = Harding 52). The absence of allies in the second of these decrees cannot be pressed. Again, an alliance with the Thessalians (R/O no. 44 = Harding 59) speaks in its preamble of 'the Athenians' only, but later (line 12) it does mention 'the allies of the Athenians', and this has been taken to show that they were consulted.[24]

We may turn from the system of representation to the guarantees and stipulations in the charter. Many of them, as we shall see, were to be breached eventually. First, there was to be no tribute, *phoros* (R/O no. 22 = Harding 35, lines 21–3). That promise was to be kept – in a purely verbal sense. They called it *syntaxis*, contribution, instead (though we shall see that this is not attested before 373). Kallistratos is the politician allegedly responsible for thinking up the euphemism (*FGrHist* 115 Theopompos F 98 = Harding 36). We shall ask later how far the league's activities justified making the allies 'contribute'. The second guarantee was made in the same breath as the first. It promised that there would be no governors of garrisons (R/O no. 22, as above).

Third, possessions in allied territory were to be abandoned (lines 25ff.). Probably most such private possessions were lost after 404, but the inscription speaks of public ones as well, and Diodorus (15. 29. 8) says specifically that cleruchies were to be restored to their former owners. Since the only existing cleruchies were Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, which were neither 'restored' nor (surely) ever intended to be, because the original inhabitants had been expelled too long ago to be reassembled, this set of undertakings seems empty, though it no doubt made reassuring reading. The fourth and related stipulation was that no Athenian was to cultivate land in allied territory (R/O no. 22 lines 35f., preferable to Diodorus' 'outside Attica').

Fifth, 'unfavourable *stelai*' (pillars) were to be taken down (R/O no. 22 lines 31ff.). What does this mean? It would be tempting to think that these are the boundary markers delimiting *temen?* (precincts) on islands like Kos and Samos (p. 324 n. 25), but the charter is explicit that the *stelai* were at Athens. Perhaps[25] the *stelai* recorded grants, to Athenian individuals and their descendants, of the right to own land in particular allied states.

Sixth and finally, constitutional freedom and autonomy were guaranteed. In addition a number of freedoms not specifically defined were no doubt assumed by the member states; they included freedom from financial, religious and judicial interference. And there was perhaps a further unspoken

and perhaps unbroken undertaking: to guarantee security in the purely physical sense, from the depredations of pirates (for piracy in the early fourth century cf. Isok. 4. 115 of 380; cf. above p. 200). An Athenian orator in the 340s (Ps.-Dem. 7. 14–15) treats the protection of the freedom of the seas as an Athenian prerogative, and it had been one of the achievements and justifications of the old Delian League to keep down piracy. (Though 'piracy' was a matter of definition: Kimon had found it convenient to expel the Dolopian, i.e. indigenous population of Skyros as 'pirates': Plut. *Thes.* 36, *Kim.* 8.) Although the Argolic Gulf and the waters round Aigina were still dangerous in the late 370s and the 360s (Dem. 52. 5 and 53. 6, and cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 1 for Spartan-sponsored piracy at Aigina), it is possible that things improved in the very early years of the confederacy's existence.[26]

And in general there were few grounds for complaint – in these early years.[27] On land, successive Spartan invasions of Boiotia, first under Kleombrotos (cf. p. 242 for his invasion, the instant Spartan reaction to the liberation of Thebes), then in 378 and 377 under Agesilaos, made small progress against the joint Theban and Athenian forces: Chabrias gets much of the credit for this (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4; Diod. 15. 32ff.; cf. *Hesperia.* 1972, 466ff: Athenian statue honouring Chabrias). Then in 375, at Tegyra, two Spartan detachments were defeated by the Theban elite 'Sacred Band' (Plut. *Pelop.* 16; Diod. 15. 37, cf. 81, omitted by Xenophon). The significance of Tegyra is that already, four years before Leuktra, the Spartans and the Greek world had been given notice that military training and professionalism were no longer a Spartan monopoly (cf. p. 196).

Held to a draw by land, the Spartans turned to the sea, but were convincingly defeated at the battle of Naxos in 376, again at the hands of Chabrias, who was showing notable versatility in these years. This was an important event, which won over most of the Cyclades for Athens, including Delos[28] – so important for religious and symbolic reasons. And the Athenian Timotheos, son of Konon, sailed to waters further west and won an equally decisive victory over the Spartans at Alyzia in 375. This produced further adherents for the confederacy, including Kerkyra (n. 18). And Chabrias added numbers of northern members.

The Athenians now needed space to breathe, because putting together a navy had been a financial effort, especially since the Thebans' reluctance to help pay for it – the first palpable sign of strain in Athenian relations with the Thebans. So (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 1) Athenian ambassadors went to Sparta, as Xenophon has it, and peace was signed. But the matter cannot be left there, because in Philochoros' report (F 151) of the peace, the initiative came from the Persian king (the Athenians *accepted* the *peace of the king*), and Diodorus confirms this (Diod. 15. 38, in other respects, however, a muddled chapter), emphasizing the king's initiative still more strongly, and plausibly giving him a motive: the desire to end inter-Greek squabbles and so release mercenaries for his own projected reconquest of Egypt. But since the Spartans had been so conspicuously the losers from the warfare up to 375 – on land, at Naxos

and at Alyzia – we can go further and suppose that it was the Spartans who as early as 376, after Naxos, suggested to the Persians that they intervene.[29] In other words the truth is almost the exact opposite of Xenophon's account: writing for an Athenian readership in the 350s, he suppresses the Spartan involvement with the Persians, the inveterate enemies of Greece.

The Persian king's efforts in Egypt still came to nothing and Pharnabazos was replaced by Datames, who, however (about 372), was to go into revolt himself, inaugurating a period of prolonged satrapal disaffection which explains why it was not until the 350s that the Persians would again be strong and united enough for an assault on Egypt.

In Greece the Peace of 375,[30] though short-lived, was not quite as transitory as Xenophon implies (it lasted until 373); and it was an advance in that it reflected the balance of forces of the future: the Spartans and Athenians, whose maritime hegemony was recognized (Nep. *Timoth.* 2. 2, Diod. 15. 38. 4), moved closer together in shared alarm at the growth of Theban power. Of the smaller places in Boiotia, Thespiai was taken over by the Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 46; 6. 3. 1ff.) and Plataia was actually destroyed (Isok. 14; Paus. 9. 1. 8; Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 1). Moreover the 370s were a discouraging period for any Spartan who still had hopes of central Greek expansion: Xenophon opens Book 6 of his *Hellenika* with the response of the Spartans to an appeal in early 375 by the Phokians against the Thebans: though Kleombrotos the Spartan king was sent out with four battalions we must assume that with the Peace of 375 this force was withdrawn, unless Xenophon has misplaced the appeal and it really belongs in 371.[31] Still more serious were the implications of another appeal, with which Xenophon continues straight after (6. 1. 2ff.), from Polydamas of Pharsalos in Thessaly against the new Thessalian power, Jason of Pherai. Jason's nominee at Oreos on Euboia had been expelled in 380 without difficulty (p. 239), but since then Spartan influence had been much weakened: in particular their expulsion from central Greece meant that they no longer had a base from which to act there. (The Oreos garrison was thrown out in its turn by the Thebans in 377: Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 56.) Despite Polydamas' alarming report of the spread of Jason's power, of his military reforms (cf. Chapter 14 p. 200, cf. 202), and of his alignment with the Boiotians (6. 1. 10), the Spartans, after examining their own resources, were forced to tell Polydamas that there was nothing they could do (para. 17), and that Polydamas must consult his own interests. So Polydamas submitted to Jason, who now formally became *tagos* (p. 97) over all Thessaly. Jason was even briefly enrolled in the Athenian Naval Confederacy, though his name had been erased from the list of members (R/O no. 22 line 111) by 371.

The Spartans' hand was still, however, not quite played out, nor were they yet ready to accept the implication of the Theban menace by holding firm to the Athenian alignment. In 374/3 the Spartans sent a force west under Mnasippos, trying to provoke a revolution on Kerkyra; Timotheos and a large fleet – sixty triremes – went from Athens in 373, in answer to the Kerkyran appeal which followed (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2; Diod. 15. 46ff.; Dem. 49) and the

peace was at an end. Timotheos, however, could not repeat his success at Alyzia of 375, and he was recalled to stand trial in disgrace. He was replaced by Iphikrates, who 'subdued the cities in Kephallenia' (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 33). But the Thebans had used the interval since the peace of 375 to accelerate the reunification of Boiotia (p. 241) under their leadership, and this yearly turning of the screws by the Thebans was alarming enough from both the Athenian and the allied viewpoint for peace moves to be once again set afoot (371). Again, Xenophon seeks to conceal the Persian aspect, though he gives himself away when he speaks (6. 3. 18) of the Spartan 'acceptance' of the peace; in other words the initiative came from elsewhere, in fact from Artaxerxes.

It is worth pausing at this point to look at morale within Athens' naval confederacy, and in particular to ask how many of the guarantees had been broken. First, the pledge about tribute had been clearly broken by 373: Timotheos' western voyage of that year (above) was subsidized 'from the common *syntaxeis*', i.e. by allied 'contributions' (Dem. 49. 49) There was no great outcry at this, and perhaps, even leaving piracy apart, it had a certain justification: allied appeals required allied money. At least the Athenians were not yet (contrast the 360s and 350s) using allied funds for territorial adventures on their own account. It was to be different when the chase after Amphipolis began at the beginning of the next decade.

Second, a garrison and garrison commanders are attested in Kephallenia in 372 (see the fragmentary inscription Bengtson 1975 no. 267, the result of Iphikrates' 'subjugation of that island' (lines l6ff.):

> [... the garr]isons wh[ich are in the islands]. And *epimelet(ai)* are [to be chosen to go to Kephall]enia, three me[n, as long as the w]ar lasts. They are to t[ake care of Ke]phallenia, so [that it may be safe for the A]thenians and the Ke[phallenians].

The noun *epimeletai* evidently means governors or garrison commanders of some sort; the verb for 'take care of' is the corresponding one, *epimeleisthai.* Though this garrison was perhaps of no long duration (since all garrisons were outlawed by the Peace of 371 and that on Kephallenia was thus presumably withdrawn),[32] this was an ominous precedent; moreover it means that we have no automatic right to assign undated garrisons, like that on Amorgos (R/O no. 51 = Harding 68) to the emergency period of the Social War of 357–355 (that particular garrison is best dated to the 360s).

So far, other specific pledges had been kept – the Samos cleruchy was still in the future (365), and the Athenians were still faithful to the guarantee of autonomy. Xenophon singles out Timotheos' good behaviour on Kerkyra in 375 (5. 4. 64): he *did not* change the constitution, he *did not* enslave or exile anybody. Chares at Kerkyra in 361/0 was not to be so scrupulous (p. 271f.), and this nice piece of 'presentation by negation' is Xenophon's way of pointing the contrast.[33]

There were grounds, however, at the most general level of all for allied disquiet. The original *raison d'être* of the confederacy had been democratic dislike of the Spartans, and fellow feeling with the newly liberated Thebans. As the Athenians moved ever closer to the former and away from the latter, the confederacy necessarily lost much of its justification. And though Boiotian ships are still found serving in the Athenian fleet as late as 373 (Dem. 49), Xenophon makes it clear that Theban participation was progressively grudging (6. 2. 1). From the allied point of view the shift of alignments was perhaps baffling: an inscription (R/O no. 31 = Harding 53) of 369 records Athenian praise for the Mytileneans for their help in 'the past war', i.e. the Mytileneans have asked what is going on and are politely told that hostility towards the Spartans is now a thing of the past. On the other hand this same inscription has been taken as evidence of a liberal readiness by the Athenians to let their allies 'answer back' and criticize Athenian foreign policy.[34]

Again, the introduction into the confederacy of dynasts like Jason of Pherai and his ally and dependant, Alketas king of the Molossians in Epirus – what has been called a 'looser category of ally'[35] – and the Athenians' unilateral alliances with people like Amyntas of Macedon, may have been resented: the adhesion of such men was more likely to be in the interests of the Athenians than of the smaller of their allies. Similarly, there was allied reluctance about the Peace of Philokrates (the peace with Philip in 346, cf. p. 282). This allied feeling was due less to traditional anti-tyrannical prejudice, which was anyway weakening in the fourth century (for the revival of tyranny cf. p. 198 on Euphron), than to the justified fear that the inevitably disruptive and acquisitive foreign policies of autocratically run states would tend to disturb the always precarious territorial equilibrium of the Greek *poleis.*

The peace conference of 371 (p. 248) was attended by Spartans, Athenians and Thebans. That peace contained a new and interesting clause: those who did not want to fight to defend the peace were not bound to do so (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 18). That is, the Spartans were not to be given carte blanche to enforce the peace. But the real historical importance of this conference is its anti-Theban aspect. The suspicions of the Spartans and Athenians at the encroachments in Boiotia of the Thebans took concrete form in a Spartan attempt to enrol 'the Thebans' as such (rather than 'the Boiotians') as signatories. At first it looked as if the Thebans would acquiesce in this, but after the lapse of a day the Theban Epaminondas announced that, sooner than sign, the Thebans would see their name deleted from the document. (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 19; Plut. *Ages.* 28 for the verbal duel between Agesilaos and Epaminondas.) This, one of the great moments of fourth-century history, meant, in the short perspective, the end of the Theban alliance with the Athenians and the reopening of war between Thebans and Spartans. On a longer view it set in motion the boulders of a political landslide: it was to bring to an end the Spartans' pre-eminence of three centuries (cf. p. 255 for the loss of Messenia), and so deprive Greece of the only power which could have provided both the hoplite strength (unlike

Athens) and the ideological magnetism (unlike Thebes) to lead the fight against Philip, and win.

For the moment King Kleombrotos of Sparta invaded Boiotia and reached Leuktra. In the battle of Leuktra the deepened Theban phalanx (p. 192), positioned unusually on the left, defeated the Spartan right; 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed. The period of Theban hegemony had begun.

To explain the Theban victory we noted (above Chapter 14, p. 198) the deepened phalanx and its importance as a kind of strategic reserve, the weighting of the left and the reasons for this, and the use of a trained elite force, the Sacred Band. But there is a negative half to the explanation: Spartan manpower problems. Even Leuktra need not have been the disaster it was, if the pool of surviving Spartiates had been larger. As it was, Aristotle says that Sparta was 'crushed by a single blow' (*Pol.* 1270).

The extent and even the reality[36] of the drop in manpower is highly controversial. Reliable quantification is difficult. At the battle of Plataia in 479, the Spartans still have 5000 hoplites, and even the losses in the earthquake of 465 were probably made up by natural replacement before long. In 418 there seem to have been 6000, but this assumes, what is far from certain, that Thucydides has made an error in calculation in his account of the forces at Mantineia in 418 (5. 68). At Leuktra in 371 there are a mere 1500 (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 1. 1; 6. 4. 15 and 17). No wonder the Spartans felt unable to field a force capable of disputing Thessaly with Jason in 375.

Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a 29ff., a crucial text on Spartan social problems) says that while Spartan property could have supported 1500 cavalry and 3000 foot soldiers the number had dwindled by the 360s to fewer than 1000. He goes on, remarkably, to attribute the defeat at Leuktra to the Spartan inability to deal with the problem of property. We ourselves might want to add the simpler point that, with a slender manpower base, the Spartan or rather Agesilaos' policy towards Thebes in the 370s was insane provocation. An interesting reform of the Peloponnesian League in its military aspect, recorded by Diodorus under the early 370s (Diod. 15. 32ff.), shows at least some awareness of the problem, as does the switch from requiring personal service to permitting financial contributions – an attempt to get money for mercenaries? (See for this Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 21, a change which probably belongs after 380.)

Aristotle was right to see the problem as at root economic and social. He lays much blame on 'the women', who, he says, 'managed many things at the time of the Spartan hegemony'. Certainly, Spartan women, unlike Athenian, enjoyed full legal capacity. At Athens a woman was *formally* restricted to transactions involving one *medimnos* or sack of corn or less (Isaios 10. 10), and though[37] the orators and inscriptions show that at Athens and in related legal systems women in fact not only have much prestige and authority within the family but are found disposing of large sums (loans, payments for dedications, etc.), it is certain that their disabilities mattered in one crucial area: women without a living father or brother (*epikleroi*) could not inherit as heiresses in

their own right. The position was quite different at Sparta, where women had long been free to marry late, and to marry whom they liked, 'heiresses' in particular being free from property restrictions. So we find a woman like Kyniska, admittedly the sister of a Spartan king, entering teams for equestrian events at Olympia, and winning (Paus. 3. 8. 1 and 3. 15. 1).[38] The result was, as Aristotle put it (1270a), that two-fifths of the land at Sparta was in the hands of the women: matrimonial freedom meant that money tended to marry money as it always will unless the tendency is artificially checked as it was at Athens by the rules inhibiting *epikleroi*.[39] Estates at Sparta must have tended to get larger, with the result that Spartiates were squeezed off their *kleroi* or lots and were forced to become indebted to the larger landowners. The full crisis was reached in the third century (Plut. *Agis and Kleomenes*).

Spartiates whose estates became smaller in this way would eventually cease to be able to produce the surplus required to pay their 'mess bills'; these contributions were one of the qualifying conditions for Spartan citizenship, the other being success in the educational *agoge?* (p. 122). When that happened they were downgraded out of the Spartiate category and were called 'inferiors', *hypomeiones.* Kinadon (p. 123f.) was one such. Other factors contributed to the thinning out of the Spartiates: late marriages meant fewer children; at Sparta homosexuality continued until late in a warrior's life; and Spartiates who were thought to have shown cowardice in battle (*tresantes* or 'tremblers') traditionally forfeited citizenship (Plut. *Ages*. 30. 6 and *Mor*. 191c, 214b). But these passages also show that after Leuktra, Agesilaos had to suspend the law (cf. Diod. 19. 70. 5 after the battle of Megalopolis later in the century). Other causes of civic disability are mentioned but not all are equally believable; 'invented tradition' has been specially active in this area of Spartan life. Such causes allegedly included failure to marry (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 9. 4), late marriage – and even *kakogamia*, making a bad marriage. We are told that Archidamos was fined for marrying too small a wife on the grounds that she would produce 'not kings but kinglets' (Plut. *Ages*. 2). This is solemnly cited in modern treatises on Spartan constitutional law. It is possible that bachelors were subject to social opprobrium, if we can believe the story of Derkyllidas who was unmarried and treated ignominiously as a result (Plut. *Lyk*. 15: a young man would not stand up to provide a seat for him because Derkyllidas had not produced a son to stand up for *him* in his old age).

All these are ways of losing status; they would not have mattered so much if Spartiate status had been as easy for outsiders to win as it was for its possessors to lose. But after the Persian Wars there is little enfranchisement of foreigners; *neodamodeis* (liberated helots) existed but were objects of deep anxiety to their always very reluctant liberators (see Th. 4. 80 and above p. 123); and though there were halfway categories called for instance *mothones* or *mothakes*, and though there is evidence that non-Spartiates might receive a Spartan education (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5. 3. 9 on such people, 'not without experience of the good things of the Spartan way of life'), the

barriers were kept high. The surprise is that after Leuktra so many of these excluded groups stayed loyal: Xenophon (*Hell.* 6. 5. 28–9) says that 6000 helots were enrolled in the army with a promise of freedom (cf. 6. 5. 32, only some of the *perioikoi* go over to Thebes; and see 7. 2 on the loyalty of Phlious, cf. p. 235 above). Myths do not die instantly. But the truth about the Spartan myth was put with, ironically, a Lakonian simplicity in the Theban epigram for Leuktra (R/O no. 30 = Harding 46): 'The Thebans are mightier in war.'

# 17

# LEUKTRA TO MANTINEIA AND THE REVOLT OF THE SATRAPS[1]

## Jason of Pherai

The immediate gainer from the Spartan defeat at Leuktra must have seemed at the time to be Jason of Pherai. He destroyed the fortifications of Herakleia, 'not so much', says Xenophon, 'to prevent anybody from approaching his domains by that route in future, but rather to remove any obstacle to his own passage to Greece' (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 27). This meant the final elimination of the Spartans from central Greece. Jason also annexed Perrhaibia to the north of Thessaly (Diod. 15. 57): we saw (p. 221) that this frontier area had been in the possession of Archelaus of Macedon at the end of the fifth century, and an inscription of the Roman period (*BSA* 1910/11, pp. 195ff. = CW 321B) shows that in the last years of his reign Amyntas had authority over part of it at least:[2] he fixed the boundaries of Perrhaibia and Elimiotis. But Amyntas preferred to stay on the right side of Jason: Diodorus (15. 57 again) says that Jason made an alliance with Amyntas; later writers were to represent this hyperbolically as Thessalian rule over Macedon, the tail wagging the dog (Isok. 5. 20; AA. 7.9. 4). How much of all this activity by Jason should be ascribed to the period *after* Leuktra is actually doubtful (from Diodorus' description of him as unpopular at 15. 57, surely from Ephorus, but as 'kindly' a very few chapters later at 60. 5, it has been argued[3] that Diodorus has compressed his material and that Jason must be allowed some time to make some friends; but though the conclusion is likely enough the particular argument will not do because 15. 60. 5 comes from a different source, the 'chronographic source', a hellenistic authority from which Diodorus drew material such as the dates of the accessions or deaths of rulers).

The second half of Xenophon's account of Herakleia, above, implies that Jason had positive ambitions to meddle in southern Greece. Polydamas the Pharsalian (see p. 240) had attributed to him even grander designs – a war against Persia. Whatever Jason's long-term plans, they are beyond evaluation since he was assassinated in 370 (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 30). Xenophon has an interesting report on his short-term aims: he sent round to 'the cities' telling them to send sacrificial animals to Delphi, where rumour had it that he was planning to take charge of the sacred assembly (*panegyris*) and the

games himself (*Hell.* 6. 4. 29–30). This is self-assertion of a particular and recognizable sort, more brazen than but definitely comparable to the inter-state struggles for influence at Delphi and Nemea which we explored in the mid-fifth century (above p. 27). But that the Jason who tried to do this was an individual not a *polis* ranges him rather with archaic tyrants like Pheidon of Argos who took over the Olympic Games (in military matters Jason may have modelled himself on a shadowy late archaic Thessalian figure called Aleuas the Red).[4] But it also ranges him with hellenistic rulers like Kassander, who presided over the Nemean Games in 315 BC (Diod. 19. 64. 1, from Hieronymus of Cardia); and see below Chapter 19 p. 297 for Philip II and other elite Macedonians at the Olympic and Pythian Games. Like other fourth-century figures, Jason represents the past and the future in one.

Jason was succeeded (after a bloody internecine power struggle on lines more familiar from Macedonian history) by his nephew Alexander. Xenophon was impressed by Jason (see the whole section *Hell.* 6. 4. 27ff. where he takes the Pheraian dynastic story down to the 350s), and there is more to this than mere anti-Theban bias (the desire, that is, to direct the focus of attention away from Epaminondas and Thebes in their day of glory). For a moment after Leuktra Jason had genuinely seemed to hold the balance between the Greek powers to the south of him, when he dissuaded the Thebans from shattering what remained of the Spartan army, urging them to quit for the moment, while they were ahead of the game (6. 4. 20ff.).

### The three theatres of Theban foreign policy (1): the Peloponnese

But Jason's death, and that of Amyntas shortly after, opened up the centre and north of Greece to foreign intrigue and invasion. This time the struggle was to be between the Thebans and Athenians, the Spartans having retired hurt from the Thessalian ring.

Theban foreign policy in the 360s[5] develops in three theatres: in the south (the Peloponnese), in the north (Thessaly and Macedon); and, after the middle of the decade, in the Aegean Sea – the 'naval policy' of Epaminondas. Xenophon, whose preoccupations are almost entirely Peloponnesian, is interested only in the first of these theatres, and even there he leaves out some of the biggest events of the age.

In the south, then, a general peace of 371/0, after Leuktra, had been concluded at Athens, from which the Thebans were again shut out as in 372/1. The news of Leuktra had been coldly received at Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 20: the herald was refused even the normal courtesies), and it seems that the Athenians still hoped to restrain Theban capacity for mischief, while advancing their own interests (the peace contained a pledge to keep 'the decrees of the Athenians and their allies'). That this peace was at Athenian instigation reflects a decline in the influence of the Spartans (though we should not suppose that they actually participated in the peace, thereby

acquiescing in their own eclipse).[6] Nevertheless the chief Athenian anxiety continues to be Thebes.

The attitude of the Athenians is made clearest in an important incident which Xenophon does not mention at all, though he gives the preliminaries. The outcome of Leuktra was to give encouragement to democratic regimes everywhere (Diod. 15. 58 about Argos, cf. above p. 192 and n. 7 on Diod. 15. 40), and the first sign of this was in Arkadia. The scattered Mantineians set about reversing the settlement of 364, repopulating and fortifying their city (*Hell.* 6. 5. 4). The process of concentration did not end there: from Diodorus we learn that Lykomedes of Mantineia organized all Arkadia into a federal state (Diod. 15. 59), for which over the next few years a federal capital was built, Megalopolis, the Great City (Paus. 8. 27. 8 and Diod. 15. 72. 4) (see Figure 17.1). The date of the foundation of Megalopolis is controversial and the foundation should be thought of as a process rather than an event, but the present writer has argued that the process began very soon after Leuktra as Pausanias explicitly says.[7] (Diodorus' discrepant date, 368, goes back not to Ephorus but to the so-called 'chronographic source'.) The Tegeans were coerced into the new league, and the Tegean exiles, who had lost the argument and the fighting over the question whether to join, now fled to Sparta. Against the physical intervention of the Spartans, which was now a certainty, the Arkadians appealed to the Athenians, but were turned down (late 370 BC: Diod. 15. 62. 3, Dem. 16. 12. This is the important incident omitted by Xenophon – as if his failure to report the formation of the Arkadian confederacy were not bad enough.). So in a momentous step the Arkadians turned to the Thebans, who invaded the Peloponnese in winter 370/69.

This first invasion, under the leadership of Epaminondas, is painted by Xenophon as a somewhat half-hearted affair (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24), but Pausanias (9. 14. 2ff.) more plausibly represents it as determined action. Its results were concrete enough: not just consolidation of the Arkadian League as a permanent check on the Spartans (and probably also the encouragement of a new league in Aitolia: R/O no. 35 = Harding 54, with Diod. 15. 57 for the Aitolians as Epaminondas' allies in 370), but the invasion of Lakonia itself, and – most catastrophic of all – the liberation of Messenia after centuries of helotage (Diod. 15. 66f.; Paus. 9. 14. 5). It was the removal of the fertile Messenian *kleroi*, essential for the maintenance of the Spartan lifestyle, which – rather than Leuktra itself, of which it was a consequence – caused the end of Spartan military greatness. Though the Athenians were roused, by a Spartan appeal, to send help under Iphikrates – at the instance of the leading politician Kallistratos who, in the Athens of these years, led the anti-Theban reaction after Leuktra – Epaminondas got his army out of the Peloponnese in safety, to the fury of Xenophon who was probably watching from Corinth as the Boiotian army slipped through (*Hell.* 6. 5. 50f.). Though in the years ahead Arkadian nationalism was to show itself quite as recalcitrant to the Thebans as it had ever been towards the Spartans, there was to be no reversing the



*Figure 17.1* Megalopolis, Arkadia

damage done to Sparta at Messene by the first of Epaminondas' invasions. In 369 things went less well for the Thebans: Epaminondas again invaded, but he withdrew in face of a force which now included help from Dionysius I of Sicily. Moreover this time the Arkadians showed resentment of the Thebans; and summer 368 brought another slight lift to Spartan morale: they defeated some Arkadians in the so-called 'Tearless Battle', as predicted by the oracle at Dodona (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1; Diod. 15. 72). By 367 the Thebans were ready to try to settle things diplomatically by a peace conference at Susa, far inside the Achaemenid Persian empire. But we cannot follow Xenophon to Susa without first looking at the north in 371–367.

## The three theatres of Theban foreign policy (2): the north

Epaminondas' first Peloponnesian invasion force had included some Thessalians (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 23): this is one of Xenophon's few allusions to the Theban involvement in the north. Then, in the second invasion (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 28), the Athenians suggested to their Spartan allies that the troops of Dionysius should be used in Thessaly against the Thebans. This second passage is thus also important as evidence that the Thebans' northern expansion was opposed by the Athenians. When did the Athenians' own 'northern policy' revive? On the evidence of the Athenian orator Andokides (3. 15) it had never really collapsed: speaking in 392, he had referred to the Athenian desire to recover, among other things, the Chersonese (cf. p. 230). But it was not until after Leuktra that Amphipolis and the Chersonese became live issues

again (though the Athenian alliance with Amyntas, Tod 129 = Harding 43 of 375–373, see p. 244, may be seen as a preliminary). The Athenian claim to the Chersonese is treated below; the claim to Amphipolis must have been made in or shortly before 369, because it was recognized by Amyntas (Aischin. 2. 32) who died in that year.[8] In 368 the Athenians sent Iphikrates to Amphipolis to pursue this claim (Aischin. 2. 27; Dem. 23. 149). They had good reason to do so, because Pelopidas of Thebes had preceded Iphikrates: a first visit by Pelopidas to Macedon falls in summer 369 in the brief reign of Alexander II[9] (Plut. *Pelop.* 26). It is from Plutarch and Diodorus,[10] both using Ephorus and perhaps ultimately deriving from the important Greek history by Aristotle's nephew Kallisthenes, that we derive much of our knowledge of the Thessalian and Macedonian policy of the Thebans.[11] That policy, the work of Pelopidas, should be seen as part of a plan complementary to what Epaminondas was doing in the Peloponnese: the one dismantling Spartan power in the south, the other seeking to neutralize Athenian influence and ambitions in the north.

So Pelopidas' northern entanglements are partly to be explained as a response to the change in the direction of Athenian imperialism – which was both a literal, geographical change, and a political departure in that Amphipolis, from the point of view of the Athenians' allies in their naval confederacy, promised nothing but a waste of their resources. But Pelopidas had originally been taken north on a legitimate enough pretext: an appeal by the Thessalian cities against Jason's successor, Alexander of Pherai, and against the other Alexander, Alexander II of Macedon, who had been invited in slightly earlier by the Thessalian Aleuads (p. 101), but had outstayed the invitation, garrisoning Larissa and Krannon (Diod. 15. 67.3). Pelopidas, sent to 'arrange things in Thessaly to the advantage of the Boiotians' as Diodorus puts it, took Larissa, obliged the Macedonian Alexander to withdraw from Thessaly and contained, but did not overthrow, the power of Alexander of Pherai. He passed from Thessaly to Macedon and there arbitrated in favour of Alexander against a rival, Ptolemy; from there he went home to Thebes. Neither the Macedonian nor the Thessalian settlement lasted long: in Macedon Alexander was killed and Ptolemy succeeded to the throne (though technically as regent for Amyntas' son Perdikkas); complaints against Ptolemy, and in Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai, brought Pelopidas north again in 368 (Plut. *Pelop.* 27; Diod. 15. 71). This was after he and Epaminondas had survived political attacks on them at home. Some trace of all this survives in the epigraphic record: at Delphi, a metrical dedication on a statue base, standing in the name of 'the Thessalians', honours Pelopidas as 'noble leader of the Boiotians' (Harding 49 = *BCH* 1963, 206, not necessarily a posthumous honour as is usually assumed. The statue was the work of Lysippos, not a cheap sculptor); and a decree of the Boiotian league, dating to the period of Boiotarchy of, among others, Pelopidas himself, awards the title of *proxenos* and benefactor to one Athenaios of *Macedon* (*SEG* 34. 355, cf. R/O p. 218 and below p. 262).

But in Macedon, Ptolemy and Eurydike, the widow of old King Amyntas, had enlisted the help of the Athenian Iphikrates who helped to drive out a pretender called Pausanias. So when Pelopidas arrived, it must have looked as if Theban influence had been supplanted by Athenian. But surprisingly (since Pelopidas' forces were small), Ptolemy immediately came to terms with Pelopidas, and even surrendered hostages who included the future king Philip II. It is difficult to believe that he did this because he was in awe of Pelopidas' reputation, as Plutarch asserts (*Pelop.* 26); a likelier motive is the calculation that the Athenians would be a more uncomfortable presence in Macedon than the Thebans would be, because the Athenians had concrete territorial ambitions – Amphipolis.[12] It is perhaps also relevant that Iphikrates had been personally close to Amyntas and his children (Aischin. 2. 28, who actually says that Amyntas had adopted him), so that the Athenians' commitment was to the children rather than to the regent. With the Thebans, by contrast, Ptolemy could perhaps hope to negotiate as something like a ruler in his own right.

On his return to Thessaly, Pelopidas was treacherously seized, during some negotiations, by Alexander of Pherai, and it took two Theban expeditions (368, 367) to get him back; the first failed partly because Alexander had turned to the Athenians who sent a general, Autokles, with thirty ships and a thousand men (Diod. 15. 71, cf. R/O no. 44 = Harding 59, line 39). This is also the moment when the Athenians tried to have Dionysius' troops sent to Thessaly against the Thebans (cf. p. 256 on Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 28). When Pelopidas was eventually released it was at a price: not perhaps any formal recognition of Alexander (for the Thebans were to interfere again in 364), but certainly loss of face, leading to three years during which the Thebans kept out of the north.

The Thebans' Thessalian involvement did not, then, come to much at this stage, but it should not be judged too severely.[13] The original mission of Pelopidas was speculative ('to arrange things to the advantage of the Boiotians') and was intended, surely, not so much to make Thessaly into a Boiotian province – Pelopidas never had the manpower with him for that – as to win as many friends and followers as possible, and to make sure that there was no chance of a second Jason coming south. Anyway the events of 364 were to show that the Thebans could still be invoked as a potential check on Alexander, and Pelopidas may have been content to be for the moment just a card up the sleeve of his Thessalian well-wishers. We should also remember the Athenian aspect: it is probable that the presence of the Thebans in Macedon, as a third force beside the Athenians and the various Macedonian kings and pretenders, made it that much harder for the Athenians to get back Amphipolis (cf. what was said above about Ptolemy's unexpected rapprochement with Pelopidas). In any case, of the various assets which control of Thessaly offered, listed in Chapter 8 above (p. 102), several were to come the Thebans' way after all – but only in 364 (see p. 263). In particular we may recall what was said in that chapter (p. 103) about the religious advantages of dominating Thessaly,

which itself controlled a preponderance of the votes in the Amphiktionic Council at Delphi. This control, which the Thebans were able to exercise after the middle of the 360s, is important for understanding how they were able to provoke the Sacred War of the 350s (p. 275).

By 368, the Thebans must have been feeling remarkably friendless internationally, with the Athenians and Alexander of Pherai ranged against them in the north, and the Arkadians making difficulties in the Peloponnese, where a quarrel between the Eleans and Arkadians (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 26) was splitting the Spartans' enemies. So we find both Thebans and Spartans (whose need for a respite needs no elaboration) at a peace conference at Delphi in 368, summoned by Philiskos of Abydos, an agent of Ariobarzanes the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. This gathering was a diplomatic failure because the Spartans were asked to recognize Messenian independence; it did, however, improve the military position of the Spartans because Philiskos – whose master Ariobarzanes' eye was perhaps already on revolt – provided them with mercenaries. (It may be that, like Cyrus' mercenaries in Thessaly, p. 220, they were to be kept in this way in innocent-looking 'cold storage' until Ariobarzanes was ready to use them himself.) Thus strengthened, the Spartans continued to pose a threat to the Thebans (the Tearless Battle, already mentioned, was fought shortly afterwards and shows that Sparta was not quite finished militarily), and there was a more serious effort at peace in 367, at Susa (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 33ff. See p. 256 for this peace conference, which was very much a Theban–Persian affair.). Pelopidas was the central figure: giving expression to the symmetrical Theban plan he asked that the Spartans should be forced to acquiesce in the loss of Messenia, and that the Athenian navy should be beached: this was the Theban reply to the actions of Iphikrates and Autokles. And the quarrel between the Eleans and Arkadians was to be settled in favour of the former. Persia approved the Theban plan, but not surprisingly, in view of the humiliation it held for the traditional great powers, there was no deal. Of the two Athenian delegates, one (Timagoras) who had unwisely agreed to the proposals was condemned and executed on his return; he was denounced by the other, Leon, who had announced in the king's hearing that the Athenians would now look for friends other than the Persian king (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 37).

But an event on the Athenians' own northern borders obliged them after all to submit to Persian-sponsored diplomacy: in early 366 the Thebans seized the disputed territory of Oropos on the Boiotian–Attic border in north-east Attica. (Diod. 15. 76; Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 1. Date: scholiast on Aischin.) This was an indirect result of the secession of the Euboians from the Athenian confederacy, soon after Leuktra. Themison, tyrant of Euboian Eretria, was responsible for the original seizure of Oropos and the Thebans then backed him up. This affair produced a revulsion of feeling at Athens: Kallistratos was the man responsible for the Athenians' anti-Theban stand; he was now tried and though he was acquitted for the moment (in 361 he went into exile) his policy of confrontation with Thebes was discredited; it was a policy which had

lost Euboia and Oropos without regaining Amphipolis. A different tack was now tried: concessions to the Thebans, in whose possession of Oropos, and in whose hegemony over Boiotia, the Athenians now acquiesced, in exchange for recognition 'by the King of Persia and the Greeks' of the Athenians' right to the Chersonese (Dem. 9. 16).[14] This bargain was formalized as a King's Peace of 366/5 (Diod. 15. 76. 3).

Leon had used threatening words to Persia in 367, and the threat was still good, judging from the Athenians' next actions: by bowing to a King's Peace on Theban terms (terms which were, however, tolerable as those of 367 were not), they had won the right to pursue their claim to the Chersonese; the Amphipolis claim had been recognized for some time now. But acceptance of a King's Peace was by this stage of the fourth century a convenience which did not preclude action against the king. On the contrary, 366 began a phase of more vigorous Athenian action against Persia, and of a more aggressive style of imperialism within the Athenians' own league. This enabled the Thebans after all to challenge the Athenians by sea (despite the failure of the crude formula of 367) because of the unpopularity which this tougher Athenian imperialism generated. (The first step here had been the pursuit since about 369 of the selfishly territorial claim at Amphipolis.)

The theatre in which Athenian and Persian interests clashed was Samos: Timotheos was sent, perhaps straight after the 366 peace, to help the satrap Ariobarzanes, who was now openly in revolt (Dem. 15. 9, where the Athenian Timotheos is said to have been ordered not to break the King's Peace, i.e. to keep his hands off mainland Asia). Timotheos found a Persian garrison installed on Samos; he expelled it and laid siege to the city. When it fell (365), he put in a cleruchy, evicting the Samian inhabitants (Diod. 18. 18). The numbers of cleruchs was very large: a mid-fourth-century Samian inscription published in 1995 lists what are evidently the members of a Council of 250 members, presided over by five generals.[15] These are versions of the corresponding Athenian institutions, scaled down by half from the Council of 500 and the ten generals. The cleruchs were therefore resident[16] and formidably numerous, even more so after two reinforcements had been sent (see below, p. 263).

## The three theatres of Theban foreign policy (3): the Aegean

The legality or rather morality of this celebrated action by the Athenians has been much debated,[17] and it is worth putting the case for and against the Athenians. In their favour it can be said, first, that Samos was not a member of the naval confederacy and therefore not covered by the pledges of the charter; and second, that the Persian garrison was itself a breach of the King's Peace by which Persia had undertaken to respect the autonomy of the Greek islands other than Cyprus and Klazomenai. It has recently been suggested that the Persian garrison may have been invited there by a Greek faction on the island,[18] and this is perfectly possible; but it would have made little difference to how

the Persian encroachment was seen at Athens. So the initial provocation was on Persia's part, and the brief given to Timotheos, to respect the King's Peace, was not wholly meaningless as far as Samos goes, even if the projected help to Ariobarzanes put the peace at risk, and even if the evidence from Erythrai – p. 235 – suggests that Timotheos went beyond his instructions after all. The temporal priority of Persian aggression on Samos is important: Samos is in a strategically commanding position for the control of the Aegean crossing (cf. Isok. 15. 109),[19] so that the Persian garrison weakened the Athenians' eastern flank from the military point of view; while politically the Persian presence was a challenge to the Athenians' ability to protect their island allies from satrapal infiltration (see p. 242 for such protection as part of the programme of the confederacy). It is also relevant to the Athenians' motives, though hardly to the morality of the affair, that they probably needed the extra land and food (Chapter 14, p. 208).

On the other side of the argument one may appeal to contemporary Greek opinion: above all there is the epigraphic evidence which shows that large numbers of individual Greeks helped evicted Samians, thereby showing what they thought of the Athenians; the individuals so thanked come from communities ranging from Kardia in the north, via Erythrai, Miletus and Rhodes, to Phaselis in the south-east.[20] Even Athenian opinion was divided: we hear of an orator called Kydias (Ar. *Rhet.* 1384.b32) who warned the Assembly, correctly, what the effect on Greek opinion would be. Curiously enough, the recently discovered cleruchy inscription includes a Kydias of the deme Lamptrai among the cleruchs (*SEG* 45. 1162 col. 1 line 19). The name is relatively rare at Athens, and it is possible[21] that the two men are identical and that the Athenian reaction to poor Kydias' misgivings was to send him on the project he had misgivings about; one thinks of Nikias, sent to Sicily in 415 although – or because – he had warned against the whole idea. So, technically unimpeachable though the Samos cleruchy may have been, it was unwise of the Athenians to excite the old fears associated with the word 'cleruchy', especially at a time when men like Epaminondas of Thebes (cf. p. 262) and Mausolus of Karia were ready and able to profit from Athenian mistakes.

Leon had spoken of the Athenians looking to 'friends other than the Persian king', and there is evidence to show that this was not just indignant bravado but was acted on. An Athenian decree of the mid-360s (Tod 139 = Harding 40, not in R/O) honours the Phoenician prince Strato of Sidon who was soon to be involved in the great Revolt of the Satraps.[22] But Timotheos' involvement with Ariobarzanes was more obviously a blow struck against Artaxerxes – and not just by the Athenians: from Xenophon's *Agesilaos* we learn that the king of Sparta (and the Persian peace conference of 367 was as offensive to the Spartans as to the Athenians) had also been sent to help Ariobarzanes, who was under siege in the Aiolid, at Assos or Adramyttion, by Mausolus of Karia and Autophradates of Lydia, both still at that time ostensibly loyal to Persia (Xen. *Ages.* 2. 26; Polyain. 7. 26). But the way the

siege ended should make us doubtful about their loyalty:[23] Mausolus and Autophradates abandoned the blockade after Mausolus had given money to Agesilaos, and it is a reasonable guess that this joint activity by Timotheos and Agesilaos was part of a deal for Greek mercenaries by satraps who were themselves about to go into revolt – in fact, that the main satraps' revolt, which Diodorus (15. 90) puts under the year 362, had already begun.

The east Aegean operations of Timotheos, and the Samian cleruchy which resulted, gave Epaminondas and the Thebans the opportunity to exploit Athenian unpopularity and to rival Athens by sea: as Epaminondas put it, the Thebans should 'transfer the *propylaia* [the ceremonial gateway] of the Athenian acropolis to the Theban Kadmeia' (Aischin. 2. 105). This Aegean policy is the third of the theatres of Theban activity which were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Epaminondas exhorted the Thebans to aim at naval hegemony and they decided to lay down keels for a hundred triremes. (Diod. 15. 78. 4–79. 1. Note in this connection an inscription (*SEG* 34. 355, cf. above p. 257), recording Theban honours from this decade for a Macedonian called Athenaios son of Demonikos, perhaps a member of a naval family, cf. Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3 for a trierarch called Demonikos son of Athenaios. Macedon was an obvious source of shipbuilding timber and perhaps Athenaios provided the Thebans with some.)[24] Nothing much came of this grand shipbuilding programme, but that does not mean that the Theban policy of trying to 'rule by land and sea', as Isokrates was to put it (5. 53), was altogether a failure: Isokrates speaks of triremes sent to Byzantium, and Justin (16. 4) of an appeal to Epaminondas from Herakleia on the Black Sea,[25] all of which supports Diodorus who says (15. 79) that a sea voyage of Epaminondas in 364 'won over' the Athenians' allies the Rhodians, Chians and Byzantines (literally he made them *idias*, his own; the word means more than just 'friendly' in Diodorus, cf. 19. 46. 1).[26] An interesting Theban coin is perhaps to be connected with the overtures to the Rhodians: it carries the Theban shield, the name of Epaminondas – and the rose (*rhodon*), the symbol of Rhodes (*Rhodos*).[27] Another trace of Epaminondas' diplomacy in this region is a proxeny decree passed in his honour by the people of Knidos, on the Asiatic mainland opposite Rhodes (*SEG* 44. 901, cf. R/O p. 218). But though it is remarkable to find the Rhodians, Chians and Byzantines already linked in hostility to the Athenians (as they were to be again in 357 at the prompting not of Epaminondas but of Mausolus), the first two did not secede from the confederacy – yet. The Byzantines, however, did; and the seduction of the Byzantines stands as the only lasting success of the Thebans' whole Aegean venture, because Byzantium's departure from the Athenian confederacy was permanent and (because of its situation on the corn route) damaging. Thus in 362 we find the Byzantines harassing the Athenian grain fleet (Dem. 50. 6), and in the next decade the Byzantines, now firmly allied to the Thebans (cf. Dem. 9. 34), were members of a Theban *synedrion* modelled on the Second Athenian Confederacy (R/O no. 57 = Harding 74 lines 11 and 21): yet another manifestation of Theban or Theban-inspired federalism.[28]

The secession of the Byzantines, and the Theban flirtation with the Chians and Rhodians, are evidence of disaffection within the Athenian confederacy, and there are other signs of trouble. On Keos, very close to Athens, anti-Athenian sentiment took open and violent shape in about 363: a revolt, and the murder of the Athenian *proxenos* (R/O no. 39 = Harding 55). This is also to be connected with Epaminondas' voyage.[29]

What had the Athenians done to deserve this, not yet a secession but certainly a display of imperfect confidence? It is time for another brief review of the way they had been keeping their pledges. By the late 360s their record was much less creditable than a decade earlier. The guarantee about cleruchies had been spectacularly broken in spirit if not formally (and we can add that the Samos cleruchy was reinforced in 362 and 352, scholiast on Aischin. 1. 53, Philochoros F 154, and that other cleruchies were sent, to Sestos and the Chersonese in 353, and Potidaia in 362: Diod. 16. 34 and Tod 146 = Harding 58; not in R/O). Garrisons and *archontes* (governors) are attested for Amorgos and Andros and are best put in about 364[30] (R/O no. 51 = Harding 68 and Aischin 1. 107). But more unpopular than anything, perhaps even more than what had happened on Samos, was surely the diversion of both Athenian and confederacy resources to goals in the north (Amphipolis and the Chersonese), which could not, even if they were won, profit confederacy members other than the Athenians. (And in fact the northern war went badly in the 360s: R/O no. 38 = WV 45 and Tod's commentary.) The Athenians could not really complain when in 366 their allies failed, as they did, to help them over Oropos (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 2, cf. p. 264).

## The run-up to the battle of Mantineia: the revolt of the satraps

The naval programme of Epaminondas in 364 was the result of ambitious and deliberate calculation; the resumption in the same year of Theban operations in the second main theatre, that is the north, was due to chance: a fresh appeal from Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai. It was Pelopidas' last campaign, because he was killed at the battle of Kynoskephalai in that year. The Thebans sent a second and larger army, of 7000 men, who defeated Alexander and forced him to join the Boiotian League, and drastically reduced his territory: Achaia Phthiotis and Magnesia were not joined to Thessaly but enrolled as separate Boiotian allies (Diod. 15. 80). The importance of this was that it gave the Thebans a clear majority of votes in the Amphiktionic Council at Delphi (they also, at this time, got the right of consulting the oracle there out of the usual order: *Syll.*$^{3}$ 176 = *Fouilles de Delphes* 3. 4. 375). See above, p. 258.

But the death of Pelopidas had shaken Theban nerve, and the large force which it took to avenge him, and to cow Alexander, must have stretched Theban resources. So we hear no more of the projected hundred-ship Theban navy. The abiding importance of the Aegean policy lay in two things:

Byzantium; and the example which Epaminondas had offered to the Karian satrap Mausolus, who in 357 is found ranged against the Athenians with exactly Epaminondas' former allies, the Rhodians, Chians and Byzantines, and with exactly the one hundred triremes of which Epaminondas had dreamt (Xen. *Ages*. 2. 26). But Mausolus' was no paper fleet.

Another reason[31] why the Thebans held back in the Aegean was the situation in the first great Theban theatre, the Peloponnese, with which we began this chapter. Here things had been sliding out of Theban control. We noticed that as early as 368 the Arkadians had been showing a spirit of independence towards Thebes, and the Susa proposal of 367, to award the disputed territory of Triphylia to the Eleans not the Arkadians, was a Theban hit at the latter and an expression of Theban anger. It was a mistake, because it drove the Arkadians once again to seek an alliance from the Athenians; this time it was granted, because the Athenians considered that the loss of Oropos was due to desertion by their existing allies (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 2) and were in a mood to welcome new ones. As for the Arkadians, their reasons for approaching the Athenians went beyond the Elis issue: Epaminondas had invaded the Peloponnese a third time in 366, and the Arkadians had been compelled to submit to Theban leadership in, and send troops for, some campaigning by Epaminondas against the Achaians in the north Peloponnese. The Thebans had picked a fairly gratuitous quarrel with the Achaians, which had for one of its motives precisely the aim of calling the Arkadians to order in this very public way (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 41). Epaminondas' initial settlement of Achaia was mild, but the Theban authorities at home reversed his measures, putting in a garrison and an imposed democratic government. There was a similar story at Sikyon, where Euphron's ambiguous behaviour (p. 205) offered no assurance to the Thebans that stable, anti-Spartan policies would be followed.

The war between the Arkadians and Eleans was resumed in 365; by now the Eleans had Sparta for an ally and this, together with the absence of the Thebans from the Peloponnese in this campaigning year, must have given heart to the enemies of Arkadian nationalism. But the Spartans were too much debilitated. It is a measure of their decline that one must now speak of 'the Spartans' not the Peloponnesian League, because that organization had effectively ceased to exist in 366, an important moment and a new 'low' in Spartan history: in that year the Spartans permitted the Corinthians to make a separate peace with the Thebans, on terms which included acknowledgement of Messenian freedom (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 9). This campaigning of 365 ended in humiliation and defeat for the Spartans at Kromnos.[32]

It was in 364, the year of the battle of Kynoskephalai, and of Epaminondas' Aegean voyage, that the Arkadian federal state fell apart. The war with the Eleans was going badly and some of the Arkadian federal officials, the Tegean faction, started to help themselves to the treasures of Olympia to pay the troops. The Mantineians objected and the Tegean element asked for Theban help; a Theban officer was sent to Tegea with a force of 300 hoplites (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4 is the source for all this). In 363 the Arkadians (by which term

we must understand the Mantineian element) made peace with the Eleans, without consulting Thebes – an act of independence, not to say defiance. The Theban officer at Tegea locked up a number of leading men from the federal cities, and though he later had qualms and released them, the Thebans were now committed to forcible intervention. This is the run-up to the campaign and battle of Mantineia of 362: the Peloponnesian allies of the Thebans included the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans, the Argives and the Messenians, and of the central Greeks the Euboians, Thessalians and Lokrians (cf. p. 206 for the Thebans and Lokrians); not, however, the Phokians who refused on the grounds that their treaty with the Thebans was purely defensive. They were to pay for this later. Ranged against this essentially anti-Spartan coalition were the Mantineians, Spartans, Eleans and Athenians.

Epaminondas' campaign opened with an attack on Sparta itself, an act which was, militarily speaking, impressive rather than productive; it did, however, have a political point, emphasizing as it did the bond which held the coalition together. That bond, fear and hatred of the Spartans, was essentially negative, but nevertheless, after so many centuries of the Spartan myth, it had an irrational power. It is a sign of Epaminondas' political failure, even before the battle of Mantineia, that his Peloponnesian allies fought to reject Sparta rather than because of the cultural attractions of Thebes, which was thought to have no cultural ideal to offer (in Ephoran language, neither Spartan *agoge* nor Athenian *paideia*: *FGrHist* 70 F119 for Ephoros' views on Thebes). The battle of Mantineia, for all the brilliance of Epaminondas' tactics, was a Theban defeat in that he himself was killed. That need not have been fatal to Theban primacy had the name of Thebes been associated in the Greek mind with more amiable values than medism, stupidity and arrogance. (Diodorus, i.e. Ephoros again, spoke of 'Leuktran pride', 16. 58; and the conventional Athenian view is put at Isok. 5. 53 and Dem. 18. 98f. The treatment of Achaia and Sikyon illustrates what they were thinking of, though those incidents were not Epaminondas' fault.)

But in all this, Greek opinion, however nearly unanimous, was not quite fair: *federalism* is the great Theban legacy to fourth-century and hellenistic Greece. The importance of federalism is (as we noted briefly in Chapter 14, p. 206), first, that it is a kind of alternative to imperialism, a way of achieving unity without force (it is no accident that the more brutal Romans were not much interested in federalism, despite the curious tradition that the sixth-century king Servius Tullius was inspired by the Greek Panionion to form the Latin League); and second, that it embodies a representative principle which means that Greek federalism was often more democratic than the often urban-dominated primary assemblies of the city-states. Arkadia itself was democratic in intention at least, witness the sovereign body of Ten Thousand (R/O no. 32 = Harding 51).[33] But federalism is an achievement which the modern historian of Thebes and Boiotia has to reconstruct almost entirely from inscriptions. (The *Oxyrhynchus Historian* should, however, be mentioned, cf. p. 106.) Of the positive charges against the Thebans, they

cannot be acquitted of a thoroughly Spartan arrogance in the Peloponnese which they had entered as liberators in 370. Stupidity we have discussed already (p. 106); medism is a theme well to the front in Xenophon's treatment of Pelopidas at Susa in 367; but medism was a game which more than one could and did play, and Xenophon cannot entirely conceal, and alternative traditions explicitly attest, Spartan participation in virtually every King's Peace in the period covered by the *Hellenika*, Perhaps the answer is simple and cynical: Thebes should have produced its own historian of the 360s (or rather a good enough historian to have survived), somebody who could not only have done justice to the Theban promotion of federal structures in Aitolia, Arkadia and the Aegean synedrion, but who could have replied in kind both to the charge of imperialistic brutality – when levelled from the direction of Athens, the evictor of the Samians; and to that of medism – when brought by an apologist of Sparta in its period of Persian-promoted ascendancy.

In fact the policy towards Persia of both the Athenians and Spartans in the 360s was equivocal: we saw that the peace of 366/5 was a Common Peace, that is, it was sponsored by Artaxerxes of Persia; but Timotheos at Samos and both he and Agesilaos, in their dealings with Ariobarzanes, are found opposing Persian interests at almost the very next instant. The revolt of Ariobarzanes was only the prelude to the great revolt of the satraps,[34] which should be thought of as lasting for the whole of the second half of the 360s (see generally Diod. 15. 90–2 – all under 362 – and Trogus *Prologue* 10). Orontes of Armenia was the leader, but the insurrectionists included Mausolus of Karia, Autophradates of Lydia, and Datames, who had already been holding out in northern Anatolia for almost a decade (see p. 247, and for his career the *Life* by Nepos). Agesilaos went out to Egypt (Plut. *Ages.* 37), and he and the rebel Pharaoh Tachos advanced on Phoenicia where Strato of Sidon was sympathetic (Jerome, *Against Jovinianus* 1. 45; Xen. *Ages.* 2. 30), while Datames pushed over the Euphrates River and Orontes moved against Syria. The Athenians as well as the Spartans helped the rebels: Chabrias took a force of mercenaries and was put in command of a rebel fleet (Diod. 15. 92, Hicks and Hill, *Greek historical inscriptions* 122). And there is evidence for diplomatic links between the Athenians and individual rebels: not just Strato (Tod 139 = Harding 40; not in R/O) but Orontes (*IG* $2^2$ 207a) and Tachos (Hicks and Hill no. 121). But this support was to an extent unofficial and backhanded, so that when the revolt failed through treachery, Orontes submitted to the king and Mausolus returned to his allegiance (Diod. 15. 91; R/O no. 54 = WV 40; Datames was killed according to Diodorus). The Athenians and the other Greek states could cover themselves by pointing to their official refusal of involvement: in the celebrated Reply to the Satraps, recorded in an inscription found at Argos (R/O no. 42 = Harding 57) of approximately 362/1, the Greeks say that they settled their differences and will abstain from war against the king if he respects the peace they have made. This is a reference to a peace concluded, in an atmosphere of general exhaustion, after the battle of Mantineia of 362 (Diod. 15. 89).

For Xenophon, who ends his *Hellenika* at this point, the outcome of Mantineia was 'uncertainty and confusion' in Greece (*Hell.* 7. 5. 27), but in fact by guaranteeing that each state should keep *what it held* (rather than 'what belonged to it', which is a formula opening the way to litigiousness) this peace at last gave general recognition to the existence and right to statehood of the Messenians. (The Spartans of course stayed out of the peace for precisely that reason.) As a result of the events of 371–362 the Spartans had two new, strong and hostile neighbours in Messene and Megalopolis. There was no 'uncertainty or confusion' about that. Nor could Xenophon, had he wished to do so, have extended his remark from Greece to the Persian empire with any greater truth: Persian authority looked stronger than ever. 'Uncertainty and confusion' would have been aptest, around 360, as a description of Macedon, the power to which within a mere thirty years both Greece and the Persian empire were to succumb.

# 18

# PHILIP[1]

### Introduction; Persia and Syracuse in mid-century

Ptolemy, regent in Macedon for Perdikkas, died in 365 and Perdikkas succeeded in his own right. The achievements of Perdikkas, which included keeping the Athenians out of Amphipolis (cf. Aischin. 2. 29), and the reorganization of Macedonian harbour dues in 361/0 through the agency of the Athenian exile Kallistratos (Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* 2. 22, cf. p. 252 for his exile) are overshadowed by the disaster in 359 in which he lost his life and 4000 men to the invading Illyrians under King Bardylis (Diod. 16. 2). The new king was Philip II (see Figures 18.1 and 18.2).

For contemporaries, the success of Philip was due to the personal greatness of Philip himself. Theopompos, who said that 'Europe had never produced a man like Philip son of Amyntas' (*FGr Hist* 115 F27), gave the title *Philippika* to his history of the period, thereby acknowledging the importance of the king's personality. Such a title could scarcely have been given to a history of any earlier period. No modern historian need shrink from following Theopompos in recognizing that Philip did what he did, and what his predecessors had been unable to do, because Philip was Philip. There is, however, a negative side to the explanation of Philip's rise, namely the absence or ineffectiveness of early opposition to him. It has been said that 'it is arguable that Caesar [in 60 BC] would not have made such an immediate impact on Roman politics had the state been [in Ciceronian language] less "wretched" and "unstable"'.[2] Something similar can be said about Philip in his relation to the traditional Greek powers. Each of them was in deep trouble in the 350s: the Thebans, because of the protracted, bitter and useless Sacred War fought for possession of Delphi in 355–346 (the first diplomatic shots of which were fired in 357, see below p. 268); the Spartans, because of their loss of Messenia and their problems inside the Peloponnese; and the Athenians because of the 'Social War', i.e. the war against their seceding allies. Each of these will be treated in turn in the following pages; it will be shown, moreover, that they are interconnected: thus (to give one illustration) it was safe for the Phokians' enemies to declare Sacred War against them only after the point in 355 when the Phokians' strongest potential allies the Athenians suddenly looked certain



*Figure 18.1* Coin of Philip II



*Figure 18.2* Head of Philip II as reconstructed by the Manchester Museum team

to lose their own 'Social War'.[3] So each state helped to make the problems of the others worse.

So much for the powers of mainland Greece (and it should be added that the death of Alexander of Pherai in 358 ended Thessaly's phase of interventionism abroad, and from now on Thessalian independence progressively dwindled; at any rate Alexander's successors initially moved closer to Thebes: scholiast on Aristid. *Panath.* 179. 6). What, though, was the state of those powers outside Greece proper which had determined Greek destinies earlier in the century? Persia was strong again after 360, and especially after 359 when a new king Artaxerxes III succeeded to the throne; he ordered the disbandment of satrapal mercenary armies (scholiast on Dem. 4. 19 = Harding 72A), a measure which completed the disciplining of the satraps which had largely been achieved by his predecessor (p. 266). But Persia shared an interest with Philip in limiting Athenian sea power; hence Mausolus was to help the rebels against the Athenians in 357 and Artaxerxes was to order Chares out of Asia Minor in 355 with the threat that otherwise he would supply the rebels with further Persian help. It is not until 346 that there is any evidence of designs by Philip against Persia, and thus before then there was no reason for Persia to do anything about Macedon. On the contrary, the king of Macedon was, from the Persian point of view, doing useful work.

The other power outside Greece proper which, as will be recalled (pp. 224, 232), had helped to bring about the first King's Peace of 386, had been the ruler of Syracuse. But nobody at Syracuse was in a condition to intervene in Greek affairs, even in the sporadic way characteristic of Dionysius I, after his death in 367. The circumstances of Syracuse's collapse as a great power, and of the reconstruction of Sicily in the 340s by Timoleon of Corinth, are recorded for us very fully in Diodorus' Sicilian narrative in Books 15–16, and in Plutarch's *Lives* of Dion and Timoleon (there is also the problematic evidence of the seventh Letter of Plato).[4] But even after Sicily had been impressively reconstructed by Timoleon, the Sicilians and their rulers were not strong enough, or interested enough, to involve themselves in affairs in Greece.

After Dionysius' death in 367 his son Dionysius II had quarrelled with his father's adviser Dion, a relative by marriage twice over of the old tyrant, and Dion went into exile (366). In 357 Dion returned from his exile in Greece, and made an attempt to 'liberate' Syracuse; but his own motives were suspect or at least suspected. He did force Dionysius to leave Syracuse for south Italy, but in 354 Dion himself was assassinated and by 346 Dionysius was back. An appeal against him to Corinth, the city which had founded Syracuse back in the eighth century, led to the mission of the Corinthian Timoleon (above p. 192), who landed in 344 and expelled Dionysius, who went to Corinth. Timoleon defeated the Carthaginians at the Krimisos River, and began to rebuild the prosperity not just of Syracuse but of much of Greek Sicily (Diod. 16. 83 – the difficulties of excavating Syracuse, due to modern settlement, mean that a clearer picture is to be had from places – Tindari, Herakleia

Minoa, Morgantina, Sicilian Megara – other than Timoleon's main centre of activity).[5]

Politically, Timoleon's settlement shows him to be a child of his oligarchic home-city, since he established what, despite loose encomiastic talk of 'democracy' in the literary sources, should certainly be counted as an oligarchic constitution; and a child of his monarchic age: all that distinguished his own position from that of the conventional 'tyrant' is his eventual abdication and his good fortune in having favourably disposed historians to write about him.[6] He was certainly not doctrinaire in suppressing other tyrannies in Sicily: most of them went, but not all: some were too loyal, and too useful.[7] The military forces which Timoleon had taken with him numbered some 3000 all told (his first landing was with only 700 men); these are not large forces for doing what Timoleon did (it is surprising that the Carthaginians held their hand for so long) and they imply an impoverishment and depopulation in Sicily which in turn helps to explain why in the mid-century Syracuse counted for so little in the outside world. As in the eighth century it now became a receptacle for a colonizing influx (Plut. *Timol.* 23 speaks of 60,000 immigrants in all), though there had always been a drift of fortune-seeking soldiers in the direction of Syracuse and Sicily in the classical period. (Hagesias of Syracuse, for whom Pindar wrote *Olympian* 6, was originally from Arkadia, just as Ergoteles of Himera in *Olympian* 12 was a *stasis* exile from Knossos in Krete.) The particular Greek exodus to Sicily in the 340s and afterwards has been plausibly connected[8] with the material debilitation of the old city-states and the imminence of the new order in Greece which Philip looked set to establish; for instance, Plutarch (*Timol.* 30) records that some of his hero's mercenaries had served in the Sacred War on the Phokian side, enlisting with him only after 'roaming round the Peloponnese for some time'. So Sicily was at most a refuge from, not a weapon against, Macedon. Nevertheless in an indirect way events in Sicily did help to condition events in the east Mediterranean: it is important that Corinth was chosen as the site for Timoleon's dedication for his victory over the Carthaginians at the river Krimisos (R/O no. 74). This symbol of a recent great success against western 'barbarians' was surely relevant to Philip's choice of Corinth as the centre of the new league directed against the eastern barbarian, Persia (see above p. 117 and below pp. 283, 287). We may now return to the problems of the mainland Greek states in the 350s – the Athenians, Spartans and Thebans.

## Athens and the Social War

The Athenians in the late 360s and early 350s were no more successful in the north than they had ever been. Every general who campaigned there was prosecuted on his return, a normal Athenian reaction to failure in the field[9] (the defection of Byzantium did not help); inside the Athenian Naval Confederacy, the Aegean islands of Peparethos and Tenos were attacked by Alexander of Pherai (Diod. 15. 95; Dem. 50. 4); and at Kerkyra, Chares

supported an oligarchic coup (Aen. Tact. 11. 13; Diod. as above). That was not the kind of thing the allies had expected back in the early 370s when they joined the new organization. There were a few compensating successes – Pydna and Methone had been won in the late 360s, but were to be lost to Philip early in his reign (Dem. 50. 5); and on Euboia in 357, Theban influence was expelled and replaced by Athenian, with a speed which showed that pro-Athenian feelings on the island were general (Diod. 16. 7, cf. R/O no. 48 = Harding 65). But the Athenians' breach of their pledges, their chase after northern territories, their failure to police their Aegean allies against a ruffian like Alexander of Pherai, all offered grounds for discontent. The underlying cause of the Social War is given by Demosthenes (15. 3, 15) as resentment of what they regarded as the Athenians' 'plotting' (i.e. increasingly high-handed imperialism) and at their 'recovery of what was their own' (i.e. Amphipolis?).[10] But Demosthenes is also helpful on the precipitating cause, which he identifies as the intrigues and incitement of the Persian satrap Mausolus. Mausolus had surely digested the example of Epaminondas a very few years before (see p. 262); and by the early 350s, after the checking of whatever precisely had been his eastward aspirations in the Satraps' Revolt, he was ready to enlarge his influence westwards at the expense of the Athenians' disaffected Aegean flank. Demosthenes' evidence is up to a point suspect in that the political context of the Rhodian speech (Dem. 15, of – probably – 351)[11] gave him every motive to minimize Athenian culpability for the war, and to magnify that of the scapegoat satrap, who had no votes in the Athenian Ekklesia; but fortunately there is external evidence to corroborate him: Diodorus (i.e. Ephorus) attests concrete naval help given by Mausolus to the rebel allies (16. 7. 3).

The war broke out in 357, and the Athenians lost one of their best commanders, Chabrias, at almost the first blow. This left Chares alone in command for the moment. The rebels savaged the Athenians' three cleruchies Lemnos, Imbros and Samos (Diod. 16, 21) – perhaps a way of making a political point against a detested institution as well as a sound strategic move (cleruchs traditionally had duties of defence). At Embata, off Erythrai, Chares wanted to engage the rebel fleet but was not backed up by his new colleagues, Iphikrates and Timotheos, who had recently reinforced him with sixty ships. Denouncing the other two in a letter to the Assembly at home, Chares got sole command (Diod. 16. 21–2), and then, short of money, hired himself out to a Persian satrap, Artabazos. This man was satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and his revolt in the mid-350s is the last main phase of satrapal insurrection in the mid-century (though it should be kept distinct from the great revolt of the 360s, in which Artabazos had stayed loyal). At first Chares gained brilliant successes (including a 'Second Marathon' – but on Persian soil, unlike the first: scholiast to Dem. 4. 19 = Harding 72A), and ravaged the territory of a Persian feudatory called Tithraustes (*FGrHist* 105 no. 4 = Harding 72C). But in mid-355, in a decisive diplomatic intervention, the Persian king wrote to the Athenians ordering them to recall Chares, or he would help

the rebels with 300 ships (Diod. 16. 22). The Athenians complied, and that was the humiliating end to the war. The *Peace* of Isokrates (Isok. 8) and the *Revenues* (*Poroi* or *Vectigalia*) of Xenophon, a set of proposals for financial reconstruction, both reflect the depressed mood of this time. One feature of the military narrative in particular bears out Xenophon's essentially economic diagnosis of the Athenians' difficulties, namely the lack of money which had forced Chares to sell his services to a rebel satrap, thus taking the war out of the domestic Athenian sphere and risking Persian reprisals.

The problem with the Athenian navy was not so much lack of ships as lack of properly equipped ships;[12] they had 349 in 353/2 (*IG* $2^2$ 1613 line 302). Part of the trouble was that the 'trierarchs',[13] rich persons appointed to pay for the equipping for one year of a trireme or part share of a trireme as a kind of income tax (such a duty or 'trierarchy' was one kind of 'liturgy' or compulsory state service) were reluctant to carry out more than the minimum demanded of them.[14] (There was a change by the fourth century in the formerly expansive attitudes of upper-class Athenians, no longer cushioned by allied tribute on the old fifth-century scale.) Thus in the late 360s there is evidence that trierarchic obligations were being hired out (*misthosis*). This is attested by a speech of Demosthenes (Dem. 51) called *On the Trierarchic Crown.* Similarly there were difficulties in operating the system of *proeisphora*, that is, payment in advance of *eisphorai*, or capital levies, by three hundred rich individuals on behalf of their taxation groups or 'symmories', from whom they then had to recoup. This system is as old as 377 (Isaios 6. 60), but had evidently broken down by the time of Demosthenes' *Against Polykles* (Dem. 50 of 362/1), when we hear of an old-fashioned system of deme-based collection. It seems[15] that *proeispherontes*, people liable to pay the *eisphora*, sought exemption from trierarchies on the grounds that *proeisphora* was a liturgy and you could not be liable for more than one liturgy at a time.

There were attempts to reorganize the system, but the size of the propertied class could not be increased by simple legal or administrative *fiat*: the so-called law of Periander in 357/6 (Dem. 47. 21, 44) tried to spread the burden of the trierarchic load over as many as twelve hundred persons, but this seems to have been unrealistically many, as we can see both from Demosthenes' unsuccessful proposals of the later 350s in Speech 14 (*On the Symmories*) and from his successful ones of 340/39 (Dem. 18. 102–8), because in 340/39 the old figure of three hundred was reverted to (Hyperides F159 OCT).

What was lacking was elementary goodwill among the rich, cf. above. Nor was it only the rich who were short of goodwill: Demosthenes' *Against Polykles* of 362 (Dem. 50. 6–7) is the first mention of conscription. It is also relevant that although the orators attest to a very active commerce, much of it was in metic hands, and though metics were liable to the occasional property tax called the *eisphora* (Lys. 22. 13; Dem. 22. 61, etc.), and to some other liturgies, they were exempt from the vital trierarchy (Dem. 20. 10–21). Xenophon in his *Revenues* (2. 1f.) makes suggestions for the exploitation of metic wealth and this idea was to some extent acted on. But only later.

Such were some of the background difficulties in the organizing of the trierarchy system. At the level of detail, that is, the manning and equipping of individual triremes, too much depended, here too, on individual initiative. The state was supposed to supply equipment (Dem. 51. 5), but if you were experienced (and rich) enough you provided your own, to avoid troublesome dealings (*pragmata*) with the *polis* (Dem. 47. 23). In any case we are told that in 357 all equipment was in such short supply that everything in private hands was commandeered by the state (Dem. 47. 20, 44). (There were also problems about manning: some trierarchs provided their own *skilled* crews: Dem. 50. 7, 12; ordinary sailors were state-provided by the 340s: Dem. 21. 155; but if Dem. 50. 7 can be trusted, a trierarch in 362 actually had to provide his own ordinary crew. Not all trierarchs can have enjoyed borrowing large sums in advance, like Timotheos in 373: Dem. 49. 11, 14f.)

No wonder that in 357 'there was no equipment in the dockyards' (Dem. 47. 20). Immediate steps were taken, it is true, when and even before the Social War broke out. Arrears of *eisphora* had already been collected in some year before 377 by Androtion (*FGrHist* 324 Androtion T6). And at the beginning of the Social War itself, in 357, the superintendent of the dockyards, one Satyros, collected thirty-four talents which were spent on equipment for a fleet (Dem. 22. 63). So too the 'nationalization' of private equipment, mentioned above, belongs now. And after 355 Euboulos improved finances generally.

All these leisurely methods were well-enough suited to campaigns in which the Athenians themselves decided when and how to strike. Demosthenes saw the danger: in an extravagant passage in the First Philippic (4. 36) he was to claim 'it is not until the news comes that we appoint our trierarchs and institute exchanges of property for them, and inquire into ways and means'. That is too fantastic to be true as it stands. But it *is* clearly true that the Athenian system was poorly suited to a war in which the initiative lay in hands other than those of the Athenians themselves. In 357 they were subjected, for the first time in many years, to the test of such a war, and their methods were shown up as inadequate: hence Chares' involvement with Artabazos and the inglorious end to the war. Demosthenes was to say in his speech *On the Crown* of 330 (Dem. 18. 234) that the Athenians had to face Macedon with small totals of tribute in hand, and without the help of their largest island allies. The orator was quite right to make this causal connection between the Athenians' Social War and the rise of Philip.

## Sparta in mid-century

Next there is *Sparta*. The causes of Spartan weakness after 370 have already been reviewed. The battle of Mantineia did not even bring them the consolation of seeing the back of the Thebans in the Peloponnese, for we hear of an invasion by Pammenes the Theban in 361 (Diod. 15. 94), who forcibly prevented the break-up of Megalopolis, which was being attempted by secessionists within the city. In the 350s Spartan foreign policy, no longer

piloted by Agesilaos who had died in 360, is very restricted: Demosthenes in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* of 353 (Diod. 16. 24), urging an Athenian expedition on behalf of the Megalopolitans, greatly exaggerates the Spartans' aggressive power at that time. It is true that they had provided help for their allies the Phokians against the Thebans in 355 (Diod. 16. 24), and that they had got into a war against Argos and fought a winning battle at Orneai in the north-west Argolid in 353 (Diod. 16. 34). But the help to the Phokians in 355 was moral (and financial) rather than active; as to the Spartan position inside the Peloponnese, a bigger war in 352 against the Argives and Megalopolitans (Diod. 16. 34 again) seems to have been prompted by the sheerest opportunism at a time when the Phokians under Onomarchos looked much stronger than the Thebans. But the Thebans against the probabilities not only invaded the Peloponnese in aid of their allies but forced the Spartans to a draw. Demosthenes' opponents were thus vindicated in their policy of non-intervention: the Spartans could not prevail over the Thebans even when they were so conspicuously weakened as they were by the Sacred War.

## The Third Sacred War

It is to the Sacred War itself, that is, to the Thebans' difficulties in the 350s, that we must now turn. The importance of this war (355–346) can hardly be exaggerated, because it was what brought Philip into Greece proper in the first instance, in the later 350s; and because he was the victor in 346 instead of the thoroughly exhausted Thebans, he, rather than they, took the prize for which they had provoked the war originally, namely the undisputed first place among the Greek states.

The expulsion of Theban influence from Euboia in 357 was a blow to Theban prestige as well as to their power in central Greece, and the Theban decision to attack the Phokians, the recalcitrant allies who had refused military help to the Thebans in the Mantineia campaign, seems to have been prompted by the mere desire on the Thebes' part to assert herself at the expense of a conveniently situated neighbour. Theban preponderance in the Delphic Amphiktiony had been assured since their settlement of Thessaly in 364: by their alliances with the Magnesians and Phthiotic Achaians, now split off from the rest of Thessaly, the Thebans controlled 16 of the 24 votes in the amphiktiony. Moreover the Thebans, acting through the Thessalian president Andronikos, had in perhaps 363 suppressed a movement against them at Delphi, the evidence for which is an Athenian inscription (*Syll*[3] 175; Hicks and Hill no. 116); and the anti-Theban elements responsible fled to Athens.

(The inscription goes 'Since Andronikos the Thessalian has exiled Astykrates contrary to the Amphiktionic laws and those of Delphi …', the Athenians passed measures favourable to Astykrates and his associates.)

So it was not difficult for the Thebans to persuade the amphiktiony to condemn the Phokians to a large fine, ostensibly for 'cultivating sacred land' (Diod. 16. 23: Diodorus' sixteenth book[16] is the main source for the Sacred

War), in the expectation that the Thebans would themselves be given the leadership of the war which would follow if, as was likely, the Phokians were unable to pay. The condemnation of the Phokians was in autumn 357. But the Phokians did indeed refuse to pay, and under their leader Philomelos they took everybody by surprise and seized Delphi itself with its treasure (spring 356). However, it was not until a year and a half later, in fact in 355, that the amphiktiony actually declared war against the Phokians: we have seen that the reason for this was that the Phokians had powerful friends, notably the Athenians, and it was not until the Athenians had clearly lost the war against their naval ex-allies (an outcome far from inevitable before Persia demanded Chares' recall) that the Phokians' enemies dared to act. This is true of the Thessalians in particular, despite earlier Thessalian readiness to follow the Thebans when it was a mere question of uttering condemnations of the Phokians, a painless matter. So at first the Phokians, fortified by the funds of the Delphic treasury, kept the initiative: Philomelos invaded Ozolian Lokris in 356, and by self-justifying embassies in the same year was able to turn his Athenian and Spartan friendships into formal alliances. But then came the end of the Social War in the Aegean, and the Thessalians were now ready to support the Thebans positively.

In the fighting of 354, the first proper year of the war, Philomelos, despite some initial success against the Lokrians and Thessalians, was decisively defeated by the Boiotians at Neon in Phokis; Philomelos threw himself over a cliff, and though Onomarchos took over the remains of the army, it must have seemed as if the war was more or less over. That seems to have been the Theban view at any rate, for when Artabazos (cf. p. 272), now deprived of his Athenian support, asked for Theban help, he got it: 5000 men under Pammenes (Diod. 16. 43). This loan of perhaps a third of the Theban army could only have happened in the optimistic aftermath of Neon, but it was a mistake, for when Onomarchos resumed the war, the Theban force in Asia found itself stranded for various reasons (Phokian successes in Thessaly, and the establishment of Athenian influence at Sestos in the Hellespont, including the cleruchy mentioned on p. 263, both contributed to block Pammenes' passage home), and so when Artabazos was defeated, the Thebans in Asia probably simply hired themselves out to Artabazos' enemy the king of Persia for a projected recapture of Egypt. In any case they were no longer available to the Thebans back home for use in Greece.

Onomarchos helped himself to more of Apollo's money, and made alliance with Lykophron and Peitholaos, who now ruled in Thessalian Pherai in Alexander's place; there was now for the first time, on the assumption that the tyrants in Pherai could carry or drag the rest of Thessaly with them, a chance for the Phokians to end the war by legitimate means: rescission, at Thessalian initiative, of the original condemnatory decree. For their part the tyrants of Pherai could hope with Phokian help to expel Theban influence from Thessaly: Philomelos' Thessalian victory of 354, and Onomarchos'

suddenly acquired wealth, seem to have convinced Lykophron and Peitholaos that there was, after all, an alternative to tame acceptance of Theban control.

But for the other Thessalian cities there was an alternative too: namely, the traditional recourse of free Thessaly against the tyrannical house of Pherai: Macedon. So in 353 the Aleuads of Larissa called in Philip II. The principle of using Macedon as a stick to hit their enemies may have been the same as that applied in the 360s and even early 350s, but the concrete results were certain to be very different given the strength of Philip's position after a mere six years of rule.

## Philip's early years[17]

Those six years had begun with the programme of military reorganization discussed in Chapter 14 (p. 202): after some initial temporizing diplomacy he had crushed the Paionians and then the Illyrians who had defeated his brother Perdikkas (Diod. 16. 4). Then, by a series of political marriages, he ensured that Macedon was encircled by friendly powers or loyal cantons: Phila of Elimiotis, Audata of Illyria and Alexander's mother Olympias of Epirus (357). Next, he probed down beyond Elimiotis into Thessaly (358: Justin 7. 6. 8, cf. 'returning to Thessaly' at Diod. 16. 14. 2 under a later year).[18] In this first intervention Philip, who was probably as anxious at this stage to avoid trouble from as to make trouble in Thessaly, laid no heavy hand on Thessaly, but perhaps gave brief and unspectacular help to the Larissans against Alexander of Pherai in the last years of his rule.

The Greek world at large may have missed the significance of Philip's Illyrian campaign, and it may reasonably have viewed his first Thessalian adventure as a resumption of established Macedonian policy; but in 357 it was, one would have thought, put on notice at Amphipolis that Macedon now had a ruler of a different and incalculably more dangerous type, militarily and diplomatically, than any before him. In that year Philip, having opened his dealings with the Athenians in 359 by an ostensible abandonment of designs against Amphipolis (Diod. 16. 4. 1), suddenly struck at the city, which he captured after a siege (Diod. 16. 8. 2 for the relatively humane settlement,[19] though his enemies were exiled, see R/O no. 49 = Hatzopoulos 1996 vol. 2: 58ff. no. 40 = Harding 63). Philip had thus achieved within months what the Athenians had failed to do in eleven years, to go no further back. That the Amphipolitans themselves had a clear idea of what they were faced with is shown by the remarkable and despairing direction to which they turned for help: Athens. But the Athenians could not,[20] or would not, fight Philip for Amphipolis, and actually declined an alliance with the Amphipolitans' neighbours the Olynthians at this time (Dem. 2. 6). The explanation for the Athenian attitude may indeed lie in the celebrated 'secret diplomacy', involving the Athenian Council, by which Philip purported to bargain Amphipolis for Pydna (Dem. 2. 6 with Theopompos F30a).[21] But Philip's next move was simply to attack and take Pydna (Dem. 1. 9), not bothering to wait for the

place to be delivered to him by virtue of any diplomatic undertaking by the Athenians. Now at last the Athenians were obliged to regard themselves as at war with Philip (Aischin. 2. 70). All this, as we have said, was clear notice, and the Athenian reaction is explicable only if we grasp the strength and blindness of their desire for Amphipolis, the quest for which had not only helped them to lose the goodwill of their allies and bring down on them the disastrous Social War, but had now led them to rebuff Olynthos, whose Chalkidic Confederation was the strongest Greek power in the north still independent of Philip. In 356 the Olynthians made an alliance with Philip instead (R/O no. 50 = Hatzopoulos 1996 vol. 2: 20f. no. 2 = Harding 67), and this helped Philip to take Potidaia in 356 and Methone in 354. (The siege began in 355 and ended in 354. It cost Philip an eye: we can see the horrific results, if it is Philip's skull which the excavators have found at Vergina and reconstructed by methods derived from modern forensic science: Fig. 18.2.) He was also greatly strengthened economically when he annexed the rich mining area of Krenides (Diod. 16. 8. 6: earlier than 356, cf. R/O no. 53 = Harding 70).[22]

The Athenians were no more astute, or fortunate, in their dealings with the non-Greek powers in the north, than with the Olynthians. An inscription (R/O no. 47 = Harding 64, of 357) records an alliance between the Athenians and the three kings of Thrace, Berisades, Amadokos and the Kersebleptes whose name turned up a few years ago on a silver bowl, part of the the 'Thracian treasure' unearthed at Rogozen in Bulgaria in 1985–6.[23] Another inscription (R/O no. 53 = Harding 70, cf. Diod. 16. 22. 3) gives the terms of a grand quadrangular alliance with the kings of Thrace, Paionia and Illyria. All this looks very sensible. But very different thinking is attested in Demosthenes' *Against Aristokrates* (Dem. 23), a problematic speech, apparently written early in the 350s and then touched up: some parts at least (e.g. para. 124, Sacred War events of 352) certainly belong late in the 350s, but other passages (cf. para. 107) assume that the Thracian kings are still independent, which they had ceased to be by 355.[24] The curiosity of this speech is that it recommends that Thrace be kept disunited in Athens' interests – a very short-sighted view of those interests at a time when the Athenians needed all possible assistance against Philip. But even if we try to retrieve some of Demosthenes' credit by pushing back his advocacy of so mistaken a policy to, say, 356, the speech *Against Aristokrates* is an interesting commentary on the epigraphic record, from which otherwise a more single-minded Thracian policy at Athens could reasonably have been inferred. In any case Philip was able to deal with the northern members of the quadrangular alliance one by one – and there is no sign that any of them received help from the Athenians, who were by now heavily committed in the Social War. In 356 Grabos of Illyria was defeated (Plut. *Alex.* 3); a defeat of the Paionians must be assumed although it is not explicitly attested; and in 353, after the final surrender of Methone (354), Philip turned against the most defiant of the Thracian kings, Amadokos, and reduced him to vassalage (scholiast on Aischin. 2. 81 = Harding 76A.

Another, Ketriporis, had probably submitted a year or two before; the final reckoning with the third and last, Kersebleptes, was to be delayed for ten years, partly because in 353 Kersebleptes acquired some friendly neighbours when the Athenians under Chares took Sestos and established a cleruchy on the Chersonese: p. 263.).

This then was the position which Philip had reached when the invitation of 353 arrived from Thessaly: he had secured Macedon against Illyria, Paionia and Thrace and reduced their rulers to vassalage or impotence; he had already done something to neutralize Thessalian Pherai in 358; he had a marriage tie with Epirus; he had taken Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaia and Methone, thus rectifying an age-old weakness of Macedon, namely its lack of outlets to the north Aegean sea as a result of the Greek colonizing scramble of the archaic period; with the remaining Greek power in that area, Olynthos and the Chalkidic League, he was already on terms of alliance; and to make all this possible he had a fine, professionally trained army and enviable resources in precious metal from Krenides, by now renamed Philippi. Moreover this great access of power had so far called forth no more than protests and inept diplomacy from any of the central and southern Greek states, tied up as they were with their own problems. With Philip's involvement in the Sacred War that was to change; but Philip was already formidably strong. That being so, it was not likely that his invitation into Thessaly, whatever its immediate outcome, would result in his politely withdrawing from Greece. With hindsight, we can say that the Aleuads of Larissa have a lot to answer for.

## Up to the Peace of Philokrates (346)

The terms of Onomarchos' alliance with the Pheraian tyrants required that Onomarchos should send help when called upon; so now (Diod. 16. 35) he sent his brother Phayllos to Thessaly against Philip, and when that did not work Onomarchos himself engaged Philip in battle – and won (Diod. 16. 35, and Polyain. 2. 38. 2, showing that this victory, the only military defeat of Philip's entire career, was achieved by artillery, which is thought to have been simple non-torsion catapults).[25] It was at this moment, when things looked so black for the Phokians' enemies the Thebans, that the Spartans tried, unsuccessfully as we saw, to reassert themselves in the Peloponnese.

But in 352 Philip returned to Thessaly, where he was probably now elected *tagos* or *archon*, i.e. ruler of Thessaly (a gesture of alarm by the Thessalians at the success of the Pherai–Phokis coalition), and he utterly destroyed Onomarchos and much of his army at the battle of the Crocus Field before Athenian help could reach the Phokians. The Crocus Field gave Philip final mastery of most of Thessaly and its resources; as Diodorus says, he 'settled the affairs of Thessaly' (38. 1); he suppressed the tyranny of Pherai and took the port of Pagasai (Dem. 1. 9), thus acquiring the valuable Thessalian harbour revenues to which Demosthenes alludes (1. 22). Philip now had absolute title to the material Thessalian resources – cavalry, harbours, revenues – which, as

we have seen in the preceding chapters, the Greek states had so long coveted, back to Kleomenes I of Sparta in the late sixth century and the Spartan foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in the fifth, through the period of Theban–Spartan rivalry in the Corinthian War and after, and the succeeding phase of Theban–Athenian rivalry in the 360s. We have almost reached the end of the Thessalian theme which has run through much of this book. Religious primacy in the amphiktiony would be formally Philip's, just as soon as he had settled the Sacred War. Actually he had it already, measured by amphiktionic votes, but with Delphi still in hostile Phokian occupation, votes meant nothing. As to the last of Thessaly's advantages, its strategic control of the land passage linking Greece and the north, Philip displayed his awareness of this by moving straight to Thermopylai, the correctly named 'Gates'. But here he was checked: the Athenians had finally exerted themselves to send a task force of 5000, which kept Philip out of the Gates (Diod. 16. 37. 3, 38. 1; Dem. 19. 319).

We next hear of Philip in Thrace. (It is an annoying characteristic of our sources for Philip's reign that we know so much more about his dealings with the Greeks, especially Athens, than about his other preoccupations; yet he had to balance the former against the latter when calculating, for instance, whether to try to force or besiege the Gates, or to answer whatever summons had reached him from the Thrace-ward region. In November 352, as we learn from Demosthenes (3. 4), he was besieging Heraion Teichos in eastern Thrace – part of the grinding down of Kersebleptes (scholiast on Aischin. 2. 81 = Harding 76A). But this campaign threatened the Athenians too, as did any hostile activity near the Hellespontine corn route (and there was now the Chersonese cleruchy not far away, newly established and vulnerable). So they decided that forty triremes should be launched, that men under forty-five years of age should embark in person, and that we should pay a war-tax of 60 talents (Dem. 3. 4). The ships never sailed. Philip was reported ill, or dead, and the mood of crisis at Athens passed. (A small force was sent in September 351.)

In 349 it was the turn of Olynthos (Dem. 1. 5ff.); in the *First Philippic*, of 351 or at the latest 350, Demosthenes had already spoken of Philip's lightning wars against Olynthos among other places (Dem. 4. 16–17) and this allusion has caused some scholars to down-date the speech to 349. What he actually says is this:

> In addition you must prepare transports for half our cavalry, and a sufficient number of boats. These, I think, should be in readiness to meet those sudden sallies of his from his own country against Thermopylai, the Chersonese, Olynthos, and any other places which he may select.

But the argument defeats itself: the very casualness of the allusion shows that Olynthos is not yet under serious attack.[26] But by 349 the situation of Olynthos was dire. Three appeals to the Athenians led to three expeditions

from Athens to Olynthos (*FGrHist* 328 FF 49–51), but the city fell in 348. Philip razed the site and enslaved most of the inhabitants (Tod 166, not in R/O, cf. Harding 81 for Chalkidian refugees on Lemnos; Dem. 9. 26). Part of the reason for the Athenian failure to do more was the need to deal with a revolt on Euboia, which may not have been actually sponsored by Philip[27] (at Aischin. 3. 87 'sent to *Philip* for help' looks like a textual error for 'sent to *Phalaikos*' the Phokian leader, for whom cf. below);[28] but it was certainly to Macedonian advantage. The island was, however, lost (Plut. *Phok.* 12f.) so that the Athenians lost twice over: on Euboia itself, and by the diversion of their resources away from Olynthos at a critical time.

In his *Olynthiacs* (Orations 1–3), Demosthenes had repeatedly urged strong action to help the Olynthians, including the suggestion that festival pay be diverted to military purposes; he planned thereby to finance a general northern task force, or rather two, one for Olynthos and one to ravage Philip's territory. Demosthenes' idea was to jab at Philip in the north at whatever point he looked weakest. His opponents preferred to meet Philip, or try to pre-empt him, on the Greek doorstep (Thermopylai; Euboia). That was certainly a cheaper policy than Demosthenes', and perhaps also the sounder of the two; but in favour of Demosthenes there was something to be said for keeping Philip on his toes:[29] barbarian neighbours, as we see from the better documented career of Philip V a century and a half later, might at any moment force a Macedonian king to modify his foreign policy, or (to put it more bluntly) to drop everything and march to some threatened frontier. It was also true, as Demosthenes observed (4. 8), that Philip was not immortal: his assassination in, say, 349 (rather than 336 when it did happen) would scarcely have surprised any contemporary who knew some Macedonian history.

With Olynthos gone, the chances of the Athenians ever taking Amphipolis receded to invisibility, and the talk began to be of peace. The evidence for the Peace of Philokrates of 346, and the run-up to it, has to be retrieved from speeches of Aischines (nos. 2 and 3) and Demosthenes (nos. 18 and 19), all of them written years after the events, and full of the most amazing lies, especially – since the peace later became very unpopular – on the central question of individual responsibility, or culpability, for the peace.

For the immediate background we must return to the Sacred War. After Onomarchos' defeat, the command of the remaining Phokian forces was taken by Phayllos and then (after his death from illness) by Phalaikos (all three men were related). By now both the Thebans, from whom the Phokians had succeeded in stripping much Boiotian territory, and the Phokians themselves, whose money was running out and whose allies the Spartans and Athenians were wholly absorbed with their own difficulties, were in very low water. The Phokians formally removed Phalaikos from the generalship on a charge of embezzlement (actually removing him was not so easy because he still had part of the army), and appointed three new generals who ravaged Boiotia (347). The Boiotians for their part now called in Philip. This was Philip's

cue to return to the heart of Greece, but at first he sent only a small force, enough to meet his obligations and check the Phokians, but not enough to allow the war to be ended without his personal intervention. The Phokians, that is the Phokians other than Phalaikos, learning that Philip was himself on his way south, as indeed he was, appealed to Sparta and Athens for help, and for a moment it looked as if there would be a rerun of Thermopylai in 352 (Aischin. 2. 36f. for the Athenian vote to mobilize a fifty-ship fleet, which does not seem to have come to anything). Then suddenly everything collapsed; Phalaikos, who may have seen in Philip his only saviour, refused to hand over Thermopylai to the Athenians, and Philip's way into southern Greece lay wide open. It was this which finally drove the Athenians seriously to seek peace with Philip (February 346).

## The Peace of Philokrates

From the favourable Athenian response to the Phokian appeal, a response which was not insincere though it was in the event insubstantial, and from an Athenian summons to the Greek world at large, early in 346,[30] organized by Euboulos, to 'deliberate about the freedom of the Hellenes' (Aischin. 2. 60, Dem. 19. 303), it is clear that the final crumbling of Athenian resistance was dramatically sudden. What caused it to crumble was, first, news of the change in Phokian, or more precisely in Phalaikos', intentions (cf. Aischin. 2. 132); and second the failure of the 'freedom of the Hellenes' mission (Aischin. 2. 79; perhaps the negative attitude of the Arkadians in particular was decisive). In March a first, and in May–July a second, Athenian embassy went to Macedon to negotiate peace. Phalaikos and the Phokians surrendered to Philip; the two Phokian votes in the Delphic Amphiktiony were given to Philip, and Phokis was broken up into villages (cf. Dem. 19. 65), though the Phokians were not actually exterminated (see p. 33 and n. 41). A last-minute attempt by the Athenians to get the Phokians included in the peace had been firmly resisted by Philip (Dem. 19. 159). The Sacred War between the Phokians and the Theban coalition was now over, with an immeasurably strengthened Philip its only victor, not only militarily supreme in Greece but, through his new amphiktionic membership, a barbarian no longer. He presided over the revived Pythian Games of 346 (Dem. 19. 128; cf. below p. 296 for such Macedonian elite involvement in the great festival sanctuaries of Greece).

The Athenian Peace of Philokrates had for its main clause the Athenian abandonment of Amphipolis (Dem. 5. 25, 'we have just ceded Amphipolis to Philip by the treaty'). But Philip wanted more from the Athenians than that – in fact, an alliance. Why was this? There would be an obvious answer if we could accept the evidence of Diodorus who claims that Philip was already planning a Persian War (16. 60). In that case the Athenian fleet would be very useful.[31] Isokrates in the *Philippos* of the same year (Isok. 5) was to urge Philip to attack and colonize the Persian empire, but that proves nothing about Philip's actual intentions. There is not much concrete evidence for a

few years yet: by the end of the 340s, Philip was in communication with Hermias who ruled an Asiatic pocket dynasty at Atarneus (Diod. 16. 54 and R/O no. 68 = Harding 79 for this man);[32] by 341 Hermias was in open defiance of Persia and was suppressed by the king's agents, the main charge against him being correspondence with Philip (Dem. 10. 32 and scholiast at p. 202 Dindorf). Another well-informed friend was the Persian Artabazos, who had been given Macedonian hospitality in about 350 when he fled from Asia after his revolt (Diod. 16. 52. 3; cf. p. 276). And it is possible that there were pro-Macedonian factions in some Ionian cities by the end of the 340s (cf. the statue to Philip at Ephesos, AA. 1. 17).

But how feasible would an outright attack on Persia have been in 346? The Persians had failed to recover Egypt in the late 350s (cf. Diod. 16. 40. 3; 44), and in the early 340s Phoenicia and Cyprus revolted as well (Diod. 16. 42. 5). We know that Cyprus was still in revolt in 346 because Isokrates (5. 103) speaks in that year of Idrieus satrap of Karia (brother of Mausolus who had died in 353) as a potential rebel; yet we know from Diodorus that Idrieus helped to suppress the Cyprus revolt, and this help was to make Isokrates' language about Idrieus look foolish. This proves that the disciplining of Cyprus was still in the future when Isokrates said what he did. So the Persians certainly had their hands full in the year of the peace of Philokrates. But before 344 (when Idrieus died) Cyprus had been recovered, as was Phoenicia not long after, leaving Artaxerxes to proceed against Egypt which, with Greek mercenary help (cf. p. 201, 246f.), he conquered in 343 (Diod. 16. 51, and for the date see *FGrHist* 69 T 1, para. 14). Then there was some mopping up in Asia Minor: the Hermias affair, already mentioned. The reduction of Cyprus, Phoenicia, Egypt and Atarneus was an impressive show of strength: if Philip did have designs on Persia's western satrapies as early as 346, admittedly a black year for Artaxerxes, they cannot be *proved* to have gone beyond the employment or encouragement of spies, double agents and dissidents, and perhaps that was the limit of what was feasible. But if we want to know where Philip, and Alexander after him, got the idea of a religious war against Persia, we need look no further than the Greek Sacred War which ended in 346: if the Phokians were temple robbers, were not the Persians of 480 temple burners? The religious card could be played more than once.

There is another, more immediate, problem about Philip's aims in 346: Demosthenes more than once implies that, as late as 346, a view was current in Greece that Philip was genuinely keeping his options open in Greece, and that he contemplated saving Phokis and coming down hard on *Thebes* instead:

> There were some who promised that Thespiai and Plataia would be repeopled, and said that if Philip became master of the situation, he would save the Phokians, and would break up the city of Thebes into villages; that Oropos would be yours, and that Euboia would be restored to you in place of Amphipolis – with other hopes and deceptions of the same kind …see p. 284.
>
> (Dem.5. 10, cf. 19. 21)

That is a surprising claim, and though taken seriously in modern times,[33] it is emphatically to be rejected: the Thessalians hated the Phokians as only Greek neighbours could hate (for this particular long-standing hatred see Hdt. 8. 30), and the Greeks generally execrated the Phokians as temple robbers, so that Philip would have been mad to risk alienating his Thessalian supporters, or affronting Greek opinion, by such a volte-face in favour of the Phokians. Perhaps something on those lines was put about by Philip's agents – but if so its purpose was simply to gull the Athenians into inactivity: this was necessary because, as we have seen, they were still contemplating a fight for Phokis early in 346.

### The breakdown of the peace, the battle of Chaironeia and the settlement of Greece

After the Peace of Philokrates there was trouble with the Illyrians (345: Diod. 16. 69. 7),[34] which Philip dealt with successfully, at the price of a serious thigh wound. In 344 he reorganized Thessaly into its ancient system of *tetrarchies* (Dem. 9. 26, cf. p. 102 for *tetrads*), and in 342 he finally moved against Thrace; this was the reckoning with Kersebleptes, postponed a decade earlier (Diod. 16. 71, cf. Dem. 12. 10; above p. 280). Here the reorganization was perhaps more ambitious, looking not back in time, as in Thessaly, but sideways to Persia: we hear at the beginning of Alexander's reign of a 'general in Thrace' (AA 1. 25; Diod 16. 62. 5), and this has been taken as evidence that Philip now turned Thrace into something like a satrapy on a Persian model – interesting evidence if true that Philip had indeed started to look east (cf. p. 283). But the case would be stronger if the Macedonian office of general over Thrace were firmly attested before the end of Philip's reign, which it is not.[35] In any case note that already in 424/3, on the evidence of Thucydides, the Athenians had a 'general of the Thraceward region', who in that year was none other than the historian Thucydides himself (Th. 4. 104. 4).[36]

As in 352, operations in Thrace brought Philip close enough to the Athenians' vital interests to provoke panic there. The atmosphere in the Athens of the second half of the 340s was highly volatile: policy towards Philip, who was at least potentially dangerous to the Athenians, was complicated by hostility towards the king of Persia, who was not. (Anti-Greek activity by Persia in the fourth century tended to take the form of infiltration of the islands.) In 346–344 Philip had done little of which Demosthenes or anybody else could reasonably complain (for one thing his wound may have incapacitated him); but there is hard evidence that he interfered in the Peloponnese on behalf of the Argives and Messenians against renewed Spartan aggression (Dem. 6. 15), and that was enough for Demosthenes, whose real concern of course was not technical offences by Philip but the constant growth of Macedonian power: from now on, despite his undoubted advocacy of the original peace with Philip in 346,

Demosthenes seeks to bring the peace to an end by convicting Philip of breaking it. In 344 he made a start by prevailing on the Assembly to rebuff an offer by Philip to renew the peace (Dem. 8. 21, 18. 136). The problem in the years that follow is to determine whether Philip was genuinely in breach of the peace or whether the 'breaches' are merely the inventions of a provocative Demosthenes. The crux is Euboia: in the *Third Philippic* of 341 Demosthenes denounces Philip for his interference in Euboia (paras. 37ff., and cf. 19. 204, spoken in the year 343); but the alleged 343 interference is not mentioned in another nearly contemporary speech (Dem. 7, delivered in 342) and the detail of the 341 allegations gets no support from the *Chersonese* speech of a few months earlier (Dem. 8). On an extreme view this is proof of Demosthenes' mendacity:[37] 'Philip was not breaking the peace: he did not need to' (because, the argument runs, he had plenty of supporters, in Euboia as elsewhere). But if we accept, as we probably must, that there were limits to what even an Athenian could get away with when describing events of very recent memory,[38] we must also accept that Philip was heavily involved, and not just diplomatically either, in the accession to power of his friends in Euboia.

Philip's Thracian campaigns brought him further and further east, until in mid-340 he attacked Perinthos in the Propontis (Diod. 16. 74; Philochoros F54 for the date). This should still be regarded as a continuation of the Thracian operations rather than as an act of aggression against the Athenians, whose ties with Perinthos were not particularly close; though Demosthenes vaguely and tendentiously gives Philip's motives generally at this time as the desire to starve the Athenians by interrupting their corn supply (18. 87).[39] The Perinthos siege was a failure from the Macedonian point of view, despite the best efforts of Philip's military technology, partly because the Persian king sent help to the city via his satraps of the western Anatolian coast: this is of interest as the first overt clash between Philip and Persia. When Philip switched attention to Byzantium, Athenian grain was truly threatened, and they sent help (Diod. 16. 77; Plut. *Phok.* 14). That, at last, meant war.

Philip took the initiative by seizing 240 corn ships assembled near the entrance to the Bosporos (Philochoros FF 54, 162). Demosthenes again distorts the sequence by representing this as the final provocation which compelled the Athenians to war (18. 73. 139), but this is belied by the dates: the capture of the ships was a consequence not a cause of the renewal of hostilities.[40] But after a few months Philip broke off the siege, and in 339 he moved south, and was at Elateia in Phokis before the end of the year (Dem. 18. 169). There was now an interval of ineffective diplomacy during which Philip tried to lure the Thebans on to his side. In vain: Demosthenes arranged a last-minute alliance with the old enemies the Thebans, and this, despite the absence of the Spartans who stood aloof, gave the Greek hoplites something like numerical parity with the Macedonian phalanx ranged against them in the decisive battle of Chaironeia fought in August 338. This battle[41] was won by a feigned withdrawal (Polyain. 4. 2. 2) by Philip, who then regathered

and routed the over-pursuing Athenians; Diodorus' account adds that Philip's son Alexander led the Macedonian cavalry to victory, presumably on the left (16. 86). The only other certainty about the battle is that Philip did not pursue the defeated Greek forces far, or at all. He wanted the co-operation of the Greeks, and Chaironeia was a means to that end.

Philip, in his political settlement of Greece,[42] did not impose pro-Macedonian regimes generally. The exception is Thebes, which was garrisoned and forced to take back exiles, i.e. Macedonian partisans were returned to power (Justin 9. 4). But in general Philip did not interfere positively in individual cities: he did not need to, because his victory brought 'his' men to power naturally. At Athens, for instance, there is evidence of a right-wing reaction in an inscription (R/O no. 79 = Harding 101) found in the early 1950s, dated to 336, which warns potential 'tyrants' not to try to attack the democracy. That this law should have been thought necessary (i.e. that subversion of democracy was a perceived danger in the post-Chaironeia atmosphere), that the constitutionalists should have issued their warning to anybody thinking of making trouble in this way, and that the stone should then have been thrown down (as the archaeological evidence shows it was, within a short time), are all evidence of a vigorous political tussle. Even at Sparta, Philip stopped short of overturning the constitution, though he invaded Spartan territory (Paus. 3. 24. 6). Isyllos of Epidauros, a slightly later poet, was to say that Philip entered Sparta in order to 'take away the kingly honour' (*IG* $4^2$ 1. 128). This does not, however, refer to any proposed abolition of the old dual kingship, but is a flowery way of saying that he eroded still further the Spartans' position of dominance in the Peloponnese. This he did by awarding the Dentheliatis, a frontier area, to the Messenians (Tac. *Ann.* 4. 43).

Such territorial alterations were one way of achieving the balance at which Philip seems to have aimed – thus, for instance, the Spartans were to be isolated in the southern Peloponnese. They were also a handy punitive device: so the Thebans forfeited Oropos, which they had held since 366 (p. 259); but though Philip threatened to raze Orchomenos, Thespiai and Plataia, which would have weakened the Thebans yet further (Paus. 1. 9. 8), he evidently did not do so (AA 1. 7. 11, showing that they had not been restored by Alexander's time). Philip did not, however, break up the great federations, although the Athenians lost most of their naval league. (Pausanias 1. 25. 3 says Philip 'took away the islands and put an end to Athenian naval supremacy'. The second of these assertions is more or less true, but they did not yet lose all their islands or island cleruchies. Symbolically important Delos, for instance, remained Athenian until 314, and in 338 the Athenians also kept Salamis, Samos, Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros.)[43] Even the Boiotian confederacy stayed intact (there are federal 'Boiotarchs' at AA 1. 7. 11) and so did the Euboian,[44] Arkadian and Achaian leagues (Hyp. *Dem.* 18). The exception was perhaps the Aitolian league, which was arguably suppressed for a time,[45] perhaps as a punishment for seizing Naupaktos from the Achaians. If so, this is a rare instance of such treatment by Philip, who seems generally to have built up

such federations so that they formed counterweights to the traditional *poleis.* How far that intention was conscious is naturally quite unknowable.

Much of this was negative and preparatory: the positive institution was the League of Corinth, set up in 337. We have the inscription (R/O no. 76 = Harding 99A) recording the terms of the general peace with Philip, with the oaths of the participants and a list of the member states and some mysterious numbers attached to the names. These numbers have in the past been taken as evidence that voting in the new league was organized on a proportional principle, but the suggested analogies – Boiotia, the Delphic Amphiktiony – are not convincing, being much more compact organizations than the new league, which had a huge geographical extension; and the better view[46] is that the numbers indicate the military turnout which each state was expected to furnish. For the rest, the stone, which is in two small fragments in the Epigraphic Museum in Athens, both of them very difficult to read, can be restored with the help of two other pieces of ancient evidence. The first is a speech of 331/0 attributed (perhaps wrongly) to Demosthenes, *On the treaty with Alexander* (Dem. 17). This deals with supposed Macedonian infractions of the treaty. The procedure of restoration is justified in view of various close correspondences (e.g. R/O no. 76 line 14 = Dem. 17. 10), but it must be admitted that the restored texts of the inscription usually printed are optimistic.

The other piece of ancient evidence is an inscription from Epidauros (Austin no. 42) which preserves the terms of a revival of Philip's league in 302 BC by Antigonos and his son Demetrios, two of the 'successor' kings who fought real and propaganda wars against rival 'successors' in the years after the death of Alexander. This is longer and fuller than the 337 inscription, but a lot had happened in the intervening thirty-five years and not all of the 302 details can safely be retrojected.

The league met at Corinth and that is itself significant. The underlying purpose was a unifying 'panhellenic' campaign against a barbarian, and Corinth had been the site of a recent victory dedication over another set of barbarians,[47] the Carthaginians who were defeated in Sicily at the battle of the river Krimisos by Timoleon (R/O no. 74, cf. above pp. 117, 271). Naturally other more prosaic factors were also relevant, such as that Corinth was strategically and politically central (see pp. 118, 271, and below for Corinth as a 'handcuff'), and that in this period it was weak, powerless and therefore uncontroversial as a meeting place.

The league guaranteed existing constitutions; this ban on political change was of course in Macedon's interest given that, as we have already noticed above, pro-Macedonian regimes had taken power in the aftermath of Chaironeia even without Philip's direct interference. Demosthenes (17. 10, cf. above for authorship) speaks of 'freedom and autonomy' – slogans reminiscent of and evidently borrowed from the old charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (p. 245). But those were flexible terms, and in the new edition of the political dictionary their definition seems not to have

excluded the posting of Macedonian garrisons in Greece proper, at Thebes (above), Ambrakia, and at the 'handcuffs of Greece', Euboian Chalkis, and Corinth (Dem. 17. 3, Polyb. 38. 3, Plut. *Aratos* 23). The alternative is to see these garrisons as a 'peace-keeping force'[48] maintained in the interest of the general security (cf. Dem. 17. 15), but that view perhaps concedes too much to Macedonian benevolence. Finally, the actual anti-democratic character of the settlement is made clear by the Demosthenic speech (17. 15) at the point where it specifies a ban on 'cancellation of debts and redistribution of land'. Although a similar ban had been included in the oath taken at democratic Athens, when democracy was restored in 404 (Andok. 1. 88), the phrase was, by the advanced fourth century, conventional shorthand for radical discontent (cf. Plato *Rep.* 566 on the programme of the archetypical demagogue in his transition to popular tyrant) and here the ban surely has undemocratic connotations.

Modern historians have unreasonably doubted whether there was an alliance as well as a peace. It is true that the very fragmentary stone does not mention the word 'alliance'; but literary evidence (AA 3. 24. 5 and Plut. *Phok.* 16) implies it. More important, all precedent – such as the Peace of Philokrates – suggests that such would have been the general expectation; it is certain that by this time Philip wanted a Greek war against Persia (cf. Diod. 16. 89.3; Justin 9.4), and that he was soon chosen as 'general with full powers' (Diod. as above). Diodorus goes on (Chapter 91) to describe the first moves in the war: Attalos and Parmenion, the most experienced Macedonian general, crossed to Asia with an advance force. In the words of the Delphic



*Figure 18.3* The remains of the theatre at Vergina (Aegae), where Philip II was murdered

oracle, quoted by Diodorus: 'the crown has been put on the sacrificial victim, and the sacrificer is at hand'. But this turned out to be the sort of two-edged oracle so dear to the Greeks (and not necessarily to be set aside on that account):[49] the 'victim' of 336 was not the Persian empire but Philip himself, who was stabbed to death at the moment of his greatest glory, after walking in a procession in which he himself was represented as a thirteenth Olympian god (Diod. 16. 92. 5). This was an astonishing departure from what Greeks thought religiously acceptable, and may have been intended to reassure his Macedonian subjects that despite his mild Greek settlement and lenient treatment of Athens he was nevertheless, like Shakespeare's Lear, 'every inch a king'. (For Philip and deification see further below, p. 306f.) The assassin Pausanias was (as far as we can see) not a political agent, nor a champion of outraged piety; he was a homosexual psychopath with an old grievance.[50] It was the kind of thing that could have happened at any time in the past twenty years, as Demosthenes had commented years ago (p. 281) when urging that the pressure on Philip be kept up. But Alexander was now old enough (he was twenty) and capable enough to assume the succession smoothly, and it was too late for Greek pressure to be of the slightest use.

# 19

# ALEXANDER[1]

### The accession

To say of any Macedonian accession that it was 'smooth' is to use a relative term: Alexander's was without challenge, but it was accompanied by the shedding of noble Macedonian blood, and it precipitated a serious insurrection, that of the Thebans. There was also the predictable Illyrian uprising.

The noble casualties of the beginning of Alexander's reign are bracketed together by Plutarch, who says (*Mor.* 327) that Macedonia after Philip's assassination was 'seething' and that 'all eyes in Macedon were on Amyntas and the sons of Aeropos of Lynkestis'. This is probably exaggerated, not just because Alexander's grip was firm from the outset, but because it is doubtful whether the Lynkestian princely house, from upper Macedonia, was as closely related to the Temenid, i.e. established Macedonian royal family, as a modern theory would have it:[2] they could no doubt be said to have 'royal blood' in a more parochial sense, referring to their own princely line of Lynkestis, but that kind of thing was true of some others too. Thus Perdikkas is said to be 'born of royal stock' (QC 10. 7. 8), but no one says that he was a candidate for the throne. The 'sons of Aeropos' were called Heromenes, Arrhabaios




*Figure 19.1* A coin of Alexander III (the Great)

and Alexander. Of these the first two were done away with immediately (AA 1. 25. 1; Diod. 17. 2). The third, 'Alexander the Lynkestian', was arrested later, in 334/3 near Phaselis in Pamphylia, when King Alexander's Asian expedition was well advanced, and he was executed later still, in 330 (AA as above; QC 7. 1). He had escaped death when his brothers died because he was quick to do homage to the new king (this presumably explains why they were killed – for not doing homage). It may also be relevant that he was son-in-law to the influential senior general Antipater.[3] Alexander the Lynkestian went on, after 336, to hold the high office of 'general in Thrace', for which see p. 284. His arrest is mysteriously connected in our sources with tales of Persian espionage; his death three years later in the aftermath of a collision with the disaffected Macedonian nobility, the 'Philotas affair' (p. 312), suggests that the original pretext for the arrest was insubstantial and that the real trouble with Alexander the Lynkestian was his connections, or supposed connections, with Macedonian dissidents.[4]


The other 'candidate' mentioned by Plutarch is Amyntas, whose dynastic claims were more serious. He was the son of Philip's brother and royal predecessor Perdikkas, and though Justin actually says that Philip was initially regent for Amyntas, this author loses our credit because he says the regency was lengthy, 'diu' (7. 5. 9–10). But the coins suggest that Philip posed as king from the first,[5] and there is no good evidence that Amyntas was ever regarded as king: a Boiotian inscription (*IG* 7. 3055, from Lebadeia) does call him 'king of the Macedonians', and this has been thought to be an insurrectionist declaration from the year 335, when another Boiotian city, Thebes, revolted. But this cannot be right because Amyntas' wife Kynna was already available for remarriage, and so presumably a widow, by 335 (AA 1. 5).[6] The 'seething' of Macedonia was therefore short-lived; it is to be dated to 336, straight after Philip's death.

The final death was Karanos, a child (cf. 'aemulus imperii') of Philip by Phila (Justin 11. 2. 1, cf. 9. 7. 3). We can add here that before setting out for the Persian expedition Alexander killed the relatives of Philip's last wife, Kleopatra (Justin 11. 5. 1).

In 335 Alexander marched against the Triballoi and Illyrians (AA 1. 1–6),[7] in some campaigning very fully described by Arrian, whose source Ptolemy probably took part. The motive given is that Alexander wished to forestall their revolt, of which he had heard, but the additional consideration given by Arrian, 'that it would do them no harm to be humbled' on the eve of the planned Asiatic expedition, suggests that the fighting was gratuitous. Most of Alexander's fighting was, and this is one of the most obvious differences from his father, who was no less of an expansionist, but who was happy to act through diplomacy and what his enemies called bribes. Certainly there was no Illyrian threat in 336 comparable to 359, though the news of Alexander's march may itself have provoked the Illyrian revolt. The ascription, in Arrian, of an official and more creditable motive, emphasized at the expense of the other, is a good introductory warning that the 'main sources' are at least as




*Map 4* Alexander's empire



60
75
45
30
Lake Aral
R. Jaxartes
(Syr Daria)
Caspian Sea
SAKAE
CHORASMIA
R. Oxus
MASSAGETAE
(Amu Daria)
Alexandreschate
(Chodiend)
Marakanda
SOGDIANA
Nautaca
Western Himalayas
R. Indus
Ai Khanoum
BACTRIA
Drapsaca
Zariaspa
(Baktra)
Zadracarta
Hecatompylos
MARDI
PARTHIA
Rhagai
Paropamisus (Hindu Kush)
Aornos
Artacoana
Alexandria Arion
(Herat)
Taxila
Bucephala
Nicaea
R. Hydaspes
R. Acesines
R. Hydrates
R. Hyphasis
R. Hesydrus
MEDIA
Salt Desert
ARIA
Alexandria
Arachoton
(Kandahar)
DRANGIANA
ARACHOSIA
(Multun)
CARMANIA
SUSIANA
PERSIS
Pasargadai
Persepolis
Return of Craterus
R. Indos
(Shikapore)
Old course of Indos
GEDROSIA
INDIA
Pura
Pattala
Persian Gulf
Indian Ocean

anxious to do their hero credit as is the 'vulgate' (for these terms see n. 1). The rapid campaigning which followed took Alexander to the Danube, which he crossed out of *pothos*, longing, to go beyond (AA 1. 3. 6). This, in its turn, introduces us to a word and theme frequently used of Alexander, for which mystical and ambitious claims have been made in modern times; but when all has been said in sober qualification, the strong 'natural curiosity', which the word denotes at its lowest, was surely an important part of Alexander's motivation throughout his short life.[8] The Illyrians were crushed by superior Macedonian drill and Alexander's own speed of attack: the one his legacy from Philip, the other his own most impressive military quality – but one which all Macedonian kings needed (Philip V being specially noted for his *celeritas* or swiftness of movement), given the proneness of any one neighbour to capitalize on damage inflicted on Macedon by another.

## The Theban revolt; Alexander and the Greeks

Thus the Theban rising of 335 (AA 1. 7ff.) was excited not just by desire for 'liberty', i.e. their own return to power, on the part of the Theban exiles, but by a popular rumour that Alexander had been killed in Illyria. We may recall that in 352 a similar rumour had circulated about Philip, and had also conditioned Greek foreign policy (p. 280 above). At Alexander's accession the Greek states had voted him the hegemony of the Corinthian League (AA 1.1), and he had been recognized as *archon* or *tagos* of Thessaly (Justin 11. 3. 1–2; Diod. 17. 4. 1). Alexander reached Boiotia within five days and overran the Theban resistance. The sack of Thebes which followed stuck awkwardly in Greek minds for many years: Aischines (3. 159) describes the influx of refugees into Attica – those who had not been enslaved – and the restoration of the once generally hated Thebes by Kassander in 316, seven years after Alexander's death, attracted subscriptions from many of the Greek states (*Syll*$^3$ 337 = Harding 131, with Diod. 19. 54).

This uneasiness is reflected in a divergence in the Alexander historians: the 'main sources' exonerate Alexander and the Macedonians, putting the blame on the Thebans' Greek enemies (AA 1. 8. 8), but Diodorus (17. 13, from the 'vulgate') is a corrective. The moral responsibility was certainly Alexander's since he could have stopped the massacre, though the actual decision on the Thebans' fate was left to the League of Corinth. But Diodorus (17. 14) is right to give Alexander the initiative here as well. He spared the house of Pindar (AA 1. 9. 10), a sop to Greek sentiment which reminds us that cultural philhellenism is not the same thing as political (thus he was to have Greek taught to the Persian king Darius' children after their capture at Issos). In any case Pindar, who had written an encomium for the Macedonian king Alexander I the 'philhellene', had ancestral claims on Macedonian generosity. Alexander was never to make much use of the League of Corinth machinery, which he seems to have viewed as a way of making Greeks punish each other (cf. p. 244 for the Chian prisoners and Kallisthenes, and note AA 1. 16. 6, invoking the

'common decrees' of the Greeks when he sentenced the Greek prisoners taken at the battle of the River Granikos to hard labour). In Kallisthenes' history, Alexander was evidently made to stress the *Greek* motive. So at the battle of Gaugamela (Plut. *Alex.* 33. 1), Zeus is urged to help the *Greeks*, and there is similarly 'panhellenism' in Alexander's letter to Darius (AA 2. 14. 4); this is all part of the attempt to represent the crusade against Persia as a punishment for Xerxes' burning of the Athenian temples. Polybius, in a celebrated passage, dismissed this too easily (3. 6).[9]

After the 'settlement' of Thebes the Athenians, who had shown at least sympathy with the Theban cause, were told to surrender a number of leading politicians, and though this order was rescinded after an appeal for mercy, the mistrust remained, on Alexander's part as well as the Greeks'. It is striking how few Greeks from the old city-states – especially Athens, Sparta, Thebes – were ever employed by Alexander in any capacity; those who were tend to have one or both of two qualifications: first, they come from outlying Greek districts or islands, or else from places strongly under Macedonian influence; and second they have some skill not possessed by Macedonians.[10]

In the first category should be placed the Thessalians with their cavalry (Diod. 17. 17. 3). Ordinary Greek troops tended to be used, on the Persian campaign, for line-of-communication purposes only: an example is the garrisoning of Sardis (AA 1. 24. 3). Nevertheless some Boiotian cavalry are attested by inscriptions (Tod 197, not in R/O, and F. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Historische griechische Epigramme* (1926) no. 72 for some Thespians).

There was, however, a good political reason for retaining Greek fighting units (rather than just not using them at all, as one might have expected Alexander to do): they were hostages for the good behaviour of the Greeks at home. Thus Alexander kept back twenty ships out of the large but politically suspect Athenian navy (Diod. 17. 22. 5). And the disbandment of the fleet in the first winter of the campaign should be explained similarly (AA 1. 20. 1; cf. 2. 2. 3 for its reassembly the following spring). Arrian gives the reason for the disbandment as shortage of money, but that is implausible since Alexander now possessed the treasure of Sardis, a rich Persian satrapal capital (AA 1. 17. 3).

Individually, as well as collectively, the Greeks employed by Alexander can be sorted into the same two categories. Like the Thessalian cavalry, Thessalian engineers and siege technicians such as Diades and Charias belong in the first category,[11] though their special aptitudes put them in the second category too, and the same is true of a man like Eumenes of Cardia with his secretarial skills – but the Cardians had always hated the Athenians (Dem. 5. 25, 8. 58), and such a man was politically safe to use. The historian and philosopher Kallisthenes came from Olynthos, now in the Macedonian orbit, and his gifts would have been hard for any Macedonian to match (Ptolemy is the only Macedonian in Alexander's entourage who took to the writing of history). There are also odd individuals like Deinokrates the Rhodian town planner (the new city of Rhodes had been laid out in the late fifth century

on the principles of the creator of theoretical town planning, Hippodamos of Miletos), or the 'bematists' (surveyors) Diognetos and Philonides (Tod 188 = Harding 110; not in R/O) from Asian Erythrai and Krete respectively; another man from Krete, which is out of the Greek political mainstream in the classical period, was Nearchos, Alexander's admiral (p. 316). But his naval skills, like those of Onesikritos from the Greek island of Astypalaia, put him in the second category too: Macedon for all its timber had long been hampered, by Greek colonies, from access to the nearest sea. The only Greek *hetairoi*, the privileged class of Alexander's 'companions', were Demaratos of Corinth and Eriguios and Laomedon of Mytilene on Lesbos, though mention should be made of Medios of Thessalian Larissa, politically reliable and perhaps a man with a special skill – the throwing of parties, for which Thessalians were famous (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 1; for Medios see also B. Helly (ed.), *Inscriptions of Gonnoi* (1979) no. 1). It was the wild drinking at a party given by this man which cost Alexander his life. There is an occasional Greek satrap in Alexander's empire like Nearchos the Kretan (Lykia), Thoas from Magnesia on the Maiander, satrap of Gedrosia, or Stasanor of Cypriot Soli (Areia). These men bear out the general conclusion of this survey, that the central places of old Greece are barely represented among Alexander's appointees and staff. One final purpose for which Alexander has been thought to have tried to use specifically Greek talent is in colonization and the diffusion of Greek culture, *paideia*, but if this was a serious aim of Alexander it failed (cf. Diod. 18. 7 on the unhappiness of the Greek settlers in central Asia, with p. 314 below). All this is evidence for recognition of specially Greek talents, but little respect for Greek freedom.

So when Alexander – Illyrian and Greek resistance now crushed – planned his Asian campaign in earnest, the man left behind was in effect appointed 'satrap of Greece': Antipater, to whom he 'handed over' Greece (AA 1. 11. 3). The description of Antipater's job (and that of his eventually designated successor Krateros) as including looking after 'the freedom of the Greeks' (AA 7. 12. 4) is the merest euphemism, an early instance of the abuse of the term 'freedom of the Greeks' which was to run through hellenistic history until its most brilliant exploitation by the Roman Flamininus in the early second century BC.

Much of this might be thought to indicate some degree of Macedonian contempt for Greeks and what they stood for. This would not be quite right. Elite Macedonians continued, in the age of Philip and Alexander, to subscribe to very traditional Greek values of competitive assertion in religious contexts (see above, ch. 8 n. 9 for Alexander I, near the start of the period covered by the present book, and cf. p. 253f. for Jason of Pherai and the Pythian festival). One such area of display is via participation at the great traditional Greek festival sanctuaries, Delphi, Olympia, Isthmia and Nemea. In 343/2, the Athenians had granted protection and honours to Arybbas, ex-king of the Molossians and an enemy of Philip II, who had expelled him. The inscription recording all this (R/O no. 70 with plates 5a and 5b) celebrates,

at the foot, Arybbas' equestrian victories at the Olympic and Pythian games, and makes the point visually with sculptured olive and laurel crowns, which have absolutely nothing to do with the Athenian honours granted. This is clearly, in part, a hit at Philip, himself an Olympic victor in 356 (Plut. *Alex.* 3. 8). We have already seen (above, ch. 18 p. 282 and n. 31) that Philip presided over the Pythian games of 346, at which a young descendant of the Theban Pagondas, whose family is well known from Pindar and Thucydides, won the crown. Then in 333/2 and after, a Macedonian governor of Babylon called Archon of Pella was granted proxeny and other honours at Delphi (for this man see also Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3, the prosopographically valuable list of Alexander's trierarchs from 326). The inscription (R/O no. 92) begins with verses celebrating Archon's equestrian victories at the Isthmian and Pythian games. Remarkably, Archon's mother Synesis ('Intelligence') is also honoured, in a grant which anticipates some aspects of female prominence in Hellenistic times, and shows that Olympias was not the only high-profile Macedonian woman in this period. The relevant volume (IV, 2005) of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* knows of three women of this name and approximate date, including Archon's mother: two from Macedonia and one from Thrace.

## The invasion of Asia Minor

In spring 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont, throwing a spear into Asian soil before landing (Diod. 17. 17), thereby claiming Asia as 'spear-won territory', *doriktetos chora*.[12] This was a Homeric idea which had played little part in the foreign relations of the Greek city-states, whose warfare had been for strips of frontier land or for 'hegemony' (cf. Dem. 15. 17. But there are a few pre-Alexander instances of the notion: Dem. 12. 23 shows that Alexander's father Philip had already in the 350s claimed Amphipolis by right of conquest; and Thucydides makes the Athenians, in an argument with the Thebans after the battle of Delium in 424/3, clearly invoke the concept of spear-won land, 4. 98. 8).[13] Homeric reminiscences abound in both of our two main literary traditions about Alexander,[14] and it is likely that this reflects not just a literary reworking of the facts but the facts themselves. That is, Alexander genuinely modelled his behaviour on the Homeric heroes, notably Achilles: he could claim descent from Achilles' son Neoptolemos through his mother Olympias of Epirus. Thus Alexander dishonoured the corpse of Batis at Gaza (QC 4. 6. 29), just as Achilles had dishonoured Hector; he 'fought with a river' (the Indus) as Achilles had done (Diod. 17. 97, cf. *Iliad* 21. 205–327, Achilles and the Skamandros); and at the death of his beloved companion Hephaistion he imitated the mourning of Achilles for Patroklos (AA 7. 14. 4). There are plenty of other examples of 'heroic' imitation. (At AA 3. 3. 2 the journey to the oracle of Ammon is in imitation of Perseus and Herakles; it was from Herakles that the Macedonian royal line ultimately descended via Temenos – just as Perseus on one account ranked as the eponymous founder of the Persian empire: Hdt. 7. 150.) Such emulation[15] (which is how we should see

it, rather than as literary imitation by the historians, though the influence flowed both ways) shaped much of the behaviour of the great figures of the ancient world, and should not be minimized.

Close to the Hellespont, Alexander fought the first of his three set-piece battles against the Persians, the battle of the River Granikos.[16] Here the 'main sources' and the vulgate are more strikingly discrepant than on perhaps any other single issue, for whereas Arrian (AA 1. 13ff. for his account) makes Alexander, in daytime, confront the massed Persian cavalry drawn up on the opposite bank of the river, the vulgate version of Diodorus (17. 19ff) has Alexander attack the unopposing Persians at dawn. That is, Alexander follows the advice of Parmenion which Arrian says he rejected. The vulgate must be wrong, not only because the idea of an attack 'under cover of dawn' is militarily implausible (it would have been chaotic to organize) but because the 'main source' account presumably goes back via Ptolemy and Aristoboulos to Kallisthenes, and it is not conceivable that any of those writers could have hoped to get away with such a bold falsification. The Persian strategy, on Arrian's account, is admittedly not easy to understand, but it seems that they hoped to repel the Macedonian cavalry, whose efficiency they may have underrated (cf. Polyain. 5. 44 for earlier Persian successes against Philip's advance force), by simply pushing it down into the riverbed.

The description of the battle in all our sources is thoroughly 'Homeric', with a good deal of prowess being shown in single combat; but, as we have seen, that is not ground for scepticism. The Persian cavalry were routed; Alexander's way into Asia Minor had been opened up. The Granikos was not a David and Goliath contest with Alexander as David; on the contrary it was, as Arrian calls it in a later context (7. 9. 7), a 'satraps' battle', hastily mounted from local levies; and the Persians were outnumbered in total (the Persian strategy at 1. 12 implies numerical inferiority at least in infantry: Alexander had perhaps over 40,000 foot and more than 6000 horse;[17] the Persians are said to have had 20,000 of each but the Persian cavalry figures are hard to believe).

Alexander's political settlement in Asia Minor, the western part of which he now overran, took two simultaneous and apparently contradictory forms: he appointed satraps in the old Persian way (AA 1. 17, Kalas was made satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Asander satrap of Lydia, the old Persian satrapy of Sardis; both men were Macedonians); but he proclaimed democracy and the restoration of laws (AA 1. 17.10; 18. 2; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 34. 2).[18] The puzzle is only apparent: back in the 390s, there had been a satrap of Ionia, Strouses (R/O no. 16 = Harding 24, cf. p. 231f. for Strouses), but the Ionian cities could nevertheless regard themselves as in some sense free from control by 'the barbarian', at least until the King's Peace (see p. 231 on R/O no. 17). Part of the explanation of the 390s evidence is to be sought in the Persian distinction between 'cities' and 'territory', *polis* and *chora*: the latter enjoyed fewer rights and was exploited more directly (cf. *I Labraunda* 42 where the distinction is already made at the end of the Achaemenid period, in the Karian satrapy of

Pixodaros). And exactly this distinction is formally perpetuated by Alexander in his settlement at Ionian Priene: he remits the *syntaxis* ('contribution', presumably recurrent) payable by the city – but makes clear that the territory, the *chora*, is 'mine' and that it must go on paying *phoros*, tribute (R/O no. 86B = Harding 106).[19]

The inscription from Priene also raises the question whether the Greek islands and cities of the western Asiatic coast were now made members of the League of Corinth.[20] The question matters because it should help us to decide whether Alexander regarded the new Greek possessions, which he had prised away from Persia, as being fully Greek or not.

Of the islands, Tenedos was clearly a member (cf. AA 2. 2. 2 on the agreement of Tenedos with Alexander and the Greeks);[21] so was Mytilene on Lesbos (2. 1. 4, where the different wording – agreement with Alexander only – is not significant). Eresos on Lesbos was a member on the evidence of the speech *On the Treaty with Alexander* (Dem. 17), para. 7. This curious production (for which see Chapter 18, p. 287) is unreliable in many details, but a fact of this kind can hardly be an invention. (The speech talks of Macedonian-sponsored 'tyrannies' in, for example, Messene, Pellene and Sikyon, paras. 7, 10, 16; though this is exaggerated language, it does underline the contrast with the treatment of Asia Minor, see further p. 300.) Chios was a member, as is proved by an inscription (R/O no. 84 = Harding 107), which contains a reference to Chiot traitors being dealt with according to 'the decree of the Hellenes', i.e. Greeks (but see AA 3. 2 for what really happened: Alexander dealt with them autocratically). When these places had joined is a problem; attempts have been made to put the enrolment, into the league, of Chios and Eresos as early as 336 or even 340, in Philip's lifetime (in which case it would be a matter of a less formal alignment because the league as such did not yet exist then, see above p. 287).[22] But despite the mention of altars to Zeus Philippios in the Eresos inscription (R/O no. 83 = Harding 112), these honours to Philip do not prove membership of the League of Corinth in his lifetime. And as for Chios, it is probable that it remained garrisoned by the Karian (i.e. Persian) satraps down to well after 340 when Persian-controlled Chios helped the Byzantines and the Athenians against Philip (Diod. 16. 77, probably confirmed by *IG* $2^2$ 234, cf. R/O no. 72 = Harding 97). Rhodes had a Macedonian garrison until after Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 1), and though this does not exclude membership – cf. p. 288 – there is no other good evidence of any kind.

For the mainland of Asia Minor there is less evidence; the mention of *syntaxis*, 'contribution', in the Priene text has sometimes[23] been taken to prove membership, since that was the term used in the Second Athenian Confederacy, an organization on which as we saw Philip's League of Corinth was modelled in certain respects. But though probable, this argument from analogy is not decisive, for reasons already discussed (n. 19). Other places south and east, like Aspendos (AA 1. 27), were treated more harshly; but, as its coinage shows, it was not fully Greek in this period (though in the

hellenistic period it claimed Argive, i.e. Greek descent, *SEG* 34. 282 )[24] and Alexander may have felt less compunction here than when settling the ancient Ionian cities of the west coast.[25]

Alexander's treatment of Asia Minor may seem inconsistent not only in that he treated cities and territory in different ways, something we have already discussed and explained above, but in the different treatment accorded to Asia Minor, where democracy and liberation are the themes, compared with mainland Greece, where a hostile critic could speak of 'tyranny' (Dem. 17) which, even allowing for exaggeration, suggests a less liberal approach than in Asia Minor. But here again there is no real inconsistency, provided we accept that Alexander was indifferent to forms of government, something for which Greeks were prepared to die before and after his day. His real 'principle' is pragmatic reversal of the previous status quo: the Persians had supported oligarchies on the whole, so in Asia Minor and the east Aegean Alexander set up democracies (see above all the nice blend of autocracy and democracy represented by R/O no 84A, Chios: 'from king Alexander to the people of Chios. All the exiles from Chios shall return, and the constitution in Chios shall be a democracy'.). In Greece, by contrast, opposition to Macedon had tended to be democratic, so we find Macedon supporting more right-wing regimes.

His passage down the western Anatolian coast saw the first of the 'Alexander foundations' – refoundations of Smyrna and Priene,[26] two old cities which were in low water by the mid-fourth century. Here he was perhaps influenced by the successful example of the satrap Mausolus, if it was he who moved or refounded cities such as Erythrai and Knidos earlier in the century, as he certainly enlarged and in effect refounded Halikarnassos whose synoikism is well attested.[27] But urban expansion and concentration were features of the later classical period; witness the new federal city of Olynthos (432), the synoikism of Rhodes (408), and of Kos and Megalopolis in the 360s, and Alexander need not have made a special study of Mausolus.[28] A precursor nearer home was his predecessor King Archelaos of Macedon, who in about 410 moved Pydna 'twenty stades away from the sea' (Diod. 13. 49. 2; but note that this was punitive treatment after a siege, and was against the usual trend which was to move inland places to sites nearer to the sea).

The conquest of the western Anatolian coast was easy except for the siege of the exceptionally well-defended Halikarnassos, a satrapal Persian capital, which held Alexander up for several months in the summer of 334 (AA 1. 20–3). In Pamphylia at Mt Climax the sea is said (*FGr Hist* 124 Kallisthenes F 31) to have receded, as if doing him obeisance (i.e. as a god); whether the words about 'doing obeisance' are from Kallisthenes himself, or are the addition of a later writer who is quoting him, is strictly uncertain, but this incident is probably the first evidence of literary efforts to 'deify' Alexander (see p. 306).

He then struck north into the plateau of inner Anatolia, and visited the old Phrygian capital of Gordion, not far (fifty miles) from modern Ankara.

Here, by cutting the 'Gordian knot', by which the yoke of the shepherd Gordios was secured (AA 2. 3), Alexander won the 'lordship of Asia' which an old legend promised. This raises the question of Alexander's early aims: the Hellespont incident (p. 297), and the Gordian knot, help to explain how he could call himself lord of Asia after the battle of Issos (2. 14. 7, in a letter to Darius which is usable evidence).[29] The scope of the ancient term 'Asia' was elastic, but here it surely denotes the whole Persian empire (as at Diod. 17. 17).[30] Arrian (4. 11. 7, in a speech of Kallisthenes which is fictitious but based on near-contemporary material, cf. n. 29) wrote of an original intention merely to 'add Asia to Europe', which might be thought to refer just to a plan to strip away western Anatolia (that would perhaps mean something like Agesilaos' more limited objectives, cf. p. 227); but there is no reason to think that Philip, the great opportunist, would ever have stopped at that if the way lay open, and still less reason to think it of Alexander. Alexander's strategy, as put into his mouth by Arrian before the siege of Tyre (AA 2. 17), was defensive (but note the phrase 'expedition to Babylon'); and in a letter (2. 14. 9) he tells the Persian king, who is by now Darius III (king from 336 to 330), that he regards himself as owning everything that had been his. Stand your ground, he tells Darius, 'because I shall pursue you wherever you are'.

Alexander swept south again, to Cilicia, and left the Anatolian subcontinent, only to find that Darius and the full Persian army, now mobilized at last, had got in his rear. This is the prelude to his second great battle, Issos (November 333),[31] fought next to the Gulf of Alexandretta which forms the right angle between the Anatolian subcontinent and the Phoenician coast. For this battle we have not only Arrian's account (AA 2. 5ff.), which goes back via the 'main sources' to Kallisthenes, but also detailed criticisms of Kallisthenes' original version. These criticisms are to be found in Polybius' polemical twelfth book (chapters 17ff.), which though as pedantic and often foolish as many ancient 'corrections' of a predecessor, are useful to us in that they enable us to get closer to what Kallisthenes actually wrote. (The 'vulgate' of Diodorus is of no value on Issos; Curtius is, however, a little better.)[32] Darius, like Xerxes at Salamis, forfeited his advantages in numbers by allowing the battle to take place in a narrow space between the shore line and the Amanos mountains (although Kallisthenes exaggerated both numbers and narrowness). Alexander won by what was to become his classic tactic of piercing a hole in the enemy left with the cutting edge of the 'Companion cavalry', whom he led on the Macedonian right, then wheeling towards the enemy centre, where by Persian tradition the king was posted. This was a kind of 'hammer and anvil' manoeuvre which relied on Parmenion holding firm with the Macedonian left, and on the infantry phalanx standing its ground. Darius fled, and his womenfolk fell into Alexander's hands. His chivalrous treatment of them, before there was such a thing as 'chivalry', prompted Diodorus (17. 38) to contrast the *tyche*, fortune, which wins battles with the self-restraint of true virtue.[33]

## Egypt; the city-foundations

After Issos, Alexander had the choice of pursuing Darius or moving south, thus giving his opponent time to regroup. That he chose the second, apparently risky, course, which took him via Phoenicia towards Egypt, may – note the *pothos* to visit Ammon (3. 3. 1, and for the word see above p. 294) – have something to do with the pull which Egypt exercised on all Greeks (cf. Hdt. Book 2). But there were also, as correctly expounded in the speech which Arrian gives him (2. 14, from the 'main sources'), sound strategic reasons as well: the Aegean Sea, where an energetic Persian counter-offensive was still going on, would never be safe for Macedon while the Phoenician ports were in hostile possession, and that, with a disaffected Greece in his rear (where the Spartan king Agis III was to lead a serious revolt in 331) would have cut off Alexander's communications in both directions (money, supplies, reinforcements, intelligence).[34] Like Agesilaos in 394 he would have had to scuttle back home.

But Alexander's great advantage over Agesilaos, thanks to artillery experts like Diades (p. 295), lay in his ability to take fortified cities by siege – not just Halikarnassos in 334 but, after the battle of Issos, the great Phoenician maritime states of Tyre and Gaza. With these places in his control (AA 2. 15ff. for the elaborate sieges of the two last-named cities) he could indeed claim to have 'conquered the Persian fleet on dry land' (cf. AA 1. 20. 1). The stubbornness of the resistance to Alexander in those three places is due not just to their fortifications but to the long tradition of Persian support of their native client rulers, the Hekatomnids of Karia (whose last representative, Ada, Alexander wisely reinstated) and the Semitic rulers of the Phoenician coastal states. Such men had no reason to hope for a Persian defeat (the rulers of Sidon and Halikarnassos had briefly taken part in the Satraps' Revolt of the 360s it is true, but perhaps only to increase their holdings). In this they were unlike, say, the Ionian Greek democrats, or the native population of Egypt.

In Egypt, Curtius says, the Persians had governed 'avariciously' (4. 7. 1, cf. Diod. 17. 59) and this misrule – which in any case goes back immediately no further than 343, cf. p. 276, not to mention a possible revolt in the 330s[35] – is given as the reason why Alexander was welcomed (November 332). But in the past seventy-five-odd years several Persian armies had failed to penetrate past Pelusium and the Nile Delta, and the lack of resistance to Alexander proves that the Persian high command had decided not to try to hold Egypt, and this, as much as Persian unpopularity, explains why Alexander had no trouble.[36]

Alexander now gave instructions for the first of the great city-foundations named after him, Alexandria in Egypt, which was to be the 'first city' of the hellenistic, and the 'second city' of the Roman, world. Like so many of his achievements, the colonizing activity of Alexander[37] was inherited from his father: we saw that after gaining control of Krenides (by 356, see p. 279), Philip renamed it Philippi, and this should really rank as the first of the

eponymous city-foundations of the hellenistic age. But Philip also refounded Bylazora (cf. Polyb. 5. 97: 'the largest city in Paionia and very favourably situated in relation to the pass from Dardania into Macedonia') and perhaps a Herakleia Lynkestis (358); he also colonized the Hebros basin in Thrace with inter alia another eponymous foundation, Philippopolis.[38] As at for instance the Athenian colony at Brea in the same area (ML 49 = Fornara 100), a garrisoning function was no doubt combined with another aim: to dispose of unwanted and (from the Macedonian point of view) undesirable population. We may compare Antipater who, after the crushing of the Athenian revolt which took place after Alexander's death, shipped off some five-figure number of Athenians, whose status was below the 'hoplite' census, to Thrace (Diod. 18. 18. 5).

Another influence was Persia: we have already noted (p. 300) the possible relation between Mausolus' refoundations in Ionia and Alexander's, and it is certain that Alexandreschate, 'Furthest Alexandria', was deliberately intended to imitate Cyrus the Great, a notable city founder (cf. Strabo 517 for Alexander as a 'lover of Cyrus',[39] and for Alexandreschate see p. 313). Increasingly, as at Ai Khanoum in north Afghanistan, archaeology has revealed that Alexander chose existing Achaemenid settlement centres for his new Alexandrias (though Ai Khanoum itself cannot certainly be identified with any attested Alexandria, it is the best excavated and richest central Asiatic *polis*, see below): there is Achaemenid irrigation in the Ai Khanoum area, and epigraphic proof of resident Persians (*SEG* 28. 1327 for the good Iranian name Oxybazos: hellenistic but probably a descendant of an earlier settler). Again, at Kandahar[40] (the probable modern site of Alexandria in Arachosia), Achaemenid pottery has been found, and a tablet inscribed in Elamite, the Persian bureaucratic script in which the Persepolis records were kept. Most of the archaeological work referred to in this paragraph was done in the 1960s and 1970s up to 1979, the year of the Soviet Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It was thought that much of the relevant archaeological and epigraphical evidence was lost forever in the years of warfare after 1979 and the aftermath of the US-led invasion of 2001, but it now turns out that much was miraculously and courageously saved from destruction. An exhibition on the theme 'Hidden Afghanistan', which visited Amsterdam and other European cities in 2007–8, revealed that inscriptions like that discussed at n. 84 below were, after all, preserved.

The 'main sources' – the good tradition which goes back reliably to Alexander's own lifetime – give niggardly numbers of cities certainly founded by Alexander. Later literary traditions and lists were far more exuberant. Here is a famous and long-standing puzzle, solved only recently (1996), and brilliantly, by P. M. Fraser.[41] He has argued convincingly, and with great learning going far beyond Greek classical sources, that the two main surviving lists of Alexander's city-foundations, that in Stephanus of Byzantium and in the earliest Greek versions of the novel-ish production known as the *Alexander Romance* (cf. below for Pseudo-Kallisthenes), go back to a

hypothetical tendentious pamphlet written in Ptolemaic Alexandria in the third century BC. The idea of its author was to minimize the urbanizing and colonizing achievement of the Ptolemies' rivals the Seleukids, by reassigning many actual Seleukid foundations to Alexander himself.

We have to take a rather different interpretative line with Plutarch who in the late first century AD credited Alexander with seventy city-foundations (*Mor.* 328). This is a gross exaggeration,[42] comparable to the traditions about archaic Miletus which was supposed to have been the mother of seventy-five or ninety cities. It needs to be interpreted against the background of Plutarch's view that Alexander's activity as a founder of cities was part of his hellenizing greatness. Plutarch's remark that Alexander changed the nature of the savage tribes among which these cities were founded is untrue, as is the statement (328e) that Alexander sowed all Greek Asia with Greek magistracies (see further p. 313). It is part of the picture of Alexander the philosopher and man of practical virtue (cf. above for Diodorus on his behaviour after Issos).

Modern scholars, until not long ago, have tended to follow Plutarch.[43] But in recent years there has been a reaction and a tendency to see most of Alexander's foundations as repressive devices with little cultural intention behind them, instruments for holding down the local peoples whose participation was enforced. No doubt many of the eastern city-foundations were bleak places, like Alexandria in Margiane, which according to the elder Pliny was refounded in the hellenistic period after it had been overrun and destroyed by barbarians (*Natural History* 6. 46–7). But it was possible to enjoy the forms of city life in the back of Asiatic beyond: at the early hellenistic city of Ai Khanoum on the Oxus in north Afghanistan,[44] excavations in the 1960s and 1970s revealed dedications to Hermes and Herakles the patron gods of athletics, i.e. there was a gymnasium, and there was a theatre. Pausanias in the second century AD was to regard these two buildings as the emblems of Greek city life (10. 4. 1). Leaving aside Alexander's success and considering only his motives, it is clear that he wanted to give his new cities a characteristically Greek send-off:[45] after the foundation of Alexandreschate in 329 BC he held a cavalry and athletic contest (AA 4. 4. 1). But such inaugural ceremonies do not take us very far; we shall see that the practical difficulties of survival could be acute. Self-defence came first, *paideia* (Greek culture) and self-government afterwards.

Nevertheless gestures like that of 329 show that the gloomy, minimalist picture of Alexander's aims does not account for all the evidence; and it certainly does not work for Alexandria in Egypt, whose foundation Arrian describes in terms which show that Alexander hoped for the city's commercial[46] and civic success. Arrian (AA 3. 1. 5) describes how Alexander personally marked out the site of the *agora* (religious centre and marketplace) and the future temples (cf. also the food omen at Plut. *Alex.* 26, and see Diod. 17. 52); the site certainly had superb natural advantages. (The actual act of foundation is dealt with further below.)

One approach to the problem of Alexander's city-foundations is to make some distinction between types of foundation: first the *poleis*, civic communities with magistrates, Assembly and perhaps Council (at Egyptian Alexandria the existence of a council is quite certain from a third-century BC inscription).[47] Plutarch tendentiously assimilates all Alexander's foundations to this type (the Ionian refoundations certainly belong here). Second, the *katoikiai*, military settlements: these are a common feature of the hellenistic, particularly the Seleukid, world, e.g. Dura Europos on the Euphrates. Third, the *phrouria*, essentially movable garrisons (cf. AA 4. 27. 7, Bazira = possibly Birkot,[48] Ora, Massage, places in the territory of Mousikanos, Pattal, or the *phrouria* (forts) against Spitamenes at AA 4. 28. 4: central Asia). Those modern scholars who take a minimalist view tend to be thinking of the second and third types.

Egyptian Alexandria was founded soon after Alexander's arrival in Egypt (before the visit to Ammon at Siwah oasis, as Ptolemy believed, not, as in QC 4. 8.1, on his return).[49] The commercial motives for the foundation have already been given, but hellenistic and Roman history, particularly the accession of Vespasian, show that possession of Alexandria was always of great military value too, though one aspect of this importance, its control of the grain outlet from Egypt, can hardly be distinguished from the commercial. The original settlement was more than just a military camp for time-expired troops, since able-bodied Macedonians and Greeks were surely encouraged to settle in Egypt – a Greek order on papyrus from the military governor Peukestas son of Makartatos (cf. AA 3. 5. 5 for this man) has been discovered, putting a temple at Memphis out of bounds.[50] However, when Strabo (797) speaks of Egyptian locals, mercenaries and Greeks, he is explicitly quoting Polybius and thus reflects second-century BC conditions, and cannot be read back automatically[51] to the first century of Alexandria's existence. Alexandria in Egypt resembles other Alexandrias and other early hellenistic foundations in that the site was not quite untouched (see p. 303 on the Achaemenid prehistory of Kandahar and Ai Khanoum): Pseudo-Kallisthenes, the *Alexander Romance*, a hellenistic novel which now and then contains some circumstantial detail, says (1. 31. 2) that Alexandria was formed by a *synoikism* or concentration of a number of Egyptian villages. But the names given for these are not reliable, except for Rhakotis (cf. Strabo 792).

On Alexander's city-foundations further east see below p. 313f.

## The visit to the Ammon oracle; deification

Alexander now travelled across the desert to visit the oracle of Ammon at Siwah: we have seen that the cult of 'Zeus Ammon' was already well established in the Greek world of the fourth century (Chapter 5, p. 63), and this visit does not prove that Alexander was already 'going native' in any very novel way. The visit is, however, of profound importance as the most dramatic evidence for Alexander's belief in his own 'divinity'[52] in the sense of divine

filiation (sonship) from Zeus. It is not quite the first piece of evidence: as we noted (above, p. 300), in Pamphylia the sea had 'done him obeisance', an incident possibly 'written up' by Kallisthenes, and suggested by a passage in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (1. 4. 18) where the Euphrates makes way for Cyrus the Younger, thus (incorrectly) predicting that he would be king. (Cf. too Homer *Iliad* 24. 96, where the sea divides to make way for Iris, a goddess herself and the messenger of the gods.)[53] And even earlier, as the sober Alexandrian scholar Eratosthenes records (cited at Plut. *Alex.* 3), Olympias had told Alexander the 'secret of his paternity', i.e. his divine filiation.

But it is with Alexander's real father Philip that any discussion must begin, for Alexander's 'divinity' or 'divine filiation' have their origins not in Persian or other oriental conceptions but in the Greece and Macedon that he had left behind him.

The Persian kings did not regard themselves as gods. Darius I in the Behistun inscription smites armies by the will and under the protection of Ahura Mazda, with whom he was in no sense identified. Greek misunderstandings of Persian belief and practice are another matter: in Aeschylus' *Persians* the chorus address Atossa as a wife and mother of gods (line 157) and Longinus' *On the Sublime* (3. 2) quoted Gorgias (in the 420s BC) as saying that Xerxes was the Persians' Zeus. But this is a mere distortion of a piece of gross flattery in Herodotus (7. 56), where a man from the Hellespont suggests that Xerxes is Zeus who has taken on the shape of a man. What contributed to Greek notions was undoubtedly the ceremony of *proskynesis* before the Persian king (p. 315), which in one of its forms required total prostration, something which Greeks reserved for gods (cf. Hdt. 7. 136, Xen. *Anab.* 3. 2. 13, Isok. 4 *Paneg.* 151).

In Greece the hero-cult of city founders and leaders of colonies was long-standing (p. 215), and these are aspects of Alexander's activity too as of Philip's (founding a city like Philippi, named after oneself, was a piece of almost superhuman arrogance). We noted also such benefactor cults as that of Lysander at Samos and Euphron at Sikyon.

But the most important, though for us elusive, precedent for Alexander was his father Philip[54] (just as he is the precedent for Alexander the city founder, cf. above). This, superficially, is a paradox, since Alexander's own beliefs, which seem to have gone deep, implied at one level a denial that Philip was his father at all.

In the theatre at Aigai just before his death Philip had been represented as a 'thirteenth Olympian god' (see p. 289 on Diod. 16. 92. 5). This remarkable statement is the solidest evidence for Philip's intended apotheosis and it is tantalizing that we do not know Diodorus' sources for the four years between 340 (when Ephoros stopped) and the beginning of Alexander's reign,[55] which makes it hard to assess the truth of the story. The altars to Zeus Philippios at Eresos on Lesbos (R/O no. 83 = Harding 112) may signify 'Zeus who is protector of Philip' rather than 'Philip who is Zeus';[56] but they are still an unusual religious manifestation in the pre-hellenistic world (cf. the statue of

Philip in the temple at Ephesos, AA 1. 17. 1). There is also some archaeological evidence, but interpretation is difficult and likely to be as circular as the building itself: I refer to the round 'Philippeion' at Olympia (cf. Paus. 5. 20. 9f.), which contained statues of Philip and his family but which may have been altered after Philip's death so any 'cult' may have been posthumous.[57] Finally, an inscription from Philippi attests a sacred precinct to Philip, who is named in what seems clearly divine company.[58]

There is enough here to have stimulated Alexander in the same direction, though we must remember that in the Greco–Macedonian world it was personal merit which secured divine or heroic honours.[59] It follows that Philip's divinity could not be inherited; nor should we speak of Alexander's role as 'son of Ammon' as some kind of *ex officio* role acquired by him as the new Pharaoh.[60]

Arrian (3. 3–4) provides the vital evidence for the visit to Ammon, which has to be supplemented by Kallisthenes (Fl4a = Strabo 88); Arrian and Kallisthenes are in basic agreement. The vulgate (see especially Diod. 17. 49–51) is significantly different. Arrian's account is, however, extremely reticent. He says that Alexander went to Ammon because of a *pothos*[61] to consult the infallible oracle; Kallisthenes adds the motive of love of glory; both agree that Alexander wished to rival the two heroes Perseus and Herakles (for the significance of these two see p. 297, cf. 82f.). Arrian says that Alexander 'was seeking' to trace his birth to Ammon, in other words the idea of his sonship from Ammon was already in his head before he set out[62] – we are reminded of the Pamphylian *proskynesis*; what he wanted was now 'more certain knowledge' (*atrekesteron*) from an infallible oracle. This is interesting, but if it were just Arrian's own comment it would not be worth much; Curtius, however (4. 7. 8), confirms Arrian. Then, still on Arrian's version, he made his inquiry of the god and received the answer his heart desired, as he said.

That is all. Kallisthenes adds some detail such as that only Alexander was allowed to enter the temple, while the rest had to listen to the priest's responses from outside. The responses were not given in words but in nods and symbols, and the priest interpreted the god. Kallisthenes is, however, very important in that he shows that the responses included the declaration of Alexander's divine filiation: he goes on to describe how Ammon was promptly confirmed on this subject of the 'birth from Zeus' by the deliverances of the Ionian oracles of Branchidai (the name of an oracle based at Didyma near Miletus) and Erythrai, seat of a prophesying sibyl. This is the crucial response of Ammon and it seems to have changed Alexander's conception of himself. But since the better sources are so reticent we cannot go much further than that. Alexander himself was in no doubt: at Gaugamela (see below) he prayed for Zeus' help 'since he was the son of Zeus' (Plut. *Alex*. 33). The word for 'since' is *eiper* which here does not mean 'if' in any tentative sense, cf. Homer, *Odyssey* 9. 528–30, where the Cyclops prays to Poseidon:

> hear me Poseidon, dark-haired god, encircler of the earth. If [*ei*, 'if', the shorter form of *eiper*] I am truly your son and you my proud father, grant that there should be no home-coming for Odysseus the sacker of cities ...
> (tr. M. Hammond)

Here *ei* really assumes and asserts the truth of what follows. And for Kleitos (Plut. 50. 6) and the Opis mutineers at the end of his life (AA 7. 8. 3, see p. 316ff.), Alexander's 'filiation from Ammon' was common knowledge. (This is relevant to the clashes with Macedonians, individually and collectively, described on p. 314f.)

The vulgate is different, fuller and more dramatic: 'son of Zeus' was here a public salutation by the priest, not a private or semi-private response, and Alexander was told, in answer to a question, that he *had* punished all his father's (i.e. Philip's!) murderers, and that he would be invincible and rule over the whole earth. These traditions are not necessarily baseless (AA 6. 19, where it is said that Alexander 'sacrificed to the gods Ammon had told him to', shows that not everything the god said was kept secret). But we may doubt whether Alexander's 'world-rule' and 'invincibility' were as central to, and pervasive in, Kleitarchos' original book as has been claimed in the fullest recent study.[63]

## Gaugamela; Alexander and the Persians

In spring of 331 Alexander left Egypt and, returning through Phoenicia, was in Mesopotamia by midsummer; the final great battle with Darius was fought at Gaugamela[64] on 1 October (Plut. *Camillus* 19). The course of the battle is even more obscure than most ancient battles, because of the tendency to disparage Parmenion to Alexander's advantage (though on the enemy side the good performance of the Indian and Persian cavalry emerges clearly enough). Again, as at Issos, Alexander's tactic on the right was to wheel and charge leftwards at the critical moment, towards Darius himself. Parmenion on the Macedonian left is, however, supposed to have sent a message to Alexander, who was already in pursuit of Darius; the message was an appeal for help. This story creates great difficulties (how could any messenger have located and reached galloping cavalry?) and most of the modern reconstructions either rationalize it (for instance by turning the message during the battle into a prearrangement)[65] or else distort Arrian's text (by rendering Arrian's 'Alexander turned back from further pursuit' at 3.15.1 as 'Alexander was just on the brink of pursuit'),[66] or else ingeniously regard the account as somehow contaminated by the later battle of Ipsos in 301 where something rather similar occurred – Demetrius over-pursued and left his father Antigonos to be killed.[67] It is better simply to reject the story as evidence of malice towards Parmenion, and to admit ignorance: all we can say is that Alexander did not in the end over-pursue ruinously. Darius did, once again, get away, and

perhaps Parmenion could safely be blamed for this. None of his family or friends survived to write history.

Darius rode in flight towards Media; Alexander turned south to Babylon, and then Susa. Possession of these great cities of the old eastern world was, as Arrian rightly says, the 'prize of the war' (3. 16. 2). That is a reference to the Persian treasure – a huge access of wealth for Alexander, even though the Achaemenids may not have gone in for economically unproductive 'hoarding' on the insane and extreme scale that was once thought.[68]

These last weeks of 331[69] were a political, as well as a military and financial, turning point, for at Babylon Alexander reappointed Mazaios, a Persian, as satrap of Babylon, though with a Macedonian, Apollodoros of Amphipolis (Amphipolis refers to location of fief, not Greek origin) as garrison commander, and another Macedonian, Asklepiodoros, to collect the taxes. This division of responsibility reproduced that which Alexander had imposed at Sardis in 334 (AA 1. 17. 7), which was itself modelled on Achaemenid practice at precisely Sardis (cf. Hdt. 1. 153, describing Cyrus the Great's arrangements). However, Alexander learnt from Cyrus' experience, which had not been wholly happy, and did not leave a local appointee in charge of funds, at either Sardis or Babylon.

Mazaios had been satrap of Syria under Darius, and commanded the Persian right wing at Gaugamela; it used to be thought that Alexander now gave him special privileges of issuing coinage bearing his own name, but this is a numismatists' conjecture with no real foundation.[70] But that Alexander, both at Babylon and a little later at Susa, where he appointed Abulites, should have appointed Persians to major satrapies is politically a departure, though of course he showed straight after Granikos that he planned to perpetuate Persian institutions, by appointing Kalas as satrap. (Ada, the reinstated satrap of Karia, pp. 73, 78, belongs to a local, non-Iranian dynasty and is anyway a special case: here Alexander was exploiting a division within the dynasty by backing her against her usurper brother Pixodaros. The only other possible Persian appointee before Mazaios is Sabiktas, appointed satrap of Cappadocia, AA 2. 4. 2, but there is no proof that this man was a Persian.) In part Alexander's attitude can be explained by mere expediency: he hoped to weaken resistance in advance by thus announcing to the upper cadres of the Persian administration that by coming over to him they could get their old jobs back. But this is too negative: in the reaction against a too idealistic view current in the first half of the twentieth century about Alexander's policies of 'harmony', *homonoia*, with Persia and Persians, the more recent move has been to deny too completely that Alexander had a policy of fusion, as opposed to repression towards the Persians.[71] But we have seen in earlier chapters of this book that satraps like Ariobarzanes and Mausolus had got on very well with individual Greeks (Agesilaos, Antalkidas, cf. p. 227); and though the views of Alexander's tutor Aristotle on barbarians were not enlightened, it has sensibly been said[72] that Alexander is not likely to have regarded Pharnabazos'

son Artabazos, who as we saw (p. 283) had spent time at Philip's court, as a natural slave.

In addition to the Babylon and Susa appointments, we hear of Phrataphernes, appointed to Parthia, Atropates (Media) and Satibarzanes (Areia). The latter rebelled and was replaced, but by Arsakes, another Persian – and another unsatisfactory appointment. An old friend, Artabazos (above) got Bactria, until he retired in 328; Alexander even had a liaison with Artabazos' daughter and a son Herakles was the result (Diod. 20. 20).[73]

Subsequently, after Alexander went over the Hindu Kush, he reverted to appointing Macedonians. Nikanor got the 'land this side of the Indos' (AA 4. 28. 6), Philippos the son of Machatas the land east of the Indos and Peithon son of Agenor the area from the lower Indos to the sea. But it is significant that these were not 'Iranian' territories.

Alexander regarded the Persian empire with the feelings of one who saw himself as the heir to the Achaemenids:[74] though he destroyed the possessions (see below) of the unworthy Darius III, he did give him a royal burial (AA 3. 22). And Alexander took care to cultivate the memory of Cyrus the Great, being as we saw (p. 303) a 'lover of Cyrus'. Again, a people known as the Euergetai ('benefactors') were honoured by Alexander because of the assistance which they had given to Cyrus (AA 3. 27), and Alexander restored Cyrus' tomb (AA 6. 29f., cf. QC 7. 6. 20). Cyrus may even (AA 4. 11. 9) have been Alexander's precedent and model for the introduction of the 'prostration' ritual, *proskynesis* (on which see p. 315).

That he punished Iranians after his return from India does not prove that his attitude had changed: towards the end of his life he honoured Peukestas, the Macedonian satrap of Persis, for his adoption of Persian habits (AA 6. 30). Nor was Peukestas alone in knowing Persian; there was also Laomedon of Mytilene, who was put in charge of barbarian prisoners because he was bilingual (AA 3. 6. 6). Alexander was planning further measures of integration shortly before his death; for instance, Persians and Macedonians were to be assimilated in the same infantry formation (AA 7. 23. 3). But perhaps this should be seen neither (as on one extreme view) as idealistic integration at the political level, nor (as on the other extreme)[75] as repression, but as a training device. Certainly military considerations alone are enough to explain the use, very soon after Gaugamela, of Iranian horse-javelin men (AA 3. 24. 1; 4. 17. 3; 5. 11. 3); it has been correctly noticed[76] that the Companion Cavalry on their own were no match for Scythian tactics. But as we shall see, this had its political consequences in the unpopularity which it generated among the Macedonians.

For the moment, however, Darius still lived, and though Alexander could appoint Persians as satraps, his own personal position did not change from King of the Macedonians into Great King of Persia – until after Darius had been hounded down and had died at the hands of his Persian noble followers in August 330. This helps to explain Alexander's next actions after passing from Susa to Persepolis (forcing the 'Persian Gates' en route): he set fire to the

palace of Persepolis at the end of his stay (January–May 330, AA 3. 18 and all sources) (see Figure 19.2). Whether interpreted as a deliberate (the 'main sources'), or as a drunken and unpremeditated (the 'vulgate' sources) act of revenge – or whether explained on a choice of modern rationalizations[77] – this was a hostile act: Alexander did not yet think of himself as destroying his own property. (Arrian makes Parmenion ineffectively urge this point of view, which resembles the – effective – advice given by Kroisos to Cyrus the Great at Hdt. 1. 88.)

But after Darius' death Alexander was at last entitled to assume the 'upright tiara', the symbol of Persian kingship (*FGr Hist* 137 Kleitarchos F5), and Arrian says he did assume it (AA 4. 7. 4, but see below). It was certainly also assumed at about this time by Bessos the murderer of Darius. It was to be some time – see p. 313 – before Alexander settled things with this man. In any case, Alexander now unquestionably started to change his personal image. The dress he now adopted was, however, a mixture (Plut. *Alex.* 45, cf. *FGr Hist 241* Eratosthenes F30; date: after leaving Zadrakarta for Parthia, cf. AA 3. 25; i.e. only weeks after Darius' death): he did not wear the Persian trousers which Greeks found ridiculous, nor the *kandys* (gold or purple cloak) nor, Plutarch says, the tiara:[78] these were the 'weird and theatrical items of




*Figure 19.2* Persepolis, a pillar of the Apadana showing cracks caused by the fire set by Alexander's troops

barbarian costume', as Eratosthenes says. Arrian's judgement (7. 29) was that this new dress was partly a 'sophism' (device) designed for non-Macedonian consumption – Persian clothes-consciousness was well known to Aeschylus who makes much of the symbolism of the rags of Xerxes in defeat[79] (*Persians* lines 835, 1030) – but we know that it gave great offence to the Macedonians (AA 7. 8. 2): it helped to precipitate the Opis mutiny.

### The passage through Afghanistan; worsening relations between Alexander and the Macedonians

The preceding section, on Alexander's relations with the Persians, shades off into the present section because it was 'orientalizing' of the kind just described which opened a gap in attitudes between him and even loyal Macedonian followers. As his career continued, his preference for such 'orientalizing' became more marked. His friend Hephaistion approved, but others did not, and Alexander chose to make a personal issue of this: Hephaistion was, in Alexander's phrase, a 'lover of Alexander' whereas men like Krateros were merely 'lovers of the king' (Plut. *Alex.* 47, an important chapter about this issue of principle).

Alexander could draw on great reserves of Macedonian loyalty – Antipater, whose goodwill was vital for getting reinforcements (cf., for example, AA 3. 11. 10), remained steady until very late, though one late source preserves the suggestion that he disapproved of Alexander's deification (Suid., under 'Antipatros Iolaou': 'alone of all the Successors he would not call Alexander a god, thinking that impious').

But the Ammon episode, and the new personal style which Alexander was now adopting, tested that loyalty, and the first great collision, the Philotas affair, came in the autumn of 330, after Alexander had moved further east across Iran via Hyrkania and Parthia and into modern Afghanistan passing the site of modern Herat (where he founded an 'Alexandria in Areia'). At modern Farah, due south of Herat, in the ancient Persian satrapy or sub-satrapy of the Drangaians, Philotas was arraigned on a 'conspiracy charge'[80] (AA 3. 26, QC 6. 7ff.). The actual evidence against Philotas was slight: he was supposed to have failed to report the (genuine) plot of one Dimnos, but if so he was, as Curtius makes him say (6. 10. 20f.), careless to have allowed Kebalinos, an informer, go around for two days without disposing of him. The real issue was the relationship between the more intransigent Macedonian nobility (note Philotas' *onkos*, pride, at Plut. *Alex.* 47) and the new Alexander; Curtius (6. 10. 8), who refers to Ammon, may explain Arrian's curious reference to a 'previous' report about Philotas conspiring in Egypt. That is, Philotas disliked the claim to be 'son of Ammon', and he said so.

The execution of Philotas was followed straight away by that of his father Parmenion, now in Media. He had been ordered to go to Hyrkania instead (AA 3. 19. 7), but there is nothing sinister in this: some twist in the story has probably been omitted by Arrian. Certainly a posting to Media, with

its large troop concentrations on the land route to the Mediterranean, was no relegation. But Parmenion was too dangerous to live: the elucidation of his family's control of senior jobs is one of the most convincing results of applying the study of family ties, the so-called 'prosopographical' method,[81] to Alexander's reign. Parmenion himself commanded the whole Macedonian left wing, and had personal command of the Thessalian cavalry (AA 3. 11. 10, cf. Diod. 17. 17. 3). Of his sons, Philotas commanded the Companion Cavalry, and Nikanor the *hypaspists*, the elite corps of Macedonian infantry (AA 3. 11. 8; 9). Other connections included leaders of infantry brigades like the sons of Andromenes, and Hegelochos the commander of the scouts (AA 3. 27. 1; 1. 13. 1 with QC 6. 11. 22): whether this man was the nephew of Philip's last wife Kleopatra, and was therefore seen as an additional threat, is doubtful.[82]

In early 329[83] Alexander, following the great southward arc which still connects western to eastern Afghanistan, passed into the satrapy of Arachosia, where he founded (or rather refounded) a city near the site of modern Kandahar. A Greek metrical inscription discovered during British excavations at the site of Old Kandahar, shortly before the Soviet invasion of 1979, shows that Old Kandahar was the site of an early hellenistic settlement, and this strengthens its identification as the 'Alexandria in Arachosia' which is the twelfth in Stephanus of Byzantium's list of Alexandrias (see *SEG* 30. 1664, cf. 34. 1434, for the inscription, and for Stephanus see above p. 303).[84]

The next two years saw some of Alexander's most demanding warfare, the campaigns in Baktria and Sogdiana against Bessos and (after Bessos had been betrayed to him and executed, in mid-329) against Bessos' successor as resistance leader, Spitamenes. At Begram not far from Kabul he founded another great Alexandria, Alexandria AD Caucasum or Alexandria in Paropamisadai (AA 3. 28. 4,[85] cf. Strabo 514 and Pliny *NH* 6. 61), on an important intersection of routes from further Asia in the east towards the west (Iran) and north (Baktria). Another showpiece foundation was Alexandreschate (Alexandria on the Tanais/Jaxartes), the eighteenth Alexandria in Stephanus' list.[86] This gives further insight into Alexander's founding motives. The imitation of Cyrus is important, for the city was to replace Cyropolis, one of the furthest Achaemenid outposts to this point of the compass. Arrian says that Alexander was planning (4. 1. 3) to found a city on the Jaxartes and give it his own name; the site was suited to greatness; it would be well placed for the eventual invasion of Scythia; and it would provide protection against the incursions of the barbarians who lived across the river. So we have three motives: prosperity, offence and security. Greek mercenaries, time-expired or otherwise militarily unfit Macedonians, and locals were settled there. Arrian says that the locals were volunteers but other evidence suggests that they were press-ganged (Justin 12, 5. 12 and QC 7. 6. 27, cf. 7. 1. 1 on Sogdians distributed as slaves to the settlers). This evidence is a main weapon in the hands of those scholars who refuse to allow Alexander high-minded cultural intentions as a proselytizing hellenist.[87]

Other foundations firmly attributable to Alexander in this part of the world[88] were really part of a purely military policy of containment (AA 4.17. 4, *phrouria*, cf. 16. 3); that is they were more like *katoikiai* than Greek-style *poleis*[89] (cf. p. 305 for this distinction). Such Greeks as were settled here were certainly held down by fear (cf. QC 9. 7. 1–11 and Diod. 17. 99. 5f., 18. 7). They were discontented and tried to get home again after Alexander's death because they missed their Greek lifestyle – although the finds at Ai Khanoum (p. 304) show that that lifestyle could be reconstructed on the banks of the Oxus. As to the forms of government, despite the large claims of Plutarch, the colonists were actually governed by *strategoi* or *episkopoi,* both military titles (cf. AA 4. 22. 5: Nikanor and 3. 28. 4: Neiloxenos). As with the archaic Greek colonies, with their militarily autocratic *oikists*, this made sense: survival, and the repelling of hostile local neighbours, were the first considerations. As to the locals, the overrunning of Alexandria in Margiane (p. 296) was an often-repeated story (cf. AA 5. 29. 5 for monsoon damage to some of Alexander's Indian foundations). If Alexander's aims included a desire to replace nomadic by agricultural habits, as Arrian asserts (*Indike* 40. 8, cf. Pliny *NH* 6. 95 on Alexander forbidding the Gedrosian fish eaters to eat fish), he failed, at least in central Asia.

Mention of the military policy of containment is a reminder that the early 320s were years of fierce campaigning of an entirely new type against enemies whose ancestors had killed Cyrus the Great. Eventual success was won by the *phrouria* system (AA 4. 17. 4); this was how Alexander solved the problems of bringing an elusive enemy to bay – and holding down the countryside after that enemy's defeat. Spitamenes was captured by mid-winter 328/7. But before this difficult phase was concluded there had been some serious military blunders, and one in particular had an importance beyond the strictly military, because it caused more trouble with traditionalist Macedonians: the Kleitos affair (late 328).

The precipitating incident was a defeat by Spitamenes of a Macedonian force which Alexander had put under the command of a Lycian interpreter called Pharnouches (which actually sounds like an Iranian name).[90] From this we may infer that Alexander had underestimated the opposition (AA 4. 3. 7ff.) and it was therefore largely his fault when the force was cut to pieces. A Greek poet at court produced a song jeering at the Macedonians. (Plut. *Alex.* 50 is the best source for the episode, cf. too AA 4. 8.) That enraged Kleitos, the commander of the Royal Squadron of the Companions. He reacted by taking advantage and more than advantage of traditional Macedonian freedom of speech towards the king, quoting Euripides (*Andromache* lines 693ff.):[91]

> A bad custom has grown up in Greece,
> the soldiers get the sweat, the generals the glory.

The lines signify an objection to personal kingship and the personality cult, which (above Chapter 14 p. 215f.) we traced back to the time of Brasidas and

Lysander (and note that Kleitos' remarks to Alexander included a reference to Ammon). Alexander, equally enraged, got hold of a pike and ran Kleitos through.

From now on, Alexander's orientalizing tendencies and conciliation of Iranian sensibilities developed without the Macedonian nobility taking an open stand against them. The next departure, the attempt to introduce the ceremony of *proskynesis*, obeisance, was primarily opposed by a Greek, Kallisthenes (though the Macedonian Leonnatos[92] is said to have burst out laughing, if that counts as an 'open stand': AA 4. 12. 2. The story is in any case a 'roving anecdote' because it is also, though less plausibly, told of another Macedonian, Polyperchon: QC 8. 5. 22–8. 6. 1). And the troubles later in the reign, culminating in the Opis mutiny, lay with the rank and file.

In early 327, at Baktra (Balkh), Alexander tried to introduce the old practice of *proskynesis*, obeisance, before the Persian king, that is himself, and on the likelier of the two versions given by Arrian,[93] Kallisthenes opposed this head on: *proskynesis* may indeed have been no more than shorthand for a graded set of social approaches (cf. Hdt. 1. 134ff.), as suited to a highly stratified society like the Persian (which for instance, as we can now see from the Persepolis tablets, dispensed rations to great dignitaries according to an elaborately differentiated tariff). Hence *proskynesis* might involve no more than the exchange of kisses, which obstinately features in our sources, perhaps as part of an official attempt to minimize the implications of *proskynesis* at a time when it was no more than a failed experiment. But to Greeks, *proskynesis* meant prostration (which indeed is probably what Alexander, as Great King of Persia, had in mind); and that meant impiety (see p. 298). Kallisthenes, who had on an earlier occasion represented Alexander as the son of a god (Ammon), was not, despite confusion on the subject later in antiquity (contrast *FGrHist* 124 T 20, 21), being inconsistent in resisting an apparent claim by Alexander, at Baktra, actually to be a god: this and other such distinctions, for instance that between a god and a hero, mattered (cf. the speech given by Arrian to Kallisthenes, AA 4. 11). The attempt to introduce *proskynesis* was dropped, but Kallisthenes' moral victory was very temporarily his to enjoy, for he fell soon after, allegedly involved in a conspiracy.

It is probable that Alexander's aims in trying to introduce *proskynesis* had been mixed: he must have been aware of its religious implications in Greek and Macedonian minds, but there is the Persian aspect too – emulation of Cyrus and a desire to conciliate and attract loyalty from his Iranian subjects. His marriage to the Sogdian princess Roxane should certainly be seen in this light.[94] Curtius says explicitly (8. 4. 25) that this was designed to bind and consolidate his Persian and Macedonian empires, 'to take shame from the conquered and arrogance from the conquerors'.

## India; the end

In 326 Alexander began the 'conquest of India' as this phase is still conventionally called, though in post-partition language most of his activity was in modern Pakistan, where he subdued the Punjab. The going here was mostly much easier, politically and militarily, in terms of the external opposition he had to face. (But there was one great battle, on the River Hydaspes[95] = Jhelum, against King Porus and his elephants, AA 5. 9ff.; and it took ferocious fighting to subdue the independent Mallians, who wounded Alexander almost mortally, AA 6. 6–11.) Partly this was because Alexander was able to exploit the fragmentation of the Indian states and the jealousy of their rulers, just as, years before, he had profited from the divisions in the Karian satrapal house. It was internal, Macedonian, opposition which defeated him: his troops, depressed by the rains and not sharing Alexander's *pothos* for infinite novelty and conquest, mutinied on the River Hyphasis (Beas), a little way inside the frontier of modern India; and he turned back, down the Indus to the Arabian Sea.

His own march back to Persia via the poorly provisioned satrapy of Gedrosia (Baluchistan) was a logistical error which cost many lives (date: 325); the fleet went separately, commanded by Nearchos, whose account survives in the *Indike* of Arrian written in Herodotean style and manner. This is the first tangible manifestation of the great stimulus to the hellenistic science and literature of geography given by Alexander's campaigns.[96]

After returning from India, Arrian says, Alexander became 'harsher', *oxyteros*, and out of the disciplining at this period (324) of satraps and generals (who Arrian says thought Alexander would never return from India), modern scholarship has reconstructed a reign of terror[97] (see AA 7. 4. 1–3 for Alexander's judgements). But though it is certainly true that delinquents were now brutally punished or called to order, not all aspects of Alexander's behaviour at this time are equally sinister. For instance, Peukestas was indeed summoned to the king's presence, but there was nothing alarming about that because he was only to be congratulated for his orientalizing (AA 7. 23. 1–3, cf. 6. 30. 2–3). Other 'detainees' arrived – but bringing reinforcements (Atropates, Philoxenos, Menandros). This looks like normal administration. However, Alexander's growing impatience (an idea present in the Greek word *oxys*) is well illustrated by his treatment of his boyhood friend Harpalos, a Macedonian with high financial responsibilities, who had deserted once before but been forgiven; this time, guilty of peculation on an impressive scale, he decamped to Greece, taking large sums of money with him; before his death he was to help to provoke the anti-Macedonian resistance whose most serious phase fell after Alexander's death. (For Harpalos see Diod. 17. 108. There is an annoying gap at the relevant point in the manuscripts of Arrian.)

At Opis, not far from Babylon, Alexander faced more mutiny in 324, which as we shall see he overcame by some theatrical gestures of reconciliation including a famous banquet. The great grievance this time was Alexander's

'orientalizing', and the importance of the Opis affair is that it shows that the grievance was felt not only by the Macedonian officer class but by the rank and file (AA 7. 6ff.).

It was not only Macedonians who were moved to resentment. Near the end of his life Alexander took two actions which alienated the Greek world also. First, in August 324, in an announcement relayed at the Olympic Games by Nikanor (not the son of Parmenion but a different man, a relative of Aristotle), Alexander ordered the Greek cities to take back their exiles (Diod. 18. 8; R/O no. 101 = Harding 122, from Tegea in Arkadia; R/O no. 85 = Bagnall/Derow 5, from Mytilene on Lesbos. The Tegea decree is interesting for its use of a 'foreign court' to settle property disputes, a very Hellenistic phenomenon. See line 24ff.). This was not formally connected with another decree, ordering the disbandment of satrapal mercenary armies (Diod. 17. 106. 3, cf. p. 270 for the similar measures of Artaxerxes III in the 350s), but the latter decree must in fact have exacerbated the 'exiles problem'. For the Athenians the Exiles Decree meant evacuating Samos which they had held since Timotheos had installed the cleruchy in 365 (p. 260), a cleruchy more than once reinforced since then (p. 263), and it is not surprising that, faced with a refugee problem on this scale, the Athenians prepared to go to war (*FGrHist* 126 Ephippos F5; for the specific decision about Samos see R/O no. 90B = Harding 127). What were Alexander's motives? Isokrates' writings show that the numbers of expatriates were indeed regarded with alarm, at least by the settled citizens for whom Isokrates speaks (p. 201): but what is interesting is that Alexander thought he could resolve the difficulty at a stroke, indifferent both to opposition (Athens) and the sheer complexity of the operation. (The Mytilene inscription shows the sort of disputes and litigation that could be expected. And as the Tegea inscription shows, the Decree cut clean across established property rights, and was thus against Macedonian interests in that the League of Corinth arrangements of 337 had generally protected the possessing classes, cf. p. 288 on Dem. 17. 15.) It seems that Alexander now saw himself in a superhuman role, imposing global solutions – like a god: it was Zeus who made men into exiles, 'wandering driven by starvation over the earth' (Homer, *Iliad* 24. 531f.), and who but a god can reverse the process on the necessary scale?

That leads to the second affront to Greek feeling, the demand for deification sent to the Greek cities in winter 324/3. This is discussed further below.

The consequences of all these actions of the final phase were felt well beyond 323; but the immediate story ends abruptly in that year with Alexander's death in Babylon, aged thirty-two, from illness after heavy drinking in the company of Medios of Larissa (p. 296).[98] The problem of Alexander's final aims has to be answered from his last acts and reliably recorded intentions, since a fabulous list of 'last plans' at the beginning of Diodorus' Book 18 emanates not from the trustworthy source whom Diodorus was to follow for the early hellenistic period, Hieronymus of Cardia, but from his more sensational source for the previous book (that on Alexander), namely

Kleitarchos.[99] They are certainly more in his manner. As given by Diodorus (18. 4), the plans included the building of a fleet of a thousand ships larger than triremes for a campaign against the Carthaginians; the building of seven great temples, three in Greece, three in Macedon and one at Troy; population transfers between Europe and Asia; and the erection of a pyramid to Philip as large as any in Egypt. Nothing much can be made of this, although it is hard to prove that any one of the plans is downright impossible (and one, in the form of the seeking of Phoenician settlers for transplant to the Persian Gulf, is soberly attested: cf. AA 7. 19 for the mission of Mikkalos of Klazomenai). Instead we are forced back to a closer look at Alexander's last acts and reliably recorded intentions, as already briefly described above.

That Alexander issued some kind of formal demand to the Greek cities for his own deification is known to us only from some dubious historical sources (Aelian *Varia Historia* 5. 12; Ath. 251b), but the balance is just in favour of belief rather than scepticism.[100] Hypereides says that Demosthenes 'agreed that Alexander could be the son of Zeus – and of Poseidon if he wants, as well' (*Against Demosthenes* col. 31) and again speaks of the Athenians 'being forced to witness sacrifice being offered to mortal men … and to see their servants [Hephaistion possibly] being honoured as heroes' (*Funeral Oration* 21).[101]

This demand, if that is what it was, is more extreme, and in Greek terms more indefensible, than almost anything that Alexander had done so far – the claim to be son of Ammon was to some extent a private affair, and *proskynesis* had its positive political aspect as a way of accommodating Persian practice. Yet the supreme self-confidence breathed by the Exiles Decree is of a piece with an explicit request by a man for his own deification.

Then there are the actions which alienated the Macedonians in the final phase. Macedonian sentiment was moving away from Alexander, it is clear, on some of his most cherished policies: by the time of the Opis mutiny the enrolment of orientals in the cavalry had become a special grievance (AA 7/ 6. 3); a new fifth hipparchy (cavalry squadron), partly composed of barbarians,[102] was taken in very bad part. At the political level, the banquet in the aftermath of the Opis mutiny is crucial evidence (AA 7. 11. 8ff.):[103] Alexander prayed for 'partnership in rule' between Macedonians and Persians. This picked up a phrase of Thucydides' Alcibiades (8. 46. 3, *koinonoi arches*, above p. 186), where it was used to make a cynical proposal to Tissaphernes for joint Atheno–Persian rule over the Greek world; and was in turn picked up, in its thought rather than its language, by Plutarch (*Mor.* 329e). In Plutarch's account, Alexander mixed the lives and customs of men 'as in a loving-cup'; there is embroidery here, and a possible Homeric echo (*Iliad* 6. 528, Hector speaks of a 'mixing-bowl of freedom'); but comparison with Strabo (1. 4. 9 = 66C), who here draws on Eratosthenes, shows that both Strabo and Plutarch go back to the great third-century scholar Eratosthenes (both writers talk of distinguishing between people by whether they are virtuous or vicious, in preference to asking whether they are barbarians or not). If so that enhances the value of the passage: Eratosthenes is not so easily to be dismissed. And we

have seen that such desire for upper-class (note the qualification) *homonoia,* harmony, between Persians and Greeks/Macedonians has parallels earlier in the fourth century. Persian and Macedonian institutions were not dissimilar: for instance, the 'royal kin' are an important feudal notion common to both empires.[104]

Immediately, Alexander undoubtedly planned to go on fighting – he offers his men 'dangers and hardships' (AA 7. 8. 12), which is surely a euphemism for something military. Arrian (7. 16. 2) also speaks of voyages to explore the Caspian Sea and circumnavigate Arabia; for Aristoboulos (Strabo 741, cf. AA 7. 19. 6) he simply wanted to be 'lord of all', and perhaps this was true. We certainly have not the evidence to refute it.

## Conclusion

Alexander's aims, in their forward-looking aspect, are further discussed in the hellenistic volume in this series.[105] But I would here repeat a backward-looking point correctly made in that volume:[106] the hellenization which Alexander's conquests undoubtedly promoted in fact (however peripheral an intention of his we judge it to have been) had already taken swift steps in the last decades of Achaemenid Persian rule. For this, satraps like Mausolus had been responsible.

Or take a client-kingdom of Persia, like fifth- and fourth-century Cyprus.[107] Cyprus is a good historical test tube, sealed off in the physical sense by the sea, and containing a strong racial mix from the first. Here we can trace the progress of hellenization between 500 and 300 as the non-Greek element advanced and receded. In the mid-fifth century, sculpture like the 'Chatsworth Head' of Apollo argues a high degree of Greek penetration; this fell back as the century continued and Athenian influence diminished in face of Phoenician (though we must allow for some exaggeration by Isokrates in his *Evagoras* of the 'barbarization' of the island before his hero got to work). But then in the fourth century a series of forceful local dynasts, the Cypriot equivalents of Mausolus, actively diffused Greek culture again:

> He [Evagoras of Cyprus] inherited a thoroughly barbarized city which, because of Phoenician rule, had neither been visited by Greeks nor acquired cultural skills, having neither market nor harbour. He put all that to rights: he extended Salaminian territory [this refers to Salamis on Cyprus], threw walls around the city, built triremes, and put up civic buildings. In this way he advanced its power so that it was generally viewed with fear rather than, as formerly, with contempt.
>
> (Isok. 9 *Evagoras* 47)

A little later we find a Cypriot ruler, Nikokreon, making benefactions at Argos, Delos and Delphi (Tod 194, from the time of Alexander; not in R/O): the Argive dedication includes the metrical Greek lines: 'I am Nikokreon,

whom the sea-surrounded land of Cyprus bore; I am a king descended from a divine lineage.'

But like Mausolus in Karia (after whose time the local Karian script dies out), such Cypriot rulers were also positively concerned to preserve the local cultural element: a dedication to Aphrodite at Cypriot Amathous, from the end of the fourth century, stands in the name of Androkles, the last king of the place, and is bilingual: it is inscribed both in the Cypriot syllabary and in the Greek alphabet *(SEG* 30. 1571).

Men like Evagoras, Nikokreon and Androkles look forward to the philhellenes of the hellenistic world, a category for which Sir W. W. Tarn coined the phrase 'culture-Greeks'. But that idea is already implicitly present in a decree which we have discussed earlier in another context, an Athenian decree of the 390s (R/O no. 11; cf. p. 231 above). Evagoras, the man for whom Isokrates wrote the panegyric just quoted, is there called *huper Hellados Hellen,* 'a Greek benefactor of Greece'.

# NOTES

## Abbreviations of periodicals

*AHB* = *Ancient History Bulletin*
*AJA* = *American Journal of Archaeology*
*AJAH* = *American Journal of Ancient History*
*AJP* = *American Journal of Philology*
*Anc. Soc.* = *Ancient Society*
*Ath. Mitt.* = *Athenische Mitteilungen*
*BCH* = *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
*BEFAR* = *Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*
*BICS* = *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
*BSA* = *British School of Athens Annual*
*CJ* = *Classical Journal*
*Cl. et Med.* = *Classica et Medievalia*
*ClAnt* = *Classical Antiquity*
*CP* = *Classical Philology*
*CQ* = *Classical Quarterly*
*CR* = *Classical Review*
*CRAI* = *Comptes rendus de I'académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*
*CSCA* = *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*
*G and R* = *Greece and Rome*
*GRBS* = *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
*HSCP* = *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
*JEA* = *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
*JHS* = *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
*JRA* = *Journal of Roman Archaeology*
*JRS* = *Journal of Roman Studies*
*L'Ant. Class.* = *L'antiquité classique*
*LCM* = *Liverpool Classical Monthly*
*MH* = *Museum Helveticum*
*MHR* = *Mediterranean Historical Review*
*OJA* = *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*
*Op. Ath.* = *Opuscula Atheniensia*
*PCPhS* = *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
*REG* = *Revue des Etudes Grecques*
*RFIC* = *Rivista filologia e d'istruzione classica*
*Rh. Mus.* = *Rheinisches Museum*
*SO* = *Symbolae Osloenses*
*TAPA* = *Transactions of the American Philological Association*
*YCS* = *Yale Classical Studies*
*ZPE* = *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigrafik*

# Notes

## *1 Introduction*

1 I make no apology for, or elaborate explanation of, my starting date. Amélie Kuhrt, in an interesting paper, has noted that the pervasive tendency of histories of Greece to begin in 480 or 479 is potentially misleading when considered from the Persian viewpoint, because it over-stresses Persian weakness and failure (Kuhrt 1988: 60 and 72 n. 3). But this book *is* a history of Greece not Persia, and, as Kuhrt herself acknowledges, the Persian defeat was perceived by the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, as formative and decisive, see E. Hall 1989.

2 For this and the related term 'hellenization', see my entry 'hellenism, hellenization' in *OCD.*[3] The active word 'hellenization', i.e. the imposition of hellenism, is controversial because it is thought by some scholars to carry the unacceptable implication that Greek is superior to non-Greek. Modern sensitivity to these usages is an aspect of post-colonialism and can be traced to E. Said 1979.

3 Conventionally, the word 'colonization' is used for the (sometimes organized, sometimes haphazard) emigration of Greeks from Greece itself to areas like Italy, Sicily, North Africa, Western Turkey and the Black Sea region. But the resulting settlements were not usually administered directly or taxed by the 'mother-city' or metropolis, and were thus unlike 'colonies' in the modern sense. (See *CT* III (2008): 277f. for some important exceptions.) For 'colonization' in the archaic period (and for reservations about the use of this word with its excessively organized, Roman, connotations) see R. Osborne 1998, cf. 1996a: 128. Osborne has a good point, but for convenience I shall continue to use the word 'colonization' in this book, esp. in ch. 19 (Alexander).

4 See Root 1991: 18. On Greek art in the Persian empire see Boardman 1994: 28–48.

5 Cornell 1995 (in the same series as the present book): 1, 4.

6 On these three authors see Gould 1989, Derow and Parker 2003, Dewald and Marincola 2006, Irwin and Greenwood 2007, and Baragwanath 2008 (Herodotus); Connor 1984, Hornblower 1994, Rood 1998, Kallet-Marx 1993, Kallet 2001, Stahl 2003, Dewald 2005 and Rusten 2009 (Thucydides, and see further below, ch. 9 n. 2); Tuplin 1993 and Dillery 1995 (the latter deals with the *Anabasis* as well as the *Hellenica.* On the *Anabasis* alone, see Lane Fox 2004). Hammond and Rhodes 2009 is now the best and most helpful annotated translation of Thucydides. Cawkwell 1972b and 1979 are excellent annotated revisions of the Penguin editions of the two Xenophon works mentioned above, and for the *Anabasis* see Rood 2005.

7 For Diodorus on the fifth century, see Green 2010. For the early fourth-century books of Diodorus note esp. Stylianou 1998 (commentary on Book 15, with valuable introduction on sources etc.).

8 The Sicilian history in Diodorus is a special problem; see below and *CAH* 6[2] 9, 121ff.

9 McKechnie and Kern 1988.

10 Kurke 1991 showed the way in some important respects. See now Hornblower 2004, Currie 2005, and Hornblower and Morgan 2007 for Pindar; Fearn 2007 and Cairns 2010 for Bacchylides; Kowalzig 2007 and Budelmann 2009 for both. On the fragmentary poems see, above all, I. Rutherford 2001 (a superlative edition of Pindar's paians, with full commentary). See also below ch. 4 n. 10 for Sicily and South Italy.

11 See Easterling 1997, an authoritative edited collection, the contributors to which basically accept the correctness of the 'social contextualization' model of Greek tragedy, and Pelling 1997, a valuable collection of essays on the relation between tragedy and history. Protest: Griffin, 1998; for replies see Seaford 2000 and Goldhill 2000. Note also Pelling 2000: ch. 9 and 196–218.

12 The best approach is through commentaries to individual plays. Sommerstein 1980–2001 (translations and commentaries) now provides a complete set. See also Dover

1972, Heath 1987, Cartledge 1990, Bowie 1993, MacDowell 1994, Lewis 1997: 173–86 (essay on 'Aristophanes and Politics' originally written in 1956 and first published posthumously), Pelling 2000: Chapters 7 and 8, Silk 2000, Lowe 2008: 1–62.

13 See Edwards 1995 (ed., commentary, tr.) for all the speeches; for speech 1 see MacDowell 1962.

14 There is still no single volume of commentary on all of Lysias, but Todd 2007 is the first volume of what will eventually be a complete commentary, and see Carey 2007 (complete text, including fragments on papyrus); of recent editions of selected speeches note esp. Carey 1989, Edwards and Usher 1986 (also includes Antiphon 5), and Edwards 1999.

15 The commentary of Wyse 1904 remains an unsurpassed sceptical classic.

16 All these writers are in Loeb translations; see also the Aris and Phillips *Greek Orators* series, the Penguin *Greek Political Oratory*, which contains a number of important short speeches, W. R. Connor, *Greek Orations* (similar), and the Penguin *Demosthenes and Aischines* (Dem. 18 = On the Crown and 19 = On the False Embassy; Aischines 2 = *On the False Embassy* and 3 = *Against Ktesiphon*). For Demosthenes see further below, ch. 18 n. 17, and (for some commentaries) nn. 19 and 30. For Aischines see Harris 1995 and (on speech 1, *Against Timarchos*) Fisher 2001. For Hyperides see the commentaries of Whitehead 2000 and (on the Funeral Speech) Herrman 2009; a recently published palimpsest of Archimedes is made up of a compound of manuscripts, including those of one new private and one new public speech of Hyperides (Tchernetska 2005 and Carey 2008).There is still no single satisfactory monograph on Isokrates. Cawkwell in *OCD*[3] is a good short account, with bibliography.

17 Rhodes 1981, full detailed commentary.

18 For translation, see Bowersock 1968; Moore 1975: 37–47; Osborne 2004 (with brief commentary); Marr and Rhodes 2008 (with fuller commentary). For a heretical view of this pamphlet see Hornblower 2000c, dating its composition to the fourth century but arguing that it deals in a fictional manner with the fifth century (a view rejected by Osborne 2004: 9). Cf. p. 345 n. 86.

19 Asia Minor, especially after 400 BC, is another rich and rewarding source. See below, ch. 6.

20 This topic is addressed by a number of the papers in Osborne and Hornblower 1994, esp. Davies 1994a at 210f. for a clear statement of the 'symbolic' motive. See also Thomas 1994.

21 Robert 1970: 21.

## *2 The beginning of the Delian League*

1 On the Delian League or Athenian Empire see Meiggs 1972, Finley 1981, Rhodes 1985 and *CAH* 5[2] (1992) Chapter 3, Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998, Mattingly 1999, Kallet 2000, Constantakopoulou 2007, Ma, Papazarkadas and Parker 2009. Osborne 2000b is an excellent translated and annotated sourcebook. For Athenian relations with Delos, see Chankowsky 2008. See further below, n. 17.

2 Pausanias' youth is stressed by Gomme 1945: 270.

3 I here disagree with Gomme 1945: 272.

4 See Meiggs 1972: 454.

5 See (accepting it) Cawkwell 1970 [=2011: ch. 5]: 53 and de Ste Croix 1972: 172. For the view adopted in the text see the commentaries of Gomme (1945) and Hornblower (*CT* I), and above all Andrewes 1978a: 91–102; 302–6.

6 Cartledge 1979: 228.

7 Though see ML 22 = Fornara 38.

8 Against the idea that there was an Arkadian confederacy in the fifth century BC, see now Nielsen 1996, concluding that 'the so-called *Arkadikon* coinage should not be described as federal' (61, cp. 41).

9 Hunt 1997.
10 Lewis, *CAH* 5² (1992) 103, 108.
11 See Hornblower 1992a, and, for Thucydides and kinship, *CT* II: 61–80; also Crane 1996: Chapter 5. On religious 'propaganda' in the Delian League see, above all, Smarczyk 1990 and Parker 1996: Chapter 8.
12 See *CT* II: 406 (Poludamidas) and III: 991ff. (Astyochos). For Spartan violence see Hornblower 2000b and cf. below, pp. 125–6.
13 Allies: Gomme (1945). Sparta: P. S. Derow, unpublished paper. Cf. Rawlings 1977, rightly protesting against translations of *proschema* as, e.g. 'announced intention' (Meiggs 1972: 47 ('declared programme'); Gomme 1945: 272).
14 Chambers 1958.
15 For Cyprus see F. G. Maier, *CAH* 6² (1994) 308 and n. 27.
16 But see Kallet-Marx 1993: 180f., who does nor think 'Aristidean' levels were low.
17 For the date of *IG* I³ 291, see *CT* III: 458–61. On the 'harshness of Kleon' fallacy, see Finley 1981. The datings accepted in, e.g. ML, had long been challenged, and later dates suggested, by H. B. Mattingly 1999, a collection of previously published papers. The 418 date for ML 37 (Egestaians) was urged by Chambers, Gallucci and Spanos 1990 on the basis of a new technique, laser enhancement. Then Matthaiou 2004 claimed, remarkably, to have read *An]tiphon* on the stone with the naked eye. Rhodes 2008 accepts the new date for ML 37 and usefully examines, case by case, the consequences for other imperial decrees, not all of which he wishes to down-date (see esp. his chart at 501f.). Ma, Papazarkadas and Parker 2009, an edited collection of papers by various scholars, is the first attempt at a new synthesis; note esp. the contributions by Kallet and Papazarkadas. Kallet 54 shrewdly notes that Mattingly's datings 'risk becoming the new orthodoxy'.
18 See Raaflaub 2009 for an argument that the Athenians borrowed their imperial methods from the Achaemenid Persians. For a realistic view of what Athenian 'support of democracy' meant in practice, Lewis 1997: 51–9; and see Brock 2009 (sceptical examination of particular cases of alleged Athenian promotion of democracies).
19 For Samos in particular see Hornblower 1991: n. on Th. 1. 117. 3.
20 Garnsey 1988: 122f. For the decree about the Chalkidians see Rhodes 2008: 504f. and chart at 502, retaining the traditional date of 446; Papazarkadas in Ma, Papazarkadas and Parker 2009: 73f. makes a case for putting even this decree in the 420s.
21 Osborne 2000b: 101 no. 186.
22 *CT* II: 97, with acknowledgement to L. Kallet-Marx.
23 See *OCD*³, entry under 'cleruchy'.
24 See Finley 1981: 52–3.
25 On the *temene* or delineated parcels of land within allied territory, marked out by stones saying, e.g. 'the boundary of Athena', see Parker 1996: 145. They are certainly evidence for Athenian territorial appropriation, but their religious significance is less obvious: a *temenos* need not be a *sacred* enclosure.

## *3 Empire*

1 ML 26 = Fornara 51; Wade-Gery 1933; but see Peek 1940.
2 Paus. 1. 15 with the suggestions of Francis and Vickers 1985.
3 See Bommelaer 1991: 225f. for the 'Marathon base' and the problem of its relation to the (possibly rather earlier) Treasury; 110f. for the monument of the eponymous heroes and its date: the career of the sculptor (Phidias) and the marked aversion at this period to excessive honours lead one to seek a date after the death of the general (Miltiades), probably towards 465, when his son Kimon was politically active ('*était aux affaires*'). See also Kearns 1989: 81 n. 8 (citing a theory of A. H. Griffiths) and Parker 1996: 120 n. 64.

4 Boardman 1977. For Connelly 1996, the horsemen are heroic cavalry of the mythical Erechtheus' day. There is no reason why there should be just *one* correct interpretation of a work of art like the Parthenon frieze.
5 See Hornblower 1992a. For Kimon and Skyros see Blamire 1989: 116–22.
6 For Delphi in all its aspects, see now the splendid entry *IACP* no. 177 (J. Oulhen); also Scott 2010 (important remarks in ch. 9 about the limits of 'panhellenic' as a descriptor of the complex and competitive activities conducted at Delphi and Olympia). For Kimon's dedication, see the inscription at *Revue Belge* 34 (1956) 542.
7 For another story connecting Delphi and Themistokles at about this time see Paus. 10. 14. 5: rude rejection of Persian spoils offered by Themistokles; see Parker 1985: 325 [Buxton 2000: 107]. If true, the story is further evidence that Themistokles was keen on Delphi even if it was not keen on him. For the story of Themistokles and the amphiktiony, see Hornblower 2010: ch. 2.
8 For Xanthippus see ML 21 = Fornara 41 D no. 5; for the Kimon and Themistokles ostraka mentioned in the text Brenne 1993:14, Parker 1983:270. On ostracism as a kind of 'scapegoating' Parker, 1983:269f. is cautious.
9 The inscription shows he was *choregos*. For this institution see Wilson 2000 (and in *OCD*$^3$ under 'choregia'). For the *Persians*, see Garvie 2009.
10 Similar language is used (see lines 693–4) about the Areopagus in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, the third play in the *Oresteia* trilogy, produced in 458/7 (Sommerstein 2008 is now the best text of and brief commentary on the whole trilogy). See Sommerstein 1996: 392–402, esp. 401, noting that this warning to the Areopagus against usurpation of powers (like the insistence at 704 on incorruptibility, which suggests its own opposite) subverts the generally favourable presentation of the Areopagus, and implies that Aeschylus supported the domestic reforms while wishing to conciliate their opponents. Sommerstein generally provides by far the best discussion of the play in its political context; he concludes that Aeschylus avoids partisanship by some deliberate ambiguity, above all at 690–2 where it is unclear who (the citizens or the members of the Areopagus) are to be restrained from wrongdoing (and see now Sommerstein 2008: xx–xxi. and 443 n. 148. There has been dispute over whether the play is 'political' or not, and if so what line Aeschylus wanted the audience to take (which as Sommerstein rightly says is not necessarily the same thing as Aeschylus' own views). Against the view that the play was political see Macleod 1983: Chapter 3, and note Gould and Lewis 1988: 90: the *choregos* (see n. 9 above) of the trilogy is Xenokles of Aphidna, a political non-entity; this might be thought to reduce the chances that the play had an urgent message (though Gould and Lewis believe it did have political implications). On the other hand it is hard to believe that a play which made such a meal of the Areopagus and which stressed alliance with Argos (line 290, 669–73, 762–4) owed nothing to contemporary circumstances. (Sommerstein is surely right that on foreign as opposed to domestic issues Aeschylus was more obviously and openly in favour of recent happenings.)
11 The older view was that the Areopagus had also exercised *retrospective* control of magistrates through the *euthyna* or 'straightening', an examination of their actions (esp. financial) in their year of office. But this has been challenged by Rihll 1995, who argues that rejection at the *dokimasia* was more common than has previously been supposed. For *dokimasia* and *euthyna* generally see the entries in *OCD*$^3$, and for *euthyna* in particular Davies 1994a.
12 See Holladay 1977: 55; n. 6 to p. 54.
13 S. Hornblower in Dunn 1992: 12.
14 See Rihll 1995: 91.
15 Parker 1996:133, giving the ancient evidence (complicated) and modern views (diverse).
16 As is wrongly claimed by de Ste Croix 1972: 213; see Holladay 1977.
17 See Boedeker and Sider 2001.
18 See Lewis 1997: 9–21, and in *CAH* v$^2$ (1992) Chapter 5; but note P. Perlman 2000: 140f.

19 Morgan 1990 for the archaic period; and for the fifth century Hornblower 1992a, now reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 1. I draw heavily on the conclusions of this article in the paragraph of text below.
20 See my long n. on the passage in *CT* II: 380–5.
21 Daux 1957: 106–8. See also Zeilhofer 1959: 36ff.; Hornblower 1992a. Lefevre 1998: 54 cautiously follows Daux on this point, but has little to say about the implications of this for Spartan policy (nothing, for instance, on the motives for the foundation of Herakleia; see below pp. 29, 158). See also Sanchez 2001: 111–15.
22 See Hornblower *CT* II: 79f. See also Sanchez, as in n. 21.
23 For the First Sacred War see Davies 1994b.
24 Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ 112.
25 Stroud 1994.
26 For the date see M. Stolper, *CAH* $6^2$ 237 and n. 7.
27 Driver 1957.
28 Hopper 1979: 72f.; cp. Meiggs 1972: 95.
29 Parker, *ARH* 1996: 174 and n. 76, discussing the 'kinship' tie; Archibald, *CAH* $6^2$ (1994: 451).
30 Archibald *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 444f.
31 J. Hind, *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 490. For the Spartokids in the fourth cent. see Tod 115 = Harding 27, not in R/O; R/O nos. 64 (=Harding 82) and 65, not in Harding.
32 See above p. 14 and ch. 2 n. 17.
33 Garnsey 1985: 75 n. 35 and 1988: 128–33. On Garnsey's use of Th. 2. 93–4 see *CT* I: 370.
34 Garnsey 1988: 133.
35 Finley 1981: 119.
36 Pritchett 1971–91: 5. 466.
37 Meiggs 1972: 124 (cp. app. 6 generally); note also his p. 131 and 139 for *Sicilian* timber.
38 Mitchell 1966: 112, prepared to be more adventurous than Chamoux 1953: 203–5.
39 For Sparta's *perioikoi* see Shipley 1991, and P. Cartledge, 'perioikoi' in *OCD*$^3$.
40 Roisman 1993a: 69–85.
41 Griffith 1979: 454. See p. 282.
42 I reject the interpretation of de Ste Croix 1972: app.x. For a better view see Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ (1992) 116. Note in particular his interesting use of Th. 3. 62.5 and 4 .92.6 (both passages in speeches) as evidence that Athenian success was due to Boiotian *stasis*, which Lewis suggests was intercity *stasis*.
43 *IG* I$^3$ 260. 9. 9 with Lewis 1997: 20 n. 43 and *CAH* $5^2$ 116 and n. 72 (cp. Rhodes at p. 50).
44 If this work is usable evidence on a historical point of this sort; see Hornblower 2000c.
45 See Parker 1985: 325 [= Buxton 2000: 107].
46 See Badian 1993: Chapter 1 (the two-peace theory); Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ 121–7 (specially valuable for the inscriptional aspect); both give earlier modern literature; add Cawkwell 1997b [=2011: ch. 8 ]and 2005: 281–7.
47 See *OCD*$^3$ under 'cleruchy' (giving recent bibliography): there was a cleruchy sent to Euboian Chalkis in 506, and see ML 14 = Fornara 44B for the settlement on Salamis.
48 Meiggs 1972: 121–5.
49 McGregor 1967; Davies 1977; Patterson 1981.
50 Meiggs 1972: 125.
51 As Robin Osborne observes to me.
52 Brunt 1993: 125, 132ff. But for the date see Meiggs 1972: 123.
53 Some have thought that he was condemned to death for failure to pay the fine, but see *CT* II: 467, commentary on 5. 16. 3.
54 They are reconstructed by de Ste Croix 1972: app. 1. But see next n. for one important error by de Ste Croix. Note the special position of Argos: despite the Thirty Years' Peace

between Argos and Sparta (see above p. 35), the Argives seem, by a separate provision, to have been allowed to have friendly relations with Athens if they wished: Paus. 5. 23. 4.

55 See *CT* I: 227f. on the passage , arguing against de Ste Croix (previous n.). Note, however, that Badian 1993: 137 argues that it was understood (and perhaps even specifically laid down) that there was to be no 'poaching' of allies, hence the two lists mentioned in my text; if so, then to this extent 'the two great powers guaranteed each other's hegemony', as Badian puts it. But (subject always to the possibility that there were more explicit clauses which have not come down to us) the guarantees were implicit not explicit.

56 Jones 1952/3; de Ste Croix 1972: 110f.

57 Adcock and Mosley 1971: 40.

58 See Badian 1993: 137–42 and below p. 112f.

59 See *CT* II: 499 and III: 232f. At 5. 89 (first sentence), Thucydides comes closest to a hint that the Melians may indeed have inflicted injuries on the Athenians, who, however, propose to disregard these for the purposes of the argument.

60 See *CT* III: 863, commenting on the Book 8 passage, and citing Brun 1996: 146. For Melos in all its aspects, see *IACP* no. 505.

61 Horden and Purcell 2000, and the responses to their important book (including a chapter by the authors themselves!) collected as Harris 2005. Absence of good harbours explains why the not-small two-polis island Ikaros, mod. Ikaria, hardly features in ancient Greek history – there are only two mentions in all Thucydides – by contrast with its neighbour to the east, high-profile Samos (see Constantakopoulou 2007: 179f. for Samian control of Ikaros). For Ikaros, see *IACP* p. 740 and nos. 480 and 481, adding Arr. *Anab*. 7. 20. 5 (for the naming from Ikaros son of Daidalos, who fell into the sea when the wax in his wings melted), and *IG* 12. 6. 2 (2003), cf. Matthaiou and Papadopoulos 2003 (the inscriptions). Alexander the Great then gave the name to another island Ikaros = mod. Failaka in the Persian Gulf: inter-island 'connectivity' of a different, mental, sort.

The islands feature magnificently (see above, preface to ed. 4, p. xvii) in *IACP*: see pp. 732–93 for the Aegean (G. Reger); pp. 620–3 no. 358 for Aigina (T. Figueira) with *IG* 4. $2^2$ (2007) for the inscriptions; pp. 643–63 for Euboia (K. Reber, M. H. Hansen and P. Ducrey); pp. 1018–32 for Lesbos (M. H. Hansen, N. Spencer and H. Williams); pp. 1053–1107 for Ionia, which includes nos. 840, Chios, 864 (Samos), and 865 (Samos, the cleruchy of 365–322), and, for the inscriptions of Samos and Chios, *IG* 12. 6. 1 (2000); pp. 1144–95 for Crete (P. Perlman); pp. 1196–1210 for Rhodes (T. H. Nielsen and V. Gabrielsen); pp. 1222–32 for Cyprus (F.G. Maier). For some others, see the nn. below.

62 Island pride: Constantakopoulou 2005, and see below, ch. 4, p. 61, for the implications of the use, from the fifth. cent., of the name 'Sikeliotai' for the Greek inhabitants of Sicily. Island networks: Constantakopoulou 2007: 243ff.; cf. Ma 2009: 134 for Rhodian involvement in the affairs of fifth-century Karpathos (the largest of the cluster of islands between Rhodes and Krete, *IACP* no. 489) during the period of the Athenian empire. For Kalaureia, see *IACP* no. 360 (p. 623 for the amphiktiony, citing the Hellenistic inscription *IG* IV 842) and Constantakopoulou 2007: 29–37; and for Paros no. 509. For the Paros temple see Rubensohn 1962 and Berranger 1992 with Constantakopoulou 2007: 47 and Richardson 2010: 90 on *Homeric hymn to Apollo* line 44. For the interpretation of the Pindar fragment, I am indebted to classes held in London by G.-B. d'Alessio in 2009 (Pindar's words *en gualois*, 'in the valleys' are difficult, given the temple's location).

63 Kimolos: *IACP* no. 496. For Euboia and Athens see Moreno 2007: ch. 3; for the importance of Euboians in the archaic period, Lane Fox 2008, an importance which fifth-century Greeks remembered, to the extent that sometimes Chalkidic origins were claimed exaggeratedly or falsely for reasons of prestige: Hornblower 1997: 183ff. For Lemnos, see *IACP* pp. 756f.; Imbros and Skyros are *IACP* nos. 483 and 521.

64 Sfyroeras 1993.

65 The quotation is mine, Hornblower 2004: 262. Tenedos: *IACP* no. 793 and Hornblower 2004: 143.

66 See above all Kowalzig 2007; also Fearn 2007. The valuable new collection of essays on the re-interpretation of the Athenian empire referred to at ch. 2 n. 17 above (Ma and others 2009) has less to say about this literary approach than might have been hoped, concentrating as it largely does on epigraphy. Much illumination can be expected from G.-B. d'Alessio's new edition of and commentary on the fragmentary poems of Pindar, in preparation. For Athens and Delos, see now Chankowsky 2008. For my Chian suggestion, see Hornblower 2004: 145–56.

67 Bohringer 1979: 10ff.; but see Currie 2005: 126f. This modern argument goes over old ground: for an earlier attempt to see Theagenes as a kind of collaborator figure who diverted Thasian politics in a pro-Athenian direction after the 460s see Pouilloux 1954: 62–105, with the criticisms of Fraser 1957: 99 (from a long and important review, not cited by Currie), who was entirely unconvinced by the attempt to see Theagenes as a politician of any sort. For Theagenes see Prioux 2007. For Thasos (*IACP* no. 526) and its epigraphic pecularities, perhaps indicative of an unusual concern with the wider (including mainland) world, and with that northern island's Cycladic island metropolis Paros, see Osborne 2009b.

68 Constantakopoulou 2007: 187–95. For *peraiai* see also Debord 1999: 264–72; Horden and Purcell 2000: 133; Carusi 2003; and Hornblower 2003: 44 and n. 15 (on Atarneus, in the *peraia* of Chios).

69 Islands with one/more than one *polis*: Reger 1997. Keos: *SEG* 39. 73 with Lewis 1997: 22–8. On Keos generally see *IACP* pp. 748–51 and (for the four cities) nos. 491–4; add now Cooper 2008b.

70 Mykonos: Reger 2001, unfortunately not providing a photograph; *IACP* no. 506. The religion of synoikized Rhodes: Parker 2009: 205–10. 'Federal' religion on Rhodes and Lesbos: Parker 1997: 15; Hornblower 2004: 134. Chios and Kato Phana: *CT* III: 816f., giving references to modern archaeological work.

71 'Kinship diplomacy': see C. Jones 1999 and M. Fragoulaki, forthcoming (on kinship in Th.) see below ch. 7 n. 9. Ionianism: see above ch. 2 n. 11. The 'cynical' view: Price and Thonemann 2010: 169, introducing some sentences about precisely the new Kydonia kinship inscription. The Athenians and 'Kydon': Papazarkadas and Thonemann 2008 (cf. already *SEG* 53. 140). Krete in the fifth century: Erickson 2005, a lengthy study. For Ergoteles, known from Pi. *O.* 12, see below ch. 4 n. 16 and ch. 14 n. 2. For the quotation in my text see Silk 2007: 190.

72 At *CT* III: 5–12, I argue that the great Athenian expedition to Sicily (and south Italy) of 415–413 was merely one episode in an Athenian/Spartan rivalry in Sicily and the west which lasted over a century, from the late sixth century to the early fourth. The suggestion would be strengthened if we were to accept the intriguing suggestion of Whitehead 2008 that there was some sort of Athenian military involvement in Sicily during the 360s.

73 For islands in Greek thought (which might be contemptuous of islanders, cf. Th. 4. 120. 3, speech of Brasidas), see my entry 'islands' in *OCD*[3]; for fantasy islands see the immediately following entry, 'islands of the blest' (E. H. W[armington], revised by E. K[earns] and S. J. K[eay]. Constantakopoulou 2007: 320ff. provides an index nicely entitled 'Index of Islands (real and imaginary)'. Even fantasy islands could be made to do useful political work. Thus the people of fifth-century Kerkyra (*IACP* no. 123) claimed that the Homeric Phaiakians had inhabited the island before them (Th. 1. 25. 4, cf. 3. 70. 4 for a precinct of the Phaiakian king Alkinoos, father of Nausikaa, on Kerkyra). What was all this but a way of upstaging their hated real-life oikists the Corinthians?

74 Lykophron, *Alexandra* line 599; Theophrastus, *HP* 4. 5. 6 with Fraser 1994: 184 and 190; Strabo 2. 5. 20. The new finds: *SEG* 48 nos. 692bis – 694; *IACP* p. 323 (J. Wilkes and T. Fischer-Hansen, seeing them as evidence for a Greek trans-Adriatic trade route); Colonna 1998 (esp. 368 for a good colour photo of a Diomedes sherd) and Kirigin and Cace 1998. For a good brief illustrated account of the new finds and their importance, see Parker 1999.

## *4 South Italy and Sicily*

1 See above all *IACP* pp. 249–320 ('Italia and Kampania') and 172–248 ('Sikelia'), both sections by T. Fischer-Hansen, T. H. Nielsen and C. Ampolo. On south Italy and Sicily together, the old book of Dunbabin 1948 is still useful in many respects; for Sicily in particular see Finley 1979, Holloway 1991 on the archaeology of Greek and Roman Sicily, but note the reservations of R. Wilson 1994. On the culture and society (notably woman-friendly) of South Italy, and especially Lokri, see Redfield 2003, a fine study. The occasional reports on Sicily and South Italy in *AR* are indispensable: *AR* 1995–6, covering 1988–95 (Sicily, R. Wilson); 2000–1, covering 1996–2000 (Sicily, F. de Angelis); 2001–2, covering 1995–2001 (Sardinia and South Italy, D. Ridgway); 2006–7, covering 2001–5 (Sicily, F. de Angelis). On Sicilian language and culture see Willi 2008 (in German), an outstanding monograph. Coarelli and Torelli 2001 is an excellent archaeological and historical guide to Greek and non-Greek Sicily. For both Sicily and south Italy the relevant chapters in *CAH* (new edition) vols 4 and 6 all give authoritative treatments; but I would invidiously single out N. Purcell's brilliant chapter on south Italy in the late fifth and the fourth centuries in vol. 6 ch. 9b. On south Italy see also Lomas 2000, arguing interestingly that in the west, attitudes to citizenship were different and more fluid than in old Greece. For a similar conclusion based on different material see Hornblower 2004: 140f.

2 As in the title of G. Pugliese Carratelli 1996, a well-illustrated multi-author volume published in connection with an exhibition at Venice; the term 'Western Greeks' is here interpreted very broadly so as to include, for instance, Cyrenaica. Note Carratelli's own outline political history of the Greeks in the west, at pp. 141–76.

3 There is some reason to think that in the sixth century there were differences in the culture of the two regions, evidenced by for instance architectural styles.

4 See *CT* I on Th. 1. 12. 4 and above all *IACP* 250ff.

5 Browning 1968: 130.

6 See Hornblower in Hornblower 1994: 146–7 n. 43. Note 'direct'. The view in the text presupposes that Thucydides had the Sicilian expedition in mind all along. This cannot be proved, but note (a) the specific forward allusions to the Sicilian expedition at 2. 65. 11 and 4. 81. 2, and (b) the *indirect* allusions to be found in, for example, the Pylos narrative of Book 4, see *CT* II on 4 12. 3; and note the possible 'pre-echoes' of Sicily at 5. 16. 1. Such indirectly displayed awareness of future events shows that Sicily was much on Thucydides' mind and suggests that the restraint of his earlier direct handling, especially, in Book 1, was deliberate.

7 See Avery 1973; Kallet 2001: 25f.

8 See Fraser and Matthews 1997 under the name Artos.

9 Wuilleumier 1939: 53–9; *IACP* no. 71. See also Malkin 1994: 120, citing Kallimachos F613 for Taras 'thrusting away the spear of the Iapygians'.

10 See Zuntz 1971: 287, and my n. on Th. 5. 11. 1 in *CT* II: 451. On post-classical Spartan/Tarentine relations note also Spawforth and Walker 1986: 91. For Herakleia in Italy see Malkin 1994: 62 and nn. 56, 121. For the text of Th. 6. 104. 2, see *CT* III: 534. For those praise ('epinikian') poems of Pindar and Bacchylides which were written for west Greek patrons (private citizens as well as autocrats), see Hornblower 2004: 78–86 and 182–201; Currie 2005: chs. 12 and 14 (on *Pythians* 2 and 3); Antonaccio 2007; Morrison 2007; Kowalzig 2007: 267–327 (on B. 11); Cairns 2010 (on B. 3 and 11).

11 Tarn 1913: 122. For 'theatricality', see Chaniotis 1997 and 2005: 212f., and for Sicily in particular as a culture of theatricality, see *CT* III: 12–21.

12 Gernet 1981.

13 On Simonides see P. J. Parsons in *OCD*[3], Boedeker and Sider 2001 (collection of essays on a new poem about the Persian wars, but touching on other aspects of his poetry) and Hutchinson 2001: 285–91. There is a good semi-fictional account of his life in Renault 1978.

14 That seems to be the implication of the story at Plut. *Mor.* 400d–e. The Corinthians after the fall of the tyranny successfully petition for permission to inscribe the city's name on what what was nevertheless known as the Treasury of Kypselos; see Andrewes 1956: 48.
15 Head 1911: 377.
16 For this interpretation see Barrett 1973 [= 2007: 78ff.], and for a fine study of *Olympian* 12, see Silk 2007.
17 Lloyd-Jones 1982: 142 [= 1990: 59].
18 Gibbon 1896: 4.203.
19 On the historians of Greek Sicily see the useful survey by Walbank 1968/9.
20 Dover, 1970: 199–202; *CT* III: 272ff.
21 For Philistos in Diodorus see Lewis, *CAH* $6^2$ 123.
22 Finley 1979: 34.
23 The modern extreme: Whittaker 1978, following the line taken by Finley 1979, which is a reaction to the 'Pindaric' view of Carthage as a would-be enslaver, to be found in, for example, Dunbabin 1948.
24 Plato, *Gorgias* 456b with Lloyd 1979: 254, cp. generally 81–5.
25 Murray 1997, but see now Robinson 2002. For Kamarina generally, see below n. 28.
26 Jameson and others (below n. 38) 58, 123.
27 On this curious item, which Busolt thought came from Philistos, see Lewis 1977: 28 n. 11.
28 For Kamarina, see *IACP* pp. 202–5 no. 28 and Hornblower 2004: 190ff.
29 Whose authenticity I accept, though it has been disputed. Barrett 2007: 38–53 thinks that *O.* 5 is not by Pindar, but dates (like *O.* 4) from 456.
30 For euergetism see A. J. S. Spawforth in *OCD*³, and the bibliography there given. For the Motya statue, see Smith 2007: 130–5.
31 For Egesta see the bibliography provided by R. J. A. Wilson in *OCD*³. Egesta fails to qualify for inclusion in *IACP*, though it is expressly called a *polis* by Thucydides (6. 2. 3), and has, notwithstanding its mixed culture, many of the diagnostic criteria of a *polis,* as laid down by the *Inventory* itself.
32 Mertens 1984; special need to impress neighbours: Osborne 1996: 265.
33 Jenkins 1976: 46–7, nos. 55 and 56; cf. *AR* 1981–2: 105.
34 See S. J. Harrison, *OCD*³ under 'Acestes'.
35 For Selinus see R. J. A. Wilson in *OCD*³ also *IACP* no. 44; architecture: Osborne 1996a: 266.
36 *AR* 1981–2, p. 102.
37 Hornblower 1982: 310 n. 126; cf. below p. 213.
38 Jameson, Jordan and Kotansky 1993, with Parker 1996 preface to reprint of Parker 1983; North 1996; Curti and van Bremen 1999 (esp. on the Olympic aspect); Burkert 2000; and Lupu 2005: 358–87, Document no. 27. For the Orestes pot in the Louvre, see Taplin 2007: 62ff. (no. 8). For the Kyrene law see esp. Parker 1983: 332–51 (App. 2). Robertson 2009 discusses at length the Selinous law (at 4–255) and the Kyrene law (at 259–374) but strangely attempts no detailed comparison. For 'sacred laws' generally, see Parker 2004.
39 Jameson, Jordan and Kotansky 1993: Chapter IX , 'Punic religion and the cult of Zeus Meilichios'.
40 M. H. Jameson, *OCD*³ under 'Sicily and Magna Graecia, Cults and Mythology'; see also Zuntz 1971: 70–5. For South Italy see below.
41 B. M. Caven, *OCD*³ 'Ducetius'; Finley 1979: 63f.; cp.14; D. Asheri, *CAH* $v^2$ (1992) 161–5; Jackman 2006. See also *OCD*³ under 'Aetna (2)', and *IACP* no. 8.
42 Lokri: Redfield 2003; *IACP* no. 59. Thurii and Athenian imperialism: Andrewes 1978b against Wade-Gery 1958: 239–70; see further *IACP* no. 74 at p. 305.
43 Cf. Cawkwell 1992 [=2011: ch. 1]: 301.
44 Garnsey 1988: 129f, see also 125f. for an important re-examination of the evidence of an Egyptian gift of grain to Athens, reported by Philochoros (see *FGrHist* 328 F121, from an Aristophanic scholion, and the fuller version of the scholia given by Müller,

*Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* vol. 1, pp. 398f. no. 90). Though one of the scholia talks categorically of corn shortage, Garnsey inclines to discount its reliability. One is still left wondering why the gift was made precisely when it was (446/5 BC), and even Garnsey, who perhaps moves on a shade too rapidly from the concrete and unproblematic evidence of *IG* $1^3$30 to the admittedly problematic evidence of the scholia, concedes that there 'could have been a food crisis'. See also Moreno 2007: 300.

45 Meiggs 1983: 124.

46 Demand 1982: Chapter 5; Vidal-Naquet 1986: Chapter 3.

47 See F. Graf, entries on 'Orphic Literature' and 'Orphism' in *OCD*[3]; Parker 1995.

48 See Hornblower 2004: 89ff, with the modern refs. at n. 12, esp. Lloyd-Jones 1990: 80–109 and Redfield 2003.

49 The evidence is most conveniently given by Rawson 1985: 30f. For the name 'Oulios' see Masson 1988, and see Hornblower 1994: 10.

50 A. Andrewes in Lloyd-Jones 1962: 6f. For the prevalence of *stasis*, civil strife, in the *poleis* of Sicily, see the remarkable statistics in the chart at *IACP* pp. 1361f. (cf. below, ch. 14 n. 1); but allowance must be made for the unbalancingly full and detailed coverage of Sicilian affairs by Thucydides in Books 6 and 7, and by Diodorus, himself a Sicilian.

51 For 'theatricality', see above, n. 11. For the features of Epicharmos and Sophron mentioned in the text, see Hordern 2004, *CT* III (2008): 17, and Willi 2008. 'Sikeliotai': Th. 3. 90. 1 and frequently thereafter. Identity expressed at Delphi and Olympia: Antonaccio 2007: 273.

## *5 Kyrene and Egypt*

1 On Kyrene and the cities of Cyrenaica, see now *IACP* pp. 1235ff. and 1240–9 ('Libya'), nos. 1025–9 (M. Austin); Kyrene itself is no. 1028. See also Chamoux 1953 and 1989, Applebaum 1979, Laronde 1987, and Mitchell 2000. For Kyrene in the light of the evidence of Pindar's three relevant epinikian odes (*Pythians* 4, 5 and 9) see Hornblower 2004: 111ff. and 243–7; Currie 2005: ch. 11; Hornblower and Morgan 2007: 13–17; note also I. Rutherford 2001: 351–5 for a paian (fr. 58 Snell/Maehler, F2 in Rutherford's own numbering) which was perhaps written for a patron from Kyrene. In *OCD*[4] note that the two relevant entries (both by J. M. R[eynolds]) are under different letters of the alphabet, 'Cyrene' and 'Pentapolis' (effectively Cyrenaica, actually the 'five cities' made up of Kyrene itself, and, from east to west, Apollonia, Ptolemais/Barca, Taucheira/Tocra, and Euesperides/Berenice/Benghazi). Both entries are long and have good bibliographies up to and including 2008.

On Egypt see *IACP* pp. 1234f. and, for the two *poleis* of Egypt, pp. 1238ff. nos. 1023 (Naukratis) and 1024 (Oasis); Cook 1983: index under 'Egypt'; and two chapters in the new *CAH*: J. D. Ray in $4^2$ Chapter 3g (525–404 BC) and A. B. Lloyd in $6^2$ Chapter 8e (404–332 BC).

In the present chapter, I use the Greek spelling 'Kyrene' for the city, but Cyrenaica for the region, because it is an English geographical expression in current modern use, whereas Kyrene is not.

2 See the scholia (Drachmann 1903–1927: 2. 220) for the dates.

3 Hellenism under pressure: see Allan 2001 for Sicily and the west, and for Kyrene Mitchell 2000: 94. For 'the man Battos' see Parker 1983: 336ff., and for 'hero-cult' paid to dead human beings such as oikists and city-founders ('new heroes') see now Jones 2010; see further below, ch. 14 n. 84. For a suggestion that Pindar does indeed indicate or insinuate actual heroization for some of his patrons, see Currie 2005 (esp. ch. 11 for a parallel between the founder Battos and king Arkesilas, for whom *P*. 5 was written); but Pindar is explicit (e.g. *Isthmian* 5. 14–16) that men should not 'vainly seek to become Zeus', and that 'mortal things are appropriate to mortals'.

4 Laronde 1987: 199f. and Paul 1984: 78 and 200 (comm. on Sallust *BJ* 19 and 79); cp. (for the 'altars') Pol. 3. 39. 2 with Walbank 1957–79: 1. 372; for the identification of the 'altars' see Goodchild 1976: 155–72.
5 Schau 1985; Chamoux 1989: 67.
6 Fraser 1951: 138. For *proxeny* see the Glossary above, p. xxi.
7 Vickers, Gill and Economou 1994: 125, suggesting that when Diodorus says 'Kyrene' he means 'Cyrenaica'; Laronde 1987: 27 for a different view.
8 Laronde 1987: 149–62.
9 Applebaum 1979: 18 is right to take *perioikoi* at 161 in the sense of indigenous people, in view of 159.4 where it certainly means that. De Ste Croix 1981: 534 follows Chamoux and denies this.
10 See Pfeiffer 1949: 1. 412 and Chamoux 1989: 65.
11 Hornblower 2000a: 133–4. For the genealogy, see Hornblower and Morgan 2007: 13f.
12 Cameron 1995: 408.
13 Applebaum 1979: 32.
14 Diod. 3. 49–51 and Reynolds 1978: 124.
15 Sherwin-White 1973: 390 and n.l; de Ste Croix 1981: 534 with 660 n. 9.
16 For representations of silphium see Fabbricotti 1993.
17 See J. Scarborough, $OCD^3$, entry under 'pharmacology'.
18 See Simon and Hirmer 1976: plate 15; Chamoux 1953: plate vi. For the view that it depicts silphium see Chamoux 1953: 258–63 and 1989: 67.
19 Laronde 146. Note, however, Walbank 1956–1979: 3. 488, n. on Pol. 31. 18. 13, for some puzzling second-century evidence which tells *against* the idea that 'Cyrenaica (and Libya generally) was a great horse-raising country': a full levy from Kyrene produces only 500 horses. But this is against the trend of much evidence from earlier periods.
20 See Hunt 1947, discussing Michel no. 666 and some literary passages. On the Polybius passage see Walbank 1957–79: 3. 488.
21 For the date of the fall see Mitchell 1966: 110ff., arguing against Chamoux's low (439) date.
22 Mitchell 112. End of Persian control: Th. 1. 110, help given without reprisals to Athenian refugees from Egypt; end of monarchy: Drachmann 1903–1927: 2. 93; Aristotle F611.17 = Hill, *Sources*$^2$ p. 42.
23 Laronde 1967: 250, 252.
24 Bommelaer 1991: 157.
25 Coster 1951: 16; Applebaum 1979: 97–109; and Garnsey 1988: 159–62.
26 Reynolds 1978: 113 line 19 with p. 117.
27 British Museum, *Catalogue of the Coins of Cyrenaica*, p. clxviii.
28 J. Boardman and others, 1973: 91 (the finer pottery Attic, some southern Italian).
29 Buzaian and Lloyd 1996: 151. Note the short inscriptions (abbreviated Greek names and words) at 138 and 142.
30 Hammond 1967a: 435.
31 For a blunt statement see Parker 1996: 196: 'the common supposition that the last quarter of the fifth century saw a sudden outburst of interest in barbarian gods is simply false. What changes in the last quarter of the century is the character of our evidence'; see further below p. p. 215. Parker rightly notes (197) that Ammon was a special case in that he was not brought to Athens for the use of the citizens but had to be consulted in his 'distant home'.
32 Porten and Yardeni 1986–93: C.3.7; Briant and Descat 1998; Kuhrt 2007: 681-703.
33 For all this paragraph see Hornblower 1982: App. 1. For the Ammon oracle see Parke 1967: Chapter ix and p. 178; I. Rutherford 2001: 352–5.
34 Cowley 1924; Kuhrt 2007: 854–9.
35 Cowley 1924: no. 21; Kuhrt 2007: 854f.
36 See Hornblower 2001a: 139.
37 Driver 1957; examples in Kuhrt 2007: 343ff., 720–3, 739ff., 816, 819f., 823f.

## *6 The Persian Empire Especially Asia Minor*

1 On the Persian Empire see Cook 1983, a good book. See esp. his Chapter 16 on satraps, hyparchs and fief-holders, with much of relevance to the Persian presence in Asia Minor; note his map on p. 179, marking known fiefs. Olmstead 1948 is more fully documented than Cook on the political side. See also Lewis 1977.

Since the first edn of the present book appeared in 1983 there has been much important new work on the Achaemenid empire, largely as a result of the activity of the Achaemenid workshops, whose proceedings have been published in the series *Ach. Hist.* (eleven vols. to date). Note esp. vol. 10 of the series, Briant 1996 (English tr. Briant 2002), a massive synthetic treatment, which takes full account of the new approaches – as does the final, Achaemenid section of Kuhrt 1995. Kuhrt 2007 is a massive two-volume translated sourcebook (one-vol. paperback ed. 2010); I refer to it by page numbers rather than by the complicated internal numbering system. Cawkwell 2005 examines the Greek wars against Persia, from the Ionian Revolt to the time of Alexander the Great, with proper attention to Persian perspectives. See also the relevant chapters of the new ed. of the *CAH*, vol. $4^2$ (1988) Chapters 1–2 (C. Young), 3a (A. Kuhrt: Babylonia), 3b (I. Eph'al: Syria-Palestine), 3c (H.-P. Francfort: Central Asia and Eastern Iran), 3d (The Indus lands: A. D. H. Bivar), 3e (M. Mellink: Anatolia), 3f (A. Fol and N. G. L. Hammond: Persia in Europe, apart from Greece), 3g (J. D. Ray: Egypt 525–404 BC; also vol. $6^2$ (1994) Chapters 3 (S. Hornblower: Persia); 8a (S. Hornblower: Asia Minor), 8b (M. Stolper: Mesopotamia), 8c (H. Tadmor: Judah), 8d (F. G. Maier: Cyprus and Phoenicia), 8e (A. B. Lloyd: Egypt, 404–332 BC). See also *Cambridge History of Iran* vol. 2, 'The Median and Achaemenian Periods' (1985) and Allen 2005.

2 For Asia Minor see separate n. 19 below.

3 Cowley 1924: no. 6, cp. Meyer 1922: 28.

4 Vidal-Naquet 1986: Chapter 13.

5 Lewis 1977: 148–52.

6 Momigliano 1975: 134f. thought that serious Greek interest in Persia ceased after the fifth century, but see Stevenson 1997.

7 With Pomeroy 1994 (commentary). For garrisons see Tuplin 1987.

8 'M'-numbered inscriptions refer to the epigraphic dossier at Hornblower 1982: 364–69.

9 Frye 1972: 87.

10 See now Osborne 1999, an important study, disagreeing with Cook 1961a and agreeing with the brief remarks of Boardman 1964. On the tribute aspect see Kallet-Marx 1993: l4lf.

11 Austin 1990: 291.

12 See Hornblower 1982: 365–6, nos. M5 and 7 for Artemisia and Ada in fourth-century Karia, and Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1.12 for a woman called Mania, of whom the verb *satrapeuein* is used. See further below, nn. 25 and 26.

13 Hornblower 1982: 367 no. M10.

14 Hornblower 1982: 366 no. M7 = *I Labraunda* no. 40.

15 Stolper 1985.

16 Hornblower 1982: 365, 366 and 368, nos. M5, 8 and 123, with formulae anticipating hellenistic grants.

17 On the trilingual Xanthos inscription, see Briant 1998a.

18 For Kilikia under the Achaemenids, see Casabonne 2004, and for the parallel with the Hekatomnids, see Hornblower 2011 (also discussing other influences and parallels, such as the Cyprus of Evagoras, for whom see below p. 319, and the hellenizing influence of the Rhodians, so close to Karia). For the Iasos inscription, see Maddoli 2007. For the view that the Hekatomnids were not proper satraps, see Childs 1981: 75 n. 122 and Petit 1988. See, however, Hornblower 1992b reviewing Petit 1990, an excellent book: if we *define* a satrap in such a way as to exclude, for example, non-Iranians and women, then

clearly people like Artemisia will not qualify. But these 'definitions' are entirely modern, and Debord 1999: 137ff. is right to reject them.

Note also that the scholiast on Demosthenes 5. 25 (Dindorf Demosthenes vol.8 p. 166) calls Mausolus satrap of Karia; this may well go back to Theopompos, who was certainly the source of other Hekatomnid material in the Demosthenic scholia, cp. *FGrHist* 115 F 299.

19 The basic book is now Debord 1999, a superb work of synthesis, particularly strong on the numismatic side. (An English tr. and revision is in preparation.) Debord's model is Judeich 1892, which retains some of its value. See also Robert 1980, Ruzicka 1992, Hornblower 1994: Chapter 8a and S. Mitchell, *AR* 1998–9: 125–91 (still, in 2010, the most recent *AR* survey); and Delemen 2007.

20 Amyzon: J. and L. Robert 1983: 97 (Kuhrt 2007: 867) and (for Tleopolemos) 168, cp. 154 no. 15B. See also generally L. Robert 1987: 351, 458.

21 On this text I follow Debord 1999: 367–74, who summarizes the recent controversy. The earlier and more exciting view (L. Robert 1975) was that the dedication was to Zeus Baradates (the legislator), i.e. Ahura Mazda, so that this would be evidence of religious syncretism; but Briant 1998b, whom Debord follows on this crucial point, argued that Baradates was a personal name not a cult title; thus 'exit Ahura Mazda' as he puts it (213).

22 R/O p. 62 point out that *arete* is not the same as telling the truth, and insist that the verses are 'Greek in background'; but they admit that *toxosyne*, 'archery', is a surprise when in a Greek context we might have expected *dikaiosyne,* 'justice'. We can surely allow the possibility of some cultural mixing. The Ephesus inscription: *JRS* 1975, p. 65 line 10 with p. 73: a Roman inscription of the first century ad; cf. *SEG* 32. 1210.

23 Robert 1987: 372. Cp. the early hellenistic attestation of a 'Median Artemis': S. Sherwin-White 1982. For the relation between Greek Artemis in Lydia and Persian Anahita see Brosius 1998, concluding that 'instead of speaking of a hellenization of the cult of Anahita, I suggest that we identify a persianization of the cult of Artemis'.

24 Cook 1983: plate 30 and pp. 165, 258 n. 32; Boardman 1994: 40 and Fig. 2. 27.

25 Sevinç 1996; *AR* 1998–9: 141–2 (S. Mitchell). The interpretation given in the text is that of Rose 2007. I am grateful to R. R. R. Smith for first drawing my attention to this find, and for discussing it with me.

26 For Artemisia see Dem. 15 and *I Labraunda* 40 = *Mausolus* M5; for Ada see Arr. *Anab.* 1. 23 and *Mausolus* M7. Carney 2005 rehearses the evidence for the female members of the Hekatomnid dynasty.

27 For excavations at Daskyleion see *AR* 1959/1960, 34f.; excavations restarted in 1988, see *AR* 1989–90, 89 and 1998–99 and 130.

28 Lewis 1977: 62.

## *7 Argos*

1 *IACP* pp. 599–619, 'Argolis' (M. Piérart) is now essential for the historical and constitutional facts; Argos itself is no. 347 at pp. 602–6; add now *IG* $4^2$ 2 (2007) for the inscriptions. See also Tomlinson 1972; for a brief sketch see the entry on 'Argos (2)' by Tomlinson and A. J. S. Spawforth, and that by A. Schachter on 'Argos, Cults', in *OCD*[3] (1996). There are important contributions in Piérart 1992. For a (still very useful) collection of references to the ancient sources for Argive affairs 479–431 see Hill[2] 359, index IV.3. For the fifth century, see Piérart 1997 who sees Argos as oscillating between two rival and opposite models, or rather, as developing (after the Persian Wars) from a hierarchic, exclusive and archaic structure comparable to Sparta's, to a more modern, Athenian-type system characterized by a more elaborate system of integrating territory and a willingness to integrate neighbouring *poleis* by citizenship grants (see esp. pp. 334 and 340); see also Piérart and Touchais 1996. But note also the suggestion of Andrewes, *HCT* iv,121ff., not registered in *IACP*: a change from a four-tribe system to a five-tribe

system based on locality. See also below, n. 19. For Pindar on Argos and the Argolid, see D'Alessio 2004; Kowalzig 2007: ch. 3; and Morgan 2007.

2 Hall 1995.

3 See *SEG* 11. 329a with 13. 246, explained by Forrest 1960: 230 and D. M. Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ 106: an Argive making a dedication at the Heraion finds it necessary to call himself an Argive; he would not have done this if Argos controlled the sanctuary at the time. The disputed role of the Argive Heraion, as a physically marginal sanctuary, in the construction of *polis* identity at Argos lies beyond the scope of this volume; see de Polignac 1995: 52f. and 1994: 13; for the ultra-sceptical view see Hall 1995: esp. 596 and 612 for Pindar.

4 Hall 1995: 583 and n. 44.

5 For Th. and Argos, see Hornblower 2006 (reprinted as Hornblower 2010 Chapter 6). For Th. and Corinth, see Stroud 1994.

6 Jameson, Runnels, and van Andel 1994. For reasons of space, the southern Argolid cannot be properly treated in the present chapter. For an excellent account of the classical histories of the cities mentioned in the text see Jameson, Runnels and van Andel 1994: 73–87.

7 Jameson *et al.* 1994: 85, 392ff.

8 Bauslaugh 1991: 94 aptly cites Diod. 10. 27. 1–3, where Datis the Mede is said to have approached the Athenians with the argument that the Athenians were descendants of Medus who had established the kingdom of Media, and with an invitation to return the ancestral hegemony. Miltiades wittily replies that the request should be reversed because an Athenian had established the kingdom of the Medes whereas no one of Median race had ever ruled Athens.

9 See above all Jones 1999; and for an excellent collection of the relevant inscriptions, many of them hellenistic, see Curty 1995. I have discussed the topic at *CT* II: 61–80, where further bibliography is given (and see Hornblower 2001a: 136f. and 2000b: 56f.). For reciprocity, see G. Herman's $OCD^3$ entry under that word, and the modern works there cited, above all Gould 1989, van Reden 1993 and Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford 1998.

10 See J. Hall 1997: 90ff. for the Homeric extension of Argos, and for the problems created by the tradition that Agamemnon was ruler of 'many islands and of all Argos' (*Iliad* 2. 108, quoted by Th. 1. 9. 4); Hall believes that Agamemnon was originally connected with Sparta and that the Argive tradition was developed later. See also Said 1994: 170; the whole article is interesting on the way the depiction of 'Argos' fluctuates in tragedy.

11 See Curty 1995 no. 3; also Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ 880.

12 See Hornblower 1996: 70 for the relation between Th. 2. 99 and 5. 80 on the one hand, and Hdt. 5. 22 and 8. 137 on the other. Cf. below p. 167.

13 No appearance by Argos in, for instance, the 'mother-city' column of the long list at Osborne 1996a: 121–5.

14 I follow Graham 1983: 154–65 and 235–44, who sees the Argive position as that of metropolis. Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 104f. call this position 'unattested, though quite likely'.

15 For the suggestion about Euboian Chalkis see Hornblower 1997: 184f. [= Hornblower 2010, ch. 9].

16 See Bauslaugh 1991: 93–6.

17 For a succinct and economical reconstruction of this difficult phase of Argive history see Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ (1992) 101f., 106–10, cp. also Piérart 1997 (above n.l) 330f. Note esp. the new epigraphic evidence for reorganization of the citizen body, discussed by Lewis (above n. 17) 101; for this evidence see further below n. 19. For *perioikoi* generally see P. A. Cartledge, $OCD^3$ under the word, and for Argive *perioikoi* in particular Andrewes 1990.

18 For the evidence for Argive democracy see Tomlinson 1972: Chapter 19.

19 For the organization by names of phratries *SEG* 29. 361; 33. 295; 34. 295; 35. 273; Lewis 101 n. 17 Hall 1995: 589f.; and above all Piérart 1997: 332f., and in *IACP*.

20 Against Forrest 1960, with an ingenious argument involving the *Suppliant Women* of Aeschylus, see Wörrle 1964: 121, also Lewis, *CAH* $5^2$ 103f. and 108, Hodkinson 1981: 261 and O'Neill 1981 (all sceptical of the Themistokles connection).
21 Cawkwell 1997b (= 2011: ch. 8): 116f.; cf. 2005: 137f. n. 13 and 281–7. See above, ch. 3 n. 46.
22 See *Eumenides* lines 762ff, 773; C. Macleod 1982: 22f. doubts that these lines have political resonance, but see A. Sommerstein 1989: 25ff. and n. on line 773 there and in Sommerstein 2008. For Aeschylus' topical innovation in transferring the scene of Agamemnon's residence to Argos see Jacoby on *FGrHist* 323a n. 7 on F22.
23 Lewis 1997: 75. See also Jameson *et al.* 1994: 15.
24 See de Ste Croix 1972: 293.
25 Kritzas 1992; see Lewis *CAH* $5^2$ 109 n. 46 and *CT* II (1996): 413.
26 See *CT* II: 412–14 on Th. 4. 133. 2, acknowledging the help of Marcel Piérart and giving modern references, above all (for an emphatic statement of the view that the rebuilding was a long process and that Thucydides' notice should be kept right out of it) Amandry 1952. For the mid-century 'Argive renaissance', see Morgan 2007: 249–263 (the phrase comes from p. 251), linking Pindar *N.* 10, which has a 'strongly civic, corporate feel' (p. 263), to the revived building activity at the Heraion.
27 See Sommerstein 1985: 155: n. on the passage.
28 Tomlinson 1972: 116f. says that Argos does not feature in Thucydides or Diodorus until the end of the Peloponnesian War, which is strictly true if we restrict ourselves to public actions by the Argive state; but the two episodes mentioned in my text are enough to show that some Argives were interested (the Aristophanic evidence implies self-interested) spectators of the great international conflict.
29 Mitsos 1952: 142 says Pollis was 'clearly oligarchic', but only on the evidence of this passage of Thucydides. The incident, clearly regarded as shocking, was also mentioned by Herodotus, 7. 137, for whom it is an instance of delayed divine retribution for the Spartan and Athenian killing of some Persian heralds long before. This was very approximate (rather than rough) justice: the Athenians went unpunished by the god, while the Argives, Tegeans and Corinthians came from blameless cities but were punished all the same.
30 See Andrewes *CAH* $5^2$ 434 for this point. For discussion of the Thucydidean detail of the whole period 421–416, see *CT* III (2008): 41–256.
31 But see *CT* III (2008): 178f., against Andrewes in *HCT* 4. 105f. and 149.
32 This point is economically made by Rhodes 1985: 44 n. 7.
33 See P. J. Rhodes, *OCD*[3,] entry under 'isopoliteia'; Whitby 1984: 98 n. 13. Tomlinson 1972: 134–7 compares the Argos–Corinth merger with the arrangements envisaged in the Argos–Tylissos–Knossos decree, for which see above p. 79. For the Argos–Corinth merger in its Corinthian War context see below p. 211, 231 and n. 70.
34 See Barrett 1954 (reprinted in Barrett 2007); Jameson *et al.* 1994: 63 and the important n. 11; Hall 1995: 581ff.; *CT* III (2008): 140ff.
35 For this suggestion see Hornblower 1995: 56.
36 For the possibility that the Argives gained only the northern part of the Kynouria region (the Thyreatis, i.e. the region round Thyrea) see Tomlinson 1972: 146 and Walbank 1967: 172–3, n. on Pol. 9. 33. 12.
37 Tod 1913: 86.

### *8 Macedon, Thessaly and Boiotia*

1 For the archaic classical and hellenistic history of Macedon see Hammond 1973a; Hammond and Griffith 1979; Hammond and Walbank 1988; and *IACP* pp. 794–809 (M. Hatzopoulos and P. Paschidis). Note also Errington 1990 and Borza 1990.
2 The basic study is Badian 1982.
3 See my commentary on these two difficult passages, *CT* II (1996): 390–2, cf. 394.

4 O. Masson, *OCD*[3], 'Macedonian language'; Dubois 1995; Voutiras 1998.
5 Greek personal names are collected in *LGPN*. For Macedonian personal names, see vol. IV (2005) and Habicht 2000, 125f.
6 Hatzopoulos 2000.
7 Andronikos provides good illustrations in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou 1980: 206f., plates 109–10.
8 The *poleis* of Macedonia: *IACP* nos. 528–44. For the names at Arr. *Ind*. 18, see Hornblower 2000: 140.
9 Pindar frags. 120–1 and Bacchylides frag. 20B, with Fearn 2007: Chapter 1. But Fearn is rash to argue, from the poem's address to Alexander as 'son of Amyntas', that Alexander was not yet king but crown prince, and thus that the poem dates from early in the fifth century. Euripides, in an epinikian poem for Alcibiades (Plut. *Alc*. 11. 2) called him 'son of Kleinias' at a time when his father had been dead for decades. As for political co-operation, Badian 1994a, a study of Herodotus' treatment of Alexander I of Macedon, shows that Alexander was not the only one to be compromised with Persia: even the Athenians had at one time, through the diplomatic offices of Alexander, made formal submission to the Great King; this embarrassing fact is merely hinted at by Herodotus. It helps to explain the hereditary Athenian proxeny of the fifth-century Macedonian kings (a gesture of gratitude for diplomatic help); not that this stopped them from pursuing policies at variance with Athens when it suited them, see text below.
10 Contrast the earlier situation, for which see preceding n.
11 See my commentary (*CT* I and II) on 1. 100 and 4. 102. For Amphipolis, see *IACP* no. 553 (P. Flensted-Jensen).
12 Meiggs, 1983: 127.
13 Karpathos: Ma 2009: 130. Other kinds of revenue: Kallet-Marx 1993: 175–6.
14 For the importance of Thessalian co-operation see Th. 4. 78.
15 Hammond in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 105.
16 *CT* II: 142.
17 See Andronikos in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou 1980: 208–11 (plates).
18 See the coin illustrated as frontispiece to Tarn 1913.
19 For Macedonian religion, see the good brief account by M. Oppermann, 'Macedonia, cults', *OCD*[3].
20 West 1980; Laks and Most 1997. For Orphism see Parker 1995, Graf (1993) and Johnston 2007; Instone 2009: 69–82 and 112–15; and cf. above p. 60. The best discussion of the possible significance of the geographical distribution of gold leaves attesting Orphism is at Parker and Stamatopoulou 2004: 23 (with map at 17 and table at 28–31); the objections in my text to the 'peripheral' theory are taken from the latter. Cole 2003: 200 (and see table 8.1 at 202–5) notes that the inscribed gold tablets 'cluster in three far-flung geographical areas: Thessaly/Macedonia, western Crete, and Sicily-S. Italy'. For fifth-century Orphic evidence, inscribed on bone, from Olbia, a Milesian colony (cf. R/O no. 93) in the northern part of the Black Sea region, see *IACP* no. 690 at p. 939, and Graf and Johnston 2007, appendix at 185–8; cf. Hdt. 4. 79 for Dionysiac mystery cult there. The word 'leaf' refers to the thinness of the metal, although, confusingly, some of the objects are indeed leaf-shaped (Parker and Stamatopoulou 2004: 1 and n. 1). Theophrastus: Diggle 2004: 369f. For the notion of 'supplementarity' see Graf and Johnston 2007: 178–81
21 The complexity of Thessaly is well brought out in the excellent chapter 'Thessalia and adjacent regions', *IACP* pp. 676–731 (J.-C. Decourt, T. H. Nielsen and B. Helly); as the authors explain at the outset, even the basic name 'Thessalia' had multiple meanings, the narrowest of which was used to designate the four great 'tetrads': Pelasgiotis, Hestiaiotis, Thessaliotis and Phthiotis. The 'adjacent regions' of their title were Dolopia, Ainis, Oita, Malis, Achaia and Magnesia (see esp. Th. 3. 92 and 5. 51). The 76 *poleis* of Thessaly are *IACP* nos. 393–468. On Thessaly in the broadest sense there is much of importance in Morgan 2003, which appeared too late be exploited by *IACP*; see also Helly 1995, and

B. Helly's various Thessalian entries in *OCD*[3]. Stamatopoulou 2007 admirably sketches the social and historical context of Pindar's *Pythian* 10. (Note also her long list at 311 n. 16 of other Pindar odes with a Thessalian element, including *Pythian* 9, in which the nymph Kyrene originates from Thessaly; and her discussion at 332 of Bacchylides 14 and 14B, on which see also Fearn 2009, accepting Maehler's view that it was written for a Thessalian 'hipparch', i.e. a magistrate of Larisa, rather than for a 'wrestler'.) She argues (1) that sixth-century and early fifth-century Thessaly was not as cut off from the wider world, or as 'backward', as had been thought; (2) that in the (later) fifth century the Thessalians were 'rather more inwardly orientated' (p. 339), perhaps because memories of Thessalian medism led to a certain introversion, and that they tended to prefer local to panhellenic games; (3) that in the fourth century they started to look outwards again, participating at the great international sanctuaries. This is an interesting if complex picture; but fifth-century inwardness should not be exaggerated, in view of the Olympic profile of Thessalians (below, n. 22). At all events, Stamatopoulou has surely succeeded in showing that Thessaly was 'not that different from other states' (340).

Westlake 1935 and Morrison 1942 are still useful for political history (fifth as well as fourth century).

22 Olympic victors: see the table at Stamatopoulou 2007: 331. Preference for local games: Stamatopoulou 332ff. Enodia: Morgan 2003: 135–40 and *IACP* no. 414 (Pherai), p. 705, with A. Henrichs, 'Hecate' and R. Parker, 'chthonian gods', both in *OCD*[3]. Gold leaves from Thessaly: Graf and Johnston 2007, nos. 25 (Pharsalos), 26a and b (Pelinna) and 27–8 (Pherai): the newly published Pherai text is no. 28, but see above all the original publication, Parker and Stamatopoulou 2004, esp. 20 for the affluence of initiates; the quotation about private mystery groups is from their pp. 22f. The *poleis* of Macedonia: above, nn. 1 and 8. The sacred law: *LSAG*[2]: 98 no. 1, and see Stamatopoulou 2007: 323 n. 103 for a list of other early inscriptions from Thessaly.

23 Helly, 'tagos' in *OCD*[3] (the alternative word was *archon*).

24 *LGPN* IIIB p. 171.

25 Sordi 1958: 67 n. 5.

26 Forrest *CAH* 3[2]3, p. 297. Note in any case that there were no doubt, right at the bottom of the scale, chattel slaves in Thessaly, as everywhere else in Greece.

27 For this as the period covered by the twenty-seven years of *Syll*[3]. 274 see Andrewes 1971: 219 and 221 n. 28. Note also Jeffery 1965: 52 n. 49.

28 For Boiotia see *IACP* pp. 431–61 (M. H. Hansen), esp. the succinct account of Boiotian federalism at 431f. Boiotia and sea power: Gomme 1945: 17–41.

29 Fraser and Rönne 1957: 90 and 102. Note also Fraser and Rönne-Linders 1971.

30 Demand 1982: 118.

31 Note, however, that this is from a Thucydidean speech in a tendentious context; see *CT* I: 456f.

32 Demand 1982: Chapter 7.

33 Zeitlin 1990.

34 Demand 1982: Chapter 5 on the Phaedo, etc. See also Vidal-Naquet 1986: Chapter 3.

35 Buck 1979: Chapters 8–9. For a different view Demand 1982: 18, drawing on a dissertation by C. Dull.

36 Buck 1979.

37 For the evidence of the Oxyrhynchus Historian see Bruce 1967; McKechnie and Kern 1988. For Thucydides on Boiotia and the Boiotians see Hornblower 2010 Chapter 5; also *CT* II (1996): 249–54 (on Th. 4. 76) and 297–300 (on 4. 93), cf. also 241 (on 4. 72. 4) for Boiotarchs and hipparchs.

38 See Andrewes, *HCT* 4: 42.

39 Hansen 1996b: 77; cf. 1995b: 23–4.

40 Cf. *IG* 12. 8. 263 for a late fifth-century oligarchic inscription from Thasos in the north Aegean, confiscating the property of six men because of 'attikismos'.

### *9 The run-up to the war*

1 For valuable discussions of the causes of the war see Dover, *HCT* 5 (1981), app. 2(7); Rhodes, 1987; D. M. Lewis, *CAH* 5[2] 1992 pp. 370–80; Badian 1993: 125–62; Rood 1998: 205–24; Pelling 2000: 82–111 and 151–8. For Rood and Pelling see below n. 4.

2 See Hornblower 1994: 131–66([reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 3), and *CT* I-III throughout; also Rood 1998 and Dewald 2005: important book-length treatments, but Dewald has no separate treatment of Book 1. Stahl 2003 is also an excellent monograph, but is in a different category, because most of the book is translated from the German original of 1966, and is innocent of narratological language and theory. The 2003 version contains two additional chapters, both about Books 6 and 7, but still, regrettably, contains no separate treatment of Book 8, and is thus the converse of Dewald.

3 Badian 1993: 125–62.

4 Rood 1998 and Pelling 2000 are generally inclined to reject political explanations of the sort favoured by Badian, preferring purely literary explanations for narrative peculiarities. I have modified my own earlier position (Hornblower 1991, 1994 and 1996) in the light of criticisms by Rood and Pelling. But I would still want to say that from the historical point of view Thucydides' under-reporting of Athenian interest in the west in the Pentekontaetia (whatever the reason for that under-reporting) remains important: without considerable supplementation from non-Thucydidean sources, the scale of Athenian expansionism in that period cannot be fully understood. In any case, the present book is about Greek history not primarily about Thucydides, and for the present I am (insofar as I depart from Thucydides) concerned more with what he left out than with why he left it out, if he did.

5 See below n. 7, for Rood citing Osborne, and note also the point I make there.

6 And now adopted by Rood 1998: 220 and n. 6l as his answer to the troubling question, why does Thucydides end the 'Fifty Years' here, i.e. after only forty-five years?

7 Against this general approach to Th.'s distribution of his material see Rood, 1998: 220 ('[t]he spread-out revelation of Athenian activity makes it seem more relentless, not less') with n. 58, with acknowledgement to Robin Osborne for the point. (See also Pelling 2000: 101.) I am not sure that 'relentless' is quite the right word for developments like Akarnania or Amphipolis (below) whose anti-Corinthian character is not immediately obvious from Th.'s handling of them.

8 *CT* I: 353–4.

9 Ogilvie 1965: commentary on the passage.

10 Lewis, *CAH* 5[2] p. 146 is good on the implications of this voyage in the wake of the Argonauts: 'Pericles was not a modest man and there was nothing little about his ideas'.

11 Tributes of Potidaia and Skione: Meiggs 1972: 539; de Ste Croix 1972: App. xiv. But I no longer think this theory plausible, see: *CT* II: 6. For Diotimos, see now *CT* III: 5.

12 And cf. Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 173.

13 Hornblower 1994: 146–7 n. 43.

14 The second of these is argued for by Badian 1993: 138–42, but see Rood 1998: 216–19.

15 With de Ste Croix 1972.

16 Lewis, *CAH* 5[2] p. 388.

17 Against Wick 1979 and Hornblower 1994: 146 and *CT* II: 230–1 see Rood 1998: 68 n. 24, whence the quotation in my text.

18 Rhodes 1987.

19 *CT* II: 19–38, 137–45; Hornblower 2010: ch. 14.

20 Ar. *Acharnians* 515–39, cf. *Peace* 605–27, cf. Plut. *Per.* 29–32; Diod. 12. 39. 3 also has the discreditable personal motive, but without Aspasia.

21 For Th.'s under-reporting of the activities of the Athenian *boule*, even where we can be sure that it played a role in fact (as in 414, see below p. 176), see *CT* III: 23–31. On kinship ties see Crane 1996: 147–61. A forthcoming book on Th. and kinship by M. Fragoulaki will shed much new light.

22 For Rood 1998: 223 n. 73, this piece of narrative delay is 'standard'. I have defended my view of this important episode at *CT* III: 1055–9, against the criticisms of H.-P. Stahl in Rengakos and Tsakmakis 2006: 301–34.

## *10 Corinth*

1 On archaic Corinth see Will 1955; on classical Corinth see Salmon 1984 and Stickler 2010; for both periods see *IACP* no. 227 (R. P. Legon); on Corinthian territory Wiseman 1978 is unsystematic but still full of interest.
2 Davies, 1994b for Athenian attitudes to accountability.
3 *AR* 1975–6 p. 8.
4 Stroud 1994.
5 See Schachter 'Corinthian cults and myths' in *OCD*[3] (1996) 391, pointing out that Corinth had to borrow its legendary figures from Argos or the east (not only Medea but Bellerophon, cf. Pindar *Olympian* 13 for Xenophon of Corinth). Oedipus grew up at Corinth as the son of king Polybus and queen Merope but his story proper begins to unfold only when he leaves Corinth because warned by an oracle that he was destined to kill his father and marry his mother. On Aletes the Heraklid founder of Corinth see Salmon 1984: 38.
6 Barrett 1978. For Corinth and athletic Corinthians in Pindar and elsewhere see Hornblower 2004: 78 and 202ff., and for Pindar's *Olympian* 13 and the archaeological evidence for mid fifth-century Corinth see Morgan 2007: 235–49; see also Stickler 2010: 35–66. On fr. 70c, Hornblower 2004: 78 and Morgan 2007: 239.
7 Below p. 287 and n. 47.
8 It is disputed whether the meeting chamber has been identified on the ground.
9 For the *diolkos*, the artificial stone track for haulage of ships – or possibly just merchandise – see R. Cook 1979: 152–3; photo in Ashmole 1972: 21.
10 Walbank 1933: 45ff.
11 Wiseman 1978.
12 Salmon 1984: 399. See S. Pembroke, 'prostitution, sacred', in *OCD*[3].
13 Salmon 1984: 400, citing other evidence.
14 Above p. 25.
15 Stroud 1968 and Salmon 1984: 413–19; but Hall 2007: 47f. is sceptical.
16 Siewert 1982 with Lewis 1997: 102–9.
17 Griffith, 1950: 241.
18 *AR.* 1978–9, p. 10.
19 Andrewes *HCT* 5 p. 10.
20 Griffith 1950; for later studies of the chronology of this see p. 350 n. 70.
21 Salmon 1984: 384ff; cf. *CAH* $6^2$ (= Lewis and others, 1994) 199 n. 13 (J. Roy) 530 (M. Austin, noting Diodorus' reference to the support of the poor), 580f. n. 58 (P. J. Rhodes) and 709 (H. D. Westlake, sceptical of some items in Diod.'s version, but not specifically objecting to the mention of the *aporoi*).

## *11 Sparta*

1 For Sparta and Lakonia see now *IACP* 569–98 ('Lakedaimon'), and for Messenia, 547–68 (both G. Shipley); Sparta itself is no. 345. The liveliest short history of Sparta remains Forrest 1980 (originally 1968); fuller is Cartledge 1979 (2002). Particular aspects have been well studied: for the army see Lazenby 1985, for religion Parker 1989 (reprinted in Whitby 2002: 161–81) and Richer 2007, for colonization Malkin 1994, for education Ducat 2007, and for property and wealth Hodkinson 2000. See also Powell 1989, Powell and Hodkinson 1994, and Hodkinson and Powell 1999 (collections of essays by different

authors); Cartledge 2001 collects his own Spartan articles, and Whitby 2002 reprints important articles and chapters by various scholars.

2 Cawkwell 1993 [= 2011: Chapter 3]; Cartledge, 'Peloponnesian League' in *OCD*[3] (1996).

3 Osborne 2009a: 287–91.

4 Shipley 1991 (reprinted in Whitby 2002: 182–9); Cartledge, 'perioikoi' in *OCD*[3] (1996).

5 Kennell 1995; Ducat 2007.

6 Toynbee 1969: 159–61.

7 Forrest 1980: 281 n. 7 for the anti-Spartan foreign policy of the tyrants at Athens.

8 Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983. That fascinating and rightly influential book regrettably confined itself to modern history, but if the editors had wanted a chapter about the ancient world they need have looked no further than Sparta.

9 Note Th. 1. 118 for the 'domestic wars' which constrained the Spartans during the years 480–430; is helot trouble meant?

10 Hunt 1997.

11 *CT* II 1996: 267.

12 Cartledge 1991, arguing against Talbert 1989 who denied that there was a 'class struggle' between helots and Spartiates. See also below for the Kinadon affair.

13 Cartledge, 'helots' in *OCD*[5] suggests that it was Lakonian helots who were used as fighters.

14 So Garlan 1995: 74: 'it is significant that the helots, who were considered particularly treacherous, were clearly more in demand [i.e. as soldiers] than Athenian slaves; this is because their residual vocation as a formerly free people [i.e. as Messenians] explained both their defiant spirit and their relative military aptitude'.

15 Cawkwell 1997a: 52 and Talbert 1989 both stress Messenian nationalism, but 'class struggle' and nationalism are hardly mutually exclusive. See also Luraghi 2008.

16 Lazenby 1997. For what follows see Hornblower 2000b: 78 n. 35 (reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 13).

17 Krentz 1995: 179.

18 Lewis 1977: 144.

19 See Hornblower 2000b (above n. 16) for the argument summarized in this paragraph.

20 And not buried or distorted in translations like 'if Pausanias acted in a dictatorial manner' (Warner, Penguin tr.), which wrongly suggests that the Greek contains a reference to 'tyranny', or 'showing an oppressive tendency' (Hammond 2009), which is too vague.

21 On this topic see Griffiths 1989.

22 Or perhaps just a Spartiate, see Hornblower 2000b: 75 n. 8, citing H. van Wees. But the Spartiates were the military elite, so the difference is not great.

23 Sekunda 1998: 24 for an illustration (a relief sculpture from the Spartan sanctuary of Artemis Orthia) of what he claims is a unique representation of a Lakonian staff or *bacteria.* I illustrate and discuss this at *CT* III: 993 (there are difficulties about Sekunda's suggestion).

24 *CT* II: 50–3, qualified on one detail by Badian 1999.

25 Sherwin-White 1980: 178.

26 On Sparta and Samos see Cartledge 1982. Cf. Hornblower 2000a: 135 n. 26 (reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 4).

27 Brunt 1993: 88.

28 Loomis 1992, including some newly discovered fragments, for which see *SEG* 39. 370 and 42. 342.

29 Against this, Seager and Tuplin 1980: 141f. see below p. 159.

## *12 Athens*

1 For Athens and Attica see *IACP* 624–42, a tour de force by general editor Hansen himself; Athens is no. 361, and the other two Attic *poleis* are Eleusis (no. 362) and Salamis (no. 363). The double-page map of Attica at Barr. map 59, deserves a special

mention. On fifth-century Athens see *CAH* $5^2$ (1992), also Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998; for fourth-century Athens, see Scott 2009; for the Athens of Alexander and the hellenistic period see Habicht 1997. Roberts 1998a (2nd edition of 1984 book) is a good general account of classical Athens and note also Roberts 1998b, a translated and annotated source book about the radical democracy. On Athenian democracy generally, the best account is Hansen 1998; see also Ostwald 1986, Sinclair 1988 and Osborne 2010, a collection of reprinted essays. On the *Athenian Constitution* attributed to Aristotle (a very important source) see Rhodes 1981 (reprinted with addenda 1992), and, for the Council of 500, Rhodes 1972 (a very thorough examination of the positive evidence; but for those occasions when the Council must have been active but Thucydides does not say so, see *CT* III: 23–31). On *demes* and representation of demes in the Council see Traill 1975 and 1986, and for deme life generally Osborne 1985, Whitehead 1986, and N. Jones 2004. On the law courts see Hansen 1974, 1975 and 1990. For the Assembly see Hansen 1983 and 1989. On 'demagogues' see Connor 1971. For individual wealthy politicians see the entries in Davies 1971 (with Davies 1981, a related thematic study); on Athenian individuals generally, Kirchner 1901, a full Athenian prosopography (for this term see Hornblower and Spawforth, 'prosopography' in *OCD*[3]); but for some purposes this has been superseded by Osborne and Byrne *LGPN* II 1994 (complete list of all attested Athenians, but without biographical detail). Develin 1989 is a valuable year-by-year list of known Athenian officials, including military commanders; this is modelled on Broughton's *Magistrates of the Roman Republic.* On the Athenian cavalry class see Bugh 1988 and Spence 1990b. For phratries (a kinship grouping which continued to control access to citizenship even after Kleisthenes' reforms of citizen organization in the late sixth century) see Lambert 1993; and for other religious and social associations N. Jones 1999. On Athenian religion see Parker 1996 and 2005 (important on Athenian historical matters of every sort, except that the affairs of the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries in 415 are virtually absent); for religious worries in the Peloponnesian War period see Rubel 2000 (a stimulating book, but infuriatingly has no index), Eidinow 2007b (good on curses), and *CT* III: 367–81 (herms and mysteries).

2 On the 'obscure' Parthenon payment see Davies 1994a: 209. It (and presumably also the Propylaia payment?) seems to derive from the auctioning of the mine leases by public officials called the *poletai.*

3 French 1965: 1.

4 Wycherley 1978: 16.

5 Mee 1978; Hornblower 1982: 14.

6 For Salamis, see Taylor 1997 and *IACP* no. 363 (arguing, surely rightly, that it was a cleruchy). For Sounion, Kenny 1947 and Moreno 2007: 118f. for the date of the walls and dockyards (some datable to 411, some Hellenistic).

7 Gouschin 1999 attempts to argue against me (but he is really arguing against Thucydides) that the 431 'synoikism' of Attica had already been anticipated by the evacuation of 480 BC. But that was an evacuation of both countryside and city (for the city see Hdt. 8. 51), not an emigration from the countryside into the city as happened in 431.

8 Thomas 1989: 211.

9 *CT* III: 350, citing Low 2007: 203.

10 Raubitschek 1991: 229–38; C. Jones 1999: 32.

11 Parker 1987a.

12 Alty 1982; but see J. Price 2001: 154 n. 56.

13 Osborne 1996a: 128 (2009a: 122); cf. 1998.

14 Lewis 1997: 100, reviewing Traill 1975.

15 Hansen 1989: 73–91. Note also the evidence from the deme of Atene, Lohmann 1993, cf. Osborne 1996a: 302f. (= 2009a: 286) and Parker 1996: 115 (it hardly existed before the fifth century and yet was a 'Kleisthenic' deme).

16 Osborne 1985; Whitehead 1986. See also Whitehead, 'demes' in *OCD*[3] for a rapid overview, and Whitehead 2001 on Thuc. 2. 16. 2.

17 For Rhamnous see Pouilloux 1958; Osborne 1990a, though note that some of the fullest epigraphic evidence from Rhamnous is from the early third century when classical conditions no longer applied: Rhamnous housed a long-term garrison at a time when the Athenians were getting Ptolemaic help against Macedon, and this garrison naturally passes decrees about its affairs; and N. Jones 2004: 135.
18 For the known members of the 'liturgical class', i.e. those wealthy enough to be liable for city liturgies, see Davies 1971.
19 See Roberts 1998a: 45–7.
20 It is possible, but not at all certain, that this man was in fact a cleruch from Salamis, see Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 26–7.
21 Parker 1987b: 143.
22 Hornblower 1982: 161 n. 197. Eleusis is actually categorized as a *polis* (of a rather special sort) in *IACP* where it is no. 362.
23 *IG* 12. 8. 2 (from Lemnos, a cleruchy) may similarly be an acknowledgement of Athenian control.
24 *Demarch*: Whitehead 1982 (also discussing Oropos, which like Eleutherai (ML 48 line 96), another frontier site, was part of Attica but not a normal deme). For the slightly puzzling evidence for perceptions of Piraeus see Roy 1998; see also N. Jones 2004: 134f.
25 Mikalson 1977; Parker 1987b; Csapo and Slater 1995: 124–32. For Thorikos as one of the 'twelve cities of Kodros' see *FGrHist* 328 F94 with Andrewes, *HCT* 5 (1981) p. 317.
26 On the *demarch* in the *Clouds* see, however, Davies 1981: 147: perhaps the debt was a state not a deme debt. For *demarchs* and the *eisphora* Davies 1981: 147.
27 Hansen 1995c.
28 Jones, Graham, Sackett 1973; Osborne 1985: 31–4.
29 The main advocate of nucleated settlement is Osborne 1985, also 1996b (giving references to post-1984 discussions, and replying to critics, notably Lohmann 1993 on Atene).
30 For Herms see J. D. Mikalson in *OCD*[3]. They were marble pillars with a bust on top, and by the classical period were thought of as representations of the god Hermes.
31 Hansen 1989: 73–91. Osborne 1996a: 302–3 (2009a: 286).
32 Siewert 1982. The argument can be grasped, by those who have no German, just by looking at the maps at the end.
33 For criticisms see Rhodes 1983, Andrewes 1983 and Lewis 1997: 102–9.
34 See, however, *HCT* iv. 372 (Dover) and *CT* III: 528 on this passage, for the difficulties of explaining how the allied, i.e. non-Athenian troops, were distributed among the (Athenian) tribes.
35 Salmon 1982: Chapter 5.
36 See *OCD*[3], entries under 'Agoracritus', 'hubris', 'Nemesis', and 'Rhamnus'.
37 Duncan-Jones 1981.
38 I owe this whole interpretation of the temples to Hector Catling.
39 The Council was exempted from meeting on the sixty or so annual festival days but not on the monthly ones. See Mikalson 1975, 196–7 and Rhodes, 1981: 521, commentary on *Ath. Pol.* 43. 3.
40 Badian 1993: 157.
41 Connor 1974, against de Ste Croix 1963.
42 Rhodes 1981: 5.
43 Hansen 1983: 26.
44 For this interpretation of the Greek, see *CT* II: 305–6.
45 Hansen 1983: 121–2. But Hansen concedes (122, 123–4) that a very small number of professional or semi-professional politicians did also exist.
46 Ober 1989; Harding 1995.
47 Kallet-Marx 1994.
48 Hornblower 1994. For Diotimos see Th. 1. 45 with *CT* I: 90 and III: 5; also below p. 179; for Thucydides and the north see Th. 4. 105. 1.

49 Fraser 1972: 1. 502, actually discussing Diod. 1. 74, the general section about democracies and political Assemblies.
50 For sycophants see Osborne 1990b with the reply by Harvey 1990.
51 Hansen 1974 and 1975.
52 MacDowell *OCD*[3] 827 col. 1, end of entry on 'law and procedure, Athenian'.
53 For the interesting suggestion that the demos was and prided itself on being a tyrant in the domestic as well as in the foreign policy sphere (Th. 2. 63. 2 and 3. 37. 2), see Kallet 1998.
54 Carter 1986.
55 Kurke 1991: 141 and 159 n. 40 collects evidence from a variety of places for prytaneion privileges for athletic victors. Megakles ostrakon: Brenne 1993: 16 and Hornblower 2004: 250.
56 Davies 1993: 57–8, drawing on Lewis 1954: 17–21 (the quotation in my text is from Lewis 1954: 19); see, however, Parker, 1996: 124, who notes that even before the Ephialtic changes, the community must have exercised some control, via the archons.
57 See Barrett 1964: 354 for a careful n. on the implications of this passage.
58 Kroll 1977.
59 Siewert 1979; Edmunds 1996: 91–2.
60 Wilson 1997 and 2000.
61 See Rhodes 2000 for a sensible discussion.
62 Hansen and Christensen in Hansen 1989: 195–211.
63 Cawkwell 1997a: 82 for the probable terms of the Assembly's instructions. Against the view in my text, see Hamel 1998: 117f. n. 7, whence the quotation.
64 With Dover 1960 (1988: 159–80).
65 I am here indebted to a paper read by the late D. M. Lewis in 1980 and comments on it in discussion by A. Andrewes.
66 See my entry 'demagogues, demagogy' in *OCD*[3].
67 On the 'new politicians' Connor 1971 remains important.
68 Davies 1971, entry under 'Dikaiogenes'.
69 Nisbet 1961: 192–7 app. VI, 'The *In Pisonem* [of Cicero] as Invective'.
70 Connor 1971.
71 Millett 1998: 245. But see Hornblower 2004: 259ff.
72 *CT* I: 518, commentary on Th. 3. 104.
73 Davies 1981: 101.
74 Osborne and Byrne 1994 (*LGPN* II): 226.
75 See Rhodes 1981 on the *Ath. Pol.* passage.
76 Lewis, 1975: 90.
77 Andrewes 1962; Finley 1974. For doubts see Thompson 1981, preferring an explanation in terms of 'charisma' rather than 'expertise', and for a balanced summing-up Rhodes 1986.
78 Andrewes 1981: 258ff.; Rhodes 1994.
79 Lewis 1997: 212–29 for the financial offices of these two. For Eubulus see esp. Cawkwell 1963c, and for Lycurgus, Humphreys 1985 (=2004: Chapter 3], Badian 1995: 100–6, Parker 1996: 242–55, Oliver 2007, and Rhodes 2010.
80 Rhodes 1979–80.
81 With the commentary of Rhodes 1981: 678f.
82 *CT* II: 332, commentary on 4. 104. 4.
83 Hansen 1979 and 1980, with Lewis 1982. Note, however, the curious fact that one important type of pay, that for the Assembly, was introduced only after the Peloponnesian War and is thus a fourth- not a fifth-century phenomenon. See Rhodes 1981: 492, discussing *Ath. Pol.* 41.3.
84 See Stadter 1989: 172ff., commentary on the passage. Plutarch's word *epistates* (overseer) may not here be technically accurate.
85 See Kallet-Marx 1994.

86 For oligarchic thought at Athens see Roberts 1995, Ober 1998, Leppin, 1999: 32–41, Ostwald 2000. I have not here used the evidence of the 'Old Oligarch' (Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.*) because I believe there is a good chance that it is a fourth-century document of literary fiction, perhaps dating from *c.* 380 BC. See Hornblower 2000c (= 2010: Chapter 16); but see above, ch. 1 n. 18 (R. Osborne).

87 Wallace 1998: 222.

## *13 The Peloponnesian War*

1 There is no escaping Thucydides as the main source for the first twenty years (431–411) of the twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless the text below will attempt to suggest an alternative way of looking at the first ten years, the 'Archidamian War'. Thucydides needs to be read with a modern commentary; see the classic five-volume work Gomme, Andrewes and Dover (1945–81), though this calls for good working knowledge of Greek because the lemmata are not translated. For a more recent commentary with translated lemmata, and not confined to historical matters, see my *CT* I–III, 1991–2008, which I do not usually cite below in detail, except where I offer a new and controversial view for which the argument is there given. There are also useful brief notes by P. J. Rhodes in Hammond 2009. After 411 we have Xenophon *Hellenica* Books 1–2 and Diodorus Book 13, derived from the mid-fourth-century writer Ephorus, who in turn drew on even earlier sources such as the *Oxyrhynchus Historian* (above pp. 5–6).

Modern accounts: see the valuable detailed four-volume history of the war by Kagan, 1969–87; more succinct and penetrating are *CAH* $5^2$ Chapters 9 (D. M. Lewis on the causes of the war and the Archidamian War) and 10–11 (A. Andrewes on the rest of the war). For an excellent one-volume military history see Lazenby 2004; and on the military side there is also much of relevance in van Wees 2004 and in Sabin and others (eds.) 2007. Cawkwell 1997a is important on the whole war from the Thucydidean angle (and cf. Cawkwell 2005: 142–61 for the Persian aspect), and Kallet 2001 is an outstanding study of the Sicilian expedition and its aftermath, again from the Thucydidean angle.

In this chapter, references without name of author are to Thucydides.

2 Green 1991.

3 Davies l993: 151.

4 Loraux 1986; Lewis *CAH* $5^2$ 370.

5 Hornblower 1995: 60 n. 65, and entry 'Peloponnesian War' in *OCD*[3].

6 See e.g. Holladay 1978 and Cawkwell 1975 (=2011: Chapter 7).

7 See Pelling 1991.

8 For the importance of these themes in Th. see Kallet-Marx 1993 and Kallet 2001.

9 See *CT* II: 82, giving references to the modern controversy.

10 Loomis 1992 (and see above, ch. 11 n. 28).

11 For the importance of Euboia as a source of grain for Athens see Moreno 2007: Chapter 3. Cavalry harassment: Spence 1990a.

12 Piérart 1995; cf. below p. 180 and (again) ch. 11 n. 28.

13 Kallet-Marx 1993: 89 and n. 44; Parker 1983: 170–5.

14 I avoid using the word 'propaganda' for reasons set out in *OCD*[3], entry under the word; but in the distinction there borrowed from J. Ellul, the Spartan liberation programme was 'agitation 'as opposed to 'integration' propaganda.

15 Tuplin 1985: 352f.

16 Price 2001.

17 For Plataia and the Plataians in the early parts of Th. see Pelling 2000: 61–81.

18 Roisman 1993b.

19 Kallet-Marx 1993: 164–70; *CT* II: 93–8.

20 Malkin 1994: 81–2.

21 Morgan 1990.

22 Hornblower 1992a (reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 1, and see Chapter 2). See above p. 28. Sanchez 2000: 117 n. 185 rejects my suggestion, but produces no new arguments.
23 Hornblower 2000a: 136 n. 30.
24 *CT* I: 520–2; Parker 1996: 150f. and n. 116.
25 Westlake 1989: 71, the most important finding of a valuable article.
26 On this period see Seager 1976 and Westlake 1989: Chapter 7.
27 It is particularly important, when describing such complex situations, to avoid tempting abstractions of the 'Corinth', 'Athens' type. Seager 1976: 254 writes of 'Corinth' that 'hatred of Athens no doubt sharpened her resentment against Sparta, but it played no constructive part in the framing of her policy'. Such use of 'her' can only mislead.
28 For this view see Hornblower 2000d.
29 Spartan numbers at Mantineia: Cawkwell 1983 (=2011: Chapter 13) argues against the 'doubling' hypothesis of Andrewes 1970: 111–17, but I now think Andrewes was right: *CT* III: 180ff. For the new suggestion about Amorges, see Thonemann 2009.
30 Gabba 1981.
31 As Rutherford 1992: 235 puts it well.
32 For Patavium see Leigh 1998.
33 See Morris 1992: 216; Malkin 1998: 134f; Zacharia 2002.
34 Ehrenberg 1938: Chapter 2; see below p. 294.
35 Borgeaud 1988: 77, 115, 155.
36 Cawkwell 1997a: 78.
37 Hornblower 1991: 492f. and 1996: 432f., giving references.
38 Frederiksen 1984: 104–7, for excellent treatments of Diotimos' visit and of the Athenian settlement; see also *CT* III: 5 (cf. above ch. 9 n. 11).
39 Frederiksen 1984: 106 and 116 n. 162; more fully Frederiksen 1968: 13 and n. 41.
40 Above p. 49 and n. 25 citing Murray 1997.
41 Cawkwell 1997a: 12f. and 125f. n. 39.
42 Bauslaugh 1991: 151–2.
43 Purcell in *CAH* $6^2$ 1994: 387.
44 Cawkwell 1997a: 82.
45 Kallet 2001: 101, 151 argues that the Athenians did not spend enough.
46 Kallet, 2001: 31, 44.
47 Ferguson 1932: 161.
48 Kallet 2001: 183–93 for agnostic scepticism about the date (415 or 413?).
49 On the date of *IG* i $^3$ 291 see *CT* III: 458–461. The 415 date was accepted in 2004 at *IACP* 206 (Katane) and 291 (Rhegion), without discussion of alternatives, although one of the authors of the relevant chapters, C. Ampolo, had argued in 1987 for the earlier date of 427–424. It is not clear whether the 2004 position represents a change of mind. For an argument that Th. at 6. 44 overdid the hostility of the south Italian cities towards the Athenians on their arrival in 415, see *CT* III: 608f., n. on 7. 33. 4–5 (on Metapontion). For the 'seven cities', see Berger 1992.
50 Frederiksen 1968: 11.
51 Worley 1994: 103.
52 Frederiksen 1968.
53 Murray 1990b, but see Wallace 1992: 328 n. 2.
54 Dover 1988: 75.
55 See *CT* III, notes on all these passages, esp. 7. 42. 1.
56 Stroud 1994; above, p. 111. Th. at 7. 36. 2 stops short of saying in so many words that the innovation was borrowed from the Corinthians, but it surely was: *CT* III: 613.
57 Roisman 1993b: 52–70.
58 For Nikias at Syracuse and his excessive proneness to divination, see Flower 2008: 114–19. The retreat: I have here drawn on *CT* III (2008); see esp. 710–13 for the Troy analogy,

and 1061–6 (App. 2) for the calculations which lie behind my claim in the text about the numerical exaggeration entailed in 40,000+ at 7. 75. 5. On 4. 125 see *CT* II: 394.
59 Rood 1998: 278 n. 82 makes the best case possible for holding that there is no contradiction between this passage and 7. 87.
60 For the 1920–2 catastrophe see Llewellyn-Smith 1998.
61 Westlake 1969: 161–73.
62 Rood 1998; Gribble 1999.
63 Hornblower 1996: 26.
64 J.-F. Bommelaer 1991: 143; Scott 2010: 105.
65 For the problems of the relation between Th. 8. 85 and Xen. 1. 1. 27–31 see Andrewes 1981: 281–5 and *CT* III: 998.
66 Lewis *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 125f.
67 Rutter 2000 shows that Th.'s view is too simple; and see my note on 7. 55 (a tricky chapter) in *CT* III.
68 For Hermocrates see Westlake 1969: 174–202.
69 Andrewes 1981: 6f.; see generally MacDowell in *OCD*[3], entry 'probouloi'.
70 Zacharia 1999.
71 Lewis 1977: 87 n. 25.
72 Piérart 1995; cf. above p. 159.
73 See the two instances at 3. 94. 2 and 5 with my nn. (*CT* I: 509 and 511).
74 Hunt 1998: 102–5 for the episodes at Chios and Syracuse.
75 Cook 1961b: 70 n. 81.
76 Andrewes 1981: 45 and *CT* I: 193.
77 So Beloch 1914: 378f.
78 Alty 1982: 3.
79 Andrewes 1981: 27–32.
80 Hornblower 1982: 84, 104. For the synoikism of Kos, see *IACP* no. 497 (cf. below, ch. 19 n. 27) and R/O no. 62 (post-synoikism 'religious calendar', specifying dates and sacrifices). For that of Rhodes, see *IACP* pp. 1197–1210 ('Rhodos', by T. H. Nielsen and V. Gabrielsen), esp. p. 1197 on the evidence for Rhodian unity earlier than 408/7; Kowalzig 2007: 250; *CT* III: 882; and Parker 2009: 205–10. On Rhodes and its control of nearby territory (mainland and islands), see also Constantakopoulou 2007: 187–95 and 243ff.
81 Despite Andrewes 1981: 475 and n. 17.
82 Siewert 1979.
83 For which see the modern references in *OCD*[3] under 'patrios politeia'.
84 Andrewes 1981: 238–9.
85 Andrewes 1981: 253 thought that Thucydides was writing under the influence of a right-wing informant who fled Athens after the fall of the Four Hundred; but see *CT* III: 1010f.
86 Ostwald 1986: App. C.
87 Andrewes and Rhodes, *OCD*[5] 1507, 'Theramenes'.
88 Knoepfler forthcoming; see *CT* III: 1028.
89 Notably de Ste Croix 1956.
90 Andrewes 1981: 325. For discussion of other problems about 8. 97 see Hornblower 1987: 160–1 and *CT* III: 1032–6; Leppin 1999: 179–83.
91 Westlake 1989: Chapter 10, an excellent discussion of the realities.
92 Meiggs 1972: 362f. on Chios and Lesbos.
93 Seager and Tuplin 1980.
94 Meiggs 1972: 368.
95 Andrewes 1953.
96 Lewis 1977: 124. Lewis's analysis is followed below. See, however, Cawkwell 2005: 290f. for doubts.
97 Andrewes 1974.

98 Robert 1983: 257–307.
99 For Theramenes' role, which soon became controversial, see Andrewes *CAH* 5 (1992) 495, and n. 68 for papyrus evidence published in 1968 and bearing on the problem.
100 Hornblower 2001a: 140 and n. 22.

## *14 The effects of the Peloponnesian War*

1 Brunt 1969: 245; Lintott 1982: Chapter 8; Austin *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 34: 'to bring *stasis* to an end required the imposition of the *status quo* by a dominant outside power, or the creation of new sources of wealth'; van Wees 2008. Note two valuable supplementary sections of *IACP*: pp. 124–9 ('*Stasis* as an essential aspect of the *polis*) and 1361f., index 19 '*Stasis*' (not really an index, rather a useful table of all the attested instances of Archaic and Classical *stasis*, with dates).
2 For Pindar on *stasis*, see also above ch. 10 n. 6 (Corinth), and Hornblower 2004: 76ff. For Krete in the fifth century, the age of the displaced Knossian Ergoteles, see above, ch. 3 n. 71. Democritus: Hussey 1985.
3 On which see the excellent commentary of Whitehead 1990 (edn 2, 2002).
4 See also Whitehead 1990 (2002): 188–9 (n. on 31. 24) for an argument which indicates a date before 346.
5 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1888: 179–83.
6 But see Whitehead's n.: the reference may be to a third, otherwise unattested, revolution some years between 386 and 371.
7 Stylianou 1998: 330–2 argues vigorously that Diodorus means what he says when he relates this phenomenon to 375 rather than to the aftermath of Leuctra in 371, as some scholars (who plausibly assume that Diodorus has muddled the Peace of 375 with that of 371) have argued. But I continue to believe that Diodorus' remark makes better sense if applied to the post-Leuktra period.
8 Lewis, *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 155.
9 See Schofield 1999, showing that other political philosophers shared this preoccupation with saving the city from *stasis.*
10 See Lintott 1992, a valuable study.
11 Tuplin in *OCD*[3], 'Xenophon'. For the *Hiero*, see Gray 2007.
12 Hirsch 1985: 98
13 Tuplin 1993: 164.
14 For Pindar on kingship theory, see Hornblower 2004: 63–6 and in Lewis 2006: 151–63. For canon see *OCD*[3] under 'canon' (P. E. Easterling) and 'Polyclitus' (2)' (A. F. Stewart).
15 On military change in this period, see above all van Wees 2004,; also Sabin and others (eds.) 2007: part 1.
16 *CT* II: 38–61 and Badian 1999.
17 For what follows see above all J. Hornblower 1981: 207–11.
18 See the Teubner edn of the *de re equestri.*
19 J. Hornblower 1981: 207ff.
20 Cawkwell 1978a: Chapter x; for the subsequent debate see the refs in *CT* II: 305–6 (from a commentary on Th.'s Delium narrative), and for a plausible reconstruction of the realities of infantry warfare see van Wees 2000b: 98–101 and 2004: 184–97; Lendon 2005: 78–114.
21 Cawkwell 1972a (= Cawkwell 2011: Chapter 14): 261.
22 Lewis 1977: 39.
23 For Brasidas, see *CT* II: 52ff and above, p. 196. For pressures exerted on generals by armies, especially coalition armies, see my essay in Lane Fox 2004: 243–63, reprinted as Hornblower 2010: Chapter 12. I there argue that the behaviour of Xenophon's Ten Thousand, the paradigmatic 'army as *polis*', was not nearly as unusual as is often assumed.
24 Pritchett 1971–91: 2, 113ff.

25 Ehrhardt 1961: 50ff., cf. Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$(1994) 89 and n. 149.
26 The phrase is from Oxford lectures by the late M. W. Frederiksen, referring to the Illyrians.
27 Roy 1967.
28 Seibt 1977: 39–45; see also Th. 1. 115. 4. The meaning of the word *epikouroi* or 'helpers' is not always clear, but in these instances mercenaries seem to be meant.
29 On the text see the note in Andrewes 1981.
30 For a more positive appraisal of such people see McKechnie 1989.
31 Rhodes 1981: 494 and 2010: 84; Parker 1996: 253f.
32 Engels 1978: 12, 16, but Quintus Curtius 6. 8. 23, with Hammond and Griffith 1979: 161 n., shows that such camp followers were still numerous in Alexander's time. *Corps d'élite*: see the list at Pritchett 1971 –90: 2, 221–4. For the Theban 'sacred band' see Davidson 2007: 349–54, 493f.
33 On the visual aspects of classical warfare see the excellent Chapter 8 by N. Sekunda in J. Boardman (ed.) *CAH 5–6, Plates Vol.* (1994); for a 'gastraphete' (a sort of crossbow) see 187 plate 209.
34 Marsden 1969–71.
35 Tarn 1930: 114–15.
36 Sekunda *CAH 5–6, Plates Vol.* (1994): 189, plate 212. Cf. generally Hornblower 1982: Chapter 11.
37 Lotze 1964: 18.
38 See now Ostwald 2000.
39 On Lysander's methods see Davies 1993: 141–7, cf. Parke 1930.
40 Lewis *CAH* 6 (1994): 30.
41 De Ste Croix 1981: 74, 395.
42 For this suggestion see Badian 1981: 33–8 and 1996: 14 n. 20. See below p. 215.
43 Hornblower 2000b: 60. See above p. 125.
44 Hornblower 1982: 77.
45 De Ste Croix 1981: 297f., but cf. A. Griffin 1982: 73.
46 Hammond 1967b: 525–40.
47 Allan 2000: 149–60. An ancient scholion on line 445 says that the play was not produced in Athens, so where? Epirus is one possibility, but Thessaly is another.
48 Hansen in Nielsen and Roy 1999: 80–8, discussing Ar. *Pol.* 1261a 29 and arguing that the Arkadians were a category-crossing example of an *ethnos* made up of *poleis.*
49 Debord 1999: 176–82.
50 For Arkadia generally see Nielsen and Roy 1999.
51 See Lewis 1990 for the view here followed. For another view, Buckler 2000.
52 Ryder 1965: Chapter 1.
53 Lewis 1997: Chapter 4.
54 Cargill 1981.
55 Hornblower 1982: 238.
56 Davies 1977; M. Osborne 1981–3: 2. 11–16, 25f.
57 For the Athenian grain supply, see Moreno 2007 and Oliver 2007. Cleruchies: Salomon 1997 argues that cleruchies had a primarily military motive. If so this does not exclude other, economic, motives.
58 In the study of archaic Greek history, there has been (above p. 322 n. 3) some revulsion against the word 'colonization', which is thought with some justice to carry over from Roman history unsuitable implications of state sponsorship and organization. The objection has much less force for operations like the Samos cleruchy, which was certainly the result of a decision by the Athenian Assembly. For the cleruchy see Hornblower 1982: Chapter 7; Griffith 1978: 140; Shipley 1987: 138–43, 155–61; Cargill 1995: 17–21 and 109–19; Hallof and Habicht 1995 (important recent inscription = *SEG* 45.1162).
59 Cawkwell 1992 (= 2011: Chapter )]: 300f.

60 For the Athenian colony to the Adriatic ('Miltiades') see *IACP* p. 326. Evidence for emigration to Italy and Sicily: MacDonald 1981.
61 Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 232 n. 146 with refs.
62 Rhodes *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) 567 n. 6 gives modern refs.
63 Hedrick 1990; Rhodes 1997.
64 For remarks ('the fourth-century crisis: what crisis?') see Davies 1995.
65 Finley 1952.
66 Andreyev 1974; cf. de Ste Croix 1966 on the 'estate of Phainippos' (Dem. 42).
67 Kirchner 1901–3: no. 4386; Davies 1971: no. 4386 at 163–4; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 10. 4.
68 For mining see Hopper 1979: 170–89.
69 Jones, Sackett and Eliot 1957: 184 n. 115.
70 Griffith 1950; Tuplin 1982; Whitby 1984.
71 Debord 1999: 398, 497; *IACP* no. 886 (P. Flensted-Jensen) at p. 1115; cf. p. 1108.
72 Demand 1990; Hornblower 1994: 223–5; Debord 1999: 383–91; see also, for Knidos, *IACP* no. 903, Knidos at p. 1123 (Flensted-Jensen), and *CT* III: 847–53.
73 Cook 1983: 219.
74 Dover 1974: 259 against the idea that fourth-century Greeks did not believe that the gods punished wrongdoing; cf. e.g. *Lys* 6. 20.
75 Parker 1985 for the better view.
76 Hammond 1967b: 509; Parke 1967: App. 1; and above all Eidinow 2007a, esp. 26–138 (note catalogue of Dodona oracle at 72–124, including some new material; see also her App. 1, questions presented by communities at the oracle of Dodona). She argues convincingly that oracle consultation and cursing are both ways of dealing with risk and uncertainty.
77 Parke 1967: 272 no. 27; Eidinow 2007a: 117 no. 4 (the blankets and pillows) and 102 nos. 5 and 6 (new slave inquiries) See also Kearns 2010: 294ff.
78 Audollent 1904: cxvii–cxxv. See now Eidinow 2007a: 139–237, and catalogue at 352–454; also Parker 2005: Chapter 6; Instone 2009: 82–5 and 115ff.; Kearns 2010: 137–40.
79 *IG* 3. 3. 24.
80 Lloyd-Jones 1983: 202 n. 31 against Dodds 1951: 194 ('regression') and 204 n. 93.
81 Parker 1996: 163f.
82 See Zacharia 2001, discussing Sophocles' fragmentary *Tereus*, a horrific play with a Thracian setting; it deals with the marriage of an Athenian princess to a Thracian king, and his rape of her sister.
83 Parker 1996: 171ff.
84 *CT* II: 453ff. (commentary on Th. 5. 11. 1). But C. Jones 2010: 26 and 104 n. 10 (with 93–6, 'Appendix: 'Living heroes?') argues vigorously against the view that this passage of Thucydides attests cult of the living Hagnon in 424. I continue to think that, in this unusually religion-rich chapter, the remarkable words *Hagnoneia oikodomemata* mean 'cult buildings for Hagnon'. On hero cult generally, see Currie 2005 and Ekroth 2007; cf. above ch. 3 n. 67 (Theagenes of Thasos).

## *15 The Corinthian War*

1 For the events covered by this chapter see *CAH* $6^2$ (1994) Chapters 2 and 5 (D. M. Lewis, 'Sparta as victor' and 'Sicily 413–368 BC'), 3, (S. Hornblower, 'Persia', section IV), and 4 (R. Seager, 'The Corinthian War'). Cartledge 1987 has much that is relevant to this chapter; and see Schwenk 1997 and C. Hamilton 1997. Scott 2009: Chapters 1–2 is part of a lively account of the fourth century. On events in Asia Minor see Debord 1999.
2 De Ste Croix 1972: App. xxi. Lotze 1964: 46 thinks that some of the more emancipated Spartans may have felt gratitude to Athens as the source of the liberal and liberating ideas which had changed their own lives.
3 Cartledge 1979: 268, cf. Lazenby 1985: 21.

4 'September 404' at Lewis *CAH* 6² (1994) 37 is a misprint for 403; see p. 882 (chronological table) for the correct date.
5 Lewis *CAH*6² (1994) 41.
6 Parke 1930.
7 Andrewes 1971: 206–16.
8 Lewis 1977: 120–2. Debord 1999: 124 n. 73 thinks that Tissaphernes was satrap of a satrapy of Ionia of normal territorial type.
9 Perlman 1964: 64ff.
10 Andrewes 1971: 217 and n. 20, who is followed for much of this paragraph.
11 For text and discussion of 'Herodes' see Meyer 1909: 199–283; Albini 1968. For a fifth-century date see Wade-Gery 1958: 271ff., and Andrewes 1971: 218ff. By contrast, Russell 1983: 111 thinks it is second century AD, but acknowledges that it is well informed.
12 See *CT* II: 261 on the passage.
13 Hornblower 1992c.
14 Sansone 1981 doubts the historicity of this visit.
15 Pareti 1961: 93–4 is here followed on the identification of Diodorus' 'Pharakides' with the well-known Pharax. Jacoby (on *FGrHist* 115 F 192–3) thinks that Theopompos is describing the elder, Pareti assumes the younger, Pharax. At *CT* III: 5–12, I attempt to contextualise this early fourth-century Spartan interest in Sicily, and to show that it is no more (and no less) than the latest in a series of probes going back to the episode of the Spartan Dorieus, for whose western activities in the late sixth century, see Hdt. 5. 42–8.
16 Andrewes 1971: 224.
17 Lewis 1977: 26, 138.
18 Seager 1977; cf. Lewis 1977: 154 who speaks of Agesilaos' aim of establishing buffer states in Asia Minor.
19 Cawkwell 1976a [= 2011: Chapter 12]: 65–6
20 Hornblower 1982: 105 and n. 209, 220 and n. 5; Lewis 1977: 151f. Below, p. 302.
21 Badian 1995: 83 and n. 13.
22 Badian 1995 is an excellent analysis of the Athenian pursuit of what he calls the 'ghost' of empire in the fourth century.
23 Seager 1967; Cawkwell 1976b.
24 Seager 1966; Tuplin 1986; Todd 1993: 316–24; Edwards 1999: 143–54.
25 Cawkwell 1981b (= 2011: Chapter 9); Badian 1991.
26 Cawkwell 1981b (= 2011: Chapter 9).
27 Clark 1990, a study whose narrow title conceals its general historical importance. For a reply, see Cawkwell 2005: pp. 193f., n. 17
28 Hornblower 1982: 128.
29 Robert 1951: 11 n. 1; Sherwin-White 1978: 31–2.
30 So Debord 1999: 264–72, a valuable discussion.
31 Underhill 1900: 177, good n. on *epikudesteroi* at 5. 1. 34.

### *16 The King's Peace to Leuktra; the Second Athenian Confederacy*

1 For the events covered in this chapter see R. Seager, *CAH* 6² Chapter 6, and add, for the King's Peaces of the period covered by this chapter and the next, Jehne 1994 and Zahrnt 2000.
2 See S. Hornblower, *CAH* 6² (1994) 82.
3 Seager l974; for the *dioikismos* or breaking up of Mantineia see *IACP* no. 281 (T. H. Nielsen) at p. 519.
4 Beloch 1922: 102. See Psoma 2001: 224 n. 307.
5 Cawkwell 1976a (= 2011: Chapter 12): 77.
6 This text used to be dated in the 380s.
7 Seager 1974: 41.

8 So wrongly Ryder 1965: 45 who writes of the Spartans' Olynthian intervention: 'it constituted a quite remarkable course of action for a state that had been traditionally conservative'. The last few words hardly do justice to Spartan policies generally in 405–395, nor does 'remarkable' take account of the specifically northern aspect to those policies.
9 With Cawkwell 1976a (= 2011: Chapter 12): 78.
10 Parke 1927.
11 Badian l991: 37.
12 See Cargill 1981 and above all Dreher 1995.
13 On the liberation of Thebes, see Cawkwell 2010. On the founding of the Second Athenian Confederacy, see Cawkwell 1973 (= 2011: Chapter 10), generally accepted here. Another view: Kallet-Marx 1985.
14 For example Hammond 1967a: 485.
15 Tod 1948: 63.
16 Accame 1941: 34.
17 Buckler 1979 and 1980b.
18 Cargill 1981 denies that Kerkyra was a member, but see Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11): 42.
19 Lewis 1997: 148 n. 39.
20 Ager 1996 collects and discusses the evidence.
21 Dreher 1995; Chapter 4. I have discussed this text to my profit with Charles Crowther.
22 Dreher 1995: 131; cf. already Hornblower 1982: 193.
23 Dreher 1995: 144–52. For foreign judges see Robert 1969–1990: 5. 137–54; A. J. S. Spawforth 'judges, foreign' in *OCD*[3].
24 Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11): 50.
25 Brunt 1993: 131.
26 Ormerod 1924: 114; Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11): 48 n. 32; Hornblower 1982: 204.
27 For a favourable view see Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11) and Griffith 1978; Cargill 1981, and de Ste Croix 1981.
28 Hornblower 1982: 190 and n. 60.
29 Cawkwell 1963a: 90 and 1979: 297 n*.
30 For which see Cawkwell 1963a.
31 Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11): 44 n. 23.
32 Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 11): 46 where it is also suggested that not all Kephallenian communities had joined the confederacy, i.e. there was not necessarily a breach of the charter; Cawkwell is also right that Amphipolis was not yet an issue, so that the Athenians were not yet unpopular with their allies on that account. For the date of the Amorgos garrison see his p. 51.
33 Hornblower 1994: 166 n. 64.
34 Griffith 1978: 136 for the second view. The first view: D. M. Lewis, unpublished.
35 Griffith 1978: 136, for Athenian 'alliances on the side'; see too Cargill 1981: 84–7.
36 Cawkwell 1983 (= 2011: Chapter 13) dissents vigorously from the usual view.
37 Schaps 1979; Gould 2001: 112–57.
38 Moretti 1957: no. 373.
39 Lane Fox 1985; on Sparta specifically, Hodkinson 2000.

### *17 Leuktra to Mantineia and the revolt of the satraps*

1 For the Greek events in this chapter see J. Roy, *CAH* 6[2] (1994) Chapter 7; Munn 1997; Buckler and Beck 2008; Funke and Luraghi 2009 (on centrifugal tendencies inside the Peloponnesian League, and the growth and consolidation of ethnicity in this period). For modern work on the Satraps' Revolt see below n. 34. For Plutarch's *Pelopidas* see

Georgiadou 1997 and for Diodorus Book 15, Stylianou 1998: valuable and detailed commentaries in English on the two most important non-Xenophontic texts about the 360s. For Plutarch's *Agesilaos*, see D. Shipley 1997.

2 Hammond in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 178ff. thinks Amyntas acted as impartial arbitrator, but this is unlikely: Macedonian power had included Perrhaibia only decades before, and this would have given Amyntas an interest. The same applies *a fortiori* to Elymiotis to the north.

3 Westlake 1935: 84 n. 2. This book is still essential reading on Jason, on whom see also Sprawski 1999.

4 For Aleuas, see Wade-Gery 1924.

5 See, as well as Roy (n. 1 above), Buckler 1980a, Cawkwell 1972b (= 2011: Chapter 14) and Hornblower 1982: 195.

6 For this peace see Ryder 1965: 71ff. and App. IV; Cawkwell 1972b (= 2011: Chapter 14): 266 n. 1. Both think that Sparta participated. For the opposite view, followed in my text, see Lewis 1997: 29–31.

7 Hornblower 1990a; *IACP* 505–39 for Arcadia as a whole (T. H. Nielsen); for Megalopolis ('Megale polis') see no. 282, taking (at p. 520) a cautious compromise view on the date: decision to synoikise taken shortly after Leuktra, but implementation postponed to 368. See also Pretzler 2009: 101 n. 73.

8 Cawkwell 1961: 81 and n. 2; Hornblower 1982: 195.

9 Hammond in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 181 has 368 but elsewhere in the same volume (p. 219) has the usual date 369 and this should be preferred. See Buckler 1980a: app. 1.

10 See n. 1 above for modern work on these two.

11 Westlake 1939; Georgiadou 1997: 20.

12 Buckler 1980a: 122.

13 As by Buckler 1980a: Chapter 5; cf. his p. 152 on the Thebans' 'recent blundering and humiliation in Thessaly'.

14 Cawkwell 1961.

15 Hallof and Habicht 1996; *SEG* 45. 1162.

16 *CT* I: 440f.: residence by island cleruchs had been doubted, for the fifth century at least.

17 Hornblower 1982: 197–200, with references.

18 Debord 1999: 291.

19 Cook 1961b: 70 n. 81, cf. above p. 181.

20 See Hornblower 1982: Chapter 5 and p. 199.

21 Habicht in Hallof and Habicht 1995: 297–8 says that 'the possibility [of identification] cannot be completely excluded because the name is relatively uncommon'; but he ends by rejecting it because men called Kydias are attested in five other Attic demes (see his p. 287), and he adds that the Aristotelian Kydias' opposition to the project makes the identification improbable. The second argument can I think be met via the 'Nikias analogy', see my text, and the first, onomastic, argument is inconclusive as Habicht himself admits.

22 Moysey 1976.

23 Hornblower 1982: 174, 201.

24 Hornblower 2000a: 140–1.

25 Burstein 1974: 49.

26 Cawkwell 1972a (= 2011: Chapter 14): 270ff.: his translation of *idias* as 'attached' on p. 271 is better than his 'friendly' on p. 3 = 270; see Hornblower 1982: 200 n. 137.

27 Kraay 1976: 114 n. 1.

28 Cf. Chapter 14 p. 206 and n. 51: I follow Lewis 1990 not Buckler 2000. For Byzantium in these years see *IACP* no. 674 (L. Loukopoulou and A. Laitar) at p. 916, accepting that Byzantium 'may briefly have left the [Athenian] League in 364'.

29 Tod 1948: 131, commentary on no. 142 (=R/O no. 39), cf. also Tod no. 141, not in R/O.

30 Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 10): 51f.

31 Cawkwell 1971a: 273. Perhaps add to the factors he adduces the obscure internal Boiotian trouble, involving men from Orchomenos, described under 364 at Diod. 15. 79.

32 For the site of Kromnos see Roy, Lloyd and Owens 1992: 190–4.

33 Larsen 1968: 180–95 esp. 195.

34 See Hornblower *CAH* 6² (1994): 84–90; Ruzicka 1997.Weiskopf 1989 goes very far in playing down the significance and even historicity of the revolt; see Hornblower 1990b.

## *18 Philip*

1 The best modern accounts of Philip in English are Cawkwell 1978a and Griffith 1979, and there is much of importance in Hatzopoulos 1996 (vol. 1 is a 'historical and epigraphic study'; vol. 2, 'epigraphic appendix', includes important new and recent Greek material, notably no. 4, boundary settlement by Philip from Mygdonia, no. 5, a letter of Philip to the Katlestai, no. 6, Alexander's settlement concerning Philippoi,which refers to Philip's earlier arrangements), and no. 83 (*SEG* 38. 658) , attesting a *temenos* or sacred precinct of Philip at Philippi, for which cf. below, ch. 19 n. 58). For an up-to-date biographical treatment see Worthington 2008. See also J. R. Ellis *CAH* 6² (1994) Chapters 14 and 15, Hammond 1994, and Heskel 1997.

2 Sabben-Clare 1971:7.

3 The point is well made in Ehrhardt 1961, the best account of the Third Sacred War, for which see also Buckler 1989 and (for the amphiktionic background, esp. in the 360s) Hornblower 2009.

4 For Dion and Timoleon see Westlake *CAH* 6² (1994) Chapter 13, cf. Lewis *CAH* 6²(1994): 155; *IACP* no. 47 'Syrakousai'.

5 Mossé 1962: 340–7; Talbert 1974 and 1997;.

6 For Ergoteles and *Olympian* 12, see Hornblower 2004: 77 and Silk 2007. Greek exodus point: Finley 1979: 95.

7 Westlake 1952.

8 Finley 1979: 95.

9 Hornblower 1982: 203 and n. l67, and pp. 206–15 for the Social War generally; also Schwenk 1997: 27f.; Scott 2009; ch.10.

10 See Cawkwell 1981a (= 2011: Chapter 10): 52f. The alternative view, which Cawkwell considers, is that the reference is to overseas properties and debts; this view is now preferred by Debord 1999: 378 n. 31, on the grounds that the Rhodians would not have cared much about the north Aegean. This is strictly true, but Demosthenes' thoughts may have strayed beyond the purely Rhodian context. Radicke 1995 (a valuable detailed commentary on Dem. 15: 109 takes para. 15 to refer to Amphipolis and the Chersonese.

11 See now Lane Fox 1997: 187f., suggesting that 352 is also possible. The present argument is not much affected.

12 Cawkwell 1962.

13 On the trierarchy, see Gabrielsen 1994.

14 Davies 1981: 88–131 and Mossé 1962: 168.

15 Jones 1957: 27; Wallace 1989.

16 On the important Astykrates inscription and the background to it, see Hornblower 2009: 45f. Diodorus: Hammond 1937: 79, arguing convincingly against the idea of a 'doublet' in Diodorus' account, i.e. he did not, as some have thought, get into a muddle and recount the same events twice in slightly different ways.

17 On the chronology of the early political speeches of Demosthenes (crucial for the unfolding of events in the 350s and early 340s) there has been important recent work: see Sealey 1993, Lane Fox 1997, Tuplin 1998 and Badian 2000a. Schaefer 1885–7 remains fundamental to the entire period of Philip and Demosthenes; as is now MacDowell 2009.

18 Griffith 1979: 218–20 and 226–7, and 1970, against Ehrhardt 1967. More suggestions in Martin 1981 and 1982.

19 Hatzopoulos 2000: 111 for epigraphic evidence (personal names) showing that people with Ionic and native names continued in positions of 'prestige and power'. But note Arr. *Indike* 18. 4 for land grants made from the territory of Amphipolis, surely at the expense of locals.
20 Cawkwell 1978a: 74 suggests that the northerly winds at the relevant time actually made it impossible for the Athenians to help Amphipolis, even if they had wanted to (cf. Dem. 4. 31).
21 Against the scepticism of de Ste Croix 1963 see de Laix 1974: 80–1 with n. 134, and Connor 1974.
22 Prag, Musgrave and Neave 1984. For Krenides, see below, ch. 19 n. 38.
23 For the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace generally see Archibald 1998. For Kersebleptes and the Rogozen treasure see Archibald 1998: 225.
24 I am here indebted to an unpublished paper by P. A. Brunt on Athens' relations with Kersebleptes. Brunt thinks Tod 151 (now R/O no. 47) may represent, not the agreement of Dem. 23. 173, but the earlier agreement made by Athenodoros, Dem. 23. 8 and 170.
25 Marsden 1969–71: 1. 59; above p. 203.
26 Cawkwell 1962 (reprinted in Perlman 1973: 47–66 and now Cawkwell 2011: Chapter 16) and Badian 2000a: 34 put the speech in 351; Lane Fox 1997: 198–9 makes a reasonable case for 350. But we can surely go no later.
27 Cawkwell 1978b, 1978a: 88–9.
28 Cawkwell 1963b: 129.
29 Brunt 1969: 250 n. 3 against Cawkwell 1963b.
30 Cawkwell 1960 and 1978a: 91–113 followed here on the question of the summons. An excellent general account of the peace of Philokrates is in Pickard-Cambridge 1914: 228–300. The Penguin *Demosthenes and Aeschines* has a valuable introduction and notes by T. T. B. Ryder (Ryder 1973). For Dem. 18 see Wankel 1976 (in German, exhaustive) and Yunis 2001, and for Dem. 19 see MacDowell 2000. For Aischines see Harris 1995. Note also Ellis and Milns 1970, a translated source book. As for the earlier period (above n. 17), Schaefer 1885–1887 is fundamental.
31 For the Pythian games of 346, see Hornblower and Morgan 2007: 38 and n. 148, citing MacDowell 2000: 257 (Pythia of late summer 346), and suggesting that the boy victor on that occasion, a Theban called Aioladas (Paus. 10. 7. 8), was a descendant of the Pagondas who featured so prominently in Thucydides' account of the battle of Delium, and was a member of a family celebrated by Pindar (frag. 94b).
The point about the Athenian fleet seems obvious, though against this Errington 1981: 74 notes that 'when Philip launched his exploratory attack on Asia Minor in 336 the Athenian navy seems to have played no part'. This does not prove that the fleet was not in Philip's mind at earlier dates.
32 For Atarneus, a place with sinister associations, see Hornblower 2003: 44f. and 55; *IACP* no. 803 (Rubinstein) traces its vicissitudes of control.
33 Markle 1974; against, see Cawkwell 1978b.
34 Cawkwell 1963b: 126f. = Perlman 1973: 152f.
35 Griffith 1979: 522–44 (Thessaly), 558 (Thrace), curiously not citing Arr. *Anab.* 1. 25. Cf. also Cawkwell 1978a: 117 and n. 9.
36 With Hornblower 1996: 332.
37 Cawkwell 1963b and 1978a: 127 and 132.
38 Griffith 1979: 502 and n. 3, cf. 546.
39 Ellis 1976: 125; Cawkwell 1978a: 117 and 186, also 1979: 216.
40 Cawkwell 1978a: 138 and 1979.
41 For which see Hammond 1973b: 534–57.
42 For which see Roebuck 1948, reprinted in Perlman 1973: 209a–218; Cawkwell 1978a: 166–76.
43 Habicht 1997: 11–12 and for Delos specifically 246.
44 Cawkwell 1978b: 42–3.

45 Bosworth 1976a.
46 Cawkwell 1978a: 166–76.
47 Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 879, citing Lane Fox for this brilliant point, but it goes back to an unpublished suggestion of the late D. M. Lewis.
48 Cawkwell 1978a: 172.
49 Fontenrose 1979: 337 puts this oracle in the 'not genuine' category; characteristic of that sceptical book.
50 On the death of Philip see Badian 1963 and 2000b: 54; Bosworth 1971; Brunt 1976–83: vol. 1; Hammond 1978; Griffith 1979: 675–98and Parsons 1979.

## *19 Alexander*

1 The surviving accounts of Alexander's reign were all written down centuries after the events they describe. The essential narrative is the seven-book history of Alexander (conventionally known as the *Anabasis*) by Arrian, a Greek from the Bithynia of the second century AD who held high office in the Roman Empire (he governed provinces in Anatolia and Spain), and modelled his literary output on Xenophon. Stadter 1980 is a good account of the man and his writings, and on Arrian's career see Syme 1988 (1982). A full and first-rate modern commentary on the *Anabasis* has reached Book 5 (Bosworth 1980a (Books 1–3) and 1995 (Books 4 and 5)); the final volume will include Books 6 and 7. For both the *Anabasis* and the *Indike,* a short treatise which contains an account of India and of the voyage from south India to Susa, undertaken on Alexander's orders by Nearchos of Krete, see Brunt 1976–1983 (complete Loeb edn of the *Anabasis* and *Indike*). This too is invaluable and – partly but not only because it includes a translation – more approachable for the beginner; it has an excellent long introduction and appendixes. A new World's Classics translation of Arrian (*Anabasis* and *Indike*) by M. Hammond, with introduction and notes by W. Heckel, is in preparation (Oxford University Press). Arrian's account (abbreviated as AA in the present chapter) goes back to the near-contemporary writings of Ptolemy, later King Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt, and of Aristoboulos of Kassandreia, both eyewitnesses and known to modern scholarship as the 'main sources' for Alexander's career; these and the other 'primary sources' (i.e. in this context, sources surviving only in 'fragments,' i.e. extracts or quotations by later writers) are collected in Jacoby, *FGrHist* nos. 117–53; there is a two-volume translation (Robinson 1953) of the fragmentary Alexander historians so gathered by Jacoby. The 'primary sources' are discussed in Pearson 1960. Ptolemy and Aristoboulos themselves drew on the account of Kallisthenes, the nephew of Aristotle, until that ceased (cf. p. 315 for Kallisthenes' death).

The other main strand of the tradition is more rhetorical and flamboyant; it goes back to Kleitarchos, a writer about whom personally little is known; he lived in the Alexandria (Egypt) of Ptolemy I in the late fourth or early third centuries BC. This tradition has come down to us in the writings of Diodorus (Book 17; on Diodorus' debt to Kleitarchos in this book see Hamilton 1977) and of Quintus Curtius Rufus (abbrev. QC. There is a commentary by Atkinson on Books 3 and 4 (1980) and on Books 5 to 7. 2 (1994). Books 1 and 2 are lost; Books 3–9 survive. On Curtius see the monograph by Baynham 1998). There are Loeb translations of both authors, the relevant Diodorus volume (Welles 1963) is particularly good. In Alexander scholarship this tradition is called the 'vulgate', a tradition of which Arrian is also aware, though he introduces material from it with formulae like 'it is said' rather than by citing Kleitarchos, whom he never mentions.

For a fuller account of the sources for Alexander see Bosworth 1988a: 295–300, and for excellent discussion at a higher scholarly level, with particular reference to Arrian's use of his material, see Bosworth 1988b.

Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* is long and valuable, eclectic in its use of source material (and so has to be treated separately from the two great strands mentioned above). There

is a useful commentary by Hamilton 1969. For Justin's section on Alexander see Yardley and Heckel 1997.

For the relevant inscriptions see Tod 1948: nos. 183–202 and most of R/O nos. 84-101; also Heisserer 1980. For the coins see Bellinger 1963. For Alexander represented in art, Stewart 1993 and 2003.

Prosopographic material is collected by Berve 1926, which should now be supplemented by Heckel 1992 and 2006 (the latter is in effect an update, in English, of the prosopographical half of Berve).

The best single book on Alexander remains Bosworth 1988a, a readable, reliable and authoritative full account of all aspects; for an excellent and more recent (but brief) sketch, see Bosworth 2006. Cartledge 2004 is an up-to-date biography, and there are many useful chapters in Roisman 2003. Two neglected aspects are well explored in recent works by Spawforth 2007 (Alexander's court) and Davidson 2007: 365–80 (Macedonian same-sex relationships; add a ref. to Plutarch *Eumenes* Chapter 1: story that Philip II talent spotted the young Eumenes when watching him at the gymnasium of Kardia). Note also three books about Alexander and the east: Holt 1988, Fraser 1996 (a very important monograph on Alexander's city-foundations, cf. below p. 303) and Bosworth 1996. Bosworth and Baynham 2000 includes an essay by E. Badian, the scholar who more than any other has swept away romantic fancy about Alexander. Worthington 2003 usefully reprints some important modern articles and book chapters, with some translated ancient sources, and plentiful linking and other material of his own. The weakest area of coverage in this book is the city foundations, for which see Fraser 1996 (cf. below nn. 41ff.) and Bosworth 2006: 16ff.

2 Hammond 1980a. For the Macedonian kings and their relations see the helpful tree at Green 1974: 586 = 587.

3 Heckel 1992: 357. Diodorus 17. 80. 2 has 'Antigonos' but this is a mistake of either Diodorus himself or a copyist.

4 For a full treatment see Badian 2000b: 50–63.

5 Ellis 1976: 235–9. Badian 1982: 47 n. 26 thinks there must be something behind Justin.

6 Ellis 1971: 21; contra Errington 1974. Cf. Bosworth 1980a: 160 and Brunt 1976–83: 1. lxi for the point about Kynna. Both scholars assume, probably rightly, that Kynna could not have been betrothed while Amyntas lived, although Macedon was not quite a monogamous society and a disgraced Amyntas' claims could conceivably have been set aside. Arrian in his *Successors* (i.e. of Alexander])1. 22 just says that Amyntas was killed before Alexander crossed to Asia. Green 1974: 141 thinks that Amyntas was still alive at the time of AA. 1.3. Against this, see Heckel 1982: 78 n.l.

7 Hammond 1974 and 1977.

8 Brunt 1976–83: 1. 469–70; Goukowsky 1978–81: 1. 173–4; Bosworth 1980a: 62. See above p. 169 and Hornblower 2004: 40 and 334 for *pothos* in Pindar and Thucydides.

9 For Alexander and the Greeks see Faraguna 2003 and Worthington 2003: 65–105. Polybius: Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 878–80.

10 Tarn 1948: 2. 39–45; Badian 1982: 39–40; Green 1974: 157–8.

11 Marsden 1977. For Lysimachos, perhaps another Thessalian by origin and one of Alexander's bodyguards, see Heckel 1992: 268 and 2006: 153ff.

12 Schmitthenner 1968 shows that the phrase and the concept 'spear-won territory' gets much commoner in Books 17 of Diodorus onwards, i.e. in the period of Alexander and his successors (the period for which Diodorus' main sources were Kleitarchos and Hieronymus of Cardia). For qualifications see Mehl 1982, but he is wrong to say that the concept was a fiction for Hieronymus; at e.g. Diod. 18. 39 the word *hoionei doriktetos* means 'in effect spear-won', cf. Polyb. 3. 87. 9, cf. 16. 34, and Mauersberger's (1968) *Polybios-lexikon* under *hoios* III; it does not imply a denial. Cf. also Walbank 1950, but contrary to Walbank and Badian 1966b: 66 n. 1, Roman fetial practice, which was concerned with the demanding of reparations, is not an influence here.

13 With *CT* II: 314.

14 Goukowsky 1978–1981: 1. 139 thinks that the idea of Alexander as hero was central to Kleitarchos' book (for which generally he makes very large claims); see further p. 300 and n. 63 below; this is no doubt true, but the 'hero' theme was equally prominent in the 'main sources', see Brunt 1976: App. IV 'Alexander and the Heroes', and Edmunds 1971.

15 Green 1978, a very good article. For the idea that such imitation could flow both ways, see Griffin 1985: 32–47, showing that life may imitate literature as well as vice versa.

16 Badian 1977; Foss 1977; Hammond 1980b; Bosworth 1980a: 107–27 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. 449–53. Except for Bosworth, all rightly follow Arrian not Diodorus.

17 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. Apps. i, xiii and introduction section 56; also Brunt 1963: 32–6. But Brunt takes too seriously the 10,000 of Polyainos 5. 44: this is a round figure (a 'myriad') for the Parmenion–Attalos advance force, which anyway suffered heavily in Asia, as Polyainos says, and cannot be assumed to have been available in numbers to supplement Alexander's army in 334.

18 With Hamilton 1969: commentary on the passage.

19 Badian 1966b; Hornblower 1982: 161–5. On *syntaxis,* Bosworth 1980a: 281 has a different interpretation – a once-for-all contribution (a sense attested for Seleukid Lydia), but against this see Sherwin-White 1985, in the course of an argument that the 'Alexander edict' is a third-century republication of what was in any case only part of a longer whole. If so, a rephrasing could have gone along with the recarving.

20 Ehrenberg 1938: 1–51; Badian 1966b; Bosworth 1980a: 281 and 183–4.

21 See Hornblower 1982: 128 on the strange references to the King's Peace.

22 Heisserer 1980, but see Bosworth 1980a: 178.

23 For instance by Jones 1949, reviewing Tarn 1948.

24 Cf. Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 878.

25 For Aspendos and its coinage see Lewis 1977: 144 n. 55; cf. *IACP* no. 1001 (A. Keen and T. Fischer-Hansen), at p. 1215.

26 Smyrna: Cook 1958/9: 34; but see *IACP* no. 867 (L. Rubinstein) for – unsurprising – indications that there was a settlement of sorts at the ancient city of Smyrna before Alexander's time. Priene: van Berchem 1970; Hornblower 1982: 323–8 and *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 225, citing Demand 1986 and 1990: 140–6. It is possible (Demand) that the refoundation of Priene was a gradual business and that we should reckon with both Alexander and before him the family of Mausolus. See also *IACP* no. 861 (Rubinstein) at p. 1092 and Botermann 1994.

27 Hornblower *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 223–4; Debord 1999: 383–93. For the synoikism of Halikarnassos, see above, ch. 14 n. 72; for that of Olynthos, *IACP* no. 588; for that of Kos, *IACP* no. 497; for that of Rhodes, see above, ch. 13 n. 80, and for that of Megalopolis, above, ch. 17 n. 7. For synoikism generally, see *IACP* pp. 115–19 ('The emergence of *Poleis* by *Synoikismos*', and p. 1365f., index on '*Synoikismos*'; also Parker 2009. Cf. also above, ch. 3 n. 70 (islands).

28 Hornblower 1990a: 77.

29 Brunt 1967–83 vol. 2: App. xxvii.

30 Brunt 1965: 208, citing Isok. 5. 76. Brunt 1976–1983: 1. App. xv points out that India had ceased to be part of the Persian empire by Darius III's time; for the elasticity of the term 'Asia' see Brunt 1976–1983: 1. liii n. 64.

31 Brunt 1976–83: 1. App. iii; Bosworth 1980a: 198–219; Walbank 1967: commentary on Pol. 12. 17ff. (with helpful maps).

32 For instance, Bosworth 1980a: 198–219.

33 In the Diodorus passage, *ta pleiona* should be translated 'more than' not (as in the Loeb edn) 'for the most part either'; see Hornblower 1983. The whole passage is Diodoran not Kleitarchan, cf. the language of the main proem at Diod. 1. 2. 3 with 'weakness of human nature' at 17. 38. Much has been written about *tyche,* fortune, in Diod. 17, and if Chapter 38 is Diodorus not Kleitarchos it limits what can be said about Kleitarchos and *tyche* because this is the most striking passage in Book 17.

34 Burn 1952 for the Persian counter-offensive; for Agis' revolt see Brunt 1976–1983: 1. App. vi, with bibliography, to which add Badian 1994b.
35 But the chronology is quite uncertain, see A. B. Lloyd *CAH* $6^2$ (1994): 344–5 and n. 44; Badian 2000b: 78 n. 52.
36 See Bosworth 1980a: 261 on AA 3. 1. 1. (Note, however, QC 4. 1. 30–1.)
37 For Alexander's city-foundations see Fraser 1996 with p. 303 below.
38 For Philip's city-foundations see Cawkwell 1978a: 39–40. For Krenides/Philippi see Fraser 2009: 151. For Herakleia Lynkestis see Ellis 1976: 168; Griffith 1979: 660, 558–9; Fraser 2009: 186 and n. 28.
39 The Loeb edn mistranslates *philokuros* here; the word refers to Alexander.
40 See Whitehouse 1978, McNicoll 1978, Helms 1979 and 1982 and Fraser 1979 – all from the short-lived journal *Afghan Studies,* which ran to just three issues (1978, 1979, 1982) before being absorbed in *South Asian Studies*.
41 'Hidden Afghanistan': see the exhibition catalogue, Cambon and others 2007. The book praised in my text is Fraser 1996.
42 Fraser 1996: 188.
43 For instance Wilcken 1967 (originally 1931): 259. But see Welles 1965: 225, Briant 1982: 227–62, and Fraser 1996.
44 For Ai Khanoum see *Fouilles d'Ai Khanoum*; Lane Fox 1973: 426–31 (excellent pictures). On the irrigation, etc., from the Achaemenid period see Gardin 1980 and Briant 1982: 486–7
45 Jones 1940: 305 n. 4.
46 Fraser 1972: 1. 1.
47 Fraser 1972: 2: 2–3 n. 6.
48 Stein 1929.
49 Date: Fraser 1967: 30 n. 27, cf. 1972: 3. 2 n. 6, preferable to Welles 1962 who puts it after the Siwah visit. See also Bosworth 1976b: 136–8 and 1980a (commentary) but see Hornblower 1981: 187.
50 Turner 1974: 239–40; see also Shipley 2000: 167 (good photograph).
51 Used by Brunt 1976–1983 vol. 1: 24 (note on AA 3. 1. 5).
52 The essential modern study is Badian 1981 supplemented by Badian 1996; see also Fredricksmeyer 2003 and Worthington 2003: 236–72. On the Ammon visit in particular see Brunt 1976–1983 vol. 1: App. v and Bosworth 1980a: 269–75, comm. on AA 3. 3–4, also Bosworth 1977.
53 Macleod 1982: 98 (note on the line) cites two other similar *Iliad* passages, 13. 29 (the sea makes way for Poseidon) and 18. 66–7 (for Thetis and the Nereids).
54 See Fredricksmeyer 1979 (p. 52 for the implications of Philippi); Griffith 1979: 662–3 and 720–1 (app. 6); Walbank *CAH* $7^2$ 1 (1984): 90.
55 Diyllos,Theopompos and Duris have all been suggested; but Jacoby, comm. on *FGrHist* 328 F56, wisely calls the source unknown. I have myself tentatively suggested that this section, which contains some egregious errors, was the result of Diodorus trying to write history himself: Hornblower 1984: 263.
56 Badian 1981: 41.
57 Ellis 1976: 307.
58 *SEG* 38. 658 with Hatzopoulos 1996 vol. 1: 155f., and vol. 2: 98f. no. 83; Chaniotis 2003: 434.
59 Fraser 1972: 1. 213.
60 Badian 1981: 45 against Green 1974: 274.
61 For this word see above p. 287.
62 Wilcken 1967: 127 is wrong to say that Alexander received enlightenment 'like a flash of lightning'. Arrian's own comment: Badian 1981: 44, but for Curtius see Bosworth 1977: 52.
63 Goukowsky 1978–1981: 1. 136–41, 149–51.
64 Brunt 1976–83: 1. App. ix; Bosworth 1980a: 285–313.

65 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. 514.
66 Hammond 1980c: 146.
67 Bosworth 1980a: 311.
68 Briant 1982: 489.
69 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. App. viii (chronology and topography).
70 Bosworth 1980a: 318.
71 Against Bosworth 1980b see Hornblower 1982: 105 and 200, and 1981: 187. Bosworth develops the position adopted by Badian 1958.
72 Lewis 1977: 152 n. 114.
73 Brunt 1975. For Satibarzanes and Arsakes see Bosworth 1981: 20–1.
74 Macedonians appointed after the Hindu Kush: Badian 2000b: 95. On Alexander's attitude to Persia, Persians and the Achaemenids (did he see himself as the last of the Achaemenids?), see Fredricksmeyer 2000, Brosius 2003 and Lane Fox 2007b. There is also much of relevance in Spawforth 2007 (an excellent and innovative study of Alexander's court).
75 Bosworth 1980b: 18. I do not follow him on the horse-javelin men (*hippakontistai*): Hornblower 1981: 187.
76 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. 1xxv, discussing AA 4. 4.
77 Bosworth 1980a: 331–2, giving the modern views and suggesting that, although the palace had been 'picked clean' = possible evidence of premeditation, Alexander's remorse points the other way.
78 Cf. Bosworth 1980a: 5 n. 30.
79 See Hornblower 1982: 157 and n. 159 for this and other evidence.
80 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. App. xi (for Farah, see 501f.), and Bosworth 1980a on AA 3. 26f; and see esp. Badian 1960a and 2000b: 64–9. Cf. Heckel 1977 (but that Koinos and Hephaistion ganged up against a doomed man is explicable psychologically for reasons other than a 'plot of the nobility' against Philotas: Koinos needed to dissociate himself, cf. QC 6. 9. 30 for Koinos' marriage links with Philotas. Badian may be right to think that Hephaistion, Perdikkas, Krateros and Koinos had their careers advanced because they had shown themselves Alexander's men in the decisive test; but in qualification QC 6. 8. 17 shows that Perdikkas was already a *somatophylax* (royal bodyguard), and cf. AA 3. 25. 6: Krateros was left in command of the whole army (before the Philotas affair)).
81 For prosopography see the entry in *OCD*[3].
82 Heckel 1982, reviving an old idea.
83 For the years 329–327 (especially on chronology and satrapal arrangements) see Bosworth 1981.
84 Fraser 1979 and especially Fraser 1996: 101, 132–40. In *SEG* 30. 1664 surely read *Alexandreusin en astois*, 'among the Alexandrian [sc. of Arachosia] citizens' – further support for the identification? It is regrettable that the final page of Barr. gives a map of Bactria (northern Afghanistan = map 99), but there is no map of Arcahosia etc. (southern Afghanistan), despite the evidence for Greek settlement there – and despite the availability of a blank page opposite map 99!
85 Brunt 1976–1983: 1. 503 and esp. Fraser 1996: 140–51
86 Fraser 1996: 151–61.
87 Briant 1982: 253; for similar conclusions, see Fraser 1996: 186–7.
88 Fraser 1996: 156 n. 101 for Oxiana and Sogdiana. Note esp. the hellenistic (possibly 2nd cent. BC) inscription discussed by Fraser 1996: 156 n. 101 (*SEG* 31. 1381 = Burstein 1985: no. 52, Greek dedication to the river god Oxos).
89 Fraser 1996: 186–8.
90 Pharnouches father of the eunuch Bagoas: see Hornblower 2000a: 142.
91 Aymard 1967; Goukowsky 1979–1981: 1. 44–7; Hornblower 2010: Chapter 12.
92 Heckel 1992: 95–7 (and 2006: 148), showing against Berve (1926) that this is the famous Leonnatos, and discounting Curtius' version (the Polyperchon variant).

93 Bickermann 1963; Brunt 1976–1983: App. xiv; Badian 1981: 48–54 (rejecting Chares' version); Bosworth 1995: 77–90 thinks (77, cf. 88) that 'the tradition of the staged public debate is not inconsistent with Chares' version of a limited introductory experiment'; but it would be odd to stage an experiment, then watch the experiment fail, and then go ahead with the real thing.
94 Here I part company with Bosworth 1980b: 11.
95 Hamilton 1956; Bosworth 1995: 262–5.
96 Murray 1972.
97 Badian 1961: 16–25 and 2000b: 75 n. 44 (and 89–95 for a valuable list of Iranian rebels in this phase); Higgins 1980. On the first flight of Harpalos, Badian 1960b and Heckel 1977.
98 O'Brien 1992; Badian 2000b: 76 n. 48.
99 J. Hornblower 1981: 91–7, cf. also Bosworth 1988b: 185–211. For Alexander's final aims see Brunt 1965.
100 Badian 1981: 54–5; Cawkwell 1994; Parker 1996: 257.
101 On these two passages see Whitehead 2000: 455–7.
102 Brunt 1963: 42–3 (but see Brunt 1976–1983: 2. 221 n. 6); Bosworth 1980b: 20f., does too much violence to the text; anyway it is clear that Arrian thought that there were five and only five hipparchies, four of them Macedonian (not, as Bosworth says, ten Macedonian ones, four Iranian, one mixed).
103 Badian 1958 is perhaps too sceptical on the Eratosthenic origin of Plutarch here.
104 Hammond 1967a: 268.
105 Shipley 2000: 38–9.
106 Shipley 2000: 39.
107 F. G. Maier *CAH* 6² (1994): 297–336 for Cyprus and Phoenicia, and *IACP* pp. 1223–32 (Maier again) for Cyprus and its ten cities: Amathous, Idalion, Karpasia, Keryneia, Kourion, Lapethos, Marion, Paphos, Salamis, and Soloi (nos. 1012-21). The Spartan legend that Lapethos (no. 1017) was founded by the Spartan Praxandros is specially intriguing. *IACP* p. 1227 cites only Strabo 14. 6. 3 for it, but the story is much older: see the Hellenistic poet Lykophron, *Alexandra*, lines 586ff., and (for onomastic corroboration) *LGPN* I: 384. On the *Evagoras* of Isokrates, see now Alexiou 2010.

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